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Photo III-0-2. An engraving from the 1772 edition of the Encyclopédie; Truth, in the top center, is surrounded by light and unveiled by the figures to the right, Philosophy and Reason.

As summarized in Chapter V of Book III, Philosophy includes following fields.\(^1\) Ethics handling morals is the study of certain values that concern human beings; metaphysics is to investigate the ultimate nature of existing reality; and epistemology examines questions about the nature of knowledge and how we get it. Philosophy of mind deals with psychological questions about the mind and body; logic is the philosophy of language by deductive reasoning to examine such properties as truth, meaning, and reference; and the philosophy of science is methodology of inductive reasoning to reach a conclusion from a finite set of observations or experiments. Finally, social philosophy analyzes the role of individual in society from social contract to criteria for revolution; political philosophy examines state and society relations, democracy, justice, rights, liberty, equality, and oppression; and philosophy of history evaluates "notions of human agency, change, the role of material circumstances in human affairs, and the putative meaning of historical events."\(^2\) On the other hand, political theory covers perspectives of democratic theory such as relations between state and people in civil society - liberalism, communitarianism, conservatism, and anarchism; theories changing the world - democratic socialism, communism and revolution, and fascism; liberal ideas of freedom, equality, and justice; trans-nationalism - pluralism, multiculturalism, and nationalism; international relations; the body politics - property, contract, and rights; the radical imagination - postmodernism, post-structuralism, and post-colonial theory; new social movements - racial and ethnic minorities, feminism, ecological visions; and a new world order and political relations with such fields as economy, society, and culture.\(^3\) In this chapter deals with history of political philosophy linking politics to philosophy of the eighteenth century: major topics to be included are the French enlightenment, the theory of revolution, law and constitutionalism, skepticism, conservatism, idealism, and utilitarianism.

In the seventeenth century, the Europeans experienced a revolutionary progress in science - Galileo Galilei and Isaac Newton in physics, Andrea Vesalius and William Harvey in medicine, Rene Descartes and Benedict de Spinoza in philosophy, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke in politics, Thomas Mun and William Petty in economics. In the eighteenth century, the scientific progress inspired French enlightenment - "Mankind's final coming of age, the emancipation of the human consciousness from an immature state of ignorance and error" as Kant noted.\(^4\) It changed the basis of Western civilization by transforming people from faith-tradition-authority to reason-liberty-equality. Their ideals spread to major European countries and even to the British colonies in America, through various channels.\(^5\) (i) Scientific popularization: Bernard de Fontenelle linked the scientific revolution to the philosophers as head of the French Royal Academy of Science during 1691-1741, who viewed that science was no longer the monopoly of experts, so even a non-expert lady aristocrat could learn about the fundamentals of the new mechanistic universe through scientific literature or conversation. (ii) Religious skepticism: although skepticism toward Christian beliefs was not widespread in the century, philosophers considered the churches as enemies of scientific progress. Pierre Bayle as a Protestant criticized traditional religious attitudes; he attacked superstition, religious intolerance, dogmatism; and believed that the existence of many religions would be beneficial rather than harmful to the state. While religious skepticism encouraged scientific studies, philosophy became a social force moving out of the schools into society and government. (iii) Travel literature: many traders, missionaries, medical practitioners, and navigators traveled and increasingly published stories in a number of travel books, newspapers, and pamphlets, which educated Europeans to understand different cultures and civilizations. The Christian perception of God became one of many.\(^6\) The liberal ideas made people change their political system towards peace and prosperity.
French intellectuals learned liberal ideas from Britain, that inspired the Enlightenment being led by "literary people, professors, journalists, statesmen, economists, political scientists, and above all social reformers" like Montesquieu, Voltaire, Diderot, d'Holbach, Helvetius, Godwin, and Condorcet. The Enlightenment influenced many intellectuals in Europe and political leaders in America. The vision representing the eighteenth century was revolutionary with the idea of unlimited progress as appeared in both the American and the French Revolutions, where the enlightened philosophers were in the center of political thoughts of the time. The movement of the American Revolution was significantly ignited by an essay of the Common Sense written by Thomas Paine and the radical speeches of Patrick Henry, which encouraged Americans to move to fight against British rule. Thomas Jefferson drafted a declaration of independence in 1776, and a strong central government was demanded by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay who wrote the Federalist Papers in the New York journals. Meanwhile, the rising number of French people had absorbed the ideas of liberty and equality circulated by writings and conversations on the street; American diplomats who lived in Paris like Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson freely consorted with French intellectuals; and returning French soldiers who participated in the American Revolutionary War helped spread of revolutionary ideals to the French people. Jean-Jacques Rousseau published the Social Contract in 1762 that supported the theory of revolution and became a theoretical basis for both revolutions. It was just like Thomas Hobbes who wrote the Leviathan at the time of the British Civil War, and John Locke who wrote the Two Treatises of Government at the time of the Glorious Revolution. Morelly was radical enough to be a forerunner of later socialists and communist thinkers by publishing The Code of Nature in 1755; and Gabriel Mably, Abbe Sieyes, and Honore Mirabeau wrote more on the theory of revolution or held up communism as an ideal before or after the French Revolution.

Some enlightened theorists and practitioners wrote on law and constitutionalism - Christian Thomasius, Christian Wolff, Frederick the Great of Prussia, and William Blackstone of Britain. In studies of history, Condorcet of France wrote the Outlines of a Historical View of the Progress of the Human Mind; Bolingbroke of Britain wrote A Dissertation on Parties, and Vico of Italy wrote the Principles of a New Science Concerning the Natural Community of Nations. There were three prominent British philosophers of the century - George Berkeley on immaterialism, David Hume on empiricism-skepticism, and Edmund Burke on conservatism. Berkeley wrote the Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge in 1710, which gave him a lasting reputation. David Hume published A Treatise of Human Nature in 1739, and Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion in 1777. Edmund Burke was a statesman and political theorist, who wrote the Reflections on the Revolution in France in 1790, which was argued by pamphleteers. Similarly, there were the great German philosophers of the century - Immanuel Kant, Johan Fichte, Friedrich Schelling, and Georg Hegel. Kant published a series of books on reason including the Critique of Pure Reason in 1781, the Critique of Practical Reason in 1788, and the Critique of Judgment in 1790. Reacting against Kant who bridged rationalism and empiricism; Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel created German idealism that was closely linked with romanticism and the revolutionary politics of the Enlightenment. Hegel associated with idealism of Plato and Kant and published the Science of Logic in three volumes during 1811-16, which introduced the dialectic - thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. Finally, Jeremy Bentham was a British utilitarian philosopher and social reformer, being in favor of "individual and economic freedom, usury, the separation of church and state, freedom of expression, equal rights for women, the right to divorce, and the decriminalizing of homosexual acts." Our discussions in this chapter are not limited to political philosophy, but expanded to all categories of philosophy, particularly in Kant and Hegel because they are the basis affecting political philosophy.
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1. The French Enlightenment - The Age of Reason

Political theories flowered in England in the seventeenth century due to the Great Rebellions and the Glorious Revolution, and in France in the eighteenth century owing to the Enlightenment, when the fertility of political thought in Britain declined because they were busy in foreign trade. The Enlightenment was an intellectual movement by great thinkers and "a desire for human affairs to be guided by rationality rather than by faith, superstition, or revelation; a belief in the power of human reason to change society and liberate the individual from the restraints of custom or arbitrary authority; all backed up by a world view increasingly validated by science rather than by religion or tradition." The philosophers - the popular philosophers of France - attacked so-called the ancien regime: they were influential to mobilize public opinions by linking people to people toward a common search for universal values - freedom and equality - against privileged traditional forces. The enlightened ideas diffused through new institutions and organizations such as Masonic lodges, learned academies and societies, and others like "public lectures, coffee houses, lending libraries, art exhibitions, operatic and theatrical performances." New ideas and attitudes were transmitted with the rising number of books, pamphlets, journals, newspapers, and pictures owing to improved public literacy. In fact, "Over 70 percent of books borrowed fell into the category of novels; 10 percent for history, biography and travel; less than 1 percent for religious works" in German libraries about this time. People were tending to read extensively, which penetrated the lower social classes in favor of their social mobility by merit though it was largely limited. All of those could be led to the emergence of public opinions as an influential political force, which formed the social and economic mechanisms, through which "culture also became part of an international system of trade and exchange."

In the relationship between Enlightenment and religion, Peter Gay and some others saw the Enlightenment as the rise of modern paganism, "either an absolute decline of religious belief or a radical shift in its meaning and context." Hegel viewed it as a religious movement, where the philosophes "carried out the Lutheran Reformation in a different form" contributing to human spiritual freedom; but he alleged that the Enlightenment "failed to produce any set of beliefs which could possibly replace religious faith." Since France had experienced no Reformation, their religious reform could be more demanding. For religious toleration, the English Parliament passed the Toleration Act in 1689 that allowed freedom of worship to Nonconformists; and France issued decrees in 1787 allowing limited toleration. Both meant that the Enlightenment was the heir "to its potential legacy of intellectual freedom" and "to the military and political conflicts" that had been experienced in the age of Reformation. Frederick the Great of Prussia established policies of religious toleration in order to bring together widely scattered territories and skilled labor recruited from all over Europe. Joseph II of Austria considered toleration on economic motives like that "the emigration of the Protestant population out of Austria would have eventually led up to an economic slump." The reasonableness of Christianity was disturbed by deism, which holds "that reason and observation of the natural world, without the need for organized religion, can determine that the universe is the product of an intelligent creator." Deists reject supernatural events such as prophecy and miracles. On the other hand, all major faiths internally generated reforming movements, such as Pietism - a movement within Lutheranism - which swept through the Protestant states of Germany in the aftermath of the Thirty Years' War and had become an active political and social force in Prussia. Similarly, Anglicanism had Methodism and Catholicism had Jansenism with the expulsion of the Jesuit order. "Hegel was right to see the Enlightenment as a continuation of the Reformation," while European rulers had implemented religious toleration to solidify their political bases among peoples.

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Photo III-1-1. Montesquieu (1689-1755)
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/fc/Montesquieu_1.png, accessed 11 June 2012

Photo III-1-2. Voltaire (1694-1778)
https://www.facebook.com/VoltaireAuthor/, accessed 17 September 2018
Science was the central value of reason or rationality, being centered in the Enlightenment, through which objective thinking was possible without passion, prejudice or superstition, and revelation. It had remained under the heading of natural philosophy in the quest for reasonable Christianity. Nature was the subject matter of science, becoming "a description of a moral ideal as well as scientifically discernible order," so natural philosophy was "in an increasingly strained relationship with philosophical enquiry which undercut its capacity to carry out the objectives of theology." However, it was gradually separating from theological ends by the time of John Locke and Isaac Newton. Nature began to be seen as dynamic processes changing overtime, and experimentalism began to establish astronomy, biology, chemistry, physics, and so forth. Social changes in science were reflected in encyclopedia of Diderot with articles from Rousseau and other pioneers. Thus, the Enlightenment induced natural and social sciences to be an acceptable form of knowledge worth to pursue. Meantime, the European contact was extended by a new set of geographical discoveries such as the Pacific islands and Australia by James Cook. The Seven Years' War forced France to transfer North America to Britain that expanded their colonial settlement and exploitation. The Enlightenment dealt with the new environment of the exotic lands, which brought them unclear identity of Europe as Christendom as well as confused idea of universal human nature and civilization. Diderot saw "the natives of Tahiti as better and happier, because more natural than the Europeans who had discovered them." The image of Tahiti became a paradise or utopia, as living "noble savages" were brought back to London and Paris, though was tarnished by the murder of Cook on Hawaii in 1779. Rousseau criticized colonialism because of a mechanism for perpetual inequality in human society, while other writers strongly asserted the abolishment of slavery. Thus, the Enlightenment faced different cultures with the exotic lands, which were greatly harmonized in the progress of human history.

The Enlightenment was useful as a "facilitator of modernization" if the enlightened despots hired leading intellectuals as a minister or a close advisor. Louis XVI appointed Anne-Robert Turgot, an Enlightenment economist, to Controller-General in 1774, but was not successful. The German states introduced Cameralism to deal with the science of government, dedicated to "reforming society and promoting economic development" by establishing its professorship at the universities: the university teachers occupied major government positions. Frederick the Great described himself the "First Servant of the State" which symbolized the Enlightened Absolutism referring to a form of monarchy. By the end of the century, major European states launched policies and programs for economic and social reformation, many of which were based on enlightened ideas. But "None were aimed at producing major increases in social mobility, or basic transfers of power in society." Absolute rulers were reluctant to contemplate risky social upheaval and did not lessen their debt to the Enlightenment. "Enlightenment gave subjects new aspirations and new expectations from monarchs, expectations for change and reform which were useful if successfully mobilized by monarchs but were difficult to control in regimes without sufficient institutional representation of the unprivileged. Once critique began, it was difficult to stop. In the end, Enlightenment and despotism or absolute monarchical power were difficult to reconcile." The Enlightenment could provide efficient measures for a state to build up its economy and society; however, the awakened people challenged the old regime and the privileged classes by demanding freedom, equality, and justice, so that conflicts between the Enlightenment and monarchy became intense, which caused social upheavals. In sum, religion and science were essential parts of the Enlightenment, and cultural differences were harmonized by enlightened forces. The Enlightenment was useful for the state, but liberal ideas made people progressive so that its conflicts with monarchs (who wanted the status quo) were unavoidable; for which the solution remained either in peaceful compromise or in violent revolution.
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Charles de Secondat Montesquieu (1689-1755), a French social commentator and political thinker, was born in the Château of la Brede near Bordeaux - the country of Montaigne. At eleven, he was sent to the College de Juilly near Paris, at sixteen returned to Bordeaux to study law, and at nineteen received his law degree. His father died in 1713 and left him considerable wealth. He married Jean de Lartigue, a Protestant, who brought him a substantial dowry; and next year in 1716, his uncle died and bequeathed him the title Baron and the presidency of the Bordeaux Parlement. He spent most of his time for studies and writings in broad areas. He published The Persian Letter anonymously in Cologne in 1721, which brought him a literary fame after he was identified. After ten years of his presidency for the Parlement, he sold it and moved to Paris for literary activities in society and the salons, and finally joined the Forty Immortals in 1728. Montesquieu left Paris for a tour for three years to Italy, Austria, Hungary, Switzerland, the Rhineland, Holland, and England. He remained in England eighteen months until August 1731: "he formed friendship with Chesterfield and other notables, was elected to the Royal Society of London and initiated into Freemasonry, was received by George II and Queen Caroline, attended Parliament." He returned to France with admiring of liberty and the political system of Britain. Retiring to his La Brede, he spent most of his time for the researches and writings, except occasional trips to Paris, until he died. He produced Considerations on the Causes of the Greatness and Decline of Rome in 1734, but it was not such a success as previous one since it dealt with a remote and complex subject. He published The Spirit of the Laws anonymously in 1748 and quickly rose to a position of enormous influence. Its reception was unfriendly from both supporters and opponents of the regime in France, and the Catholic Church banned the book along with his other works and included it on the index of Prohibited Books in 1751, while it received the highest praise from the rest of Europe as well as from America.

Montesquieu in his Persian Letters presented 161 letters written by Rica and Usbek, two Persians traveling in France, and their correspondents in Isfahan. The letters not only exposed French life and society through comments on their people and institutions, but also revealed absurdities of Oriental conduct and creeds. Though the structure of his writings was disordered, the book combined the exotic with the erotic stories, so that it was interesting enough to attract many readers of the time, who were eager to reconfirm the reality of their society as well as to know about different culture and religion with curiosity. He could expose the corruption of the court, wasteful and useless nobles, and problematic state finances; and "could praise the ancient republics of Greece and Rome, and the modern republics of Holland and Switzerland." Letters 11-14 wrote about the nature of man and state: to defend from the attack of savage peoples, individuals agreed that "the crown should be bestowed upon the justest among them....You would be prefer to be subject to a king, and obey his laws" in realizing that "the individual's self-interest is always to be found in the common interest" since their unrestricted pursuit of self-interest leads to mutual destruction. Letter 29 wrote about heresy: "But nobody is a heretic against his will: all he has to do is to split the difference of opinion into two halves, and provide a distinction for those who accuse him of heresy....it makes a man as white as snow, and he can have himself declared orthodox....but they could disagree with him about the meaning of the term, and burn him for being a heretic. It would be useless to draw distinctions." Letter 35 wrote about Islam: "they worship the good angels and distrust the bad." Letter 122 wrote on poverty: "The king, the courtiers, and a few private individuals possess all the wealth, while all the other languish in the depth of poverty." Their children "are carried off in the mass by the frequent epidemics that poverty and malnutrition always produce...Men are like plants, which never grow well unless they are properly cultivated; in nations stricken by poverty the species suffers, and sometimes even degenerates. France provides an excellent example of all this."
In his *Considerations of the Causes of the Greatness and Decline of Rome*, Montesquieu minimized the role of individual persons and events in history. "It is not chance that rules the world. Ask the Romans, who had a continuous sequence of successes when they were guided by a certain plan, and an uninterrupted sequence of reverses when they followed another. There are general causes, moral and physical, which act in every monarchy, elevating it, maintaining it, or hurling it to the ground. All accidents are controlled by these causes. And if the chance of one battle — that is, a particular cause — has brought a state to ruin, some general cause made it necessary for that state to perish from a single battle. In a word, the main trend draws with it all particular accidents. In discussing the transition from the Republic to the Empire, he suggested that if Caesar and Pompey had not worked to usurp the government of the Republic, other men would have risen in their place."

Montesquieu wrote that "When the domination of Rome was limited to Italy...the senate was able to observe the conduct of the generals and removed any thought they might have if violating their duty. But when the legions crossed the Alps and the sea, the warriors, who had to be left in the countries they were subjugating for the duration of several campaigns, gradually lost their citizen spirit....The soldiers then began to recognize no one but their general....They were no longer the soldiers of the republic but those of Sulla, Marius, Pompey, and Caesar....when the people could give their favorites a formidable authority abroad, all the wisdom of the senate became useless, and the republic was lost....If the greatness of the empire ruined the republic, the greatness of the city ruined it no less." He viewed that "the decline of Rome was due first of all to a change from a republic - in which there had been a division and balance of powers - to an empire better fitted to govern dependencies, but so centering all rule in one city and one man as to destroy the liberty and vigor of the citizens and the provinces. To this prime cause were added other factors in the course of time."

Montesquieu defined three forms of government in his pioneering work *The Spirits of Laws*. In its Part 1 forms of government, the republic is ruled by the people having sovereign power with the principle of democratic equality and virtue - suitable for small states. The monarchy is ruled by one alone with fixed and established laws and honor - appropriate for middle-sized states. The despotic is ruled by one alone without law and rule, but with the principle of fear - apt for large empires. He sees the difference between the monarchy and the despotic state in that the monarchal prince is enlightened and his ministers are more skillful and experienced in public affairs than the despotic ones. Education in monarchies emphasizes honor - nobility, frankness, and politeness - as the universal master; but education in the despotic state is limited since knowledge is dangerous to extreme obedience and ignorance is rather helpful. In the republic, the full power of education is necessary to produce individual virtue as love of the laws and the homeland. He sees that love of democracy is love of equality and love of frugality. "The principle of democracy is corrupted not only when the spirit of equality is lost but also when the spirit of extreme equality is taken up and each one wants to be the equal of those chosen to command." He insists that "In the state of nature, men are born in equality, but they cannot remain so. Society makes them lose their equality, and they become equal again only through the laws." Aristocracy is corrupted when the power of the nobles becomes arbitrary. "Extreme corruption occurs when nobility becomes hereditary; the nobles can scarcely remain moderate...Therefore, a large number of nobles in a hereditary aristocracy will make the government less violent." Social disorder arises from extreme inequalities between those who govern and those who are governed as well as between the different members of the governing body. The laws should prevent and check "hatreds and jealousies" coming from inequalities, and should work to sustain the nobility as the subordinate power for the ruler, so it is essential to curb their poverty as well as to moderate their wealth not to worsen inequality. If the government is corrupted, the best laws turn against the state.
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In its Part 2 political liberty, defining it as the right to do everything the laws permit, he praised the constitution of England as a monarchy that led to his political thought - separation of powers with checks and balances between three branches of government - legislative, executive, and judicial functions. "Montesquieu regards the England so described as not only freer but more just and in some respects wiser than the ancient republics or his own democracy" though Voltaire viewed his analysis totally inappropriate. "Its first advantage is the clear-cut separation of powers and the checking mechanism built into the legislative and executive branches. The second is the representation of public opinion through one branch of the legislature, which can then proceed to discuss legislative matters and abstain from executive decisions in a manner impossible to the ancient city-state. In addition, the judicial power is less menacing and more just. Finally, the single executive - though not comparable in wisdom to a body like Roman senate - will nevertheless possess a great amount of concentrated power and sufficient motives to wield that power vigorously. Constitutional government of this type could not be expected to work without a considerable amount of internal friction, so that some sacrifice of quality and smoothness in governmental operation is the necessary cost of liberty." In order for the citizens to enjoy the maximum in legal security, the criminal laws are crucial, having function similar to that of the Bill of Rights in the Constitution of the United States. Montesquieu distinguishes four kinds of crimes: those against religion, morals, tranquility, and security. "The net result of his analysis is to make it impossible in a free state to prosecute sacrilege by legal means, or to punish moral turpitude except in sexual matters. Limitations are also set to the dangerous charge of treason, and writings should be considered criminal only when they prepare reasonable action. Finally, legal procedures and penalties must be so devised as to insure just treatment as far as possible." He condemned that it is contrary to the spirit of government for the private financiers to collect taxes.

In its Part 3, 4, and 5 Montesquieu wrote on nature, commerce, and religion. (i) Climate is the first and most powerful factor in determining an economy, laws, and its national character. People are more vigorous in cold climate than in hot: The people in hot countries are timid like old men; those in cold countries are courageous like young men. The law of Mohamed prohibits the drinking of wine; that is fitted to the climate of Arabia; but such a law would not be good in cold countries. "Women are marriageable in hot climates at eight, nine, and ten years of age....They are old at twenty: this reason in women is never found with beauty there....it is very simple for a man to leave his wife to take another and for polygamy to be introduced." (ii) "The natural effect of commerce is to lead to peace. Two nations that trade with each other become reciprocally dependent; if one has an interest in buying, the other has an interest in selling, and all unions are founded on mutual needs.” Moreover, “The spirit of commerce produces in men a certain feeling for exact justice, opposed on the one hand to banditry and on the other hand to those moral virtues that make it so that one does not always discuss one's own interest alone and that one can neglect them for those of others....Its spirit is not contrary to certain moral virtues,” which concepts were essential for the rising capitalism. (iii) He views that moderate government is better suited to the Christian religion and despotic government to Islam; and that the Catholic religion better suits a monarchy and the Protestant religion better adapted to a republic, simply because the people of the north have a spirit of liberty and independence. Christianity is not only true but the greatest worldly good mankind could possess; but the perfection of Christian counsels is incompatible with political life so that the most perfect Christian would not make a good citizen. He is critical of social and political effects of Christianity on opposing commerce and money-lending in the Middle Ages, and fostering chastity that discouraged marriage and propagation. He insisted on that the Church should be subject to the civil power: things ruled by the principles of civil right must not be ruled by those of canonical right. Laws should not disturb other religions.
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Francois Marie Arouet, known as Voltaire (1694-1778), was a French Enlightenment writer, historian, and philosopher, advocating civil liberties. He produced numerous works in almost every literary form - plays, poetry, novels, essays, and historical and scientific works. He was born to an affluent attorney in Paris. Receiving a classical education at the Jesuit college of Louis-Grand, he began to study law, but soon gave up and devoted to writings. His father obtained a job for him as a secretary to the French ambassador in the Netherlands in 1713, but he was forced to return to Paris because of his scandal with a young lady named Pimpette. In 1716 his satirical verses made him exiled to a place one hundred miles from Paris for a year. In 1717, two anonymous writings of satires appeared. One on the Regent's manner of life wrote that "A boy reigning; a poisoner administering; councils ignorant and unstable; religion more unstable; an exhausted treasury; public faith violated; sedition imminent; the country sacrificed to the hope of a crown; the inheritance anticipated; France perishing." The other on the state of France wrote that "I have seen the Bastille and a thousand other prisons filled with brave citizens, faithful subjects. I have seen the people wretched under the rigorous servitude. I have seen the soldiers perishing of hunger, thirst, and rage...." Assuming Voltaire the author, the Regent imprisoned him at Bastille but released a year later. In 1718, Voltaire wrote a tragedy of Oedipus that was successful in Paris. After the death of his father in 1722, Voltaire became rich with an annuity from the inheritance and a pension from Louis XV. In 1724, he wrote poems and plays, among which La Henriade criticized the Massacre of St. Bartholomew, which made the French ashamed of its religious wars. In 1726, physical quarrels with the Chevalier de Rohan-Chabot made him arrested by police who put him into Bastille again. "Voltaire wrote to the authorities defending his conduct and offering to go in voluntary exile to England if released... Members of the government give him letters of introduction and recommendation to prominent Englishmen."

Achieving considerable fame in poems, Voltaire returned to France in late 1728. He knew the limits of English freedom but used it as a whip to stir up revolt in France against oppression by state and church. He was growing toward the greatest thinker of Enlightenment, criticizing royal absolutism, the lack of religious toleration, and of freedom of thought in France. In 1734, he published the Letters of Philosophy, which praised separation of power in the government of England, no taxes levied without consent of Parliament, and no taxes exempted because of being a noble or a priest. He claimed that the English constitution restored natural rights of all men in terms of liberty of person and property, freedom of press, right being tried fairly by law and undisturbed juries, and right to profess the religion chosen by individuals. During 1734-44, Voltaire retired to the chateau of Madame du Chatelet at Cirey in Champagne, where he enjoyed a peaceful life with her. Returning to Paris in 1745 at age 50, he wrote several stories including The Mystery of Fate - the longest one. In 1748, he published The Voice of the Wise Men and the People as a pamphlet, which attacked the French church and its property. Voltaire claimed that "monasteries were wasting the seed of men and the resources of the land in vain idleness." He basically thought that "the pope and priests had propagated superstition and mythology through absurd doctrines and hypnotic ritual among ignorant and credulous people to deaden the mind and strengthen this delusion." He believed that the pope had controlled education, censored and persecuted dissidents to extend church power, and amassed wealth by using forgery documents such as the Donation of Constantine. He criticized merciless religious hatreds particularly between Catholics and Huguenots in France. In 1751, Voltaire published The Age of Louis XIV as a project of the dynasty, which he began in 1734, set aside in 1738, and resumed in 1750. For this, Voltaire "read 200 books and reams of unpublished memoirs. He consulted with scores of people who gave accounts of what happened at Louis' Court, and in the archives at Versailles, he studied the original papers of Louis' ministers, and the manuscripts left by Louis himself."
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Voltaire visited Frederick the Great at Potsdam in 1750 by invitation and stayed in Germany with writings (where he finalized The Age of Louis XIV) until 1754. His returning to France was not welcomed by Louis XV, so he moved into Switzerland in early 1755, where he stayed until June 1758, when he was permitted to return to Paris. On November 1, Lisbon was destroyed by an earthquake that killed 15,000 people and injured almost the same number. Voltaire wrote his poem On the Lisbon Disaster - "Oh, miserable mortals, grieving earth! Oh, frightful gathering of all mankind! Eternal host of useless sufferings! Ye silly sages who cry, ‘All is well,’ Come contemplate these ruins horrible...." During 1734-56, he delved into metaphysics and theology which was accumulated into his Philosophical Dictionary printed in 1764, in which he defined "theist" that he called himself since 1750: "The theist is a man firmly convinced of the existence of a Supreme Being as good as He is powerful, who has created all beings with extension, vegetating, sentient and reflecting; who perpetuates their species, who punishes crimes without cruelty, and benevolently rewards virtuous behavior. The theist does not know how God punishes, how he protects, how he pardons, for he is not reckless enough to flatter himself that he knows how God acts, but he knows that God acts and that He is just. Difficulties against Providence do not shake him in his faith, because they are merely great difficulties, and not proofs. He submits to this Providence, although he perceives but a few effects and a few signs of this Providence; and judging of the things he does not see by the things he sees, he considers that this Providence reaches all places and all centuries. Reconciled in this principle with the rest of the universe, he does not embrace any of the sects, all of which contradict each other; his religion is the most ancient and the most widespread; for the simple worship of a God has preceded all the systems of the world....He believes that religion does not consist either in the opinions of an unintelligible metaphysic, or in vain display, but in worship and justice."26

Voltaire anonymously published Candide in 1759 that framed a story of adventure and love with a satire of "Leibnitz's theodicy, Pope's optimism, religious abuses, monastic amours, class prejudices, political corruption, legal chicanery, judicial venality, the barbarity of the penal code, the injustice of slavery, and the destructiveness of war."27 He wrote: "Have you no monks to teach, to dispute, to govern, to intrigue and to burn people who do not agree with them?"28 Voltaire published A Treatise on Toleration in 1763 in connection with the case of Jean Calas, whose son was found with hanging, but was falsely charged with murder caused by religious hatreds against the Catholics. The Catholic court charged that a Huguenot father killed his son, who had proposed to become a Catholic. In November 1761, the municipal court pronounced Jean Calas, his wife, and his son Pierre guilty, and sentenced them to be hanged. Voltaire fought against the municipal court as the conscience of Europe in order to protect the innocent family. In March 1765 the King's Council finally declared the condemnation of Jean Calas annulled and pronounce him innocent. Voltaire defined toleration: "Do I propose, then, that every citizen shall be free to follow his own reason, and believe whatever his enlightened or deluded reason shall dictate to him? Certainly, provided he does not disturb the public order....If you insist that it is a crime not to believe in the dominant religion, you condemn the first Christians, your forefathers; and you justify those whom you reproach with persecuting them....For a government to have the right to punish the errors of men it is necessary that their errors should take the form of crime. They do not take the form of crime unless they disturb society. They disturb society when they engender fanaticism. Hence men must avoid fanaticism to deserve toleration."29 He views that the Protestant Reformation was "only a halting step toward reason," and "a religion preaching God and virtue would be of real service to mankind." He questioned that "Tradition is capable of being wrong and oppressive, and an impediment to the advancement of understanding. How can man progress if he is forbidden to question tradition?" Voltaire was progressive.
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Voltaire wrote broadly on political philosophy. On power and state, he deliberated in his *Thoughts on Public Administration* of 1752, the *Dialogue between ABC of 1768*, and *Letters of Philosophy* of 1734. He never thought that it was possible simply to transfer the British political model to France without the House of Commons, while French parlement was really a court of law. He viewed that the only viable system of government for France was that of absolute monarchy. He made a crucial distinction between absolute and arbitrary power - the absolute monarch is enlightened and acts with reason, tolerance, and justice. He believed that democracy was superior to all other systems of government, "because there everyone is equal, and everyone works for the happiness of everyone else." However, he ambivalently wrote that "The people are not fit to govern. I could not bear my wig-maker to be a legislator." He sees that natural man is equal to the animals that is to become self-sufficient in the food, clothing and shelter afforded to animals by nature; the essence of primitive existence is reduced to "the pursuit of well-being and the acquisition of defenses against omnipresent evil:" and the need of society is based on the "individual's basic need for the family unit." On freedom and humanity, he saw that the enemy of the people was the Church and the state, at either a political or an ideological level. "The malignant presence of the Roman Church in the executive and legislative arms of government in Catholic countries constituted for Voltaire the major cause of civil disorder, intolerance, persecution and judicial corruption." As previously discussed, his writings largely criticized the corrupt Church "to propagate superstition and mythology, to control education, and to oppose dissent with censorship and persecution." Particularly, *A Treatise on Toleration* expressed his endeavor toward religious toleration and humanity. He concerned dynamics of conflict between the spiritual and temporal or church and state powers, by investigating the whole issue of papal involvement in politics - legitimacy of papal rights to temporal rule.

On crime and punishment, Voltaire wrote that natural laws are "those laws that nature points to in all ages to all men for the maintenance of that sense of justice which nature...Everywhere theft, violence, murder, ingratitude towards benevolent parents, perjury committed in order to harm rather than help an innocent person, plotting against one's country, are all obvious crimes that are curbed with varying degrees of severity, but always justly." Basic laws are "just laws based on convention, on ancient customs, ancient prejudices which change with times." He not only saw that severe penalty serves to increase crime levels rather than to reduce them, but also opposed to the laws of confiscation of property and a disproportionate punishment. On war and peace, Voltaire tried to act as an arbitrator between France and Prussia during the War of the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years' War. His experience taught him that "international law and international codes of conduct were illusory concepts without any basis in the realities of human behavior." He saw that war was often justified by patriotism based on a citizenship having a homeland; since the majority of people would have no homeland, patriotism is only possible in that utopian state, a republic. "Peace treaties arose from expediency, not good will, and their provisions were contingent and precarious." He believed that "Man's salvation and destiny lay in human hands, and would be realized through human actions." On wealth and poverty, Voltaire developed a number of theories about national wealth in his *Dialogue between a Philosopher and a Comptroller-General of Finance* of 1750, which challenged orthodox mercantilist theory. "Voltaire concedes the value of gold and silver in the context of balance of trade problems and in times of war. However, he insists that the true wealth of a state does not reside exclusively in its holdings of precious metals, but rather in produce, industry and labor." He added that "The peasant is right to protest against the system that exploits his labor for the benefit of the few, but the rich lady's lackey is also right" since it returns to society through her extravagant purchases (which consumption can generate employment and income in that business).
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Denis Diderot (1713-84) was a philosopher, art critic, writer with "brilliant imagination and fertile ideas" during the Enlightenment. He was born to a family of the master-cutler at Langres in Champagne, where he was educated by the Jesuits until the age fifteen. He came to Paris with his father who intended to send him to a famous Jesuit college in 1728, but he studied at and graduated from the University of Paris with a Master of Arts in 1732, and there upon he embarked on the course of studies leading to a Doctorate in theology. Loving with every branch of science, literature, philosophy, and art; he enjoyed various studies with freethinking and subversive ideas. Once, he became a law apprentice, but gave it up for a life of studies, so that his father cut off his allowance, but his mother sent him secret subsidies. Falling in love with Antoinette Champion, Diderot married her in 1743. "Like most freethinkers of that century, he was shaken to his intellectual roots by reading Montaigne and Bayle...Perhaps through Montaigne’s rich references to the pagan classics, he was drawn to further study of the Greek and Roman philosophers.” Though not financially affordable to visit England, he learned most of intellectual developments through studies. He translated Shaftesbury’s *Inquiry concerning Virtue and Merit* in 1745, from which he learned that a moral code based on reason could serve social order than religion. He published his first book the *Philosophical Thoughts* in 1746 in which a deist, an atheist, and a pantheist have a dialogue on the nature of divinity; which not only argued against skepticism and atheism but denounced the irrationality and intolerance of the established church. “Skepticism is not for everybody...The true skeptic has counted and weighed reasons.” He saw monasteries as imprisonment: “Men have banished Divinity; they have confined it in a sanctuary; the walls of the temple hide it from sight; it has no existence outside.” He defended the passions: “it is only passions, and grand passions, which are able to raise the soul to grand achievements; without them there would be no sublimity.”

In his *Letter on the Blind for the Use of Those Who See* of 1749, Diderot argued that “our ideas of right and wrong are derived out not from God but from our sensory experience. Even the idea of God has to be learned, and it too, like morality, is relative and diverse. The existence of God is doubtful, for the argument from design has lost much of its force...there is no sign of design in the universe as a whole.” Taking the concept of Locke’s sensationalism, Diderot was switching his faith from deism to atheism by that time. The police arrested and imprisoned him at the Chateau de Vincennes, and released after three and a half months subject to no further violation. He anonymously published a *Letter on the Deaf and Dumb for the Use of Those Who Hear and Who Speak* in 1751 that made a considerable impact by avoiding heresy. During 1751-72, Diderot devoted most of his time to organizing, defending, and editing the *Encyclopedia* that was a twenty-eight volume compendium of knowledge, as its manager and intellectual driving force, believing in that “Reason is for the philosopher what grace is for the Christian.” Its main purpose was to change the general way of thinking, while its contributors attacked religious superstition, advocated toleration, and demanded improvements of political, legal, and social programs that would lead to a better society; which was more cosmopolitan, tolerant, humane, and reasonable; so that state censors periodically suppressed its publication. It gave attention to the technology beginning to transform the economy in Britain and France. After Volume VII appeared in 1757, several writers were imprisoned. The Council of State completely outlawed the *Encyclopedia* by a decree of 1759: “The advantages to be derived from a work of this sort, in respect to progress in the arts and sciences, can never compensate for the irreparable damage that results from it in regard to morality and religion.” Diderot continued the work, and printed Volume VIII – XVII in Paris in 1761. As Catherine the Great and Frederick the Great offered to complete the *Encyclopedia* under their protections, which might persuade the French authorities to allow the printing in Paris, so all of eleven volumes could be published during 1765-72.
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Diderot wrote The Nephew of Rameau in 1761 but left it unpublished. The text was found after his death, translated into German, and retranslated into French in 1823. The original manuscript was not discovered until 1891. The novel deals with four issues: an attack upon the enemies of the Encyclopedia and of progress; the musical war between the Italian and French styles of opera; a discussion of moral values; and literary and artistic questions. He wrote the Dream of d’Alembert in 1769 - fictional dialogues presenting his thoughts in the form of a dream to explore philosophical materialism - that matter is subject to evolution. Part I views that there is no difference between man and animal but one of organism (organic development), and likewise between animal and plant; "how do you know that feeling is essentially incompatible with matter...There is no more than one substance in the universe, in man, in animals." The dialogue continues to show "that all matter is sensitive in greater or lesser degree, active or inert, and that the passage from inert or potential to active sensitivity can be explained in purely physical and mechanical terms." Part II includes three themes: "(i) animal reproduction is purely mechanical and subject to breakdowns and mutations, hence some discussion leading to a tentative theory of evolution; (ii) the mechanical structure of the body which Diderot likens to a spider (the nerve-center in the brain) and its web (the nervous network in the body), and this analogy is considered at some length, with example intended to show that monsters, freaks, exceptions in nature are due simply to physical damage to the web or network through threads having become tangled, crushed or broken; (iii) hence our psychological or moral behavior is also explicable in terms of physiology." 

In the waking state the network obeys the impressions made by an external object. Asleep, it is from the exercise of its own feeling that everything passing within itself emanates. There is nothing to distract in a dream; hence its vivacity." Part III denounces chastity as unnatural: “Nature tolerates nothing useless” and Diderot rounded out his theory of evolution.

Diderot visited Catherine the Great at St. Petersburg in 1773 by invitation and advised her “how Russia could be transformed into Utopia.” He wrote his last novel Jacques the Fatalist and his Master for over two decades during 1762-80, which was published in 1796 but the Paris police banned and destroyed copies of the book. Jacques and his Master are involved in a series of adventures. Their struggle is based on the distinction between state and philosophy, and their conversations touch real people and current events in politics, society, and religion. The author tried to convince that human beings are rational creatures who make conscious decisions, and that philosophy does not threat human happiness. Diderot was a liberal thinker in many fields. In religion, he transformed himself from Voltairean deism to Spinozan atheism: he thought that conception followed perception, that ideas had physiological roots, and that knowledge, mind, and spirit were products of the mechanical operations of the material body, in which God was irrelevant. In ethics, he proposed to follow nature such as instinct, through which, he could make himself free from the bonds that religion and society lay upon him with their conventions, prohibitions, and laws. In politics, he accepted "constitutional monarchy, but proposed a national assembly chosen by property owners having a stake in good and economical government." He dreamed of a benign society in which liberty and equality would be assured to all but he doubted it due to the limited intellectual level of the people. In economy, he knew that inequality of possessions would continue as long as inequality of ability remained but dismissed socialism as impracticable because there was only a small number of disorganized proletariats. Declaring the rights of property sacred and absolute, he favored state subsidies to agriculture. In evolution, he recognized that nature was in a state of constant flux: “All life-forms were once something else and will continue to evolve, which means that the chain of being is not fixed but subject to change.” So “human will and human intelligence can become part of the chain and turn natural change into progress” which is a pre-Darwinian concept – a theory of evolution.
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Claude Adrien Helvetius (1715-71) was born to the first physician to Marie Leszczynski, studied under the Jesuits at the College Louis-le-Grand, was apprenticed to a tax collector, and became a farmer general of taxes at the age twenty-three. He met Voltaire, spent time as a guest of Montesquieu, and became a close friend of d'Holbach, whose dinners gave him opportunities to meet leading intellectuals of the time. In 1751, Helvetius gave up his lucrative job and retired to his feudal estate at Vore-au-Perche to write a book that would change the world; and married a countess Anne-Catherine de Ligniville, who maintained a salon attended by the leading figures of the Enlightenment. He published De l'Esprit (On Mind) in 1758 arguing against Montesquieu's theory that climate influenced the character of nations. The book attracted immediate attention and aroused the formidable opposition, particularly from the dauphin. It was declared to be heretic - so atheistic that it was burned by Church and state. The state ordered him to retire to his estate for two years. "The religious authorities, particularly the Jesuits and the new Pope began to fear the spread of atheism and wanted to clamp down on the 'modern thought' hard and quickly, so it became almost a scapegoat for this. This great publicity resulted in the book being translated into almost all the languages of Europe" so that the book was mostly widely read. He restated and amplified his views in the treatise De l'Homme (On Man) of 1776, "which attacked priests as venal peddlers of hope and fear, perpetuators of ignorance, and murderers of thoughts." We find all the ideals of the time in them as follows.

(i) Mind: "All mental states are combinations of sensations felt at present, or revived from the past through memory, or projected into the future through imagination. Judgment is the sensation of differences among sensations; and reason is a combination of judgment...mind is an assemblage or sequence of mental states; soul is the sensibility of the organism, the capacity to receive sensation." (ii) Equality of Intelligence: all men at birth have an equal aptitude for understanding and judgment; and there are no inborn superiorities of mind, but environment, education, and circumstances make differences. The progress is made by spread of knowledge through education. The educational system of France must be freed from the Church and assigned to the state by replacing the teaching of Latin and Greek with that of science and technology, and by forming health bodies with wise and virtuous mind. Catholic control of education "not only retards the technical advance of a nation by slighting science, but it enables the clergy to form the mind of the child to priestly domination." (iii) Toleration and Christianity: "Religious intolerance is the daughter of sacerdotal ambition and stupid credulity...We see Christian churches at Constantinople, but there are no mosques in Paris...Toleration subjects the priest to the prince; intolerance subjects the prince to the priest." He was not an atheist but hoped that a universal religion under state control would promote a natural morality free from rewards and punishments after death. "An honest man will always obey his reason in preference to revelation." (iv) Utilitarian Ethics and Egoism: The life pursues happiness coming from pleasure, which is fundamentally physical. Virtue is behavior that gives us the greatest pleasure to the greater number. Many virtuous actions are altruistic in the sense that they are intended to benefit others, but motivated by self-satisfaction. "Religious asceticism or devotion may appear to be highly virtuous, but it is only a long-term investment in celestial securities" that is egoistic. (v) Government: A constitutional monarchy is good, but a federation of democratic republics is better. "Theoretically aristocracy is unjust, since superior ability is a product of chance; but complete democracy is undesirable as long as the poor are uneducated and property-less; consequently, a wise legislator will aim to spread education and property." (vi) Economy: "The almost universal unhappiness of men and nations arises from imperfections of their laws, and the too unequal partition of their riches." Therefore, "When a man's lands exceed a certain number of acres, they should be taxed at a rate exceeding the rent," though politically impracticable.
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Paul d’Holbach (1723-89) was born to a landowning family in the Rhenish Palatinate of Germany. After death of his mother, he moved to Paris in 1748 and became a French subject. He married into a family of financiers and obtained nobility by investing in the Company of Secretaries of the King, which secured his economic and social position. After a sudden death of his wife, Paul married her sister but became hostile upon the Church. His scholarly career began as he translated scientific works from German into French, and secretly translated the works of British freethinkers into French in the 1760s. He established a salon at his Parisian house where leading intellectuals, either believers or disbelievers, exchanged their ideas on various issues of unlimited fields. His salon became so famous that foreign intellectuals visiting Paris tried to get an invitation. Contributing articles to the Encyclopedia, he publicly declared himself an atheist, while the enlightened positioned their religion largely in the deism that was between Christian fanaticism and atheism. In his Christianity Unveiled of 1761, Paul views that religion is the art of intoxicating men with enthusiasm, and state policy and morality have been corrupted by their religious prejudices. "By means of threatening men with invisible powers, they (Church and state) force them to suffer in silence the miseries with which visible powers afflict them. They are taught to hope that, if they consent to become miserable in this world, they will for that reason be happy in the next." Paul views that the union of Church and state causes fundamental evil in France: "Instead of morality, the Christian is taught the miraculous fables and inconceivable dogmas of a religion thoroughly hostile to right reason....and to rely blindly on the authority of his master." It can be advantageous only to ignorant and vicious princes who desire to form a league with priesthood to tyrannize over the people. "True toleration and freedom of thought are the most proper instruments for the destruction of religious fanaticism...If enthusiasm produce disorders in society; let it be suppressed...Reason will break their chains."41

Paul published The System of Nature under a pseudonym in Amsterdam in 1770, that was condemned by the authorities and publicly burned.42 He saw so much misery in a world ruled by kings and priests that he concluded that man would be happier if they follow scientists and philosophers by turning their back upon them. Influenced by Newtonian science, he established the materialism based on the mechanical nature. (i) "The source of man's unhappiness is his ignorance of nature. The pertinacity with which he clings to blind opinions imbibed in his infancy...the consequent prejudice that warps his mind...appear to doom him to continual error...The most important of our duties, then, is to seek means by which we may destroy delusions that can never do more than mislead us...Let us try to inspire man with courage, with respect for his reason, with an inextinguishable love of truth, to the end that he may learn to consult his experience, and no longer be the dupe of an imagination led astray by authority...that he may learn to found his morals on his nature, on his wants, on the real advantage of society; that he may dare to love himself; that he may become a virtuous and rational being, in which case he cannot fail to be happy." (ii) Matter always existed with different essences, forming a variety of combinations, endowed with various properties. "Everything in the universe is in motion; the essence of mater is to act: if we consider its parts attentively, we shall discover that not a particle enjoys absolute repose...All that appears to us to be at rest, does not, however, remain one instant in the same state. All beings are continually breeding, increasing, decreasing, or dispersing, with more or less tardiness or rapidity." In short, "nature is but an immense chain of causes and effects, which unceasingly flow from each other. The motion of particular beings depends on the general motion, which is itself maintained by individual motion."43

(iii) Man is a production of nature - subject to the same vicissitudes as all her other productions, so there is no reason why man believes himself a privileged being in nature. We have none of the Divinity nor of creation, so it acknowledges our ignorance of the powers of nature if we pretend
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that the human species descended from a first man and a first woman, created by a God. On
immortality of soul, he views that man is a being purely physical, so that the soul is merely the
activity of the body and can have no separate existence. “To say that the soul will feel, think,
enjoy, and suffer after the death of the body is to pretend that a clock shivered into a thousand
pieces will continue to strike the hour, and have the faculty of marking the progress of time.”

(iv) On fatalism, “Man’s life is a line that nature commands him to describe upon the surface
of the earth, without his being able to swerve from it even for an instant. He is born without his
consent....his ideas come to him involuntarily....He is unceasingly modified by causes, visible or
concealed, over which he has no control.” Thus, man is the work of nature; "he exists in nature;
he is submitted to her laws. He cannot deliver himself from them, nor can he step beyond them,
even in thought. Instead, therefore, of seeking outside the world...for beings who can procure him
a happiness denied him by nature, let man study this Nature, let him learn her laws...let him apply
these discoveries to his own felicity, and submit in silence to her mandates, which nothing can
alter." (v) Education will furnish the true means of rectifying the wanderings of mankind, by
forming valuable citizens to the state by reason of advantages. The morals of the people are
neglected in all countries. "If politics did seriously occupy itself with the instruction and with the
welfare of the people; if laws were more equitable...it would be unnecessary to seek in another life
for fanciful chimeras...against the real wants of man." Ignorance and fear have created gods. "The
fear of death can never do more than make cowards; the fear of its pretended consequences will
make nothing but fanatics or melancholy beings, who are useless to themselves and unprofitable
to others. Death is a resource that ought not to be taken away from oppressed virtue, which the
injustice of man frequently reduces to despair. If man feared death less, he would neither be a
slave nor superstitious; truth would find defenders more zealous; the rights of mankind would be
more hardly sustain; error would be more powerfully opposed.”

It concludes that "all the errors of mankind...arise from man's having renounced reason, quit
experience, and refused the evidence of his senses, that he might be guided by imagination,
frequently deceitful, and by authority, always suspicious. Man will ever mistake his true happi-
ness, as long as he neglects to study nature, to investigate her immutable laws, to seek in her alone
the remedies for those evils which are the consequence of his present errors.” His Good Sense
was published in 1772, which was publicly burned. The book "systematically presents the atheistic
challenge to religion, critiquing point by point every contention of religion from the nature of God
to the existence of the soul, belief in miracles, heaven and hell, the divine right of kings, the role
of the priesthood, and many other points of dogma and tradition.” He views that Christianity
encourages despotism: "The Christian religion, devised for the benefit of tyrants, was established
on the principle that the nations should renounce the legitimate defense of themselves." Paul
published Social System in 1773 that placed morality and politics in a utilitarian framework. "A
body of men that can lay claim to wealth and honor solely though the
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William Godwin (1756-1836) was an English journalist, political philosopher, and novelist. He was born to a Calvinist family and his father was a Nonconformist minister in Guestwick in Norfolk who died young. He was educated at Hoxton Academy and became a minister. After serving five years as a Calvinist pastor in a country parish, his faith was shaken when he read the System of Nature written by Paul d'Holbach. He came to London in 1782, still nominally as a minister, to regenerate society with his pen: his aim was "the complete overthrow of all existing institutions, political, social, and religious." He is considered "one of the first exponents of utilitarianism, and the first modern proponent of anarchism." Although he wrote novels, essays, histories, and other works, his major work was An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice and its Influence on General Virtue and Happiness consisting of eight books published in 1793. After the Rights of Man published by Thomas Paine in response to the Reflections on the Revolution in France by Edmund Burke, Godwin thought about the political justice. The book made him an intellectual leader among radicals, although Godwin himself opposed to revolutions. Influenced by Helvetius, Godwin argues that humanity will inevitably progress with human perfectibility and enlightenment. Although the evils in political society are inseparable from our existence, remedies should be taken for their removal: the vice in man results from error, but reason can correct it, since human beings use their reason to decide the best course of action.

Godwin interprets political justice as follows: (i) The peace of society is interrupted by the inequality of property and the luxury causing destructive passions of the poor. In most countries, legislation is in favor of the rich against the poor; the enforcement of law is "not less iniquitous" than its spirit; and political institutions maintain the conditions of inequality. The "excellencies and defects of the human character are not derived from causes beyond the reach of ingenuity to modify and correct." The conduct of human beings is governed by the judgments they make and the sensations that are communicated to them: the characters of men are determined by education, through which the causes of this ignorance or miscalculation can be removed. In this sphere, political institutions are more powerful and influential to suggest the path to be avoided as well as to be pursued. (ii) Society is produced by our wants and government by our wickedness. Justice is necessary as a rule of conduct originating in the connection of one with the other percepient based on principles of equality and reciprocity. The rights of man are active or passive in structuring the form of governments, the content of laws, and the shape of morality. The nature of happiness and misery is independent of positive institution, that may furnish an additional motive to the practice of virtue, and may inform the understanding of what actions are right or wrong. Thus, "positive institutions ought to leave me free in matters of conscience, but may properly interfere with my conduct in civil concerns." The conviction of a man's individual understanding is the legitimate principle of society imposing on him the duty of adopting any species of conduct. (iii) When we enter the social contract, we have promised obedience to government, and therefore are bound to obey. The obligation is of different degrees according to the nature of the case. "What we most expect and require in a member of the same community is the qualities of a man, and the conduct that ought to be observed indifferently by a native or a stranger. Where a promise or an oath is imposed upon me superfluously, as is always the case with promises of allegiance; or where I am compelled to make it by the operation of a penalty; the treatment I suffer is atrociously unjust, and of consequence the breach of such a promise is peculiarly susceptible of apology." An individual should be obliged to yield his personal pretensions to the sense of the community, but all private considerations must yield to the general good. We shall have many reforms but no revolutions: "Revolutions are the produce of passion, not of sober and tranquil reason. There must be an obstinate resistance to improvement on the one side, to engender a furious determination of realizing a system at a stroke on the other."
2. The Theory of Revolution

The revolution in definition, typology, causes, and evolutionary patterns varies according to the focus by different scholars. The revolution is a fundamental change affected by the use of violence in government, regime, and/or society. It is "on the one hand, the seizure of power that leads to a major restructuring of government or society, the establishment of a new set of values for distributive justice, and the replacement of the former elite by a new one, and on the other hand, the coup d'état involving no more than a change of ruling personnel by violence or threat of violence." Chalmers Johnson sees six types of revolution: first, the jacquerie or reactionary is a spontaneous mass peasant rising; second, the millenarian rebellion is inspired by a living messiah; third, the anarchistic rebellion is the nostalgic reaction to progressive change; fourth, the Jacobin communist revolution occurs in a highly centralized state and a large capital city; fifth, the conspiratorial coup d'état is a planned work of a tiny elite fired by an oligarchic or sectarian ideology; and finally, militarized mass insurrection is a planned mass revolutionary war guided by a dedicated elite. The patterns of revolutionary activities vary. In the French Revolution, an oppressive and inflexible ruling class cannot recognize the demand for change from the people, so that more oppression continues until their discontents explode toward revolt. The old regime is expelled by the moderates, but soon the militarists or extremists replace them: "Cromwell replaces Pym, Robespierre replaces Mirabeau, Lenin replaces Kerensky." While idealistic programs tested by radical idealists under growing dictatorship, disillusionment coming from the chaotic reality call for new regimes. Nevertheless, they are old forms under new names - Cromwell was replaced by Charles II, Robespierre was replaced by Napoleon, and Lenin was replaced by Stalin. The pattern of the American Revolution is a unique one different from the French Revolution: it was "not a class revolution, a social revolution, or even an over-turning the men" who had held ruling positions in the colonies.

According to Aristotle, the chief cause of the revolution lies in "the desire for equality, when men think that they are equal to others who have more than themselves;" or "the desire for inequality and superiority, when conceiving themselves to be superior they think that they have not more but the same or less than their inferiors; pretensions which may or may not be just." It is a lack of harmony between interest groups due to "the gap between the expectations and the perceptions of reality" of a dysfunction or disequilibrium in a system. Therefore, revolution is possible if a condition of multiple dysfunction in the politics, economy, and or society meets an intransigent elite or if certain catalytic factors intervene in the system as precipitators worsening the explosive condition. They are "the emergence of an inspired leader or prophet; the formation of a secret, military, revolutionary organization; and the crushing defeat of the armed forces in foreign war." The behaviorists view differently: "a primary cause of revolution is the emergence of an obsessive revolutionary mentality" of fanatics, extremists, and zealots - such men as the English Puritans in the seventeenth century, the French Jacobins in the eighteenth century, the Russian Bolsheviks in the early nineteenth century, and the China's Maoists in the late twenty century. For example, the rise of population, economic growth, and urbanization result in rapid social mobility, but widened resentment between the gainers and the losers. Being conscious of their inferiority, the latter tries to approve the changing social order or to destroy the existing regime by imposing their norms and values. In this case, a sudden ideological conversion forms the character of the revolutionaries. A similar example is shown in the modernization of underdeveloped societies, though pre-revolutionary situations are different. This subsection consists of three parts of revolution theories: communism in France, radicalism in America, and the social contract of Jean-Jacques Rousseau with the legacy of Hobbes and Locke.
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2-1. Radicalism in America

The radicalism of revolution can be measured by the degree of political changes that is usually accompanied by killing enemies and confiscating properties, and by that of social transformation in relationships that bounded people each other. The American Revolution was a constitutional defense of American rights against British encroachments - no taxation without representation. It seems to be "a little more than a colonial rebellion or a war for independence" that belongs to unusually conservative affairs. But if we consider the social change actually taking place, the American Revolution is no less radical. In destroying monarchy and establishing republics, the Americans had changed their governments and society. Once the stream of revolution started, it "could not be confined within narrow banks, but spread abroad upon the land." Moreover, the revolution occurred together with the modernization, so that political changes, economic growth, and socio-cultural transformation were mixed, amplified, and appeared differently at the same time in the next few decades and beyond. Hence, the degree of radicalism was deep and wide in American society. In the mid-eighteenth century, the British people thought that they lived in a republican monarchy, so monarchal and republican values co-existed in colonial society side by side in the culture. Monarchies relied on family, kinship, and patronage, accepting patriarchal absolutism; but the enlightened society favored liberal paternalism, that children had rights and obligations, and parents should earn their love, respect, trust, and consent to the rule. The liberalization of parental authority "spilled out to affect all economic and social relations." The revolution forced Americans to be changed from subjects of the monarchy to citizens of the republic. Since republicanism is based on liberty, equality, and independence; more and more people had broken away from paternal society toward individualism. This change widened the gap between individuals and made society more unequal and complex.

The American Revolution proved that equality was the most powerful ideology, while their nation was explosively transformed by democracy toward the most egalitarian society in history. Since human nature is the same in all ages, everyone is presumed to have job to make a living, while the separation of gentlemen from commoners was blurred. The commoners elected their representative legislatures to the state or federal government that brought interest groups politics with new kinds of linkages holding people together in society. Officeholders in democratic America were likely to be interested men "who could not be trusted to behave virtuously without bureaucratic checks and regulations." It was a problem for the new republic to protect private property and minority rights from the interests of the enhanced public power. Democracy not only created a political and legal environment for economic expansion, but radically transformed personal and social relationships of people. Meantime, fundamental intellectual issues existed in the American Revolution. On representation and consent, the British government insisted that "every Member of Parliament sits in the House not as representative his own constituents but as one of that august assembly by which all the commons of Great Britain are represented." On constitutions and rights, the conception of constitutionalism shifted during the revolution period. One argued on "a limitation on the power of lawmaking bodies" and the other viewed that "the constitution is fixed; it is from thence that the supreme legislative as well as the supreme executive derives its authority." On sovereignty, the pivotal question lay in the nature and location of the ultimate power in the state. Since powers remain in the whole body of the people, the power of the legislative body is uncontrollable but by themselves, and we must obey. There were more issues such as in slavery and establishment of religion. It may be significant to review the two best-known revolutionary thinkers in colonial America, Thomas Paine and Thomas Jefferson, who were associated with France through writings and following actions.
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Photo III-2-1. Thomas Paine (1737-1809), accessed 10 August 2012,

Photo III-2-2. Thomas Jefferson (1743-1809), accessed 10 August 2012,
Official_Presidential_portrait_of_Thomas_Jefferson_%28by_Rembrandt_Peale%29_1800-29.jpg
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Thomas Paine (1737-1809) was born in Thetford of England between a Quaker father and Anglican mother. He received limited formal education at a Quaker school and worked for his father as a corset maker at age thirteen. As he tried other occupations, he met Benjamin Franklin in London, and received a letter of recommendation from him to try his fortune in America. Self-educated Paine arrived in Philadelphia in November 1774, and soon became managing editor of a new publication. In January 1776, Paine anonymously published the Common Sense that became immediately successful. It contains the two major ideological themes: advocating a republican form of government and urging independence based upon the theory of natural rights "with more emphasis upon moral and philosophical principles than upon economic self-interest."

His essay consists of four parts. (i) On the origin and design of government, Paine views that "Society is produced by our wants and government by our wickedness." In a state of nature, a small group of people finds it necessary to form a political structure because of the defect of moral virtue. Under some convenient tree, they deliberate and decide with increasing numbers that it is necessary to select representatives for legislative matters but with the restriction that "the elected might never form to themselves an interest separate from the electors." The purpose of government will then be achieved with freedom and security. Though the British constitution recognizes the republican nature of the monarchy, it allows the excessive power of the monarchy and denies that the Constitution provides reciprocal checks among the three branches of King, Lords, and Commons. (ii) Paine attacks the monarchy and hereditary succession by asserting that no truly natural or religious reason is assigned to distinguishing men into kings and subjects. "In the early ages of the world, there were no kings; the consequence of which was, there were no wars." Since all men being originally equals, "no one by birth could have a right to set up his own family in perpetual preference to all others forever...One of the strongest natural proofs of the folly of hereditary right in Kings, is that nature disapproves it." Furthermore, hereditary succession is evil since "it opens a door to the foolish, the wicked, and the improper, it has in it the nature of oppression" so that it does not prevent outbreak of civil war. If a minor succeeds the throne, the regency can have every opportunity to betray the king. Therefore, in short, "monarchy and succession have laid but the world blood and ashes."

(iii) On present state of American affairs, Paine argues that "American would have flourished as much, and probably much more, had no European power taken any notice of her." The British motives to protect America were interest not attachment: "she did not protect us from our enemies on our account; but from her enemies on her own account."" France and Spain were, nor perhaps ever will be, our enemies, but as our being the subjects of Great Britain." The phrase of Parent or Mother Country applied to England is false, selfish, narrow, and ungenerous: "Europe, and not England, is the parent country of America." It is absurd that a continent is perpetually governed by an island. England may belong to Europe, but America to itself. Paine wraps up his arguments with that "nothing but independence" can assure peace and prosperity and suggests a plan for establishing a government in America. (iv) On the present ability of America, he emphasizes the need for immediate action - "the time hath found us." "The Continent hath at this time the largest body of armed and disciplined men of any power under Heaven...Our land force is more than sufficient, and as to Naval affairs, we cannot be insensible that Britain would never suffer an American man of war to be built, while the Continent remained in her hands." Britain is oppressed with debts, but we have no debt. "Even though Britain may have larger naval forces, only a limited part of them could be sued against America, and the extensive natural resources of the colonies would permit the rapid construction of a fleet that could challenge the British." Paine concludes that "nothing can settle our affairs so expeditiously as an open and determined declaration for independence," which may help us to get any kind of assistance from France and Spain.
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Paine published a series of pamphlets under the title of The American Crisis during 1776-83, from which thirteen pamphlets were printed in 1776-78, which were contemporaneous with early parts of the American Revolution. In The Crisis III of April 19, 1777, Paine supported American independence under four heads. (i) The natural right of the continent to independence is not debatable, since to deny such a right would be a kind of atheism against nature; and the best answer to such an objection would be that "The fool hath said in his heart there is no God." (ii) The interest of the continent in being independent is also obvious. America has flourished under the government of Britain, but there is every natural reason to believe that she had been an independent country from the first settlement thereof, "uncontrolled by any foreign power, free to make her own law, regulate and encourage her own commerce, she has by her time been of much greater worth than now." (iii) The necessity of being independent became so evident and important that the continent ran the risk of being ruined every day that she delayed it. "The increasing importance of commerce, the weight and perplexity of legislation, and the entangled state of European politics, would daily have shown to the continent the impossibility of continuing subordinate." (iv) The moral advantages arising from independence is important. "The spirit of dueling, extended on a national scale, is a proper character for European wars. They have seldom any other motive than pride, or any other object than fame. The conquerors and the conquered are generally ruined alike, and the chief difference at last is, that the one marches home with his honors, and the other without them." "The principal causes why independence has not been so universally supported as it ought, are fear and indolence, and the causes why it has been opposed, are, avarice, down-right villainy, and lust of personal power." "If Britain cannot conquer us, it proves that she is neither able to govern nor protect us...only road to peace, honor, and commerce, in Independence." Paine considers independence as America’s natural right and interest.

As a professional revolutionary, Paine lived in France for most of the 1790s. In response to the Reflections on the Revolution in France published by Edmund Burke in 1790, he published the Rights of Man in London in 1792 that opposes the idea of hereditary government of the monarchy. Despite not speaking French, he was elected to the French National Convention, but arrested in December 1793 and imprisoned for a year because he sided with the Girondins. He views that "from the Revolution of America and France, are the renovation of the natural order of things, a system of principles as universal as truth and the existence of man, and combining moral with political happiness and national prosperity. As shown in the first three articles of the French Rights of Man and of Citizens, he writes "I. Men are born, and always continue, free and equal in respect of their rights. Civil distinctions, therefore, can be founded only on public utility. II. The end of all political associations is the preservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man; and these rights are liberty, property, security, and resistance of oppression. III. The nation is essentially the source of all sovereignty; nor can any individual, or anybody of men, be entitled to any authority which is not expressly derived from it." He published The Age of Reason in three parts in 1794, 1795, and 1807, based on deism. "Paine advocates reason in the place of revelation, leading him to reject miracles and to view the Bible as an ordinary piece of literature rather than as a divinely inspired text. It promotes natural religion and argues for the existence a creator-God." He describes the Bible as fabulous mythology by dismissing the idea that Moses wrote the Pentateuch and criticizing the history of Christianity as one of corruption and oppression. A hostile reaction came mainly from his denial of the Bible as a sacred and inspired test, human-invented Christianity, his ability commanding a large readership, and his satirical style of writing. In his writings, Paine gained ideas more from his conversations with contemporaries than from direct reading of books. He returned to America in 1802 and "had to live quietly and in a condition approaching poverty until his death in New York."
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Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826) was an American founding father, the principal author of the Declaration of Independence, and the third President of the United States. "At the beginning of the American Revolution, he served in the Continental Congress, representing Virginia and then served as a wartime Governor of Virginia (1779–1781). Just after the war ended, from mid-1784 Jefferson served as a diplomat, stationed in Paris. In May 1785, he became the United States Minister to France. Jefferson was the first United States Secretary of State (1790–1793) serving under President George Washington. With his close friend James Madison he organized the Democratic-Republican Party, and subsequently resigned from Washington's cabinet. Elected Vice-President in 1796...Jefferson opposed Adams and with Madison secretly wrote the Kentucky and Virginia Resolution, which attempted to nullify the Alien and Sedition Acts."64 He was born to Peter Jefferson, a planter and surveyor, in current Albemarle County of Virginia. Graduating from the College of William and Mary in 1762 by completing his studies only in two years, he was admitted to the Virginia bar in 1767. At the age twenty-one, he controlled the inherited land of around 5,000 acres including Monticello with 20 to 40 slaves. He married Martha Skelton in 1772 who produced six but only two surviving to the adulthood and died in 1782. He wrote the Notes on the State of Virginia during 1781 and published anonymously in Paris in 1785, and London in 1787, that describes a different aspect of the state of Virginia. It contains his firm belief in citizen's right to express themselves freely without fear of government or church reprisal, which led later to charges of atheism by his opponents in the presidential election of 1800.63 On slavery, Jefferson signed a bill prohibiting the trans-Atlantic slave trade in 1807, though the domestic slave trade was untouched.64

As an American Founding Father, Thomas Jefferson has been seen as a major American icon of liberty, democracy and republicanism owing to his drafting of the Declaration of Independence, comprising three parts: a declaration of rights, a list of grievances, and the declaration of independence proper. (i) The declared rights accept the enlightened thought of natural rights: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. - That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, - That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to affect their Safety and Happiness." (ii) In the list of grievances, "The history of the present King of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States. To prove this, let Facts be submitted to a candid world." (iii) In declaration, "We, therefore, the Representatives of the United States of America, in General Congress, Assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions, do, in the Name, and by Authority of the good People of these Colonies, solemnly publish and declare, That these United Colonies are, and of Right ought to be Free and Independent States; that they are Absolved from all Allegiance to the British Crown, and that all political connection between them and the State of Great Britain, is and ought to be totally dissolved; and that as Free and Independent States, they have full Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances, establish Commerce, and to do all other Acts and Things which Independent States may of right do."
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The right for America to declare its independence has been a matter of some controversy. The Declaration emphasizes on the right of self-defense against British aggression. But the right of self-defense is not quite the same thing as the right to re-establish a government. "The justification of right to resolve a system of government and to begin to erect a new one in its place is based on the typically enlightened concern for the end of government." British government has failed in America according to the fundamental criteria of good government as indicated in the list of grievances. The Declaration asserts that men are entitled to pursue happiness, and it is an important business for the British government to provide ordinary human happiness to the American people "without being hindered unnecessarily either by government or by their fellow men." It means that "government's capacity to promote the happiness of its subjects, however negatively, was connected with the vital question of the legitimacy of government." If governments set a base claiming to rule on their capacity to increase human happiness, it would invite their subjects to judge whether their governments to meet the criteria or not. Although they want a form of government increases the sum of human happiness, they do not desire to connect the legitimacy of government directly to the pursuit of human happiness: the outcome of elections reflects satisfaction or dissatisfaction of voters in this regard.

Jefferson does not include the property right in Declaration as one of inalienable rights which men have. At the time of the American War of Independence, he might be easier to mention on war to pursue happiness rather than to defend property right, which could easily be misinterpreted by ill-disposed persons "as a proclamation of a war to defend inequality of property distribution." One explanation may be that the right to pursue happiness includes the right to property, since the form most men's pursuit of happiness takes is the pursuit of wealth. Locke's own defense of property right stresses the right of retention, but Garry Wills emphasizes the right to alienate property from the property owner such as in the feudal system. Since the United States is a land-abundant country, "the Jeffersonian dream of America was a dream of a virtuous and frugal republic of yeoman farmers, republican Roman in modern dress." He did not place the manufacturer ahead of the farmer, and considered that "American commerce was primarily exchanging the surplus of agricultural commodities for other needs." History proves that was not the case. In this regard, Alexander Hamilton was right: he concerned much about industry and commerce, and created the financial institutions in the process of industrialization and modernization, though their differences made noise in the Washington's cabinet.

The Declaration is oddly silent about the form of government for the independent United States to take, which suggestion would eventually be taken under the new Constitution of 1787. "The Declaration certainly does not assume that the protection of natural rights is confined to one type of government only." Since France and Spain were absolute monarchies, "it would be an odd way to ask them for help by accompanying the request with the observation that their government were an affront to the sensibilities of mankind." Jefferson agrees with Paine that a republican form of government is proper to protect natural rights, as most enlightened thinkers believe the monarchy is improper to protect them in the United States of America. As a matter of fact, "the first form of national government under the original Articles of Confederation lacked both the force and the mechanism to be an effective guarantor of individual rights. It is easy to forget that only forceful government can protect rights. Strong government and natural rights are not necessary antitheses; a government so weak that it could never be a position to threaten natural rights would never be in a position to protect them. In this sense, the strong national government which eventually came to be founded on the basis of the Constitution of the United States may have been the government, in the particular circumstances, which provided best for the necessary minimum of national power and the necessary maximum of the protection of rights."
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2-2. Communism and Revolutionaries in France

According to Will and Ariel Durant, the French government was "not as despotic as Prussia's, not as corrupt as England's; its bureaucracy and provincial administration contained some good and many able men. Nevertheless, the Bourbon monarchy had failed to keep up with the economic and intellectual development of the people. Revolution came to France sooner than elsewhere because the middle classes had reached a higher stage of intelligence than in any other contemporary nation, and the alert and aroused mind of her citizenry made sharper demands upon the state than any government of the time had to meet." The French people were awakened by the enlightened thinkers demanding liberty and equality against the privileged classes of the regime. Communism was part of voices against oppression and exploitation causing resentment, arising from hunger and disease, against the rich and strong. The ministry of Turgot tried to repair the chaotic economy with the program of "no bankruptcy, no increase in taxes, and no loans" by checking the expenditures of the court and by introducing free competition in the market with the removal of monopoly. He resigned in less than two years in May 1776, that presaged the collapse of France. Jacques Necker (1732-1804) was appointed to the director of finance in October, who pursued gradual reforms to make less enemies. In contrast, France spent a billion livres by sending money and blood to America, in return receiving a impulse of freedom. Since France bypassed the Reformation and went directly from Renaissance to the Enlightenment, the voices of anti-Catholicism and religious toleration were severe and violent, while intellectuals were moved to deism or a secret atheism, that was similar to that Darwinism impaired religious belief in England in the next century. Meantime, the influence of Rousseau was tremendous. "Rousseau has a hundred times more readers among the middle class and lower class than Voltaire," since he lived in the age of feeling, though Voltaire lived in the age of reason.

In retrospect, the French Revolution attacked the nobility and clergy. The nobility had become "a vestigial organ, taking much blood from the social organism, and giving little but military service in return" without paying taxes by holding every major office in the army, the navy, and the government. Though ninety-five percent of the peasants were free in 1789, the surviving feudal dues took ten percent of their income. The clergy was hated because they were landed proprietors, lords of manors, tithe owners, and administrators in this world without paying taxes. "The poor suffer from cold and hunger, while the canons feast and think of nothing but fattening themselves like pig that are to be killed for Easter." The peasants suffered from poverty by tilling 55 percent of French land owned by the nobility, the clergy, and the king. Wages of farm laborers rose twelve percent but prices rose sixty-five percent during 1771-89. When drought and famine came in 1788-89, they became a revolutionary force. Similarly, urban laborers suffered from poverty, and the shortage of bread derived them to the street: in some towns, "workers rose in revolt, seized municipal offices, and established a brief dictatorship of the proletariat over the commune." Meantime, the middle class grew in money and power: they resented the disparity between their economic power and political participation. The bourgeoisie did not want to overthrow the monarchy, but they aspired to control it. They generally felt that the full taxation of all classes is the only way to escape from national bankruptcy. As the king hesitated the reform, the bondholders - the bourgeoisie - became a revolutionary force. In sum, "The essence of the French Revolution was the overthrow of the nobility and the clergy by a bourgeoisie using the discontent of peasants to destroy feudalism, and the discontent of urban masses to neutralize the armies of the king." There had been influential ideas before and during the revolution. Morelly and Mably were the extreme communists; while Sieyes, Mirabeau, and Brissot were the revolutionaries participating in real politics to destroy the old regime.
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Etienne-Gabriel Morelly (1717-?) was a utopian thinker and revolutionary writer who was presumably born in Paris. His family lived in Vitry-le-François in 1721, and Morelly seems to have returned to Paris by 1743. "Despite extensive biographical investigations, his works remain the major source of information about his identity and ideas." His two pedagogical works - *Essai sur l'esprit humain* of 1743 and *Essai sur le coeur humain* of 1745 - outline "the stages of learning and personality development from sensory perception, through memory or judgment, to practical experience in the world, reveal Morelly’s optimistic view of human nature." His *Le Prince les délices des coeurs* (1751) is a dialogue between a fictional prince, his courtiers and his confidant that portrays human nature as essentially positive, the political thought and describes the ideal monarch. His *Lettres de Louis XIV* (1755) implies a criticism of Louis XV by "using a collection of fictional correspondence to uphold and idealize Louis XIV’s statesmanship." His *Sinking of Floating Islands (Basiilade)* of 1753 is an heroic or epic prose poem influenced by the enlightened fascination with the Orient and the New World, which describes a golden-age of pastoral society "founded upon and governed by the love of its inhabitants for each other." The *Code of Nature* of 1755 is the other utopian work, which tries to establish a model of legislation conforming to the intention of nature - communism. He views that the private property is the basis and the vehicle of all the vices that generate "vanity, fatuity, pride, ambition, duplicity, hypocrisy, dishonesty" that break down most of our sophistic virtues. Hence, "where no property exists, none of its pernicious consequences could exist." "If it were not for the greed, egoism, rivalries, and hatreds engendered by private property, men would live together in peaceful and cooperative brotherhood." Parts of his book are extracted as below:72

(i) It is said that sacred and fundamental laws would tear out the roots of vice and of all the evils of a society: "I. Nothing in society will belong to anyone, either as a personal possession or as capital goods, except the things for which the person has immediate use, for either his needs, his pleasures, or his daily work. II. Every citizen will be a public man, sustained by, supported by, and occupied at the public expense. III. Every citizen will make his particular contribution to the activities of the community according to his capacity, his talent and his age; it is on this basis that his duties will be determined, in conformity with the distributive laws." (ii) On distributive or economic laws, "I. In order that everything be carried out in good order, without confusion or trouble, every nation will be enumerated and divided into families, tribes and cities, and, if the number of cities is large enough, into provinces as well...VIII. The quantities of the products of every variety will be determined, and will then be apportioned, either according to the number of citizens of each city, or according to the number of those who use the particular product; the durable products will be publicly distributed according to the same rules, and the surplus will be placed in reserve." (iii) On agrarian laws, "I. Every city will have a stretch of cultivable land that will be as contiguous and as uniform as possible, that will not be held either as a whole or in part as private property by anyone, and that will be sufficient for the subsistence of the inhabitants. II. If a city is situated in an arid region, then only crafts will be practiced there, and the neighboring cities will provide what is necessary for the subsistence of its inhabitants; but this city will nevertheless have, like every other community, its crops of agricultural workers, who will work either in the city's own territory wherever there are arable places, or in the agricultural areas of the neighboring cities." (iv) On police laws, "I. In every occupation, the oldest and most experienced will take turns every five days, according to seniority, in supervising five or ten of their companions, and will demand no more or less work of them than they would demand of themselves. II. In every occupational group, there will be one master for every ten or twenty workers, and it will be his task to instruct them, inspect their work, and report on their work and conduct to the chief of the crops, will be chosen annually."
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Gabriel Bonnot de Mably (1709-85), a philosopher and politician, was born to a rich noble family in southeastern France. His father was Secretary of the King in Parliament of Grenoble; his older brother John Mably rose to Provost General of the Marshalsea in Lyon, and hired Jean-Jacques Rousseau as a tutor for his children; and his two younger brothers became the leading sensualist philosopher. He went to the College de la Marche of the Jesuits in Lyon, then entered the Jesuit Seminary of St. Sulpice in Paris, and he left it in 1735 as a sub-deacon. "His religious attitude remained secret. He clearly had neither the conviction nor the ambition to pursue a career in the church. He was interested more in history and politics, particularly the development of domestic and foreign policy of France in historical perspective." Mably entered the diplomatic corps as secretary of the foreign minister in 1743. His seven years in Paris and Versailles gave him a knowledge of politics, international relations, and human nature; which ignited to "his socialist aspirations with pessimistic doubts."73 Quarreling with his boss, Mably retired to Marly in 1748, a village in the vicinity of Paris, where he devoted to his studies of mainly politics with interests in history, jurisprudence, and moral philosophy. Like Voltaire and Morelly, he was a theist without Christianity by believing in that "morality cannot be maintained without a religion of supernatural punishments and rewards." He relocated his home to Paris in the 1760s, where he actively engaged in his intellectual life through friendly relations with the circle of reformists and conservatives of Parisian society, and inclined to communism but how?

His publications of about thirty can be divided by four categories.74 (i) His Parallel Romans and the French was printed in 1740. He revised the Observations on History of the Greeks in 1764, and published the Observation on the History of France in 1765. The first two parts of the latter present his ideas on the task of the Estates General and try to prove the fall of a mixed constitution as it had existed until the fourteenth century. The third part, posthumously published in 1788, deals with the evolution of the Estates General until the seventeenth century, that contains anti-absolutist criticism with his plea for a radical reform of the French monarchy to a constitutional one. (ii) On peoples' rights, he wrote The Public Law of Europe in mid-1740 based on his preliminary work and experience of its diplomatic function as secretary to the foreign minister, which was completed by 1748 when the Treaty of Westphalia was signed, and amended later. He published the Principles of Negotiations in 1757 in which he first criticized the old regime. (iii) He wrote the Concerning the Rights and Duties of the Citizen in 1758 but was posthumously published in 1790. It proposes a republican monarchy, spending cuts in state, and a curb on land holdings and various sumptuary laws; which was influential to the political thought of the French Revolution. His Interviews Phocion of 1763 views the moral duty of politics, and his De Law of 1776 criticizes social consequences of private property. He agrees with Morelly in deriving the vice of man not from nature but from property; the property is the cause of all evils of society that should be removed to return to a kind of tribal communism. He thought that "the Indians were happier under Jesuit communism in Paraguay than the Frenchmen of his time." (iv) His other works on other topics engaged him in controversy. He attacked the Physiocrats in his Doubts Proposed to Philosophers Economists of 1768 and elsewhere. In the last years of his life, Mably published two works - From Government and Laws of Poland in 1781 and Observations on the Government and the Laws of the United States of America in 1784; viewing the possibilities of political reforms in Poland and America. In sum, he views that "communism is the only social order that will promote virtue and happiness." Hence, "All that we can do is to hold up communism as an ideal toward which civilization should gradually and cautiously move, slowly changing the habits of modern man from competition to cooperation. Our goal should be not the increase of wealth, nor even the increase of happiness, but rather the growth of virtue, for only virtue brings happiness."75 The French Revolution adopted many of his proposals.

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Emmanuel Joseph Sieyes (1748-1836) was a French Roman Catholic abbe, clergyman and political writer. As the son of a notary of Frejus in southern France, Sieyes was educated for priesthood in the Catholic Church at Sorbonne and ordained priest in 1772. Influenced by John Locke and other political thinkers of the Enlightenment, "Sieyes accepted a religious career not because he had any sort of strong religious inclination, but because he considered it the only means to advance his career as a political writer." He ascended to vicar-general in 1780 and chancellor in 1788 of the diocese of Chartres. Since he was not noble birth, his opportunities for further advancement in the church were so limited that "he was already embittered against the aristocracy by the time the States General were summoned in 1788." As writers were invited to express their views to the Estates General during the public controversy over the organization, Sieyes published his celebrated pamphlet - What Is the Third Estate? - in January 1789, which begins with three questions: (i) What is the third estate? Everything. (ii) What has it been in the political order up to present? Nothing. (iii) What does it demand? To become something.

First, "What is necessary for the subsistence and prosperity of a nation? Particular labors and public functions." Particular labors can be divided into four classes: farmers, industrial workers, merchants, and scientific professions - they are the third estate. Public functions may include "the Sword, the Robe, the Church, and the Administration." The third estate is nineteen-twentieth of all the services that the privileged order refuses to perform. The monopoly of public functions by the privileged is "a social crime against the third class" due to their exclusion, and the removal of free competition will be "more expensive and less well done." Second, "it is quite impossible that the body of the nation or even that any particular order should become free if the third estate is not free." A common law and a common representation are what make one nation. Everyone who is privileged by law departs from the common law; all the privileged is opposed to the common right; therefore, they are opposed to the third estate. The pretended utility of a privileged order for the public service is only a chimera. "If the privileged order were removed, the nation would not be something less but something more. So what is the third estate? Everything, but an 'everything' shackled and oppressed. What would it be without the privileged order? Everything, but an 'everything' free and flourishing." So many inactive people waste resources in society because of privileges, exemptions, and even rights against common law. Third, up to present, the third estate has not had true representatives in the Estates General. Therefore, "its political rights are naught." It is quite certain "that it cannot come to vote at the Estates General if it ought not to have there an influence which is as least equal to that of the privileged classes, and it demands a number of representatives equal to the number of the two other orders together...The third estate demands therefore that the votes be taken by heads and not by order." This equality of representation is influential in the Estates General in terms of the number of deputies.

His most significant contribution thus might be in that the number of deputies for the Third Estate should be equal to that of the two privileged orders combined, and the Estates General should vote not by orders but by heads. The pamphlet was so successful that he was elected as the last (the twentieth) of the deputies to the Third Estate from Paris. As a political theorist and as an elected deputy, in the opening years of the French Revolution, he shaped the currents of revolutionary thought, drafted the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789 and expanded on the theory of national sovereignty and representation. He opposed the abolition of the tithe and the confiscation of Church lands, which reduced his authority. After the execution of Robespierre, he reemerged as an important political player. Advising Napoleon Bonaparte to take over the government and inaugurate a new constitution, Sieyes played a prominent role in organizing the coup d'etat that brought him to power. He was elected in the second in chair of the French Academy in 1803, but was expelled after the restoration in 1815.
Honore Gabriel Mirabeau (1749-91) was a revolutionary, writer, journalist, and politician in France. He was born at Le Bignon near Memours to Victor de Mirabeau, an economist of the Physiocratic school. He entered the military academy in Paris, where he acquired mathematics, German, and English, and read eagerly. "He read Voltaire and lost religion and read Rousseau and learned to feel for commonality." He was commissioned to a cavalry regiment in 1767. His love scandal (that his father obtained a letter de cachet) caused him to join the French expedition to Corsica, where he proved his military genius. He learned the value of hard work in the French army, which contributed to his popular success in later years during the Revolution. After his return, he married Marie de Covet in 1772 by expecting a rich dowry though gained very little, and permanently separated in 1774. Mirabeau quarreled with a country gentleman, which made him imprisoned on an island off Marseilles in 1774. He was transferred to the castle of Joux, where he fell in love with Sophie, escaped to Switzerland and to the Netherlands, but was caught and sent back to Paris, and imprisoned in the castle of Vincennes in 1777. In the prison, he developed "how to curb his natural eloquence and his dialect became firm, commanding and moving." He was released under custody of his father in December 1780. He wrote Des Lettres de Cachet et des prisons d'état in prison and published it in 1782, which described the injustices of arrest without warrant and detention without trial and demanded reform of prisons and the law: it so moved Louis XVI that he ordered the release of all the prisoners held at Vincennes. He left Paris for Holland, where he was employed by a publisher. In 1784, he met Nehra who was the daughter of a Dutch statesman and political writer: she was an educated woman capable of appreciating Mirabeau’s good points - her love strengthened his life. He went to London where his Lettres de Cachet was translated and well-admired, and wrote the Considerations sur Pordre de Cincinnatus in 1785. On return to Paris, after a preliminary trip to Berlin, he was dispatched in June 1786 on a secret mission to the court of Prussia and returned in January 1787.80

Mirabeau published the Secret History of the Court of Berlin in 1787 and De la monarchie prussienne sous Frederic le Grand in 1788 based on information obtained from his trips and from an expert on Prussia. "On hearing of the king's decision to summon the Estates General, Mirabeau went to Provence, and offered to assist at the preliminary conference of the nobility of his district, but was rejected. He appealed to the Third Estate and was elected to the Estates in both Aix and Marseilles."91 He chose Aix and attended to the opening of the Estates General on 4 May 1789 as a deputy of democratic commoners. Although the scandals of his private life with women, time in prison, and extensive debt were all well known, his great capacity for work and extensive knowledge were influential in the National Assembly. "From the beginning, Mirabeau recognized that government exists in order that the bulk of the population may pursue their daily work in peace and quiet, and that for a government to be successful it must be strong.” La Marck, a close friend of the queen, consulted Mirabeau on "what measures the king ought take" after the events of October 5th and 6th in 1789. He wrote a state-paper for the court: If the king is not free in Paris, he must go to a provincial capital, where he must appeal to the people and summon a great convention. It would be ruinous to appeal to the nobility. "When this great convention met, the king must show himself ready to recognize that great changes have taken place, that feudalism and absolutism have forever disappeared, and that a new relation between king and people has arisen, which must be loyalty observed as both side for the future." In April 1790, Mercy-Argenteau, Austrian Ambassador to Paris - a queen's informal adviser - became a medium of communication between Mirabeau and the court. Since then, he wrote many state-papers for the court, and the court paid his debts in return. He established harmony between the minister and the Assembly by preventing the Assembly from doing much harm in foreign affairs. Unfortunately, Mirabeau died of illness in April 1791. Mirabeau ‘s plan never took effect.
Jacques Pierre Brissot (1754-93) was a lawyer, writer, publisher, and a leader of Girondins as "a moderate bourgeois faction that opposed the radical-democratic Jacobins during the French Revolution." He was born to an inn-keeper at Chartres, received education, and hired by a lawyer in Paris. He married Felicite Dupont who translated English works into French and had three children. By reading Voltaire and Rousseau, he had literary ambitions, which led him to go London in 1783, where he published literary articles and founded two periodicals, but failed. Returning to Paris, he was imprisoned in the Bastille for pamphlets against the government but was released in September 1784. He was forced to retire to London, where he devoted himself to pamphleteering. Inspired by the English anti-slavery movement, he later founded the Society of the Friends of Blacks in February 1788. "He left for the United States in May, but, when the Estates-General were convened in France, he returned and launched a newspaper, Le Patriote francais in May 1789 (that later became an organ of the Girondins). Elected to the first municipality of Paris, he took delivery of the keys of the Bastille when it had been stormed. After Louis XVI's flight to Varennes, Brissot attacked the king's inviolability in a long speech to the Jacobins (July 10, 1791) that contained all the essentials of his future foreign policy. Elected to the Legislative Assembly, he immediately concerned himself with foreign affairs, joining the diplomatic committee." Although the Jacobin leader opposed him, war was declared on Austria in April 1792, that gave fresh impulse to the revolutionary movement despite the early defeats. As the Jacobins of the Paris Commune denounced him, Brissot represented Eure-et-Loir in the National Convention. He was still influential in the diplomatic committee: his report led to war being declared on Britain and the Dutch in February 1793. As the Convention was further radicalized, he and other Girondins were charged by being "agents of the counter-revolution and of the foreign powers" in June and executed in October of the year.82

Britannica wrote on his capacity as below: "Of the Girondists, Vergniaud was the better orator, but Brissot was quick, eager, impetuous, and a man of wide knowledge. However, he was indecisive, and not qualified to struggle against the fierce energies roused by the events of the Revolution." He was one of the most influential writers on the success of the French Revolution or "at least have the most accelerated its movement." From the end of 1791, under leadership of Brissot, the Girondins supported foreign war as a means to unite the people behind the scene by spreading the principles of the French Revolution with his diatribes against European monarchs. The followers of Brissot and the followers of Lafayette entered into tactical alliance to promote war, although their goals were different. Brissot favored offensive war with courage or devotion as a sign of patriotism by rejecting a defensive strategy that looked like treason. "Lafayette wanted ultimately to preserve order and a constitutional system. Brissot advocated a crusade against kings that would be bound to result in more far-reaching consequences. With a black and white view of the world, Brissot saw all kings and their allies as evil. He rejected peace and even diplomatic relations with those men whom he perceived as enemies."83 Meantime, Brissot and the Girondins were against the execution of the king because of two negative reasons: the loss of negotiating power with foreign countries, and the fear of massive royalist rebellion. From the opening of the National Convention in September 1792, the Girondins united in opposition to the Jacobins, but they "were held responsible for the defeats suffered by the army in the spring of 1793 and were made more unpopular by their refusal to respond to the economic demands of the Parisian workers." In other words, the Girondins failed in leading the Revolution due to their reluctance to adopt emergency measure to stimulate the revolutionary currents, and to provide policies to carry out economic policies for the Parisian workers. This was the indisputable limit of his capacity leading the Girondins at a critical time resulting in life or death from the ruthless fighting or competition with the Jacobins, the radical revolutionaries.
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Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-78) was a philosopher, writer, and composer of Romanticism of French expression. He was born at Geneva, a Huguenot republic since 1536, governed by the a secretive executive committee of 25 members from its wealthiest families. His father was a watchmaker and his mother was a daughter of minister died shortly after his birth. Rousseau was raised by his aunt Suzanne, from whom he acquired his passion for music. He was sent to board for two years with a Calvinist minister in a hamlet outside Geneva, where he learned the elements of mathematics and drawing. At age thirteen, he was apprenticed to a notary for a few months, and to an engraver. After returning to the city from pastime and finding the city gates locked due to the curfew, he ran away from Geneva in March 1728. "In adjoining Savoy, he took shelter with a Roman Catholic priest, who introduced him to Francoise-Louise de Warrens, age 29. She was a noblewoman of Protestant background who was separated from her husband. As professional lay proselytizer, she was paid by the King of Piedmont to help bring Protestants to Catholicism."\(^{84}\) They sent him to Turin to complete his conversion. Despite her inclining to deism, she was attracted to Catholic doctrine - forgiveness of sins. Rousseau supported himself for a time as a servant, secretary, and tutor, wandering around Italy and France, while he lived on and off with De Warrens. When Rousseau reached at age 20, she took him as her lover and the steward of her house. She had a large library and loved music. Rousseau was introduced to her intellectual circle - the world of letters and ideas. She arranged a formal music lessons for his profession, while he read books broadly. As her affairs shifted to the other as early as the summer 1737, Rousseau lost his paradise. Becoming a tutor at Lyons shortly, he moved to Paris in 1742 with a new system of musical notation, unexpectedly that was not accepted by the Academy.

Becoming Secretary of French Ambassador to Venice in 1743-44, Rousseau experienced a profound distrust of government bureaucracy. Returning to Paris, he met Therese Levasseur in March 1745, who remained his companion until his death, though Rousseau never felt the least love for her, and never desired to possess her. He took a job as Clerk in the office of Dupin, while he maintained contacts with the enlightened thinkers - Voltaire, Diderot, d'Holbach, and Grimm. In 1749, Rousseau won the first prize from the Academy of Dijon with the Discourse on the Arts and Sciences that was published in 1750. He wrote both the words and music of his opera Le Devine du Village, which was performed for Louise XV in 1752, who offered a lifetime pension to him but he turned down. On returning to Geneva, he converted to Calvinism and regained his official citizenship. He published a Discourse on the Origin of the Inequality of Mankind in Geneva in 1755 that was written in Paris two years ago. In 1756, he moved with Therese and her elderly mother into the Hermitage, where he wrote a romantic novel - Julie, ou la nouvelle Heloise, referring to the Heloise of Heloise and Abelard fame, which became perhaps the most famous novel of the 1700s. He published his great works The Social Contract and Emile or On Education in Geneva in 1762. The Letters from the Mountain was printed at the end of 1764 that became sensational. He took refuge in Britain by Hume's help in January 1766, where he began to write his autobiography. Returning to France in May 1767 under a false name, he resumed to write his biography. The French Court allowed him to return to Paris subject to not publishing books in 1770, so that Rousseau was able to read his Confessions in public in Paris. Upon invitation, the Considerations of the Government of Poland was written in 1776. The Confessions was posthumously published in Geneva: Book 1-6 were published in 1782 and Book 7-12 in 1789. It was an honest exposure of his personal life without hiding any part of his past. Though the same title was used only by St. Augustine of Hippo who wrote it in Latin during AD 397-8, it was concerned with inner emotion rather than with outward achievement.\(^{85}\)
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Photo III-2.3. Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-78)

Photo III-2.4. Rousseau’s *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality of Mankind* published in 1755

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The Origin of Inequality of Mankind: Rousseau negatively views the effect of arts and science on morals in his debut essay - *A Discourse on the Moral Effects of the Arts and Sciences* of 1750. The progress of the arts and sciences has added nothing to real happiness of mankind, because luxury and profligacy - arising not from human needs but from a result of pride and vanity - corrupt and dissolve our morals. The progress of knowledge made government more powerful but crushed individual liberty: the princes should use knowledge of the learned in order to promote the happiness of mankind. "Let the learned of the first rank find an honorable refuge in their courts; let them there enjoy the only recompense worthy of them, that of promoting by their influence the happiness of the people they have enlightened by their wisdom. It is by means only that we are likely to see what virtue, science and authority can do, when animated by the noblest emulation, and working unanimously for the happiness of mankind. But so long as power alone in on one side, and knowledge and understanding alone on the other, the learned will seldom make great objects their study, princes will still more rarely do great actions, and the peoples will continue to be, as they are, mean, corrupt and miserable."

In his *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality of Mankind* of 1755, Rousseau views that there are two kinds of inequality among human species: one is natural or physical, and the other is moral or political inequality. Naturally, human being consists in a different of age, health, bodily strength, and the qualities of the mind or of the soul, so that the strongest and the smartest turned his labor to best account. Politically, human being depends on a kind of convention, and is established or at least authorized by the consent of men; that consists of the different privileges, making people richer or more powerful. In the state of nature, a savage man is robust and content with simple desires like food, a female, and sleep; the only evils he fears are pain and hunger; no savage knows what it is to die, he knows neither greed nor resentment; and his needs are simple and his desires are instantaneously fulfilled. He faces natural inequalities which do not exacerbated by inequities: accumulations of the products of the arts and sciences in the hands of some men but not others. The savage man kills his enemy or his rival for self-preservation, but not out of mere competitiveness; while he has no moral relations or determinate obligations one with another. There are differences or inequalities between men in a state of nature, however, their degree of inequalities is much less or lower than that of inequalities in a state of society.

Let's suppose that men had so multiplied that the natural produce of the earth was no longer sufficient for their support. They are forced to cooperate for mutual interest or compete each other in a conflict of interest. Meanwhile, they establish families under one roof, and families create the bonds between them for reciprocal defense against external threats; which forms a new community through more intimate connections. Morality began to appear in human actions, and everyone was the only judge and avenger of the injuries done him, so that the goodness which was suitable in the pure state of nature was no longer proper in the new-born state of society. As the cultivation of land necessarily create its distribution; property, once recognized, gave rise to the first rule of justice - the right of property; its inheritances intensify inequality, which causes the most terrible disorders - a state of war - in the new society. Every man arms against the rest, and no safety could be expected either in riches or in poverty. People want to institute rules of justice and peace, with reciprocal obligations between the powerful and the weak. They choose a supreme power that may govern them by wise laws to protect all the members of the association, accepting their chains in hope of securing their liberty. “Such was, or may well have been, the origin of society and law, which bound new fetters on the poor, and gave new powers to the rich; which irretrievably destroyed natural liberty, eternally fixed the law of property and inequality, converted clever usurpation into unalterable right, and, for the advantage of a few ambitious individuals, subjected all mankind to perpetual labor, slavery and wretchedness.”87
“It is easy to see how the establishment of one community made that of all the rest necessary, and how, in order to make head against united forces, and the rest of mankind had to unite in turn. Societies soon multiplied and spread over the face of the earth, till hardly a corner of the world was left in which a man could escape the yoke.” As civil right has become the common rule among the members of each community, the law of nature maintains its place only between different communities, where, under the name of the right of nations, "it was qualified by certain tacit conventions, in order to make commerce practicable, and serve as a substitute for natural compassion" that is no longer survived except in some great cosmopolitan spirits. But in bodies politics, the division of mankind into different communities is often followed by national wars, battles, murders, and reprisals. As government has in its infancy and the political state remains imperfect, the public alone was to be witness and judge. If it were inconsistent with common-sense, "It is beyond dispute, and indeed the fundamental maxim of all political right, that people have set up chiefs to protect their liberty, and not enslave them." No man can sell his liberty as to submit to an arbitrary power which may use him as it likes. Liberty is a gift which people hold from nature as being men, so "their parents (meaning any authorities) have no right whatsoever to deprive them of it" because nature would not have to be changed. In the very nature of the contract, the parties would be sole judges in their own cause, and each would always have a right to renounce the contract, as soon as he found that the other had violated its terms, or that they no longer suited his convenience. "The different forms of government owe their origin to the differing degrees of inequality which existed between individuals at the time of their institution." If any one man is pre-eminent in power, virtue, riches or personal influence, he becomes sole magistrate forming a monarchy; if several stood above the rest, they form an aristocracy; and if the commons lead the supreme administration, a democracy is formed - the three types of governments.

In these different governments, all the offices were at first elective. "But the more elections had to be repeated, and the more they became a nuisance; intrigues set in, factions were formed, party feeling grew bitter, civil wars broke out; the lives of individuals were sacrificed to the pretended happiness of the State; and at length men were on the point of replacing into their primitive anarchy. Ambitious chiefs profited by these circumstances to perpetuate their offices in their own families: at the same time the people, already used to dependence, ease, and the convenience of life, and already incapable of breaking its fetters, agreed to an increase of its slavery, in order to secure its tranquility." Having become hereditary, magistrates "contracted the habit of considering their offices as a family estate, and themselves as proprietors of the communities of which they were at first only the officers, of regarding their fellow-citizens as their slaves, and numbering them, like cattle, among their belongs, and of calling themselves the equals of the gods and kings of the kings.” Accordingly, the progress of inequality establishes laws and the right of property (rich and poor) the first; the institution of magistracy (powerful and weak) the second; and the conversion of legitimate into arbitrary power (master and slave) the third, which are the degree of inequality. The last term of inequality is a complete return to the law of the strongest - despotism - as a consequence of excessive corruption; that completely dissolved the original contract of government. The tyranny has no right to complain of violence - the popular insurrection compelling him, because he violated the contract making people happy, and because it is plainly contrary to the law of nature. Rousseau questions to himself how the soul and the passions of men insensibly change their very nature; why our wants and pleasures in the end seek new objects; and why the original man having vanished by degrees, society offers to us only an assembly of artificial men. The savage man lives within himself, while the social man lives constantly outside himself, so that the spirit of society and the inequality, not by any means of the original state of man, "transform and alter all our natural inclinations."
The Social Contract: Rousseau hopes to harmonize individual liberty with governmental authority. He views that “Man is born free; and everywhere he is in chains. One thinks himself the master of others, and still remains greater slave than they.” A family is natural, so children attached only so long as they need him for their preservation. As soon as this need ceases, the natural bond is dissolved, and they become independent. If they remain united, it is not natural but conventional. The family is the first political society: “the ruler corresponds to the father, and the people to the children; and all, being born free and equal, alienate their liberty only for their own advantage.” The right of the strongest is not justified “unless he transforms strength into right, and obedience into duty.” Since no man has a natural authority over his fellow and force creates no right, “conventions form the basis of all legitimate authority among men.” On slavery, he views that “To renounce liberty is to renounce being a man, to surrender the rights of humanity and even its duties.” A slave made in war or conquest has no foundation other than the right of the strongest. The right of slavery is not only illegitimate but also absurd and meaningless. In forming an association to defend and protect natural liberty, the problem lies in how he can remain as free as before, and how he can regain his original rights if the association violates the agreement. The problem is resolved by the Social Contract. "Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will, and, in our corporate capacity, we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole." Alienating all of personal rights to the whole community, each individual becomes a member of the newly created political association; in which all people enjoy civil liberty by obeying self-set obligations. Unlike natural liberty bounded by individual, civil liberty is limited by general will or public spirit for the common good of the community, which decrees laws through the assembly containing votes in order to maintain the conditions of civil society. This public person - the union of all the members - is called State when passive, Sovereign when active, and Power when compared with others like itself.

"The passage from the state of nature to the civil state produces a very remarkable change in man, by substituting justice for instinct in his conduct, and giving his actions the morality they had formerly lacked." Through the device of general will, Rousseau attempts to reconcile the apparent tension between natural liberty bounded only by the strength of the individual and civil liberty secured by morality and laws. On real property, he views that each member of the community gives himself to it including all the resources at his command, but the right of the first occupier should be held by its members since "every man has naturally a right to everything he needs." He defines that the right of the first occupier becomes a real right only when the property right has already been established by the conditions as below: first, the land must not yet be inhabited; second, a man must occupy only the amount he needs for his substance; and third, possession must be taken by labor and cultivation. He raises questions and explains how the lands of individuals became public territory and how the right of Sovereign, extending from the subjects over the lands they held, became at once real and personal. In taking over the goods of individuals, the community “only assures them legitimate possession and changes usurpation into a true right and enjoyment into proprietorship.” The possessors who gave up their properties are regarded as depositaries of the public good such as maintaining forces against foreign aggression. He emphasizes that "the right which each individual has to his own estate is always subordinate to the right which the community has over all: without this, there would be neither stability in the social tie, nor real force in the exercise of Sovereignty." Book I remarks two points: "that, instead of destroying natural inequality, the fundamental compact substitutes, for such physical inequality as nature may have set up between men, an equality that is moral and legitimate, and that men, who may be unequal in strength or intelligence, become every one equal by convention and legal right." Laws are always of use to those who possess and harmful to those who have nothing.89
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Therefore, the general will alone can direct the State according to the object for which it was instituted, that is the common good. Sovereignty is nothing less than the exercise of the general will, so it can never be alienated. Sovereignty also is indivisible in principle for the same reason but is divided according to its object such as into legislative and executive powers. Rousseau sees a great deal of difference between the will of all (majority will) and the general will: “the latter considers only the common interest, while the former takes private interest into account,” and the general will remains as the sum of the differences. No partial society is allowed within the State; but "if there are partial societies, it is best to have as many as possible and to prevent them from being unequal." As nature gives each man absolute power over all his members, the social compact also gives the body politic absolute power over all its members - Sovereignty - under the direction of the general will. The Sovereign is sole judge of what is important, but cannot impose upon its subjects any fetters that are useless to the community. The sovereign power is absolute, but it does not and cannot exceed the limits of general conventions. When the general will changes its nature by pursuing particular objects, it is no longer a general will and is acting no longer as Sovereign, because it violates an equality and commonality to all that the social compact initially sets up among the citizens. On the right of life and death, Rousseau views that the social treaty has for its end the preservation of the contracting parties. Every man has a right to risk his own life in order to preserve it: a man who throws himself out of the window to escape from a fire is not guilty of suicide. Nevertheless, if the State orders that you should die, he ought to die since “his life is no longer a mere bounty of nature, but a gift made conditionally by the State.” If the trial and the judgment are the proofs that he has broken the social treaty, he must be removed by exile as a violator of the compact or by death as a public enemy. In a well-governed State, there are few punishments, while the Sovereign has the right of pardoning and exempting the guilty from a penalty imposed by the law. Frequent punishments are always a sign of weakness.

“In a state of nature, where everything is common, I owe nothing to him whom I have promised nothing; I recognize as belong to others only what is of no sue to me. In the state of society all rights are fixed by law, and the case becomes different.” When the whole people decrees for the whole people, the decree is made is general, which act is called a law. Hence, the object of laws is always general, and never particular person or action. Properly speaking, laws are “only the conditions of civil association.” At the birth of society, the association creates an assembly which members - legislators - are elected by the people in order to make law, which mould the ruler. The legislators occupy in every respect an extraordinary position in the State, but they can never claim the right to pass any law merely on their own authority without consent of the people. Every law the people has not ratified in person is null and void – is, in fact, not a law. Rousseau recognizes the difficulty of legislation, which compelled the fathers of nations to have recourse to divine intervention and credit the gods with their own wisdom in submitting laws of the State, such as in the Judaic law. He concerns three points on the people. First, the maturity of the people is important to establish a successful regime: the Russians are barbarous and not ripe for civilization. Second, "it is possible to fix limits that will make it neither too large for good government, nor too small for self-maintenance," so the State must assure itself a safe and solid foundation. The men make the State, and the territory sustains the men, the right relation therefore is "that the land should suffice for the maintenance of the inhabitants, and that there should be as many inhabitants as the land can maintain.” Third, liberty and equality are two main objects in the systems of legislation. We are told, such equality is an unpractical ideal that cannot actually exist, but we have to make regulation continuously to keep equality against the reverse trends by constraining its abuses. Rousseau closes Book II by introducing the four types of laws - political or fundamental laws; civil laws, criminal laws, and custom laws.
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Book III deals with the different forms of government. The legislative power belongs to the people, but the executive power cannot belong to the generality of Sovereign "because it consists wholly of particular acts which fall outside the competency of the law, and consequently of the Sovereign, whose acts must always be laws." An intermediate body between the subjects and the Sovereign is called *magistrates, kings, or governors*; and the whole body bears the name *Prince*; who executes the laws and maintains liberty. The government gets orders from the Sovereign and gives them to the people. If the State is properly balanced, the power of the government is well received by the power of the citizens. "If the Sovereign desires to govern, or the magistrate to give laws, or if the subjects refuse to obey, disorder takes the place of regularity, force and will no longer act together, and the State is dissolved and falls into despotism or anarchy." In a perfect act of legislation, the general will dominates the individual and the corporate wills; while in the natural order, the general will is always weakest, the corporate will second, and the individual will strongest of all due to the desire of self-preservation. The forms of government depend on the number of magistrates in the government: *democracy* is ruled by the whole people or the majority of the people; *aristocracy* is ruled by a small number of the people; *monarchy* is ruled by a single magistrate; and the combination of them may result in *mixed forms*.

"Nothing is more dangerous than the influence of private interests in public affairs, and the abuse of the laws by the government is a less evil than the corruption of the legislator, which is the inevitable sequel to a particular standpoint. In such case, the State being altered in substance, all reformation becomes impossible." A small State with great simplicity of manners is suitable for democracy. Rousseau introduces natural, elective, and hereditary aristocracies: "as artificial inequality produced by institutions became predominant over natural inequality, riches and power were put before age, and aristocracy became elective. Finally, the transmission of the father's power along with his goods to his children, by creating patrician families, made government hereditary, and there came to be senators of twenty." On monarchy, the will of the people, the will of the prince, the public force of the State, and the particular force of the government are all in the hands of prince towards the same end. The power coming of a people's love is no doubt the greatest; but it is precarious and conditional, and princes will never rest content with it: they usually want to be powerful. Monarchy is suitable only for great States where the distance between prince and people is too great, and the State lacks the bond of union. The mixed governments are able to overcome the weaknesses of a single form of government in some ways.

All forms for government do not suit all countries because each government faces different natures of the people and lands holding different endowments. Rousseau views the marks of a good government are in the preservation and prosperity of its people. "As the particular will acts constantly in opposition of the general will, the government continually exerts itself against the Sovereignty." Then, sooner or later the prince inevitably suppresses the Sovereign and breaks the social contract. The abuse of government causes its tendency to degenerate the system either by contraction from democracy to aristocracy and from aristocracy to monarchy or by dissolving the State in two ways. First, when the prince ceases to administer the State in accordance with the laws and usurps the Sovereign power, the State is dissolved and another one is formed solely by the members of the government to be master and tyrant. Second, when the members of the government severally usurp the power, the State is dissolved, which results in anarchy: royalty becomes tyranny. "Such is the natural and inevitable tendency of the best constituted governments." Whenever the laws grow weak as they become old, the State is dead. The deities of the people are not and cannot be its representatives: they are merely its stewards. The idea of representation is modern, but as soon as the members of assembly are once elected, slavery overtakes it, and it is nothing but a short moment of liberty.
In Book IV, when the social bond begins to be relaxed and the State to grow weak, and when particular interests begin to make the smaller societies influence over the larger, the general will ceases to be the will of all and becomes mute. Is the general will exterminated or corrupted? "Not at all: it is always constant, unalterable and pure; but it is subordinated to other wills which encroach upon its sphere." Rousseau views that "Even in selling his vote for money, he does not extinguish in himself the general will, but only eludes it." In voting, all the qualities of the general will resides in the majority though there are several grades of unequal divisions. He agrees with Montesquieu that election by lot is democratic in nature. If choice and lot are combined in election, positions requiring special talents should be filled by the former. He analyzes the Roman Comitia to learn some lessons from them. First, the Comitia Tributa were the council of the Roman people, who elected the tribunes, in which the senate had no right to be present, and was forced to obey laws on which they could not vote. Rousseau names it the tribunate - "the preserver of the laws and of the legislative power" which serves sometimes to protect the Sovereign against the government, as the tribunes of the people did at Rome. Second, the Romans adopted the dictatorship at the time of crisis to avoid the ruin of the State. During the first period of the Republic, the dictatorship was often employed because the Senate had not yet a firm enough basis to be able to maintain itself by the strength of its constitution alone. Towards the end of the Republic, the Romans used their dictatorship to defend the public liberty against force from abroad. Dictators held office for six months only, and abdicated before their time was up, so no further project was possible to them. Third, the censorship is the declaration of public judgment: public opinion is the form of law which the censor administers, like the prince, only applies to particular cases. "When legislation grows weak, morality degenerates; but in such cases the judgment of the censors will not do what the force of the laws has failed to effect." The censorship may be useful to preserve morality by preventing opinion from growing corrupt.

In discussions of civil religion, Rousseau raises a question: Why there were no wars of religion in pagan times, where each State had its cult and its gods? He answers that "it was precisely because of each State, having its own cult as well as its laws." As Jesus came to set up a spiritual kingdom on earth, the theological was separated from the political, which brought about the internal divisions of the people as well as the external divisions of the world. He views three types of religion. First, the religion of man is informal, unorganized, and limited to the purely internal worship of god and the eternal obligations of morality. It is the true theism called natural divine right or law. Christianity is concerned solely with the things of heaven, not of this world. Christians make bad soldiers who won't fight with the passion and patriotism. Second, the religion of the citizen is a national religion defined as civil or positive divine right or law. Organized with formal dogmas, it teaches love of country, obedience to the state, and martial virtues. It is necessary to provide the state with moral underpinnings; but if religion is separate from the state, then there is always the danger of disobedience. Third, the religion of the priest causes conflict of interest between state and church: it gives men two codes of legislation, two rulers, and two countries, renders them subject to contradictory duties, and makes it impossible for them to be faithful to both the religion and citizenship. Believing in religious tolerance, Rousseau suggests a public religion making good citizens. "There is therefore a purely civil profession of faith of which the Sovereign should fix the articles, not exactly as religious dogmas, but as social sentiments without which a man cannot be a good citizen or a faithful subject...The dogma of civil religion ought to be few, simple, and...The existence of a mighty, intelligent and beneficent Divinity, possessed of foresight and providence, the life to come, the happiness of the just, the punishment of the wicked, the sanctity of the social contract and the laws: these are its positive dogmas. Its negative dogma I confine to one, intolerance."
Chapter III. Political Philosophy

Emile or on Education was a treatise on the nature of education and of man, tackling fundamental political and philosophical questions about relationship between individual and society through the novelistic device of Emile and his tutor. Although it was banned in France and Geneva and was publicly burned in 1762, Emile served "as the inspiration for what became a new national system of education" during the French Revolution. Some consider it as the first philosophy of education in Western culture. It consists of five books. Dealing with how one would have to raise a child, Book I begins with that "Everything is good as it leaves the hands of the Author of things; everything degenerates in the hands of man." Plants are shaped by cultivation and man by education; and everything which we do not have at our birth but we need when we are grown is given by education. This education comes to us from nature or from men or from things, but we are the hypothetical masters only for that from men. If three educations were different from one another, one must choose between making a man or a citizen because one cannot make both at the same time. As expressed in his Social Contract, natural man is entirely for himself, but civil man is only a fractional unity of the whole, which is the social body. “Good social institutions are those that best know how to denature man, to take his absolute existence from him in order to give him a relative one and transport the I into the common unity.” To denature man is to suppress some of natural instincts, which is an effort to explain how natural man can live within society. Rousseau introduces two contrary forms of instruction from opposed objects – one is public and common, and the other is individual and domestic. He suggests many details of nursing and education from one’s birth, when half of the children born perish before the eighth year in his time. Believing that nature has already done half of the work in education, he views that the poor man does not need to be educated because his station gives him a compulsory education (meaning that weeds grow stronger). The natural education ought to make a man fit for all human conditions, so the rich man receives least education from his station.

Book II discusses about the initial interactions of the child with the world in the second period of life as his infancy has gone. “The most dangerous period of human life is that from birth to the age of twelve. This is the time when errors and vices germinate without one’s yet having any instrument for destroying them; and by the time the instrument comes, the roots are so deep that it is too late to rip them out.” Rousseau sees that the process of education should follow the order of nature: the children must not be constrained since the perpetual constraint in keeping them exacerbates their vivacity - nature wants children to be children before being men understanding reason, and they should be treated according to their ages: “Let childhood ripen in children.” Their education should be derived less from books and more from interactions with the world, with the developing the senses and the ability to draw inferences from them. The first education consists “not at all in teaching virtue or truth but in securing the heart from vice and the mind from error… if you could bring your pupil healthy and robust to the age of twelve without his knowing how to distinguish his right hand from his left, at your first lessons the eyes of his understanding would open nothing in him which could hinder the effect of your care. Soon he would become in your hands the wisest of men; and in beginning by doing nothing, you would have worked an educational marvel.” Rousseau views that “the only lesson of morality appropriate to childhood, and the most important for every age, is never to harm anyone. The very precept of doing good, if it is not subordinated to this one, is dangerous, false, and contradictory.” Our primary sentiments are centered on our preservation and our well-being, so it is a mistake to speak to children of their duties without their rights; it is rather wise to tell them the opposite of what is necessary. Taking an example of playing at flying kites, he implies that the children have never specifically been taught, but they are able to understand the physical world through inference, and it is possible for them to achieve their tasks by cultivation of the sixth sense called common sense.
Chapter III. Political Philosophy

From the age of twelve up to adolescence, children would be very weak as a man, but very strong as a child as noted in his Book III. Rousseau views that "In the state of weakness and insufficiency concern for our preservation concentrates us within ourselves. In the state of power and strength the desire to extend our being takes us out of ourselves and causes us to leap as far as is possible for us. But since the intellectual world is still unknown to us, our thought does not go farther than our eyes, and our understanding is extended only along with the space it measures." 92 “Remember always that the spirit of my education consists not in teaching the child many things, but in never letting anything, it would be of little importance to me provided he made on mistakes. I put truth into his head only to guarantee him against the errors he would learn in their place. Reason and judgment come slowly; prejudices come in crowds; it is from them that he must be preserved.” He views that a fundamental principle of good education in "not to teach him the sciences but to give him the taste for loving them and methods for learning them when this taste is better developed” while curiosity challenges him from "a bottomless sea, without shores, full of reefs." The ideas of social relations are formed little by little in a child’s mind even before he can be an active member of society. Reason and judgment come slowly.

The education of the post-adolescence period is dealt with in Book IV. Our passions are the principal instruments of our preservation: reaching at maturity, man needs a female companion since love is a natural movement. I have taught my Emile how to live and how to earn his bread, but this is not enough. “To live in the world, one must know how to deal with men; one must know the instruments which give one a hold over them. One must know how to calculate the action and the reaction of particular interests in civil society and to foresee events so accurately that one is rarely mistaken in one’s undertakings, or at least has chosen the best means of succeeding.” Rousseau exposed his natural religion remaining in involuntary skepticism. He writes that “Tow-thirds of mankind are neither Jews nor Mohammedans nor Christians, and how many million men have never heard of Moses, Jesus Christ, or Mohammed? ...Will they all go to hell for having been recluses?” “These religions can all have their justifications in the climate, the government, the genius of the people, or some other local cause which makes one preferable to another according to the time and place. I believe them all to be right as long as one serves God suitably.” Emile cultivates the relations with his companion through books, theater, and tour. Rousseau wants to teach him to feel and to love the beautiful of all sorts in order to fix his affections and tastes on it and to prevent his natural appetites from becoming corrupted.

Introducing Sophie, a woman to be Emile’s companion, Book V begins with describing differences between men and women when education of women was mostly ignored in society. “In what they have in common, they are equal. Where they differ, they are not comparable. A perfect woman and a perfect man ought not to resemble each other in mind any more than in looks, and perfection is not susceptible of more or less. In the union of the sexes each contributes equally to the common aim, but not in the same way. From this diversity arises the first assignable difference in the moral relations of the two sexes.”93 Sophie is eighteen with the charms of sensitivity, virtue, love of decent things as well as talents and sentiments; and Emile is twenty-two with the effects of successful education. In matching poor Sophie and rich Emile, Rousseau writes that “I do not say that compatibilities based on convention are immaterial in marriage, but I do say that the influence of natural compatibilities is so much more important that it alone is decisive for the fate of married life. There is a suitability of tastes, dispositions, sentiments, and characters.” Despite their falling in love each other, Emile leaves Sophie for two years of tour in order to learn more about the world before his becoming a member of the state. The designated project requires him to know his physical relations with other beings, his moral relations with other men, and his civil relations with his fellow citizens. Gentleness is the first quality of a women.
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The Confessions and Romanticism: Romanticism was an artistic, literary, and intellectual movement that originated in Europe and flourished in most areas in 1800-40 at its peak. Rousseau was the first great figure in the Romantic movement in his writings, but to some extent he only expressed already existing tendencies. Bertrand Russell introduced that movement as follows:94 (i) Cultivated French people, in the eighteenth century, admired sensibility that meant the emotion of sympathy. "The man of sensibility would be moved to tears by the sight of a single destitute peasant family, but would be cold to well-thought-out schemes for ameliorating the lot of peasants as a class. The poor were supposed to possess more virtue than the rich; the sage was thought of as a man who retires from the corruption of courts to enjoy the peaceful pleasures." (ii) The romantics were not without morals; on the contrary, their moral judgments were sharp and vehement. They were based on quite other principles than those that had seemed good to their predecessors. By the time of Rousseau, many people had been tired of safety, and began to desire excitement. There was revolt against the existing system - against monarchy and aristocracy, industrialism, and conservative principles. (iii) The Romantic Movement is characterized by the substitution of aesthetic for utilitarian standards. The Romantics love beauty, but their senses of beauty are different from their predecessors, such as their preference for Gothic architecture. Rousseau naturally admired the Alps, and his followers wrote on wild nature, which is useless, destructive, and violent. (iv) The temper of romantics is best studied in fiction. "They liked what was strange: ghosts, ancient decayed castles, the last melancholy descendants of once-great families, practitioners of mesmerism and occult sciences, falling tyrants and pirates." Thus, Romanticism admires passions in love, and its essential form is considered as a reaction or revolt against norms and values in the existing systems of politics, economy, art and science, and society and culture - embodied in most part of civilization.

In this regard, Will and Ariel Durant explain Romanticism in contrasting perspectives such as "The rebellion of feeling against reason, of instinct against intellect, of sentiment against judgment, of the subject against the object, of subjectivism against objectivity, of solitude against society, of imagination against reality, of myth and legend against history, of religion against science, of mysticism against ritual, of poetry and poetic prose against prose and prosaic poetry, of neo-Gothic against neoclassical art, of the feminine against the masculine, of romantic love against the marriage of convenience, of ‘Nature’ and the ‘natural’ against civilization and artifice, of conventional restraints, of emotional expression against conventional restraints, of individual freedom against social order, of youth against authority, of democracy against aristocracy, of man versus state – in short, the revolt of the nineteenth century against the eighteenth century, or more precisely, of 1760-1859 against 1648-1760."95 In other words, "The Confessions became the bible of the Age of Feeling, as the Encyclopedie had been the New Testament of the Age of Reason."96 The early Romantic period coincides with the age of revolutions - an age of upheavals in political, economic, and social traditions, so a revolutionary energy was at the core of Romanticism – by its emphasis on emotion and individualism. In Germany, Goethe bathed Werther in love and tears in 1774, but the romantics were young in the last years of the eighteenth century. "The German romantics tried to create a new synthesis of art, philosophy, and science, looking to the Middle Ages as a simpler, more integrated period. As time went on, they became increasingly aware of the tenuousness of the unity they were seeking. Later German Romanticism emphasized the tension between the everyday world and the seemingly irrational and super-natural projections of creative genius."97 In English literature, the group of poets now considered the key figures of Romantic movement. In contrast to nationalism in Germany, "Romanticism in English literature had little connection with nationalism, and the Romantics were often regarded with suspicion for the sympathy many felt for the ideals of the French Revolution."
Chapter III. Political Philosophy

3. History and Politics, and Law and Constitutionalism

Philosophers were deeply aroused by the prospect of radical change in the course of history, that is similar to that political scientists are now interested in historical issues and problems drawing from almost every traditional disciplinary subfield. In France, the National Convention was divided into two political factions in the process of passing a new constitution for the French Republic in 1793. Marie-Jean de Condorcet was in charge of drafting a new constitution. When the Convention passed the Jacobins’ draft constitution hastily, he wrote a pamphlet denouncing the new constitution, which made the National Convention order his arrest. In the nine months of hiding, he wrote *Outlines of an Historical View of the Progress of the Human Mind* in which he divided history into ten stages. He foresaw the unceasing progress of human history by improving equality of wealth, social status, and education as well as by removing prejudices and errors of the people. In England, when Queen Anne was succeeded by George I in 1714, the Whigs replaced most of the Tories from government positions. Henry St. John Bolingbroke supported the Jacobite Rebellion in 1715 to overthrow George I for the Pretender. Being pardoned later but retired to France, he wrote the *Letters on the Study and the Use of History* in 1735, which evaluates British international relations with the European countries in history from historical viewpoint, although he consistently intended to rebuild the Tories by attacking Walpole and the Whigs. In Italy, Giambattista Vico was a professor at the University of Naples (called as the sleeping partner of Enlightenment), who wrote the *Principles of New Science* in 1725, arguing that “the key to true understanding of the past lies in accepting that customs and emotional lives of ancient Greek and Romans, Egyptians, Jews and Babylonians were rapidly different from our own.” In his time, his work was ignored, but has remained deeply influential since the dawn of Romanticism. “Social scientists from Auguste Comte to Karl Marx approved and embroidered on Vico’s theory that each society passed through a recognizable series of stages of development.”

On the other hand, “Constitutionalism is the idea, often associated with the political theories of John Locke and the founders of the American republic, that government can and should be legally limited in its powers, and that its authority or legitimacy depends on its observing these limitations.” The idea of constitutionalism requires limitation on power and authority of the government established by constitutional law. But the British constitutional system contains a number of constitutional conventions which effectively limit government in the absence of legal limitation - social rules arise within the practices of the political community and impose limits on government powers. (i) Germany: Christian Thomasius taught law in the vernacular instead of Latin at the University of Halle, and made a sharper distinction between law and morals. Christian Wolff taught philosophy at the University of Halle, and of Marburg during his exile: being more interested in ethics than jurisprudence, he sought to express a fundamental unity of law and nature. Frederick II of Prussia is more important for what he did than for what he wrote: he was a significant bridge between the autocratic and the constitutional state in the history of modern politics. (ii) Britain: William Blackstone was a jurist, judge, and Tory politician, who published the *Commentaries on the Laws of England* during 1765-69, making the common law readable and understandable by non-lawyers. For decades, a study of the *Commentaries* was required reading for all first year law students; his contribution was "to create a succinct, readable, and above all handy epitome of the common law tradition." (iii) The United States: English traditionalism and the Blackstonian conservative element were mixed with the ideals of the *Federalist* led by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay. The American leaders were pragmatic realists in forming a new republic, but the French leaders tended to be visionaries: that was a fundamental difference between the American and French students of constitutionalism.
3-1. History and Politics

In France, Marie-Jean de Condorcet (1743-94) was a philosopher, mathematician, and political scientist, whose method in voting "totally selects the candidate who would beat each of the other candidates in a run-off election. Unlike many of his contemporaries, he advocated a liberal economy, free and equal public education, constitutionalism, and equal rights for women and people of all races." He was born in Ribemont and educated at Jesuit College in Reims and at the College of Navarre in Paris. When he was sixteen, his analytical ability gained praise, and soon became a student under d'Alembert. Publishing the Essay on Integral Calculus in 1765, he was elected to the French Royal Academy of Sciences by 1769. Publishing another paper on integral calculus in 1772, he became a friend of Jacques Turgot. He was widely recognized and became an honorary member of many foreign academic and philosophic societies such as in Sweden, Germany, Russia, and the United States. "In 1774, Condorcet was appointed Inspector General of the Monnaie de Paris by Turgot. From this point on, Condorcet shifted his focus from the purely mathematical to philosophy and political matters. In the following years, he took up the defense of human rights in general, and of women's and Blacks' rights in particular." As Turgot was dismissed, he continuously received prestigious appointments: holding Permanent Secretary of the Academy of Sciences until 1793 and admitting to the French Academy in 1782. Writing on the theory of probability in 1785, he published Life of Mr. Turgot in 1786 and Life of Voltaire in 1789 with literary reputation. In the French Revolution, Condorcet was elected as a Paris representative in the Legislative Assembly in October 1, 1791 and drafted a proposed constitution - a constitutional monarchy - for the new France. He tried to establish a national and secular educational system of broad scope as a primary function of the state. Condorcet entered the National Convention as a deputy that convened in September 21, 1792, in which he chaired the committee preparing a new constitution for France as a political scientist.

His draft constitution reflected several concepts: the establishment of a bill of inalienable human rights similar to the earlier Declaration of Rights of Man and Citizen; the creation of the government structure assuring protection of human rights and effectuating the will of the people; and the prevention of the excessive concentration of power. Due to the intense rivalry between the Girondins and the Jacobins, Condorcet's draft constitution was a product of the Girondins to the eyes of the Jacobins, though they knew he was his own man. As a Jacobin draft constitution was finally adopted on June 24, 1793, Condorcet wrote an anonymous pamphlet advising the citizens to repudiate the Jacobin constitution. The Convention quickly passed a motion for his arrest: Condorcet died, as a victim of Terror, in his first night in prison from self-administered poison. In the nine months of hiding, he painfully but patiently wrote his famous work, Outlines of an Historical View of the Progress of the Human Mind that was posthumously published in 1795. It consists of introduction, nine epochs of history, and future progress of mankind in the tenth epoch. He writes in introduction that "there exist, at all times and in all countries, different prejudices, according to the degree of illumination of the different classes of men, and according to their professions. If the prejudices of philosophers be impediments to new acquisitions of truth, those of the less enlightened classes retard the propagation of truths already known, and those of esteemed and powerful professions oppose like obstacles. These are the three kinds of enemies which reason is continually obliged to encounter, and over which she frequently does not triumph till after a long and painful struggle. The history of these contests, together with that of the rise, triumph, and fall of prejudice, will occupy a considerable place in this work, and will by no means form the least important or least useful part of it." In the era of the revolution, he tells people to know what can better enlighten us to avoid errors and prejudices.
Chapter III. Political Philosophy

The first three stages include the union of families into tribes; pastoralism and agriculture; and invention of writing. The fourth stage is the golden age of Greek civilization in which all men possessed equal right to the knowledge of truth, and the functions of priests were confined to the worship of the Gods. The fifth stage is the development of knowledge during the rise and decline of Rome: almost every religion of the empire had been national, and the priests had presumed to assert no claim upon the moral conscience. The sixth stage is the dark ages from the fall of the Roman Empire to the Crusades: the morality was the province of the priests alone to inculcate, comprehend those universal principles which no sect has overlooked. The seventh stage is the growth of science between the Crusades and the invention of printing: the spread of knowledge beyond the clergy and the stimulation of scientific discovery caused to accomplish the divergence of human mind from the monopoly and control of thought by both state and church. The eighth stage is from Gutenberg to Bacon, Galileo, and Descartes who threw off the yoke of authority: “It is in this epoch only of the progress of the human mind, that man has arrived at the knowledge of the globe which he inhabits.” The ninth stage is from Descartes to the foundation of the French Republic: "The Americans, as they appeared only to combat against the tyrannical prejudices of the mother country, had for allies the rival powers of England....The French, on the contrary, attacked at once the despotism of kings, the political inequality of constitutions partially free, the pride and prerogatives of nobility, the domination, intolerance, and rapacity of priests, and the enormity of feudal claims, still respected in almost every nation in Europe; and accordingly the powers we have mentioned, united in favor of tyranny.” In the tenth stage was the age of the liberated mind: "Our hopes, as to the future condition of the human species, may be reduced to three points: the destruction of inequality between different nations; the progress of equality in one and the same nation; and lastly, the real improvement of man."

First, Condorcet views that there would be the moments "in which the sun will observe in its course free nations only, acknowledging no other master than their reason; in which tyrants and slaves, priests and their stupid or hypocritical instruments, will no longer exist but in history and upon the stage." Second, the inequalities of wealth, conditions between classes, and instruction either could not exist or would quickly cease "if positive law had not introduced factitious means of amassing and perpetuating them; if an entire freedom of commerce and industry were brought forward to supersede the advantages which prohibitory laws and fiscal rights necessarily give to the rich over the poor.” Third, the equality of education is essential for the entire mass of the people to protect their rights, and the progress of arts and sciences improves the general welfare of the people: there is a description of truths in political science; and the arithmetic can predict for the uncertain future. He foresaw "the rise of journalism at a check on governmental tyranny; the development of a welfare state through national insurance and pensions; the stimulation of culture by the emancipation of women; the lengthening of human life by the progress of medicine; the spread of federation among states; the transformation of colonialism into foreign aid by developed to underdeveloped countries; the lessening of national prejudices by the spread of knowledge; the application of statistical research to the illumination and formation of policies; and the increasing association of science with government.” In the ending, "This sentiment is the asylum into which he retires, and to which the memory of his persecutors cannot follow him: he unites himself in imagination with man restored to his rights, delivered from oppression, and proceeding with rapid strides in the path of happiness; he forgets his own misfortunes while his thoughts are thus employed; he lives no longer to adversity, calumny and malice, but becomes the associate of these wiser and more fortunate beings whose enviable condition he so earnestly contributed to produce.” Like Voltaire, he retained a deistic belief in God: “The time will come when the sun will shine only upon free men who know no other master but their reason.”
Chapter III. Political Philosophy

In Britain, Henry St. John, Bolingbroke (1678-1751) was a politician, government officials, and political philosopher. Born at Lydiard Tregoze in Wiltshire and christened in Battersea, he was educated at a Dissenting academy, travelled to France, Switzerland, and Italy during 1698-99, and acquired exceptional knowledge of France. Returning to Parliament in 1701 for the family borough as a Tory, he was gaining an ascendancy over the House of Commons. After Queen Anne's accession, he supported the bills in 1702-04 against occasional conformity, served as Secretary at War during 1704-08 and Secretary of State in 1710-14 under Robert Harley. The War of the Spanish Succession ended by the Treaty of Utrecht signed in March 1713, and Queen Anne was succeeded by George I in August 1714. "The new king had been close to the Whigs but he was willing to bring in Tories. The Tories however refused to serve and gambled every-thing on an election, which they lost. The triumphant Whigs systematically removed the Tories from most of the posts nationally and regionally." Supporting the Jacobite rebellion of 1715 which sought to overthrow George I, Bolingbroke fled to France and became foreign minister for the Pretender. He was attained for treason, but received a royal pardon and returned to London in 1723. By the influence of Walpole, he was excluded from office and Parliament "as a man of many treasons and dubious fidelity." He published magazines first called The Country Gentleman in 1726 and later The Craftsman by writing most damaging articles against Walpole. He published A Dissertation Upon Parties with a series of his nineteen letters in 1733-34 which mockingly dedicated to Walpole. Quarreling with an enemy, he retired to France and wrote the Letters on the Study and the Use of History in 1735 and the Letters on the Spirit of Patriotism in 1736 attacking the corruption of Walpole's administration. Visiting England in 1738, he wrote the Idea of a Patriot King who uses his power to make the people more prosperous and happier. At the time of political turmoil in Britain - just like the civil war and the glorious revolution, his writings must be significant enough to be investigated and evaluated.

In a Dissertation upon Parties, Bolingbroke uses the concept of the separation of powers against the centralization of executive power in the evolving cabinet system of Walpole. In Letter 1, "There is no complaint which hath been more constantly in the mouths, no grief hath lain more heavily at the hearts of all good men, than those about our national divisions; about the spirit of party, which inspires animosity and breeds rancor; which hath so often destroyed our inward peace, weakened our national strength, and sullied our glory abroad. It is time therefore that all, who desire to be esteemed good men, and to procure the peace, the strength and the glory of their country by the only means, by which they can be procured effectually, should join their efforts to heal our national divisions, and to change the narrow spirit of party into a diffusive spirit of public benevolence." In Letter 19, "the Whigs are so far…cooperate to promote the success of them; and that, however personal prejudices, personal partialities, and old habits, that are daily wearing off, may be still entertained by some amongst them, all the independent men, who pass under that name, unite in the common cause of liberty and their country. – It remains therefore that no national party can be formed in opposition to those, who endeavor to secure the independency of Parliaments against the new influence of the crown, and against corruption; nor any strength be exerted, except that of a faction, composed of the refuse of all parties, gleaned up by one who hath none for him. – I would willingly carry this farther; and, in doing so, I shall not advance a paradox, unless it be supposed, which I think would be a greater paradox, that a man may have abilities to destroy the constitution, and yet not sense enough to see his remote, as well as immediate, his family, as well as personal interest. I say then, that if a design of raising the power of the crown above any pitch of prerogative, and of reducing Parliaments to an absolute dependency, as well as a faction to support this design, be formed; the very man who forms such a design, and such a faction, must be infatuated, if he can with very sincerely his own success.\(^{104}\)"
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The *Letters on the Study and the Use of History* is the reason to include him in the category of "History and Politics" in line with Condorcet and Vico. In Letter III, Bolingbroke views that "as experience is conversant about the present, and the present enables us to guess at the future; so history is conversant about the past, and by knowing the things that have been, we become better able to judge of the things that are." Letter VI overviews the civil government of Europe - France, England, and Spain - in the beginning of the sixteenth century; and Letter VII covers the same to 1688; and Letter VIII the same during 1688-1735 on which he intends to focus. Reviewing major historical events, including the development of wars and international relations, he reminds of the British position in Europe. "The rage of negotiating began twenty years ago...the treaty of Utrecht...We came exhausted out of long wars? and, instead of pursuing the measures necessary to give us means and opportunity to repair our strength and to diminish our burdens, our ministers have acted, from that time to this, like men who sought pretenses to keep the nation in the same exhausted condition, and under the same load of debt. This may have been their view perhaps; and we could not be surprised if we heard the same men declare national poverty necessary to support the present government, who have so frequently declared corruption and a standing army to be so. Your good sense, my lord, your virtue, and your love of your country, will always determine you to oppose such vile schemes, and to contribute your utmost towards the cure of both these kinds of rage; the rage of warring, without any proportionable interest of our own, for the ambition of others; and the rage of negotiating, on every occasion, at any rate, without a sufficient call to it, and without any part of that deciding influence which we ought to have. Our nation inhabits an island, and is one of the principal nations of Europe; but to maintain this rank, we must take the advantages of this situation, which have been neglected by us for almost half a century: we must always remember, that we are not part of the continent, but we must never forget that we are neighbors to it."

When governments are work out, the decay appears in every instance.

In the *Letters on the Spirit of Patriotism*, Bolingbroke attacked the corruption of Walpole administration and called for "a new spirit of selfless devotion in English politics." The *Idea of Patriot King* (1738) was "an attempt to build, with displaced Tories and discontented Whigs, a new party of Tories dressed in Whig principles, renouncing Jacobitism, and seeking to reconcile land with commerce, empire with liberty, public service with private wealth." It was argued that England was "now so debased that no one could save it except the king who should rise above faction and party, even above Parliament, take power into his own hands, repel and punish bribery, rule as well as rein. But the patriot king would view his power not as a divine right but as a public trust, not as absolute but limited by natural law, the liberties of his subjects, the freedom of the press, and customs of the realm: and we would judge all issues according as they affected the prosperity and happiness of the people. He would promote commerce as the chief source of a nation's wealth." He views that "A Patriot King will neither neglect nor sacrifice his country's interest. No other interest, neither a foreign nor a domestic, neither a public nor a private, will influence his conduct in government. He will not multiply taxes wantonly nor keep up those unnecessarily which necessity has laid, that he may keep up legions of tax-gatherers. He will not continue national debts, by all sorts of political and other profusion; nor, more wickedly still, by a settled purpose of oppressing and impoverishing the people; that he may with greater ease corrupt some, and govern the whole, according to the dictates of his passions and arbitrary will. To give ease and encouragement to manufacture at home, to assist and protect trade abroad, to improve and keep in heart the national colonies, like so many farms of the mother country, will be principal and constant parts of the attention of such a prince. The wealth of the nation he will most justly esteem to be his wealth, the power his power, the security and the honor, his security and honor." The Silly kings have resigned themselves to their ministers.
In Italy, Giambattista Vico (1668-1744) was a political philosopher, rhetorician, historian, and jurist. Born in Naples, Italy, June 23 1668, to a bookseller and daughter of a carriage maker, he "received his formal education at local grammar schools, from various Jesuit tutors, and at the University of Naples from which he graduated in 1694 as Doctor of Civil and Canon Law." Tutoring for nine years in Votolla, Vico returned to Naples and taught rhetoric at the University of Naples until 1741. His Principles of the New Science Concerning Common Nature of Nations was first published in 1725 and the third in 1744 consisting of five books. Vico developed his notion of science "in opposition to the then dominant philosophy of Descartes with its emphasis on clear and distinct ideas, the most simple elements of thought from which all knowledge, the Cartesian held, could be derived priori by way of deductive rules." His basic challenge was "to develop this science in such a way as to understand the facts of the human world without either reducing them to mere contingency or explaining their order by way of speculative principles of the sort generated by traditional metaphysics. They must be rendered intelligible, that is, without reducing them, as did the Cartesians, to the status of ephemera." Vico attempted to develop a method "which itself comes to be in the course of applying it to human experience, and this takes the form of a history of civil society and its development through the progress of war and peace, law, social order, commerce, and government." He views that "Nations need not develop at the same pace - less developed ones can and do coexist with those in a more advanced phase - but they all pass through the same distinct stages: the ages of gods, heroes, and men." Hence, he was interested in that "the transition from one stage to the next and the steady ascendance of reason over imagination represent a gradual progress of civilization, a qualitative improvement from simpler to more complex forms of social organization. He characterizes this movement as a "necessity of nature" which means that, with the passage of time, human beings and societies tend increasingly towards realizing their full potential."

In the eternal commonwealth, realizing that the plebeians had a human nature equal to that of the nobles, both share the civil rights, the entire people seek justice in common and thus enact laws which are just. As democracy grew corrupt, so did philosophy, which sank into skepticism. "Like furious winds lashing the sea, they stirred up civil wars in their republics and reduced them to utter chaos. The state fell from its perfect liberty to the perfect tyranny of anarchy, or unbridled liberty of free peoples, which is the worst of all." Against such civil maladies, three great remedies are introduced for providence to administer civil institutions. (i) Providence may arrange that the people discover a leader like Augustus, who rises up and establishes himself as their monarch. Without universal satisfaction and contentment of their people, monarchies are neither long-lived nor secured. (ii) If providence finds no such remedy within, it seeks one outside the commonwealth. When people are corrupt, they are natural slaves to unbridled passions such as luxury, fastidiousness, avarice, envy, price, and ostentation. (iii) When the people suffer from a fatal civil malady, and can neither accept a native monarch, nor tolerate the conquest and protection of a superior nation, then providence may administer an extreme remedy to their extreme illness. Eventually, the few survivors could naturally become sociable. Thus, the providence renews the piety, faith, and truth which are both the natural foundations of justice, and grace and beauty of God's eternal order. If people lose their religion, nothing remains to keep them living in society. "Religions alone have the power to cause the peoples to do virtuous works by stimulation of the senses, which alone move men to perform them; and the reasoned maxims of the philosophers concerning virtue are of use only when employed by a good eloquence for kindling the senses to do the duties of virtue...To sum up, from all that we have set forth in this work, it is to be finally concluded that this Science carries inseparably with it the study of piety, and that if one be not pious he cannot really be wise." His New Science was received more favorably after his death.
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3-2. Law and Constitutionalism

German Natural Law: As discussed in Chapter III of Book III, Natural law, contrasted with the positive law or man-made-law, is "a system of law that is purportedly determined by nature, and thus universal. Classically, natural law refers to the use of reason to analyze human nature - both social and personal - and deduce binding rules of moral behavior." There are different theories of natural law. Aristotle held that what was just by nature was not always the same as what was just by law; and Cicero viewed that "both justice and law derive their origin from what nature has given to man, from what the human mind embraces, from the function of man, and from what serves to unite humanity." Some early Church Fathers sought to incorporate natural law into Christianity. Thomas Aquinas saw natural law as rational creature’s participation in the Eternal Law. In the seventeenth century, Thomas Hobbes established legal positivism based on a theory of social contract that all men could agree upon; the natural law is how a rational human being, seeking to survive and prosper, would act so that it is always considered in line with natural rights. The Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 allowed the Holy Roman Empire to remain in divided states, so that the territorial princes welcomed natural law that served as the underlying ideology supporting their centralized legal system, drafting constitutions, and educating princes and growing elites. Hence, natural law was institutionalized, and the subject was introduced to most of universities and other educational institutions in Germany. There was a strong interest in a natural law of Supra-traditional or -confessional standpoints "as a basis for social morality and positive law" so that "the princes tried to maintain a close alliance with, control over, university faculties as seedbeds for such ideas." Natural law theory in the eighteenth century was divided into two broad streams in Germany: one was in line with Pufendorf followed by Thomasius, and the other was in line with Leibniz followed by Wolff, both which were different each other as below.\(^{115}\)

(a) Christian Thomasius (1655-1728) was born to a jurist and philosopher, educated at the University of Leipzig, and received law degree at the University of Frankfurt in 1679. He practiced law in his hometown Leipzig where he taught at the university, and later at the University of Halle from 1690 for the rest of his life. In his early years, he was interested in matters of law, particularly in Pufendorf’s natural law theory. In 1688 Thomasius published the Institutions of Divine Jurisprudence, which is "essential to understanding the origins of the Enlightenment in Germany, where his importance was comparable to that of John Locke’s in England." His Introduction and Application of the Doctrine of Reason as well as of Moral Theory appeared in Halle during 1691-96, which turned to matters of theoretical and practical philosophy. "Thomasius's philosophical stance was an empiricist one, not the rationalism that we find in much of the philosophical tradition and with Wolff. It is true that his belief in natural human reason and its capacity to find truth suggests a mild rationalism, but Thomasius abhorred innate ideas and maintained that all knowledge, all thought, begins with sense perception. This strong sensationalism (which has similarities with Locke's position) was coupled, as has already been noted, with an enlightenment stance, in the sense that it was governed by the conviction that knowledge, truth and morality are the purview of everyone, not merely the elect few." His moral theory is a theory of the will: "He held that in moral matters, the will dominates reason. Though human beings have free choice if not externally constrained, the will is not free. Rather, it is dominated by human affects; our passions, impulses, and desires .... Morality requires a conscious act of will. The trouble with morality arises because the will is determined by evil desires, in particular, lust, ambition, and avarice. Although there are noble sentiments as well, which similarly influence the will, they are in conflict with the negative dispositions. The conflict can be brought to a positive conclusion only by appeal to divine grace."\(^{116}\)
(b) Christian Wolff (1679-1754) was born to a modest family in Breslau, Silesia and learned mathematics, physics, and philosophy at the University of Jena. He lectured at the University of Leipzig until 1706, when he moved to the University of Halle where the headquarters of Pietism is located. Wolff was popular in his lectures attracting around 1,000 students from all over Germany. Being accused of fatalism and atheism, he was ousted from his chair at Halle in 1723 and moved to the University of Marburg, where he became one of most fashionable professors in Europe. Being called by Frederick II to Halle in 1740, Wolff became the chancellor of the university in 1743. "His philosophy held almost undisputed sway in Germany until it was displaced by the Kantian revolution, due partly to his distinctive habit of writing in both Latin and German." 117 His first philosophy was the German Logic that sets out the rules for thought and refines the natural capacity and functions as the condition of science: the powers of understanding have to be honed through practice and experience. His second was the German Metaphysics that appeared seven years after the Logic. Linking existence to consciousness, his Metaphysics treats ontology, empirical psychology, cosmology, rational psychology and natural theology. Wolff published about a book a year: ethics in 1720, politics in 1721, physics in 1723, teleology in 1724 and biology in 1724. In the ethics, "Moral perfection is the guideline by which we ought to choose between two (or more) equally possible actions. That is to say, when making a free choice we ought to consider whether the action promotes the perfection of our inner and outer state and that means considering whether the state of the soul and the body accords with the prior state or contradicts it." In the German Politics, "he proceeds to investigate the varieties of human societies and to specify how they ought to be set up so as to promote the uninhibited progression to the common best.” As Wolffianism declined in the 1750s, German philosophy was at loose ends, lubricated by aesthetics and common-sense philosophers.

(c) Frederick the Great (1712-86) anonymously published Anti-Machiavel in 1740, with a preface of Voltaire, just after Frederick became king, asserting that Machiavelli offered a partial and biased view of statecraft. "His own views appear to reflect a largely Enlightenment ideal of rational and benevolent statesmanship" maintaining the health and prosperity of his subjects - the promotion of public happiness - that made a great impression as a declaration of his political philosophy. "A king, he said, should not pursue glory and annexation of territory. As 'the first servant of the state', he must work for justice and for the happiness, the prosperity, and even the liberty of the people. While Frederick regarded 'Plato's man' as mythical, Marcus Aurelius, 'the crowned philosopher', was his hero.” At the beginning his rein, "Frederick recalled Wolff to Prussia, arranged a meeting with Voltaire, invited him and other philosophes to Berlin, and revived the Academy, filling it with French writers and scientists. He extended toleration to Catholics; he declared the freedom of the press; he gave asylum to writers threatened by prosecution of France; and he reformed the Prussian legal system to limit both the use of torture in the legal proceedings and the number of crimes subject to the death penalty.” The first edition of his Works of the Philosophers of Sans Souci was published with a substantial collection of poems and essays in French in 1750. Frederick during his reign of forty-six years was far from the philosopher king whom he tried to be in his first writing. He did not allow the publication of critical writings to his rule; he used the bureaucratic machinery established by his father; and his army with the brutal discipline invaded and seized Silesia of Maria Theresa by a Machiavellian way, accepting "that war was a natural feature of the international system, and that it was necessary part of the duties of sovereign.” In 1770, publishing critiques of two radical works of Essay on Prejudices and The System of Nature in Encyclopedie of d’Holbach, Frederick argued "that the mass of the people could not be, and ought not to be, given the opportunity of an elite education, and that religion and superstition were indispensable to them” separating himself from the extreme philosophes.118
English Common Law: William Blackstone (1723-80) - an English jurist, judge, and Tory politician - was born into a middle-class family in London, and educated at Charterhouse School, before he was admitted to Pembroke College, Oxford, and switched to and completed a Bachelor of Civil Law degree at Oxford and took the degree of Doctor of Civil Law from it in 1751. In July 1753 he decided to retire from his practice and concentrate on teaching academic law and doing legal work in and around Oxford. He had been recorder of Wallingford since 1749 and assessor (judge) of the Chancellor’s Court since 1751. Blackstone had developed a great interest in common law, and in 1753 he began to lecture on that subject. These were the first lectures on English law ever delivered in a university. His listeners were captivated by the lucidity and charm of his style and by the simplicity with which he presented the subject. Through his Commentaries on the Laws of England originally published during 1765-9, Blackstone explained the British constitution as the mixed but balanced constitution.

(i) The mixed constitution: The British constitution is blended together in one system by the mixture of monarchical (the king), aristocratical (the Lords), and democratic (the Commons) power. The legacy of the Glorious Revolution was emphatic in "its repudiation of the pretensions of Stuart absolutism, and supporting doctrines of non-resistance and divine right kingship." Therefore, "The power of royal prerogative were more narrowly circumscribed and more exactly defined, and the great precedent of deposing one king and establishing a new family."

(ii) Parliamentary sovereignty: "Political authority was created through a voluntary transfer of natural right; the aims of such political association were to secure individual liberty and the collective good; and, to achieve such purposes, every political society required a supreme, irresistible, absolute, uncontrolled authority in which...the rights of sovereignty reside. The distinguishing mark of sovereign power was the making of laws, which power, in Britain, was exercised by the king-in-parliament." Moreover, "Parliament had confirmed its sovereign power by regulating the succession to the throne; by altering the established religion of the land; and by changing even the constitution of the kingdom and of parliament themselves."

(iii) The balanced constitution: The relationship between executive and legislative authority changed dramatically in the following decades of the Glorious Revolution. In the past, parliamentary freedom had been challenged by royal prerogative placing parliament under the absolute influence of a king or his minister involved in corruption. The independence of parliament was to be restored through a strengthening of the electoral process by adopting freedom of elections and frequent elections, which could reduce or block executive corruption. In 1780 Burke presented the plan for economic reform, which primary purpose was "to reduce the direct and visible influence of the executive and to extinguish secret corruption..."

(iv) The separation of power was discussed by Montesquieu in The Spirit of Law of 1748 which presented England's constitution as "a basic institutional model which provided the correct framework and standard for understanding the logic of constitutional liberty more generally." but "his treatment of English structures and practices proceeded at a highly abstract level, replete with comparisons to political arrangements in the states of the ancient and modern world." Regarding judicial independence and institutional autonomy, "Blackstone stressed the need for the judicial power from the legislative no less than from the executive power."

(v) The English common law as case law or precedent is "law developed by judges through decisions of courts and similar tribunals, as opposed to statutes adopted through a legislative process or regulations, issued by the executive branch." "common law courts are not absolutely by precedent, but can reinterpret and revise the law, without legislative intervention...evolves through a series of gradual steps, that gradually works out all the details, so that over a decade or more, the law can change substantially but without a sharp break..."
Blackstone's *Commentaries* are an influential treatise on the British common law in the eighteenth century, and colonial lawyers were required to read them. They are divided into four volumes - on the rights of persons, the rights of things, of private wrongs, and of public wrongs. (i) "The Rights of Persons is by and large concerned with the relations of status in the English social structure, from the King of England and the aristocracy down to the untitled commoners. Also dealt here were common relationships such as that of husband and wife, master and servant (in modern day terminology, employer and employee), and guardian and ward." (ii) "The Rights of Things, Blackstone's longest volume, deals with property. The vast majority of the text treats of real property, this being the most valuable sort in the feudal law upon which the English law of land was founded. Property in chattels was already beginning to overshadow property in land, but its law lacked the complex feudal background of the common law of land, and was not dealt with by Blackstone at anywhere near the space he devoted to land." (iii) "Of Private Wrongs dealt with torts as they existed in Blackstone's time. The various methods of trial that existed at civil law were also dealt with in this volume, as were the jurisdictions of the several courts, from the lowest to the highest. Blackstone also adds a brief chapter on equity, the parallel legal system that existed in English law at the time, seeking to address wrongs that the common law did not handle; the chapter on equity seems almost an afterthought." (iv) Of Public Wrongs is Blackstone's treatise on criminal law: Blackstone explains how the criminal laws of England were just and merciful. "It is a melancholy truth, that among the variety of actions which men are daily liable to commit, no less than an hundred and sixty have been declared by Act of Parliament to be felonious without benefit of clergy; or, in other words, to be worthy of instant death". Blackstone frequently had to resort to the devices of assuring his reader that the laws as written were not actually enforced, and that the King's power of pardon existed to correct any hardships or injustices.  

*The British constitution* is a set of laws and principles under which the United Kingdom is governed. Unlike many other nations, "the UK has no single constitutional document. This is sometimes expressed by stating that it has an uncodified or unwritten constitution. Much of the British constitution is embodied in written documents, within statutes, court judgments and treatises. The constitution has other unwritten sources, including parliamentary constitutional conventions and royal prerogatives.” Historically, the British king could not alter the law except through the mechanism of parliamentary legislation, so that he could not accuse or punish his subjects without mobilizing of the institutions of the common law as discussed above. “Since the Glorious Revolution of 1688, the bedrock of the British constitution has traditionally been the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, according to which the statutes passed by Parliament are the UK's supreme and final source of law. It follows that Parliament can change the constitution simply by passing new Acts of Parliament. There is some debate about whether this principle remains valid, particularly in light of the UK's membership of the European Union.” The United Kingdom is a constitutional monarchy: succession to the British throne is hereditary. “Under the British Constitution, sweeping executive powers, known as the royal prerogative, are nominally vested in the Monarch. In exercising these powers the Monarch normally defers to the advice of the Prime Minister or other ministers,” which principle can be traced back to the Restoration - the Queen reigns, but she does not rule. “In England the established church is the Church of England. In Scotland, there is no state church, the Church of Scotland having been disestablished by the Church of Scotland Act 1921; Wales and Northern Ireland have no established church. England and Wales share the same legal system, while Scotland and Northern Ireland each has its own distinctive legal system. These distinctions were created as a result of the United Kingdom being created by the union of separate countries according to the terms of the 1706 Treaty of Union, ratified by the 1707 Act of Union.” Queen Anne was the first occupant of the unified throne.
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The United States: The Federalist: "Federalism was the most influential political movement arising out of discontent with the Articles of Confederation, which focused on limiting the authority of the federal government. For example, the Articles allowed the Continental Congress the power to sign treaties or declare war, but it was essentially powerless to do so because all major decisions required a unanimous vote. The movement was greatly strengthened by the reaction to Shays' Rebellion of 1786–1787, which was an armed uprising of yeoman farmers in western Massachusetts. The rebellion was fueled by a poor economy that was created, in part, by the inability of the federal government to deal effectively with the debt from the American Revolution. Moreover, the federal government had proven incapable of raising an army to quell the rebellion, so that Massachusetts had been forced to raise its own."124 As fifty-five delegates met at a Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia and generated ideas, Alexander Hamilton and James Madison with John Jay anonymously published 85 articles of the federalist papers in New York City to convince the people of the state to vote for ratification of the new Constitution of the United States allowing a centralized government.125 "Those opposed to the new Constitution became known as the 'Anti-Federalists'. They generally were local rather than cosmopolitan in perspective, oriented to plantations and farms rather than commerce or finance, and wanted strong state governments and a weak national government." The first Congress ratified the new Constitution in 1789 and submitted twelve articles of amendment to the states and passed on December 15, 1791 that became the Bill of Rights. The Tenth Amendment set the guideline for federalism in the United States: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." As the Federalist Party was distinct, the opposition party emphasized the fear that a strong national government would threaten the liberties of the people, which brought party politics in coming decades. The major ideas of the federalist papers are as follows.

The Federalist under the title of "The Union as a Safeguard against Domestic Faction and Insurrection" writes that "The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular states, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other states...In the extent and proper structure of the Union, therefore, we behold a republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government. And according to the degree of pleasure and pride we feel in being republicans, ought to be our zeal in cherishing the spirit and supporting the character of the Federalists" (10th paper). A navy of the United States would embrace the resources of all more than a single state could do: a unity of government results in a unity of commercial and political interests. A nation cannot exist without revenues, the principal part of which can be drawn from commerce, so that tax burdens from land may decline (11th and 12th papers). If the States are united under one government, "Nothing more evident than that the thirteen states will be able to support a national government better than one half, or one third, or any number less than the whole...we shall clearly discover that a separation would be not less injurious to the economy than to the tranquility, commerce, revenue, and liberty of every part" (13th paper). The territory of the new republic was favorably proposed to limit to the natural boundary of the thirteen states from the Atlantic to the Mississippi probably not exceeding 750 miles based on four reasons below: (i) the national government has the whole power of making and administering laws, which jurisdiction is limited to its capacity providing such services; (ii) the immediate object of the federal Constitution is to secure the union of the thirteen primitive states, which would be practicable; (iii) Transportation and communications – the intercourse throughout the Union – will be facilitated by the new improvement of roads and canals; and (iv) almost every State will be a frontier that may cause some sacrifices for the sake of the general protection from both internal and external threats (14th paper), and thus the proper equilibrium will be maintained throughout.
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The insufficiency of the Confederation to preserve the Union lies in the power of making laws and the measures of enforcing laws by the federal authority in terms of a penalty or punishment for disobedience (15th paper). “The government of the Union, like that of each State, must be able to address itself immediately to the hopes and fears of individuals; and to attract to its support those passions which have the strongest influence upon the human heart....possess all the means, and have a right to resort to all the methods, of executing the powers with which it is entrusted, that are possessed and exercised by the States” (16th paper). The Union must provide the common defense of members; the preservation of public peace against internal convulsions and external attacks; the regulation of commerce with other nations and between the States; and the superintendence of our intercourse, political and commercial, with foreign countries (23rd paper). The proper provision of national forces - armies and navies - is necessary for national safety and security against internal insurrection and external invasion - the standing armies in time of peace is necessary with the consent of the legislature (24th - 29th papers). The general power of taxation supports civil and military activities of both State and national governments. A tax may be laid on a particular article by a State as well as by the Union, but it is defined by the second paragraph of Article VI that laying a tax for the use of the United States would be supreme in its nature, and could not legally be opposed or controlled by the authority of the State unless upon imports and exports (30th - 36th papers). It is viewed that the proposed Constitution is neither a national nor a federal Constitution, but composition of both. “In its foundation it is federal, not national; in the sources from which the ordinary powers of the government are drawn, it is partly federal and partly national; in the operation of these powers, it is national, not federal; in the extend of them, again, it is federal, not national; and finally in the authoritative mode of introducing amendments, it is neither wholly federal nor wholly national” (39th paper).

The several powers conferred on the government of the Union may include different classes: (i) security against foreign dangers; (ii) regulation of the intercourse with foreign nations; (iii) maintenance of harmony and proper intercourse among the States; (iv) certain miscellaneous objects of general utility; (v) restraint of the States from certain injurious acts; and (vi) provisions for giving due efficacy to all these powers. The State government is regarded as constituent and essential parts of the federal government, while the latter is essential to the organization of the former (40th - 46th papers). The separation of powers with check-and-balance between the legislative, executive, and judiciary branches is introduced into the structure of the Constitution (47th - 51st papers). The House of Representatives is bi-anually elected, and the qualification of the elected must be of age of twenty-five years; must have been seven years a citizen of the United States; and must be an inhabitant of the State he is to represent. The number of the representatives elected from each state is the best scale of wealth and taxation, while slaves are considered as property, not as persons (52th - 58th papers). The times, places, and manners of holding elections for senator and representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the legislature thereof; but the Congress, at any time, by law, make or alter such regulations except as to the places of choosing senators (59th). The Senate is examined on the qualification of its members; the appointment by the State; the quality of representation in the Senate; the number of Senators for six-year term; and the power vested in the Senate (59th - 64th papers). The House of Representatives shall have the sole power impeaching the President, and the Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments (65th - 66th papers). The executive power is discussed (67th - 77th papers), including particularly the veto power, the pardoning power, and appointments with the Senate confirmation. The judicial power is discussed (78th - 83th papers) and the bill of rights (84th paper). In conclusion, the adoption of the Constitution will provide additional securities to the republican government, and to liberty and property (85th paper).
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Photo III-4-1. Bishop George Berkeley (1685-1753), accessed 5 January 2013,

Photo III-4-2. David Hume (1711-76), accessed 5 January 2013,
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/1/1c/Allan_Ramsay_David_Hume_1711_1776_Historian_and_philosopher_Google_Art_Project.jpg/800px-Allan_Ramsay_David_Hume_1711_1776_Historian_and_philosopher_Google_Art_Project.jpg
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4. Immaterialism, Empiricism-Skepticism, and Conservatism

The branches of traditional philosophy are more diversified into modern philosophy in the fields of morals, metaphysics or ontology, epistemology, psychology, methodology, and others like social philosophy. Meantime, Continental rationalism, British empiricism, and German idealism are firmly established; while the disputes between rationalism and empiricism take place within epistemology. As discussed in Book III, rationalism is “any view appealing to reason as a source of knowledge or justification.” Technically, it is a method or a theory “in which the criterion of the truth is not sensory but intellectual and deductive.” It is usually associated with the introduction of mathematical methods into philosophy, which was led by Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz; so it is commonly called Continental Rationalism. Rene Descartes sets a system of knowledge by discarding perception as unreliable and admitting only deduction as a method. He introduces dualism that mind controls the body, but that the body can also influence the rational mind - the nature of body is extension of the mind. Benedict de Spinoza introduces substance monism that there is one and only one substance that is God. Human mind is simply the idea that corresponds to the human body. There are three kinds of knowledge - opinion, reason, and intuition; among which reason is an adequate perception of things gained from “common notions and adequate ideas of the properties of things.” Gottfried W. Leibniz also applies reason to first principles or prior definitions rather than to empirical evidence in his philosophy. His Theodicy is based on his optimism viewing that our universe is the best possible one that God could have created: it is optimal among all possible worlds. Generally speaking, in the age of Enlightenment, it is observed that Rationalism was so much overloaded that the limits of reason were often challenged by Empiricism, Romanticism, or others.

Empiricism is a theory of knowledge asserting that it comes only from sensory experience, as shown in John Locke, George Berkeley, and David Hume in Britain. John Locke is famous in his political treatises, and his metaphysics is based on empiricism; all knowledge comes from experience consisting of sensation and reflection. George Berkeley was a metaphysician for defending immaterialism: he was interested “in religion, the psychology of vision, mathematics, physics, morals, economics, and medicine.” He views that things that are immediately perceived are real things, which exist in the mind as ideas; but denies the existence of material substance that is not perceived by direct senses; which is the basis of his immaterialism or subjective idealism. He opposes to the skeptics and atheists, and rejects the abstract ideas or generalization of things. David Hume was the last of British empiricists, and skeptic in human understanding due to its imperfection and narrow limits. His treatises deals with reason, passion, and morals; and sees that the passions could be controlled by the exercise of enlightened reason. Though morality is properly felt than judged, the harmony of passion with reason may be influential on the will as long as the passion of self-interest is tamed. He also views that justice is useful and beneficial to promote civil society. Edmund Burke was an empiricist, and more a politician than a theorist in politics. As he criticized the executive corruption, the relations between the King and the Parliament worsened. On American affairs, Burke was sympathetic but tried to keep colonies within the empire by conciliation; on Catholics in Ireland, he criticized the Penal Laws and passed the Savile Act to reduce British oppression in Ireland; on Indian affairs, he led the impeachment of Warren Hastings, Governor-General of India; and on France, he defended the aristocratic order and argued that the French Revolution would end disastrously. His work was popular to conservatives like Joseph de Maistre who was active against the French Revolution. This subsection deals with three different ideas including immaterialism of George Berkeley, empiricism and skepticism of David Hume, and conservatism of Edmund Burke and Joseph de Maistre.

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George Berkeley (1685-1753) was one of the three famous British Empiricists including John Locke and David Hume. As an Anglo-Irish philosopher, his primary achievement was the advancement of a theory that he called immaterialism (later subjective idealism called by others). Born in Kilkenny, Ireland, he was educated at Kilkenny College and attended Trinity College, Dublin, where he completed a Master's degree in 1707. He remained at Trinity College as a tutor and Greek lecturer. His Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision was published in 1709, that examines visual distance, magnitude, position and problems of sight and touch, and its conclusions are accepted as an established part of the theory of optics. In 1710, he published the Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, which was great success and gave him a lasting reputation in his field of philosophy. His Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous of 1713 was perceptual relativity of his phenomenalism. During 1714-20, he interspersed his academic endeavor with extensive travel in Europe. In 1721 he took Holy Orders in the Church of Ireland, earned his doctorate in divinity, and began to lecture in divinity and Hebrew at Trinity College, Dublin. In 1724, he was made Dean of Derry. He launched the project of founding a college in Bermuda in 1725 for training ministers and missionaries in the colony. In 1728, he married Anne Forster, and went to America on salary £100 per annum. He landed near Newport, Rhode Island, where he bought a plantation in Middletown. He waited for funds promised by the British government for his college, but the funds were not forthcoming so that he left America and return to London in 1732. He took part in efforts to create a home for the city's abandoned children. In 1734, Berkeley was appointed to Bishop of Cloyne in Ireland, which position he held until he retired. He published Siris: Philosophical Reflexions and Inquiries concerning the values of tar-water in 1744 and Further Thought of Tar-water in 1752. He retired and went to Oxford to live with his son, where he died soon and was buried. Here the first three books are discussed.

(a) Essay towards a New Theory of Vision (1709) presents “a theory of various aspects of the spatial content of visual experience that attempts to undercut not only the optico-geometric accounts of e.g., Descartes and Malebranche, but also elements of the empiricist account of Locke.” The visibility of space was concerned on the Renaissance perspective tradition and its reliance on classical optics in the development of pictorial representations of spatial depth. “This matter was debated by scholars since the 11th century Arab polymath and mathematician Alhazen affirmed in experimental contexts the visibility of space. This issue raised in Berkeley’s theory of vision was treated at length in the Phenomenology of Perception of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, in the context of confirming the visual perception of spatial depth, and by way of refuting Berkeley’s thesis.” Berkeley distinguishes between ideas of sight and touch and between the visible and the tangible. He views that “if the informations from touch and sight disagree at any time, we are always to depend upon touch, as that which, according to the usual ways of speaking upon these subjects, is the true representation of the essential properties.” “The extension, figures, and motions perceived by sight are specifically distinct from the ideas of touch, called by the same names; nor is there any such thing as one idea, or kind of idea, common to both senses.” In other words, “our ability to perceive distances by sight does not rely on assumptions about necessary connections between the immediate and the mediate objects of sight. Instead, that we can recognize by sight how far away something is from us is to be explained as a learned ability to associate visual cues with conceptually unrelated tangible ideas of distance.” More particularly, upon perception of an idea, it must not be entirely new, but have something in it old and already perceived by us. It must be in common with ideas we have before known and named as to make us give it the same name with them. The unprejudiced person like a man born blind perceives in a new manner different from he did before, so he relies more on his own judgment rather than generality of men. The consideration of motion may furnish a new field for inquiry.
(b) **Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge** (1710) includes rationale of the principles, supposed objections to the principles answered, and consequences and applications of the principles. “The material world becomes real in being perceived: it depends for its reality upon the spiritual realization. As colors become real with the introduction of light in a dark room, the material world becomes real in the life and agency of Spirit.” Viewing that ideas of Senses are more real and stronger than ideas or images of things (immaterialism or idealism), he attacks Locke’s doctrine of abstract ideas as germs of skepticism: “it is impossible for me to see or feel anything without an actual sensation of that thing, so is it impossible for me to conceive in my thought any sensible thing or object distinct from the sensation or perception of it.” The abstract matter or substance must all be void of meaning: the only lawful abstraction is nominal: the application of a name in common to an indefinite number of things which resemble one another (nominalism). In applications, Berkeley considers skepticism, abstractions, and natural philosophy. He sees that material substance has been a friend to atheists in all ages. (i) The works of nature are not produced by the will of men but by that of God. Since a human spirit is not perceived by sense, the existence of God is present to our minds by the ideas of imagination, that continuously affect us; from which he rejects religious skepticism. (ii) Berkeley views the doctrine of abstract ideas to be another great source of errors. When we attempt to abstract extension of time, place, or motion from all other qualities, we lose sight of them since the objects of sense are nothing but sensations. The doctrine of abstraction has contributed towards spoiling the most useful parts of knowledge. (iii) Berkeley sees that natural philosophy induces skepticism, but all these complaints are groundlessly influenced by false principles. He suspects the mathematicians are no less deeply concerned than other men in the errors arising from the doctrine of abstract general ideas, and the existence of objects without the mind. Berkeley tries to vindicate faith in God in the concluding part of his principles of human knowledge.

(c) **Three Dialogues of between Hylas and Philonous** (1713) was published in opposition to the skeptics and atheists to defend his Principles. (i) The first dialogue tries to demonstrate that materialism is incoherent, untenable, and leads ultimately to skepticism: all material things are in themselves insensible and to be perceived only by our ideas: “when I hear a coach drive along the streets, immediately I perceive only the sound; but from the experience I have had that a sound is connected with a coach, I am said to hear the coach. It is nevertheless evident that, in truth and strictness, nothing can be heard but sound; and the coach is not then properly perceived by sense, but...are only suggested to the mind by experience, grounded on former perceptions.” What is called matter is thus melted in a spiritual solution. Berkeley rejects the abstract ideas or generalization of things by the changing environment of the material world. (ii) The second dialogue argues that unrealized matter is not merely unproved but a proved impossibility: “it must mean nothing or it must mean a contradiction, which comes to the same thing.” Hence, concrete and intelligible realism based on active living spirit replaces the material world with the abstract hypothetical and unintelligible realism. (iii) The third dialogue negates the reality of the material world: material substance is not only a hypothesis but also a false and groundless one; the world consists of nothing but minds and ideas; and the real things are “those very things I see, and feel, and perceive by my senses.” Thus, to be perceived is one thing (Spirit), and to exist is another (Matter). The matter is the absolute or external existence of unthinking, unperceiving, inactive material substance. Since men judge of the reality of things by their senses, there is nothing in the world but spirits and ideas. Immaterialism (or Idealism) sees that “things they immediately perceive are the real things...the things immediately perceived are ideas, which exist only in the mind.” The new ideas of Berkeley contributed to providing a foundation of German idealism that was developed by Emanuel Kant and George Hegel.130
David Hume (1711-76) was a philosopher, well-known historian, economist, and essayist devoted to empiricism and skepticism. Born to a family of the modest estate in Edinburgh, Scotland, Hume entered the Edinburgh University where he read widely in history, literature, philosophy, some mathematics, and contemporary science. After shortly working for a business in Bristol, he moved to France, read French and other continental authors, and drafted A Treatise of Human Nature during 1734-37. Returning to England, he published Book I, Of the Understanding and Book II, Of the Passions anonymously in 1739 and Book III, Of Moral in 1740. The Treatise gave him a life-long reputation as an atheist and a skeptic, but he never held an academic post. Hume joined his cousin James St. Clair to be his secretary on an ill-fated expedition to Quebec in 1746, and on an extended diplomatic mission to the courts of Vienna and Turin 1748. During this period, Hume had formed a conception of his philosophy as a man of letters, and began to rewrite his three books of the Treatise as separate publications. He published An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding in 1748. An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals appeared after returning home in 1751. The Faculty of Advocates chose him their Librarian, who received little or no payment, but that gave him the command of a large library. Hume published his Political Discourse in 1752 and six-volume History of England during 1754-62 that became a best-seller, giving him the financial independence. Hume served Lord Hertford, the Ambassador to France, as his Private Secretary in 1763 and returned to London in 1766, accompanied by Rousseau, but their friendship ended quickly and miserably. Serving as undersecretary of state in London for a year of 1767-68, Hume retired to Edinburgh and built his own house for comfortable life. His Autobiography and Dialogues concerning Natural Religion was posthumously published in 1777 and 1779. It must be more significant to review the refined version of two Enquiries in order to understand Hume’s thought and philosophy.

(a) An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (1748): (i) Philosophy of Mind and Empiricism: Influenced by the Enlightenment, many philosophers began to search for a scientific framework that would correct excessive speculation in philosophy, and to oppose intolerance and dogmatism in religion. “Hume distrusted tradition and authority, while maintaining confidence in the powers of philosophy and the new science to generate a proper intellectual climate for dispassionate investigation.” Philosophers largely thought “that reason can penetrate beyond what can be known on the basis of experience, while Hume adapted the narrow capacity of human understanding in his Enquiry. Influenced by Boyle and Newton, Hume’s philosophy is based on empiricism which is the theory “that experience, not pure reason, is the source of all information about matters of fact.” He commended experience and criticized speculative reason, but his understanding and experimental method is not entirely clear. Hume considers several faculties of the mind including the understanding, reason, the senses, the imagination, and the passions. All the perceptions of the human mind include two distinct kinds: impressions and ideas. Impressions are from our sensations, passions, and emotions; and ideas are their faint images in thinking and reasoning, so that the former is stronger and livelier than the latter that is in our mind. Impressions and ideas are divided into simple and complex: a particular color, taste, and smell are simple, but they form a complex one united like in an apple. The complex ideas are divided into relations, modes, and substances. “The idea of a substance as well as that of a mode is nothing but a collection of simple ideas that is united by the imagination, and have a particular name assigned them.” Hume uses the line of thought to distinguish fact from fiction and truth from falsity: the term “substance” has been employed in philosophy without clear meaning, making it meaningless by himself. He maintains that certain ideas are naturally combined in the mind: the natural principles of associating or connecting ideas are the relations of resemblance, contiguity, and causation. Hume’s innovation was to seek universal principles of association.
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(ii) Epistemology: Human reasons are divided into Relations of Ideas and Matters of Fact. The former is in the sciences of geometry, algebra, and arithmetic which affirmation is either intuitively or demonstratively certain without depending on any other existent; while the latter is not ascertained in the same manner. The negative statement of relations of ideas is a contradiction, whereas that of fact is not a contradiction, but results in falsehood. The epistemological criterion agrees that a statement is certain when we are justified by the mere operation of thought in not doubting its truth; but statements about matters of fact are not known by the mere operation of thought and are neither intuitively nor demonstratively certain: their truth or falsity depends on the underlying evidence, which is gained by experience. Hume is skeptic about claims of certainty in matters of fact as well as philosophical reasoning. He views that “all reasonings concerning matter of fact seem to be founded on the relation of Cause and Effect. By means of that relation alone we can go beyond the evidence of our memory and senses.” The matter-of-fact inference is extended to causal inference based on experience, not on reason, from which Hume faces a dilemma of induction. The basis of belief in cause-effect relations leads to causal inferences: “Adam could know nothing about the effects of water merely by feeling it or seeing it – or by using capacities of pure reason to think about it…No one could know without experience that water will clean dirty clothes.” Hume sees that human capacities for obtaining knowledge and probable belief are more limited than his rationalist predecessors had maintained. His skepticism about induction maintains that reason does not support inductive inference. His solution for skeptical doubts lies in the effect of custom, not reason, as a principle of human nature more instinctual than rational, based on repeated experience of cause-effect relations. Belief is nothing but a more vivid and steady conception of an object, than what the imagination alone is ever able to attain: higher probability of thinking with reasonableness caused more confidence in recurrence. The human reason lies above animals’ but below the God’s.

(iii) Metaphysics: Hume views that we can discover causes by experience, but we cannot discover necessary connections by experience, which is found in the inference of understanding from the cause to the effect - the feeling of the transition in the mind. Hume introduces two definitions of cause. One is constant conjunction that is “a cause to be an object, followed by another, and where all the objects, similar to the first, are followed by objects similar to the second” – which is the factual basis necessary for belief. The other is a conveyance or transfer of thought that is “an object followed by another, and whose appearance always conveys the thought to that other” – which is the psychological basis for necessary for belief. “Although human choices and actions often seem irregular and unpredictable, Hume supposes that the world is everywhere law-governed and predictable.” There are two problems: metaphysical and ethical in human actions. “The metaphysical problem is whether human actions are causally determined by prior conditions. The ethical problem concerns the implications of determinism for blame and excuse, systems of punishment, and other features of the moral life.” Hume insists that “everything is determined, and free will is possible,” – an adequate theory of freedom requires determinism. He defines, liberty is a power of acting or not acting, according to the determinations of the will; and necessity is beyond the constant conjunction of similar objects, and the consequent inference from one to the other. It is believed that “there is a constant conjunction between motives and actions in human behavior, and that human nature remains the same over time in its principles and operations…we can expect to establish universal principles of human nature and scientific psychology.” However, some philosophers find this analysis is “dogmatic, unduly speculative, and incompatible with Hume’s demand for a science of human nature.” It may be premature to give up on the causal explanation of human actions “merely because no law-like motivation connections have been discovered.” The laws governing human behavior do not describe causes and their effects.
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(iv) Philosophy of Religion: Hume defines a miracle as “a transgression (or violation) of a law of nature through a divine intervention. Miraculous events must actually violate a law – that is, a causal regularity in nature.” Many theologians have argued that “a miracle does not occur in the natural order and therefore cannot violate the natural order. In this conception, a miracle is brought about by a cause (namely, God) that transcends the order of nature.” When a miracle is reported by its observers, the crediability of a person’s testimony becomes matter in terms of creditability. Persons who are honest, impartial, and sober of judgment are generally reliable; whereas persons who have doubtful character cause us to be suspicious about their reports. Hume maintains that evidences – the proof of miracles - are inadequate to sustain reports to be positive. So it is questionable whether the evidence is based on experience of the frequency with which events are constantly conjoined. The testimony of the apostles to the miracles would be more substantially reliable than ordinary people, but in weighing the state of the evidence, one could decide that the reports have less support than the law of nature. Hume also challenges the religious belief that God causes miracles, but he does not conclude that miracles cannot occur or even that we cannot experience miracles. In the age of Enlightenment, theists believed in the immediate operation of God’s providence; while deists rejected a particular providence. Hume primarily criticizes the philosophical theologians of the Judaic, Christian, and Islamic religions on causation, analogy, and the existence of evil and disorder. First, we are naturally curious about the cause(s) of the universe since we have no experience of the beginning of universe. Second, it is too remote to support the analogy between the origin of natural objects and that of designed objects. Third, Hume maintains that “the many features of the universe from which we draw pleasure and satisfaction are counterbalanced by the evils, disorders, and hardships of life, all of which appear contrary to the plan of a wise, superintending God.”

(v) Skepticism: Hume’s philosophy in this book is skeptical, and tends to give us a notion of the imperfections and narrow limits of human understanding. Plato’s Academy turns skeptical based on the dialectic method of Socrates; and Pyrrho of Elis, who travelled with Alexander the Great, attacked the dogmatism and presented a skepticism based on the refusal to accept positive beliefs without evidences. Hume denounces the excessive form of skepticism since they question even the trustworthiness, but favors a mitigated skepticism that investigates the limits of mental capacities to support basic beliefs. Skepticism is considered with regard to two ways. In reason, man makes natural errors in judgments that reduce confidence. If one makes an error in his first judgment, the second one would be less confident, and the successive ones in continuous diminution, so infinite repetition of erroneous judgments would be in a total extinction of belief, that is the skepticism in reasoning. In senses, the body changes its position and quality, and its continuous existence provides the coherence and constancy of certain impressions. Observing a relation of cause and effect between different perceptions, we cannot observe a relation between perceptions and external objects since perceptions are the only existences. As perceptions are dependent and interrupted, the double existence of perceptions and objects must be in doubt. Hume does not believe that perceptions resemble objects and cannot discover the relation between perceptions and external objects. Thus, skeptical doubt naturally arises between reason and senses, which is a direct and total opposition between them or “between conclusions we form from cause and effect, and those that persuade us of the continued and independent existence of body.” In skeptical solution, Hume views that custom or habit controls our belief that the future will resemble the past. “All belief of matter of fact or real existence” is derived from causal inferences: belief is nothing but a more vivid and steady conception of an object than the imagination can obtain. Hume insists on that his philosophy is not deeply skeptical, but his skeptical problem remained until Kant framed a new concept of idealism.

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(b) An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals (1751): Hume expresses his position in ethics based on the empirical method to deduce general maxim by comparing particular instances.

(i) Moral Distinctions: The theorists of his time view that moral good and evil are discovered by reason, divine revelation, conscience or reflection, or a moral sense in approval or disapproval of human behavior. Siding with the moral sentiment, Hume views that moral distinctions are not derived from reason, because virtue and vice are not the objects of understanding. According to him, the understanding has two operations - the comparison of ideas to discover the relations of objects, and the inference of matter of fact to discover their existence. Since virtue and vice are neither relations nor matter of fact, they are not the objects of understanding. “Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself is utterly impotent in this particular. The rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of our reason.” Morality is more properly felt than judged, so is distinguished and determined by sentiment. Yet “reason in conjunction with passion may have a strong influence on the will. It may prompt passion by informing it of the existence of its object,” though the calm judgments of reason are not sufficient to move the will. He links morality with forcible duty and obligation like the character of law.

(ii) Benevolence: Hume views that the benevolence or softer affections are estimable: “The epithets sociable, good-natures, humane, merciful, grateful, friendly, generous, beneficent, or their equivalents” expressing the highest merit, which human nature is capable of attaining. He views that “by doing good only, can a man truly enjoy the advantages of being eminent….no qualities are more entitled to the general goodwill and approbation of mankind than beneficence and humanity, friendship and gratitude, natural affection and public spirit, or whatever proceeds from a tender sympathy with others, and a generous concern for our kind and species.” The skeptics assert that the origin of all religious worship was derived from the utility of inanimate objects to the support and well-being of mankind. In all determinations of morality, public utility is principal - giving alms to beggars is naturally praised. It seems undeniable “that nothing can bestow more merit on any human creature than the sentiment of benevolence in an eminent degree; and that a part, at least, of its merit arises from its tendency to promote the interests of our species, and bestow happiness on human society….The social virtues are never regarded without their beneficial tendencies, nor viewed as barren and unfruitful. The happiness of mankind, the order of society, the harmony of families, the mutual support of friends, are always considered as the result of their gentle dominion over the breast of men.”

(iii) Justice: To him, public utility is the sole origin of justice. If nature gives us an unlimited abundance of resources, man finds himself fully provided with whatever he desires to obtain, so that justice, being totally useless, would be an idle ceremonial. In an opposite extreme, if a society is total lack of necessities as if a city besieged were perishing with hunger, the public opens granaries without the consent of proprietors; where the need for self-preservation suspends the laws of justice. A virtuous man falls into a society of gangsters, remote from the protection of laws, while power is the only measure of right like in the state of nature. Suppose that the conjunction of the sexes is established in nature, a family immediately arises, and several families unite together into a society; and that several distinct societies maintain a kind of intercourse for mutual convenience and advantage, and the boundaries of justice grow larger with the force of their mutual connections. Then, justice is useful and beneficial to promote civil society, so it is public utility as the foundation of virtue. Internationally, when a number of political societies are erected, a new set of rules are discovered to be useful as laws of nations. By a similar way to domestic affairs, all politicians will allow that reasons of state may dispense with the rule of justice, and “invalidate any treaty or alliance, where the strict observance of it would be prejudicial, in a considerable degree, to either of the contracting parties.”

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(iv) The Utility of Social Virtues has a natural beauty and amiableness, while the rules of justice promote and take hold of some natural affection. “It must please, either from considerations of self-interest, or from more generous motives and regards...As much as we value our own happiness and welfare, as much must we applaud the practice of justice and humanity, by which alone the social confederacy can be maintained, and every man reap the fruits of mutual protection and assistance.” The circumstance of utility is a source of praise or approbation: it is constantly appealed to in all moral decisions concerning the merit and demerit of actions. There are certain factors making society difficult to maintain. The first is the passions of selfishness and confined generosity: “A man commonly loves himself better than any other single person. And although the total of his affection for others is usually greater than his self-love, it is restricted mainly to his relatives and friends.” The second is the scarcity and instability of external goods: “External goods do not exist in enough quantity to satisfy everyone’s needs and desires. And they may be taken from their possessor and become useful to someone else, unlike useful bodily attributes. These internal and external circumstances coincide to produce the chief impediment to society, the ‘insatiable, perpetual, universal’ desire of acquiring possessions for ourselves and those near us.” It also appears that “in our general approbation of characters and manners, the useful tendency of the social virtues moves us not by any regards to self-interest, but has an influence much more universal and extensive. It appears that a tendency to public good, and to the promoting of peace, harmony, and order in society, does always, by affecting the benevolent principles of our frame, engage us on the side of the social virtues. And it appears, as an additional confirmation, that these principles of humanity and sympathy enter so deeply into all our sentiments, and have so powerful an influence, as may enable them to excite the strongest censure and applause.” The virtues are useful to promote the interest of society.

(c) Political Essays (1752). Hume “combined Hugo Grotius’s idea of sociability and Thomas Hobbes’s idea of unsociability as the fundamental characteristics of the active side of human nature.” He views that “the idea of rational consent to government in the contemporary world is even more hypothetical...almost every present and past government has been founded originally either on usurpation or conquest or both, without any pretense as a fair consent or voluntary subjection of the people.” Hume questions “How could politics be a science, if laws and forms of government had not a uniform influence upon society?” Moreover, Hume’s epistemology undermines natural law: rules of natural law are invented by man to cope with what may be natural without such rules. On the balance of power, Hume views that “It is the praiseworthy attribute of ‘civilized monarchies’ as of republics that they are a government of laws, not of men....The spirit of the people must frequently be roused in order to curb the ambition of the court; the liberty of the press is so thoroughly essential to the support of our mixed government, this sufficiently decides the question: Whether this liberty be advantageous or prejudicial, there being nothing of greater importance than the preservation of the ancient government, especially if it be a free one.” Hume concludes that social stability is not accident but “the result of the simple operation of natural principles of human nature, or the result of superimposed rules” that is rather the result of a system of conventions. On power and the system of influence, Hume accepted factions or parties as necessary evils that ought to be tolerated because to eliminate them would be a remedy worse than the disease. “Most dangerous were parties or factions of principle, for they tended to crystallize opinion around inflexible positions and to generate the intractable enthusiasm.” In his History of England, Hume views that there is no particular reason for emphasizing the continuity of a political system that remains essentially the same as monarchy. He sees that the origin of government in the past has nothing to do with its legitimacy in the present, so that justice simply with “rule by law” makes a system legitimate. His economics is discussed in Chapter IV.
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Edmund Burke (1730-97): (a) Introduction. Burke was an Irish statesman, author, orator, political theorist, and philosopher, oriented through the educational medium of the Irish Enlightenment. Born to a Protestant father and a Catholic mother in Dublin, Ireland, he was raised in his father’s faith and remained a practicing Anglican throughout his life. Receiving his early education at a Quaker school in Ballitore, he studied at Trinity College, Dublin during 1744-48. In 1750 Burke entered the Inn of the Middle Temple in London to study law but spent more time to study literature and travel Continental Europe. As his father cut off his allowance, Burke began to make his income by publishing his Vindication of Natural Society in 1756. “It is a satire of Lord Bolingbroke’s deism. Burke confronted Bolingbroke not in the sphere of religion but civil society and government, arguing that his arguments against revealed religion could apply to all institutions.”139 In 1757, he published A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful, separating his aesthetic position into physical and intellectual beauties, which attracted the attention of prominent Continental thinkers. In 1757 Burke signed a contract with Robert Dodsley to write the History of England that was posthumously published in 1812 under the title of An Essay towards an Abridgement of the English History. He helped his cousin William to publish An Account of the European Settlements in America in 1758. In the same year, Burke signed another contract to write and edit the Annual Register reviewing major events in history, politics, and literature of the day: he served the journal as chief editor until the 1790s. Meanwhile, Burke married Jane, daughter of a Catholic physician who had treated him: they had one survived son. Being introduced to William Gerard Hamilton in 1759, Burke became his private secretary in 1763 when he was appointed Chief Secretary for Ireland. During his staying in Ireland, he wrote his Tracts on the Property Laws, which attacked the oppressive laws of Britain against Catholics in Ireland. In 1765, he began his career in politics by taking the position of private secretary to the Marquess of Rockingham, Prime Minister of Great Britain at the time.

In late 1765, Burke entered the British Parliament as a member of the House of Commons for Wendover, and had maintained his parliamentary membership for almost thirty years until 1794 though his electoral district varied according to political climates. His speeches were so persuasive that he seemed to be able to “stop the mouths of all Europe.”140 Burke published his pamphlet on Observations on a Late State of the Nation in 1769 in replying to the pamphlet The Present State of the Nation written by Grenvillite. About this time, he joined the circle of leading intellectuals and artists in London and took a leading role in the debate over the constitutional limits to the executive authority of the King. Burke published his Thought on the Cause of the Present Discontents in 1770 that criticized the secret influence of a neo-Tory group by calling the king’s friend. In a parliamentary debate on the prohibition of the grain export, he argued in favor of a free market in corn toward economic reform. On the American War of Independence, he supported for the grievances of the American colonies under the government of King George III and his appointed representatives in his speech of 1774. He appealed for peace as preferable to civil war at the House of Commons in 1775 by saying that “the people of the colonies are descendants of Englishmen.” In 1781, Burke was appointed Chairman of the Commons’ Select Committee on East Indian Affair in 1781. He presented the Commons with the Article of Charge of High Crimes and Misdeemours against Hastings in 1786, and the trial served to establish the principle that the Empire ought to be a moral undertaking. In 1790 he published his Reflections on the Revolution in France that is an anti-revolutionary treatise representing philosophic conservatism in English politics and political literature. Frankly speaking, Burke was more a politician than a theorist in politics: he never established a system or theory in political philosophy, but spoke to the rulers and the educated of his time. His closeness to politics brought him to the attention of historians and of conservatives of our time.141
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Photo III-4-3. Edmund Burke (1730-97)

Photo III-4-4. Burke’s *Reflections on the Revolution in France* published in 1790
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(b) **Culture and History**: In 1756 Burke anonymously published *A Vindication of Natural Society: A View of the Miseries and Evils Arising to Mankind* criticizing the philosophical works of Lord Bolingbroke’s deism and rationalism: “without the exertion of any considerable forces, the same engines which were employed for the destruction of religion, might be employed with equal success for the subversion of government.” He expresses his confidence in that “The fabric of superstition has in this our age and nation received much ruder shocks than it had ever felt before; and through the chinks and breaches of our prison, we see such glimmerings of light, and feel such refreshing airs of liberty, as daily raise our ardor for more. The miseries derived to mankind from superstition, under the name of religion, and of ecclesiastical tyranny under the name of church government, have been clearly and usefully exposed.” Through a brief survey, he finds that “no part of the globe natural liberty and natural religion are to be found pure, and free from the mixture of political adulterations.” Contrasted to natural society, Burke discusses three general forms of government - despotism, aristocracy, and democracy: “republics have many things in the spirit of absolute monarchy, but none more than this; a shining merit is ever hated or suspected in a popular assembly, as well as in a court.” Moreover, introducing a mixed form of government that combines above three, Burke implies that “A man is allowed sufficient freedom of thought, provided he knows how to choose his subject properly. You may criticize freely upon the Chinese constitution and observe with as much severity as you please upon the absurd tricks...But the scene is changed as you come homeward, and atheism or treason may be the names given in Britain, to what would be reason and truth if asserted of China. I submit to the condition, and though I have a notorious advantage before me, I waive the pursuit.” “We are indebted for all our miseries to our distrust of that guide which Providence thought sufficient for our condition, our own natural reason, which rejecting both in human and divine things, we have given our necks to the yoke of political and theological slavery.”

(c) **On aesthetics**, Burke published *A Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful* in 1757 that categorizes objects of experience into the sublime and the beautiful in terms of the impact of senses. Preferring the Sublime over the Beautiful, Burke views that the passion caused by the sublime in nature is astonishment, and astonishment is that state of the soul in which all its motions are suspended, with some degree of horror. The mind is so much entirely filled with its object that it cannot entertain any other, nor reason on that object which fills it. Astonishment is the effect of the sublime in its highest degree; its inferior effects are admiration, reverence, and respect. No passion so effectually robs the minds of all its powers of acting and reasoning as terror; and whatever is terrible with regard to sight, is sublime. He also views that the beautiful associates qualities of balance, smoothness, delicacy, and color: the beautiful in the sense of feeling is similar to that in the sense of vision. Beauty presents a remarkable contrast with the sublime; they may sometimes occur together, but they are none the less opposite and contradictory. As for the causes of them, their ultimate cause can never be unraveled by any industry of ours, but we may distinguish certain proximate causes. Burke breaks the classical aesthetic theory by separating between intellectual and the physical-sensual beauty: his preference of the sublime over the beautiful was critical for the emergence of Romanticism....On the other hand, his aesthetic theory can be deduced from his prior allegiance to philosophical empiricism. John Locke argued that all knowledge was simply a matter of sensual experience, in which regard, the ideas of the beautiful and the sublime are tracing such concepts of specific sensual perceptions. Accepting empiricism that was prosperous in his time, Burke wrote that “I conceive, if we can discover what affections of the mind produce certain emotions of the body; and what distinct feelings and qualities of body shall produce certain determinate passions in the mind, and no others, I fancy a great deal will be done.”

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(d) Politics and Society: Burke published a pamphlet, Thoughts on the Present Discontents in 1770 that was directed chiefly against Court influence that had first been used successfully against the Rockingham Ministry. In those days, the large number of newly-rich men bought their way into the House of Commons for personal reasons and could easily be attached to the King’s party. “Many seats in Parliament were regarded as hereditary possessions, which could be let at rental, or to which the nominations could be sold…The election of John Wilkes for Middlesex, in 1768, was taken as a triumph of the people. The King and his ministers then brought the House of Commons into conflict with the freeholders of Westminster.” Calling them the king’s friends altering the right of election itself, Burke took his stand with the people, while public discontents arose from the internal corruption as well as the conflict with the American colonies. As the nation has settled £800,000 a year on the Crown, Ministers said that this allowance had not been sufficient for the purpose, and that they had incurred a debt of £500,000. After this proceeding, Burke supposes “that no man can be so weak as to think that the Crown is limited to any settled allowance whatsoever. For if the Ministry has £800,000 a year by the law of the land, and if by the law of Parliament all the debts which exceed it are to be paid previous to the production of any account, I presume that this is equivalent to an income with no other limits than the abilities of the subject and the moderation of the Court - that is to say, it is such in income as is possessed by every absolute Monarch in Europe.” Burke concludes that if a faction ruling by the private inclinations of a Court against the general sense of the people, and if this faction undermines all the foundations of our freedom and weakens all the powers of executive government, the people will see “the necessity of restoring public men to an attention to the public opinion, and of restoring the Constitution to its original principles. Above all, they will endeavor to keep the House of Commons from assuming a character which does not belong to it.” Burke suggested economic reform in Britain, which is discussed in Chapter IV of this book.

(e) America and Revolution: In the late 1750s and early 1760s, Burke worked on a colonial history of America, and helped for his cousin to write An Account of the European Settlements in America, concerning on issues in the West Indies and Puritan New England. In his pamphlet, Observations on a Late State of the Nation of 1769, he viewed that the misguided policies of Britain had brought about the tension between the British government and America in the 1760s. He argued that although Britain retained the right to tax its imperial subjects, “the Stamp Act was impractical and thus should be repealed. Indeed, according to Burke, the Americans were correct in arguing that they had not been adequately represented in Parliament. He maintained that those who spoke of ‘virtual (or indirect) representation’ were naïvely unaware of the nature of the situation.” In fact, the problem was not a matter of institutions or law but of leadership causing a diplomatic failure by creating tensions between Britain and her colonies. It was wrong for Burke to ignore the radical nature of the American Revolution: he treated the tension as a commercial affair, but the colonies were demanding for the natural rights of the people – liberty and equality. In his Speech on American Taxation of 1774, Burke appealed to the House of Commons to return to the conciliatory policies of the Rockingham administration. “I charge, therefore, to this new and unfortunate system the loss not only of peace, of union, and of commerce, but even of revenue, which its friends are contending for. It is morally certain that we have lost at least a million of free grants since the peace. I think we have lost a great deal more…Until you come back to that system, there will be no peace for England.” In his Speech on Conciliation with the Colonies of 1775, Burke outlines six major causes for America’s fierce spirit of liberty: what Americans sought is their traditional rights as Englishmen, so the British should recognize the de facto right of America to tax itself. Burke aimed at advancing the Rockingham interest and keeping the colonies within in the empire by conciliation to be more beneficial in the long run.
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(f) Ireland and Catholicism: Burke was consistently critical to the brutal domination of Protestant in Ireland (I imagine is was humanity and fairness). As an Irishman, Burke sympathized with his Roman Catholic countrymen, who were denied basic rights and liberties under Anti-Catholic penal laws. His Tracts on the Property Laws of 1765 argues “that laws which transgress considerably on ‘coming right and the ends of just government’ cannot command obedience and are subject to repeal. Governments have no right to make unjust or generally injurious laws, because this flouts divine Natural Law. Burke asserted that ‘a conservation and secure enjoyment of our natural rights is the great and ultimate purpose of civil society’; all forms of government ‘are only good as they are subservient to that purpose.’ Hence the Penal Laws were wrong.”

He sees that improvement of society must be pursued through persuasion and encouragement, not compulsion. The Savile Act of 1778 provided the first small reform of the anti-Catholic penal laws in Britain, which allowed that Catholics could more easily purchase and inherit land; and priests were no longer jailed merely for saying mass. Although his constituents in Bristol were unhappy with his interests in Catholic rights, he clearly set forth his position on Catholic issues in his Address on the Gordon Riots and the Catholic Question of 1780. “And now…. let me take to myself some degree of honest pride on the nature of the charges that are against me. I do not here stand before you accused of venality, or of neglect of duty. It is not said that, in the long period of my service, I have, in a single instance, sacrificed the slightest of your interests to my ambition or to my fortune. It is not alleged that, to gratify any anger or revenge of my own, or of my party, I have had a share in wronging or oppressing any description of men, or any one man in any description. No! the charge against me are all of one kind: that I have pushed the principles of general justice and benevolence too far – further than a cautious policy would warrant, and further than the opinions of many would go along with me. In every accident which may happen through life….I will call to mind this accusation, and be comforted.”

(g) India and Colonialism: The relationship between the British government and the East India Company became complicated in managing the affairs of India. Burke believed that the Company’s abuses in India were so great that only the government intervention could resolve the problem. In his Speech on Mr. Fox’s East India Bill to the Commons in 1783, Burke advocates the replacement of East India Company directors by a government commission to run India.”

Many of his charges against the Company, and against Governor-General Warren Hastings in particular, have been converted by historians on factual grounds. But the speech reflects his conception of the proper role of Britain in governing other countries, his sincere concern for the just treatment of the people of India, and his genuine sympathy with their sufferings.” In early 1786 Burke raised questions over Hastings’ role in the Maratha War. “The attacks on Hastings were largely made by opposition Whigs hoping to embarrass the government of William Pitt.” Pitt and other government ministers defended Hastings and suggested that he had saved the British Empire in Asia. Pitt broadly defended Hastings, but declared his punishment of the Rajah had been excessive. Hastings returned to Britain in June 1785, and an anti-Hastings motion was passed in the Commons in 1786, to which Burke delivered his Speeches on the Impeachment of Warren Hastings: “I have here spoken only of the beginning of a great, notorious system of corruption, which branched out so many ways and into such a variety of abuses, and has afflicted that kingdom with such horrible evils from that day to this, that I will venture to say it will make one of the greatest, weightiest, and most material parts of the charge that is now before you….I will now come to a scene of peculation of another kind: namely, a peculation by the direct sale of offices of justice, - by the direct sale of the successions of families, - by the sale of guardianships and trusts…” Burke emphasizes that “I must do justice to the East. I assert that their morality is equal to ours, in whatever regards the duties of governors, fathers, and superiors.”
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(h) The French Revolution: In 1790 Burke published his Reflections on the Revolution in France that was an anti-revolutionary treatise representing philosophic conservatism in British politics and political literature. A great many British supported the French Revolution in the beginning, but the rhetorical and philosophical power of the Reflections became influential for them to modify their attitude to be more cautious. Due to his personal background and political orientation, Burke was ambivalent between aristocrats and bourgeoisie. England experienced the Puritan Revolution in 1642-60 and the Glorious Revolution in 1688-89, while Thomas Hobbes published Leviathan in 1651 and John Locke the Second Treatise of Government in 1690. William and Mary landed in England, terminated the kingship of James II, and ascended the throne without civil war that was not a real revolution but a renewal of the former government. Owing to the Glorious Revolution and the Hanoverian Succession, George III ascended the throne in 1760 but struggled in domestic politics: in 1783 under the pressure of the House of Commons, the Duke of Portland became Prime Minister, with Fox as Foreign Secretary and Lord North as Home Secretary. George III mistrusted the Whigs and Burke who criticized the corruption of the King’s Friends. Burke was sympathetic with the Americans but aimed to keep the colonies within the empire by conciliation. Meantime, Richard Price published his Observations on the Nature of Civil Liberty in 1777 that strongly opposed to the war with America; and Josiah Tucker published A Treatise Concerning Civil Government in 1781 that attacked John Locke’s principles as tending to democracy and supporting the British constitution. Burke and Tucker were in line with social theory of Whig holding “commercial progress to be part of the science of human nature and perfectly compatible with hereditary monarchy and landed aristocracy.” But Price was in favor of the primacy of natural rights that would destroy the commercial and the moral ties. In religion, the Toleration Act of 1689 was amended in the 1770s, and finally the Doctrine of the Trinity Act of 1813 removed penalties against Unitarians.

Burke brought up that the people of England have acquired three fundamental rights to justify the British system against France. First, the Declaration of Right earned by the Glorious Revolution became the cornerstone of constitution, declaring the rights and liberties of the subject, and for settling the succession of the crown in the Protestant line. He sees that “The people of England will not ape the fashions they have never tried, nor go back to those which they have found mischievous on trial. They look upon the legal hereditary succession of their crown as among their rights, not as their wrongs; as a benefit, not as a grievance; as a security for their liberty, not as a badge of servitude.” Second, kings are undoubtedly the servants of the people because the power has no other rational end than that of the general advantage. “But the king of Great Britain obeys no other person; all other persons are individually, and collectively too, under him and owe to him a legal obedience.” “The speculative line of demarcation where obedience ought to end and resistance must begin is faint, obscure, and not easily definable.” He sees that the wise will determine from the gravity of the case, but a revolution will be the very last resource to be considered. Third, the right to frame a government for the people came from the Magna Charta of 1215 requiring King John to proclaim certain liberties and accept that his will was not arbitrary, the Petition of Right of 1628 that Parliament says to Charles I that “Your subjects have inherited this freedom,” and the Declaration of Right of 1689 as explained in the first. “We have an inheritable crown, and inheritable peerage, and a House of Commons and a people inheriting privileges, franchises, and liberties from a long line of ancestors.” Burke was eager to criticize the French Revolution as an irreparable calamity to the French people and to mankind by indicating their punishment in their success – “law overturned; tribunals subverted; industry without vigor; commerce expiring; the revenue unpaid, yet the people impoverished; a church pillaged, and a state not relieved; civil and military anarchy…”

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The Whigs in Britain was consciously post-feudal in the natural harmony between landed and commercial wealth - landed aristocrats and bourgeois formed a class of creditors in the process of the agricultural revolution and the first industrial revolution in the eighteenth century. The moral health of society depended on virtue and wisdom in the free market, so that proper interactions between politics (aristocrats) and economy (bourgeoisie) could be critical for peace and prosperity, while the House of Commons represented the voice of commoners though the inadequate representation was a defect of constitution. In the 1780s, Burke embarked upon the impeachment of Warren Hastings, Governor-General of India, to injure Pitt and the King. The French Revolution was critical to both the Whig and the Tory as threats or opportunities in their power politics. It began with the abolition of feudal rights, the confiscation of church land, the march to Versailles, and bringing the royal family to Paris: “as a Whig, Burke believed that every element of ruling society should possess property in its own right, and as an Anglican he believed that the Church should be an element of the ruling order and not a branch of the salaried civil service.” While Price was happy to see what was going on in France, Burke was fearful to see the rise of a new revolutionary intelligentsia. He was negative to the composition of the National Assembly that was unaccountable in their capacities of its elected members, departing from the ancient course of the ruling structure: they were inferior, unlearned, mechanical, merely instrumental members of the profession. The destruction of the nobility removed men of great civil and great military talents – the ornament of their age; and a separation of church and state concurred with the confiscation of its property by employing the rhetoric of anti-Christian deism. He feared neither bourgeois nor proletariat class, but was afraid of the power of an intellectual and professional class to be easily separated from the social order for its remodel. He views that nothing is an adequate representation of a state that does not represent its ability and its property – though ability is a vigorous and active principle, as property is “sluggish, inert, and timid.”

Burke’s concern was for the integration of the intellectual and lettered class - conservative landowners, progressive merchants and industrialists, and a clergy or national church - with national tradition. He feared the Unitarian dissenters who would separate church from state in England, and the association of intellectuals against Christianity in France. Burke sees that the social system is vindicated through sacred, natural, and historical factors by setting conditions for our moral and practical thinking. The second half of Reflections is devoted to revolutionary experiments in public finance, state-building, and military power in France: why they cannot possibly construct a governing order as stable as the English? Burke was considered as an enemy of rational reform “only insofar as it threatened to substitute the active intellect for the social order of which it was part. In defense of that order, he mobilized all the resources of nature, history, and tradition.” To him, the French experiment is “the very last example that Britain ought to follow. In fact, he advises the French to refashion their state on the British model.” In counter-arguments to the Reflections, Thomas Paine criticized the hereditary succession of the British throne, and defended the separation of church from state in his Rights of Man of 1791-92. Mary Wollstonecraft published A Vindication of the rights of Woman in 1792 that was a response to educational and political theorists of the time who did not believe women should have an education. She argues that women ought to have an education commensurate with their position in society: women are essential to the nation. William Godwin published his Enquiry Concerning Political Justice and its Influence on Morals and Happiness in 1793. He believes that government “insinuates itself into our personal dispositions, and insensibly communicates its own spirit to our private transactions.” So he proposes “a society in which human beings use their reason to decide the best course of action.” Later we can see that the conservatives of the 1950s found Burke as “a defender of liberal society against revolutionary totalitarianism.”
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Joseph de Maistre (1753-1821) was a magistrate and senator of the Kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia. He was born into a recently ennobled Savoyard family and educated under the tutelage of the clergy (most likely the Jesuits). Completing his studies in law at the University of Turin, Maistre entered legal establishment and became a prominent member of the local Masonic lodges. He first welcomed the French Revolution as “a harbinger of much needed reform” but rejected it completely and turned to a terrible conservative, as its supporters destroy longstanding institutions, engaged in class warfare, and launched a de-Christianization campaign. As the revolutionary army invaded the kingdom, Maistre became a fleeing senator of Savoy, followed by the two decades of his exile at first in Lausanne, Switzerland and later in St. Petersburg, Russia as a combative counter-revolutionary. Engaged in political and philosophical readings and writings during 1792-96, Maistre anonymously published his Considerations on France in 1797 that is “the best known French equivalent of Edmund Burke’s Reflections.” As the Napoleon army advanced, he fled to Venice, but left Italy and arrived in the Russian capital, where he served as a diplomatic minister of the King Sardinia to St. Petersburg during 1803-17. Returning to home after the war over, he spent the rest of his life in Turin with his writings.155

His Considerations on France begins with the absolutism: “We are all attached to the throne of the Supreme Being by a supple chain that restrains us without enslaving us. Nothing is more admirable in the universal order of things than the action of free beings under the divine hand.” Maistre criticizes that an assault against sovereignty is “undoubtedly one of the greatest crimes” that can be committed and every assault committed against sovereignty in the name of the nation is “always more or less a national crime.”156 It is believed that a large indivisible free nation cannot exist under a republican government, and encourages a counter-revolution: “It is common fallacy nowadays to insist on the danger of counter revolution.” He was against confiscated properties because “People do not dare enjoy these properties publicly, and the cooler people become to the idea, the less they will dare utilize their properties.” About vengeance of counter-revolution, Maistre defends the king to extend his amnesty, and worries that the innocent individuals suffer from the Revolution. Maistre recognizes that “liberty needs its critics as well as its supporters” due to diversity and conflict of interests between individuals. He claimed that the crimes of the Reign of Terror in the French Revolution were “the logical consequence of Enlightened thought, as well as its divinely-decreed punishment.”157

Defending absolutism with rigorous logic, Maistre argues in his Essay on the Generative Principle of Political Constitutions and other Human Institutions of 1809 that “constitutions are not the product of human reason, but come from God, who slowly brings them to maturity.” In On the Pope of 1819 he argues “that authority in politics should therefore derive from religion, and that in Europe this religious authority must ultimately lie with the Pope.” In his Saint Petersburg Dialogues of 1821, Maistre views on human justice - “God has given sovereigns the supreme prerogative of punishing crimes, in which above all they are his representatives.” He continues that “Moral vices can increase the number and intensity of illness to a degree that it is impossible to fix….There is no need to go further to justify the ways of Providence even in the temporal sphere, above all if this consideration is joined to that of human justice, since….the advantage of virtue is incalculable, without giving any reasons or even appealing to religious consideration.”158 In his Enlightenment on Sacrifices of 1821, Maistre views that “The gods are good, and we are indebted to them for all the good things we enjoy: we owe them praise and thanks. But the gods are just and we are guilty. They must be appeased and we must expiate our sins; and, to do this, the most effective means is sacrifice.”159 Maistre was called as “a fierce absolutist, a furious theocrat, and intransigent legitimist, apostle of a monstrous trinity composed of Pope….the champion of….the hardest, narrowest and most inflexible dogmatism….”
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5. German Idealism and British Utilitarianism

British empiricists such as Francis Bacon, John Locke, George Berkeley, and David Hume view that all knowledge comes from the sense perception; while Continental rationalists like Rene Descartes, Baruch Spinoza, and Gottfried Leibniz favor the role of reason to obtain knowledge. But German idealists turned the philosophy toward a new direction in two decades before and after 1800. In his An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding of 1748, David Hume as an empiricist is doubt in that perceptions resemble objects, because man makes natural errors in reason, and the body changes which disturb the consistency of observations in senses. The skeptic doubt arising between reason and senses is against the objective validity of the law of causality supporting empiricism. In order to resolve this skeptic doubt, Hume introduces custom or habit that controls our belief in that the future will resemble the past. Hinted by Hume, Immanuel Kant establishes his transcendental idealism in the Critique of Pure Reason of 1781, viewing that a priori or transcendental knowledge is formed by sensuous intuitions existing in the mind that is antecedent to experience; by the understanding transformed by categories that result in judgments (transcendental analytic); and by reason saving us from fallacies, if the judgments or ideas are illusory, through thesis-antithesis-synthesis (transcendental dialectic).

The Kantian philosophy was transformed into metaphysical idealism led by Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. In his Wissenschaftslehre of 1794, Johann Fichte develops metaphysical idealism from the critical philosophy by eliminating the thing-in-itself and by introducing the Ego with self-consciousness. Fichte considers two paths to make clear the ground of all experience: abstracting from the intelligence-in-itself associated with the feeling of freedom (idealism), and the thing-in-itself associated with the feeling of necessity (dogmatism). He chooses idealism not dogmatism to explain experience owing to his previous inclination to ethics. In his Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature, Friedrich Schelling stands at the midpoint of German idealism between Fichte his mentor and Hegel his former roommate at university. Schelling’s philosophy starts from the line of Fichte, but moved to esthetics and theology in his later writings. Against Kant, Fichte, and Schelling, George Hegel proposes Absolute Idealism in his Phenomenology of Spirit of 1807 through a logical relationship: consciousness, self-consciousness, reason, spirit, religion, and absolute knowledge. He published on the philosophy of Logic, Right, and History with the dialectic method by using logical contradiction for synthetic equilibrium that is temporary but an endless development in history. During the Berlin years, his political writings inclined to Protestantism as a political ideology shifting from feeling to thinking. His writings educated German intellectuals contributing to its ideological reconstruction after Napoleon.

On the other hand, Jeremy Bentham and James Mill created a new concept of utilitarianism in Britain. The challenge of early liberalism came from both political and economic thoughts in Britain. According to Hume’s skepticism, reason is incapable of judging the truth or falsity of any moral proposition. If reason cannot teach humanity how to act, natural rights do not exist. As the tradition of natural rights became questionable, liberalism was threatened. Meanwhile, the industrial revolution in Britain created bourgeoisie and proletariat classes, which changed economic and social environment. Hence, the partisan interests of the commercial classes became more important than individual interests of natural rights. In this given environment, utilitarianism appeared as a response of liberalism to the intellectual and social crises in the nineteenth century of British society. As a leading theorist in Anglo-American philosophy of law, Jeremy Bentham influenced the development of social welfare. “He advocated individual and economic freedom, the separation of church and state, freedom of expression, equal rights for women,” and so on. James Mill was his secretary and immediate collaborator.

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Photo III-5-1. Immanuel Kant (1724-1804)

Photo III-5-2. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831)

Book IV. The French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution: 1715-1815
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) was a German philosopher, who researched, lectured, and wrote on philosophy and anthropology during the Enlightenment in the time of Frederick the Great. Born to a saddler in Königsberg, East Prussia, he studied at the Collegium Fredericianum in 1732-40, when the society was under pietism stressing intense religions devotion, personal humility, and a literal interpretation of the Bible. “Kant received a stern education – strict, punitive, and disciplinary – that preferred Latin and religious instruction over mathematics and science. Despite being raised in a religious household and still maintaining a belief in God, he was skeptical of religion in later life and was an agnostic.” At the University of Königsberg, Kant studied the philosophy of Leibniz and Wolff under Martin Knutzen - a rationalist. After his father’s death in 1746, Kant worked as a family tutor for eight years until 1755, when he finished his Magister degree. Taking positions of assistant librarian for fifteen years, Kant lectured “not only on logic, metaphysics and moral philosophy but also on physics, mathematics, geography, anthropology, pedagogy and mineralogy.” In spite of his growing reputation as an original thinker, Kant could not obtain tenure at the university; but in 1770, he was appointed to an ordinary professor of logic and metaphysics at Königsberg. He developed his own philosophy during the pre-critical period, and published the Critique of Pure Reason in 1781. Theorizing his thought into the Kantian ideal, he published a series of books including the Metaphysics of Morals in 1785, the Critique of Practical Reason in 1787, the Critique of Judgment in 1790, Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason in 1793, Perpetual Peace in 1795, and Metaphysics of Ethics in 1797. Kantian philosophy was influential on modern philosophy and such other fields as politics, sociology, religion, or literature: for example, Hegel developed his dialectical method based on elements within the Critique of Pure Reason; which stimulated Karl Marx to frame essential part of the structure of Marxism in the nineteenth century to be discussed in Book V.

(a) Critique of Pure Reason: Kant writes that “all human cognition begins with intuitions, proceeds from thence to conceptions, and ends with ideas.” Our intuition is the representation of phenomena; we know nothing more than our own mode of perceiving the nature of objects; so the sensibility is modeled by the structure of our mind (perception) through inherent forms of intuition under the subjective conditions of space and time. The conception of the sensibility is a confused representation of “things-in-themselves” and a falsification of real existence. Kant views that the universal problem of pure reason lies in how synthetical judgments a priori are possible such as in pure mathematics or pure natural science, since “pure reason is the faculty which contains the principles of cognizing anything absolutely a priori.” According to him, sensuous intuitions and empirical conceptions constitute the elements of all our knowledge, either transcendental or empirical. Transcendental or a priori knowledge is the pure form of sensuous intuitions existing in the mind that is antecedent to experience, so independent from empirical contents (without their admixture). Empirical or a posteriori knowledge is based on the content of experience in the matter of all phenomena; it is quite possible that our empirical knowledge is compounded through impressions we received from senses. Knowledge springs from two sources: the power of receiving representations (receptivity for impressions), and of cognizing by means of these representations (spontaneity in the production of conceptions), so that intuitions without conceptions must be blind. He classifies logic into the general (universal) and the particular use of understanding. General logic makes abstraction of all content and cognition – calling it transcendental logic – which is divided into Analytic and Dialectic. Kant views that a priori knowledge must be analytic: for example, “An intelligent man is intelligent” or “An intelligent man is a man.” However, a misuse of conceptions or categories may cause error - transcendental illusion - that is unavoidable; which needs dialectics of pure reason “in order to avoid unscientific conclusions and guard against metaphysical dogmatism.”
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On the one hand, Transcendental Analytic is the dissection of our a priori knowledge into the elements of the pure cognition of the understanding: all sensuous intuitions are collected and united into the pure conceptions of the understanding - the synthesis of the diversity. The pure conceptions of the understanding apply a priori to objects of intuition in general, which is logical functions in all possible judgments. A judgment can be brought by factors of quantity (universal, particular, singular), quality (affirmative, negative, infinite), relation (categorical, hypothetical, disjunctive), and modality (problematical, assertoric, apodictic). Kant applies this general logical form of cognition for analytic conceptions, called categories, consisting of such factors as quantity (unity, plurality, and totality), quality (reality, negation, and limitation), relation (inherence and subsistence, causality and dependence, and community), and modality (possibility, existence, and necessity) - the table of the categories. Knowledge is perception transformed by categories into a judgment or an idea: the application of the categories to objects of the senses is the original form of understanding in relation to time and space, resulting in judgments and conclusions. The analytic judgments are based on the principle of contradiction: for example, “It is impossible for a thing to be and not to be at the same time.” Nevertheless, the synthetic judgments make us to go out beyond a given conception: in order to synthetically compare one with the other, a third thing is necessary, in which the synthesis of two conceptions is originated and adopted. The table of the categories is a natural guide to synthetic principles as rules for the objective employment of the former: “all principles of the pure understanding are axioms of intuition, anticipations of perception, analogies of experience, and postulates of empirical thought in general.” Therefore, “we cannot perceive the possibility of a thing from the category alone, but must always have an intuition, by which to make evident the objective reality of the pure conception of the understanding.” We require not merely intuitions within the limit of categories but also external intuitions beyond the limit of categories.

On the other hand, Transcendental Dialectic is to contend itself with exposing the illusory appearance in transcendental judgments, and guarding us against it. The pure reason is the faculty of knowledge from principles a priori, and presents us with the idea of a transcendental doctrine of psychology, cosmology, and theology. The dialectic tries to reconcile such assertions as thesis and anti-thesis in order to induce a synthesis based on transcendental reasoning. “The result of all the dialectical attempts of pure reason not only confirms the truth of what we have already proved in our Transcendental Analytic, namely, that all inferences which would lead us beyond the limits of experience are fallacious and groundless, but it at the same time teaches us this important lesson, that human reason has a natural inclination to overstep these limits, and that transcendental ideas are as much the natural property of the reason as categories are of the understanding. There exists this difference, however, that while the categories never mislead us, outward objects being always in perfect harmony therewith, ideas are the parents of irresistible illusions, the severest and most subtle criticism being required to save us from the fallacies.” He believes that “human reason contains not only ideas, but ideals, which possess, not, like those of Plato, creative, but certainly practical power – as regulative principles, and form the basis of the perfectibility of certain actions.” The idea provides a rule with virtue and wisdom in their perfect purity, while the ideal serves us “a standard of action, with which we may compare and judge ourselves, which may help us to reform ourselves” although the perfection is not easily attainable. Kant views that materialism is impossible in the system of pure reason, since soul is not substance and we know matter through ideas. The conception of an absolutely necessary being is a mere idea, and “it is incapable of enlarging our cognition with regard to the existence of things” which we do not know to exist. Hence, the objective reality of Supreme Being “can neither be proved nor disproved by pure reason.”
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(b) Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals: Kant classifies knowledge into two parts: material philosophy consisting of physics (laws of nature) and ethics (laws of freedom); and formal philosophy - logic having no empirical part. Logic is pure philosophy, but if limited to definite objects of understanding, it can be metaphysics: metaphysics of nature or metaphysics of morals. So “physics will have an empirical and a rational parts, and ethics likewise.” Kant calls empirical part of ethics “practical anthropology” and rational part of ethics “morals.” All moral philosophy rests solely on a priori laws requiring a power of judgment sharpened by experience. A metaphysics of morals is indispensable, “not merely because of motives to speculate on the source of the a priori practical principles which lie in our reason, but also because morals themselves remain subject to all kinds of corruption so long as the guide and supreme norm for their correct estimation is lacking.” The scope of this book is limited to examination of pure practical reason to establish the supreme principles of morality. In Section I of transition from the common knowledge of morals to the philosophical. Kant sets the principles of morality; that to have moral worth an action must be done from duty; that an action performed from duty does not have its moral worth in the purpose which is to be achieved through it but in the maxim by which it is determined; and that duty is necessity of an inclination to the object as an effect of the proposed action, but we can never respect for it precisely because it is a mere effect and not an activity of a will.

“Thus the moral worth of an action does not lie in the effect which is expected from it or in any principle of action which has to borrow its motive from this expected effect.” Kant resorts to the common reason of mankind in its practical judgments: neither science nor philosophy is needed to know “what one has to do in order to be honest and good, and even wise and virtuous” as long as the common human reason is used as the standard of its judgments. Nevertheless, to be wise in moral matters, “common human reason is impelled to go outside its sphere and to take a step into the field of practical philosophy.”

In Section II of transition from popular moral philosophy to the metaphysics of morals, Kant views that the will, commanded by common reason, determines the action in accordance with a universal practical law. The objective principle - that a perfectly good will is subject to objective laws - is a command of reason as far as it constrains a will, which is called the imperative. The hypothetical imperative represents the practical necessity of a possible action as a means to achieve something else which one desires; while the categorical imperative represents an action as of itself objectively necessary, without regard to any other end. The moral imperative appears to be categorical and unconditional requiring a practical law, so that there is one categorical imperative in morality, in which the maxim of our actions by the will of rational beings becomes a universal law of nature. “Morality consists in the relation of every action to that legislation through which alone a realm of ends is possible…every rational being must act as if he, by his maxims, were at all times a legislative member in the universal realm of ends.” Section III discusses transition from metaphysics of morals to the critical examination of pure practical reason. Since the concept of freedom is the key to the explanation of the autonomy of the will, Kant presupposes freedom as the property of the will of all rational beings; which reduces the concept of morality to the idea of freedom. The idea of freedom follows consciousness of a law of action: rational being takes objective necessity of action provided reason is practical without hindrance. Since rational being belongs to the world of the intelligible under laws, the concept of autonomy is connected with the universal principle of morality, which is the ground of all actions of rational beings, so categorical imperatives are possible. If both the world of sense and that of intelligence subsist together, the former makes us become accountable for what belongs merely to our desires and inclinations. However, reason would overstep all its bounds if pure reason can be practical to seek unconditional necessity of the moral imperative.
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About the idea of Critique, Kant distinguishes it between the theoretical and practical use of reason. The theoretical or pure reason examines all the cognitive faculties which contain the principles of cognizing transcendental a priori knowledge as defined in his Critique of Pure Reason. The practical reason – rational part of ethics defined as morals - is concerned with the determining grounds of the will motivating action of rational being bound by the categorical imperative to one’s duty rather than subjective preference as explained in his Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. The metaphysics of morals is limited to the pure practical reason requiring rational necessity without any sensible incentives. As practical reason concerns about the use of reason to decide how to act, Thomas Aquinas defines the first principle of practical reason as that good must be done and pursued, and evil must be avoided; David Hume asserts that reason alone cannot be a motive to the will, but rather is the slave of the passions, and moral distinctions are derived not from reason but from the moral sentiments: feelings of approval or disapproval; and Utilitarians consider reason as an instrument of the satisfactions of wants or needs; those which are different from Kant’s position.

(c) Critique of Practical Reason: Kant deals with moral theory, freedom of will, and the postulates of pure practical reason. (i) Moral Theory: Kant argues that every individual has moral consciousness, a higher element than the pursuit of pleasure, despite often conflict between moral and desire. Moral consciousness is from the inherent psychological structure like categories, not from experience. It commands us unconditionally to do the highest good for its own sake, as an end in itself, not as a means to happiness or reward. The practical principle or maxim is always “a product of reason” and determines the will as an unconditional practical law, which we call the moral law. In other words, if moral requirements apply with rational necessity, reason alone can determine the will to motivate action, so that reason by itself establishes the fundamental law of pure practical reason; which becomes the basic principle of morality or Categorical Imperative. However, Empiricists view that motives and reasons for action must ultimately be based on individual desires or basic preferences, so that practical reason has the limited function in the morality, that is “empirically conditioned” based on given desires. (ii) Freedom of the Will: Kant establishes a connection between morality and freedom of the will: if anyone follows the moral law, he is transcendentally free; and if anyone has a free will to determine himself to act independently, the moral law is the basic principle of his will. Kant views that transcendental freedom is a kind of causality as natural necessity exercised by agents whom it can motivate. The rule of judgment under laws of pure practical reason is whether you could indeed regard the action as possible through your will. “Only rationalism of judgment is suitable for the use of moral concepts,” but “mysticism is still compatible with the purity and sublimity of the moral law.” Thus, Kant presupposes the freedom of the will of rational being, acting under universal law in accordance with reason alone independently of external causes from the phenomenal world. (iii) The Postulates of the Pure Practical Reason: The moral law generates a duty to bring about the highest good in the world. But the concept of the highest good already contains an ambiguity: the highest can mean either the supreme or the complete. Morality is the principal part of the highest good that can be fully accomplished only in an eternity leading to the postulate of immortality; while happiness is the state of a rational being as everything goes according to his wish and will. The practical task of pure reason is to promote the highest good: it is possible by assuming the immortality of soul and the existence of God as a moral author of universe who has ordered the world so as to support the ends of morality, and by insisting that the highest good is a natural need of practical interests under the subjective condition of our reason rather than a duty or a command under the objective condition of that. A concept of the highest good (of the kingdom of God) alone satisfies the strictest demand of practical reason.
(d) **Critique of Judgment**: Kant deals with two parts: aesthetic judgment focusing on the beautiful and sublime; and teleological judgment discussing the role of teleology. Since the areas of aesthetics and teleology were traditionally less philosophical in his time, it was less attentive to readers than previous Critiques. Kant divides philosophy into theoretical, judgment, and practical parts by inserting the term judgment in the middle between theoretic and practical, and correspondingly introduces the three faculties of soul: the faculty of cognition; the feeling of pleasure and displeasure (aesthetic judgment); and the faculty of desire. The aesthetic judgment is determined by the formal finality, *a priori* as the basis of its reflection upon nature, apart from the conformity to law (pure reason) or the final end (practical reason). He introduces four kinds of delight: agreeable, beautiful, sublime, and good. (1) The agreeable is a pure sensory judgment based on subjective inclination alone; the good is the ethical judgment conforming objective moral law; and the beautiful and the sublime, standing between them, are based on “subjective universal” judgments. The judgment of taste to the beautiful is not cognitive, so not logical, but aesthetic based on subjective feeling or conditions, entirely independent of charm and emotion, and of the concept of perfection. (2) The sublime is absolutely great in comparison with which all else is small: there are two forms of the sublime – the mathematical and the dynamical. The delight in the sublime is independent of interest in its quality, universally valid in its quantity, subjective finality in its relation, and necessary in its modality. The sublime is the capacity of thinking which evidences a faculty of mind transcending every standard of sense. (3) The teleological judgment investigates the causality looking the ends: “An organized natural product is one in which every part is reciprocally both end and means,” and we must look beyond nature in order to find the end of the real existence of nature itself. Kant views that natural teleology cannot prove the existence of God, but it has “a positive role to play with respect to religion and morality, in that it leads us to ask what the final purpose of nature is.”

(e) **Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason**: Kant tries to compromise reason with religion in this book. He conceives God as a thing-in-itself (a noumenon status of the deity): “that we cannot experience God at all – since all our experience is necessarily structured by the forms of space and time, and hence is only of appearances.” This book investigates “whether there is a form of Christianity that can at the same time be a form of the rational religion demanded by morality. Kant is sharply critical of traditional theology and church practice on a number of points, but he is also quite sympathetic with some of the Christian views in which he is most interested.” For example, he endorses the doctrine of original sin inherited two moral liabilities from their first ancestors: one is the guilt of the first sin, and the other is corruption that is fundamental, so that moral aspiration is central to his religion. He believes that if we do all that we can do, “then God is there and will supply whatever else is needed, which would be sanctifying grace.” He also views that “God is doing the right thing, only doing what we deserve, in counting moral progress as perfected holiness.” He considers a church as an ethical community providing a social structure “in which people instruct, encourage, and support each other in virtue, instead of providing each other with temptations to vice.” Kant thinks that “nothing but a morally good will is by itself pleasing to God, as nothing else is unqualified good” so he avoided attending public worship. According to him, there are at least three conditions that a church satisfies to be a true church: “(1) Its doctrines and practices must not contradict the principles of rational morality; it must be in that sense ‘within the boundaries of mere reason.’ (2) It must assign the pure religious faith of reason priority over its own historically conditioned doctrines and practices, regarding the latter merely as means or vehicle to the fostering and social embodiment of the former. (3) A true church must enshrine ‘a principle for continually coming closer to pure religious faith until finally we can dispense’ with historical faith as a vehicle for religion.”

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(f) Perpetual Peace: Kant expresses his views on peace in this book: “The state of peace among men living in close proximity is not the natural state; instead, the natural state is a one of war, which does not just consist in open hostilities, but also in the constant and enduring threat of them. The state of peace must therefore be established, for the suspension of hostilities does not provide the security of peace, and unless this security is pledged by one neighbor to another (which can happen only in a state of lawfulness), the latter, from whom such security has been requested, can threaten the former as an enemy.” Kant believes that the civil constitution of every nation should be republican, that the right of nations shall be based on a federation of free states, and that cosmopolitan right shall be limited to conditions of universal hospitality. Kant suggests three measures to guarantee perpetual peace. First, the people must form itself into a nation so as to be able to prepare itself to meet the external threat with military might. It requires “to apply the mechanism of nature to men so as to organize the conflict of hostile attitudes present in a people in such a way that they must compel one another to submit to coercive laws and thus to enter into a state of peace, where laws have power.” Second, the idea of international right presupposes the existence of many separate, independent, adjoining nations; and although such a situation is in itself a state of war, yet this situation is rationally preferable to their being overrun by a superior power that melds them into a universal monarchy. Despotism vitiates all powers, and an equilibrium of the liveliest competing powers is produced and secured by that the growth of culture and men’s gradual progress that lead to mutual understanding and peace. Third, the spirit of trade cannot coexist with war, and sooner or later this spirit dominates every people. “Since financial power may be the most reliable in forcing nations to pursue the noble cause of peace; and wherever in the world war threatens to break out, they will try to head it off through mediation, just as if they were permanently leagued for this purpose.”

Kant sees the disagreement between morals and politics cause a serious problem in relations to perpetual peace. Morality is in itself practical and is the totality of unconditionally binding laws according to which we ought to act, so no conflict exists between politics as an applied doctrine of right and morals as a theoretical doctrine of right. If a conflict were to occur between them, we expect reason to pursue our ultimate goals. But since man will never want to do what is required to achieve the goal of perpetual peace, only the collective unity of combined wills requires that civil society to be a whole, which coercion subsequently provides a basis for public right if the general will establishes a constitution. As an individual state feels to be superior to another, the means of increasing its power causes all theoretical plans for civil, international, and cosmopolitan rights to dissolve into empty and impartial ideals; then politics would be the whole of practical wisdom, and the concept of right would be a contentless thought. Now we can think of either a moral politician who interprets the political principles being coherent with morality, or a political moralist who forges a morality to suit the statesman’s advantage. The moral politician will follow such a way as to conform with natural right at the cost of self-sacrifice so that a nation may already possess republican rule. Despotic moralists violate rules of political prudence in many ways, which make progress impossible and perpetuate the violation of right. This practical man ignores the idea of right and solves the problem empirically at the expense of the people. His maxims are not in public good but in “sophistries” such as arbitrary usurpation of power and crimes to human nature, causing rebellion and destroying the unity of the people. In order to bring practical philosophy into harmony with itself, the political moralist should act the moral politician rightly to stop (on the agreement between politics and morality), so his maxim would become a universal law. In this regard, Kant emphasizes two essential principles: “All actions that affect the rights of other men are wrong if their maxim is not consistent with publicity,” and that “All maxims that require publicity (in order not to fail of their end) agree with both politics and morality.”

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Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814), a German philosopher, was born to a linen weaver liberated from serfdom in a small village in rural Saxony. The indigence of Fichte’s family was a common condition of rural Saxony and Germany of the time; but his academic success made him escape from his poverty and enter the middle class. Receiving basic education from his father, Fichte showed remarkable ability, which reputation made a country landowner support him for education. In 1774, he entered the foundation-school near Naumburg, where he received excellent education under the spirit of the semi-monastic institution though his social life and contact with the world were not sufficient. Fichte entered the Jena theology seminary in 1780 but ended his studies without completing the degree in 1784 when his supporter died. He became a tutor in various families in Saxony during 1784-88 and worked as a private tutor in Zürich for two years, where he widened his contacts with society. In 1790, he left Zurich for Leipzig, where he began to study the works of Kant. In 1791, Fichte travelled to Poland and worked as a private tutor in Warsaw or Dansk and published the Attempt at a Critique of All Revelation in 1792. After his marriage to Johanna Ran in Zurich in 1793, Fichte published the Restoration of the Freedom of Thought from the Princes of Europe criticizing the ruling nobility for its suppression of the freedom of thought, and the Contributions toward Correcting the Public’s Judgment of the French Revolution defending the French Revolution and arguing for the legitimacy of violent revolt in general. Becoming a professor of philosophy at the University of Jena in 1794, Fichte illustrates subjective idealism centered between transcendental and absolute idealism, lying in its historical role “as a rung on the ladder from Kant to Hegel.” He published the Concerning the Concept of the Wissenschaftslehre in 1794, and its final version was published during 1797-8 under the different topic of “An Attempt at a New Presentation of the Wissenschaftslehre” in the Philosophisches Journal of his time with four installments.

(a) Wissenschaftslehre (the science of knowledge): Fichte views that the philosopher can engage in abstraction by means of free act of thinking. In order to provide a credible nexus for thought and action, Fichte introduces two series of events: ideal series associated with freedom of selfhood, and a real series associated with necessity of the thing. If the philosopher abstracts from the selfhood, then he left with the thing-in-itself as the explanatory ground of experience, the way of its proceeding is idealism. If the philosopher abstracts from the thing, then he is left with an intellect-in-itself as the explanatory ground of experience, the way of its proceeding is dogmatism. Fichte sees that “The dispute between the idealist and the dogmatist is actually a dispute over whether the self-sufficiency of the I should be sacrificed to that of the thing, or conversely, whether the self-sufficiency of the thing should be sacrificed to that of the I...The representation of the self-sufficiency of the I can certainly co-exist with a representation of the self-sufficiency of the thing, though the self-sufficiency of the I itself cannot co-exist with that of the thing.” He tries to convince that dogmatism (materialism) cannot explain the ground of experience, and that idealism can do so as the only possible alternative. Idealism appears within consciousness as an “I” in itself and is determined solely by me; but dogmatism never provides a transcendental deduction of ordinary consciousness: the thing-in-itself is a complete postulation which assumption provides no evidence. If the dogmatist loses his belief in the reality of the independent external world, he will lose his belief in himself too. The idealist has a strong belief in him so that he does not need things to support him as dogmatist does. “The Ego posits itself as limited by the non-Ego, and thus becomes cognitive; or the Ego posits the non-Ego as limited by the Ego and becomes active.” The identity of thinking and being is subjective and objective in the Ego, but the sole source of cognition and of being is subjective in the mind. Since unlike his successors Schelling and Hegel, Fichte found the source of his idealism in the “I” or the Ego based on its intuitive self-perception, his metaphysics is called subjective idealism.
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(b) *Foundations of Natural Right* (1796-7): Fichte defends equal rights for all persons as an integral part of his philosophical system. (i) The concept of right is deduced by self-consciousness of individuals, requiring the principles of right imposing equal and reciprocal limits on the freedom of all. Fichte introduces three separate theorems. First, self-consciousness is possible only if finite subjects are self-determinate. Second, “The finite rational being cannot ascribe to itself a free efficacy in the sensible world without also ascribing such efficacy to others.” Third, the finite rational being cannot assume the existence of others without positing itself as standing with those beings in a particular relation. (ii) In applicability of the concept of right, he emphasizes that mutual influence of free and rational beings upon one another is a necessary condition of self-consciousness in applicability. He views that “Original rights are rights that individual have independently of any actual political order and that must be safeguarded and respected within a just state….Original rights would have a normative validity in the absence of a state, but they can be actual only in a political order” that establishes the right of coercion. (iii) For empirical application of the concept, the state requires his version of social contract on property, protection, and unification. The property contract presupposes an agreement of that all will unite their strength in protecting the property of each; the protection contract is conditional on the fulfillment by the other parties of their obligation, and relies solely on the individual dispositions of the contractors; and the unification contract requires that each individual makes a contribution to the protective body by voting to appoint magistrates, securing or guaranteeing the constitution, and providing services and or finance. (iv) Further discussing the civil law and political right on constitution, Fichte rejects the separation of powers and prefers a monarchy to a republic as long as right and justice prevail in the state. The state has a twofold relation with its subjects: duties to protect them as per its contract with them, and the right to require that they fulfill their duties as citizens and obey the laws. He views that society could only exist in a commonwealth.

(c) *The System of Ethics* (1798): Fichte “focuses attention more strongly on the relation of moral personality to its embodiment and individual identity, and on the place of the individual moral agent in a living community with others” by insisting that “Always act according to the best conviction of your duty or Act according to your conscience.” He is equally strict on the motivational demands of morality. Being charged by atheism, Fichte was dismissed from Jena and moved to Berlin in 1800, when he published *The Vocation of Man* that expresses his more inclination toward Christian piety; and *The Closed Commercial State* that argues that “foreign trade and manipulations of currency enable the richer nations to drain poorer nations of their metallic wealth; therefore the government should control all foreign commerce, and possess all negotiable bullion and currency. Armed with this power, the state should guarantee to every individual a living wage and an equitable share in the national product; in return the individual must yield to the state the power to fix prices, and to determine the place and character of this work.” As Napoleon troops occupied Berlin, Fichte delivered lectures to the people as Professor in Königsberg, which became the *Addresses to the German Nation* published during 1807-8, displaying a cultural nationalism by reminding all Germans of their brilliant history such as the triumph over Rome and the commercial dominance of the Hanseatic League by the Germans, by rejecting the hopeless materialism in English life, and by denuding the French Enlightenment and Revolution; which position was different from his earlier writings. Fichte emphasizes a complete reform of education: the revolution must be in the enlightenment of the mind and the cleansing of the character. “The child’s abilities must be developed by the method of Pestalozzi; and they must be directed to national goals determined by the state.” The state must be led by educated and dedicated men who are equipped with moral consciousness. Fichte said that “I cannot give up hoping ….that it is education alone that can save us.”
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Friedrich W. J. von Schelling (1775-1854), a German philosopher, was born to a Lutheran pastor at Leonberg in Württemberg. He attended a Protestant seminary at the University of Tübingen in 1790-95, where he shared a room with Hegel and Hölderlin, both of whom were five years older than himself. As Schelling studied the Church fathers and ancient Greek philosophers, his interest gradually shifted from Lutheran theology to philosophy. In 1792 he graduated from the philosophical faculty, and in 1795 he finished his thesis for his theological degree. Meanwhile, he studied Kant and Fichte, who greatly influenced him. After two years tutoring, in 1797 he moved to Leipzig, then Jena, where he came into contact with the early Romanticists - Friedrich Schlegel, Caroline (his future wife), and Novalis; and via Goethe’s influence, Schelling took up his first professorship at Jena University during 1798-1803. At Jena, Fichte advised Schelling to focus on transcendental philosophy, but was becoming a leader of Romantic school who rejected Fichte’s thought. With Schelling’s help, Hegel became a private lecturer at Jena University. Schelling moved to a new University at Würzburg where he taught for three years until 1806. “This period was marked by considerable flux in his views and by a final breach with Fichte and Hegel.” He moved to Munich to be a state official – associate of the Bavarian Academy of Sciences and Humanities during 1806-41 except a leave for lectures at Erlangen during 1820-27. In 1841, he was appointed professor of philosophy at Berlin with the mission of combating the influence of Hegelianism by expounding his own religious system. Among those in attendance at his lectures were Sören Kierkegaard, Jacob Burckhardt, Alexander von Humboldt, Friedrich Engels, and Michael Bakunin. His lectures on philosophy of revelation became unpopular to reverse the course, so that the audience started gradually to diminish. In 1846 Schelling finally abandoned his lectures except for occasional discourses at the Berlin Academy. Later he retired to Munich and busied with his publications on mythology and revelation.

Schelling published On the Ego as Principle of Philosophy, and Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism in 1795 that contrasts criticism represented by Fichte with dogmatism represented by Spinoza in order to solve the problem of the existence of the world. It supports Fichte but implies a sort of synthesis reconciling the conflicting attitude between Spinoza and Fichte. (a) Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature was first published in 1797 and revised in 1803, which brought him fame and secured his first professorship. Holding Leibniz in high regard because of his view of nature, he views that it is the growth of reflection that has introduced a rift between the subjective and the objective or the ideal and the real. “If we think away the work of reflection, we must conceive man as one with Nature…. In general, reflection has grounded and perpetuated the distinction between the objective external world of Nature and the subjective inner life of representation and self-consciousness, the distinction between Nature and Spirit. Nature thus becomes externality, the opposite of Spirit, and man, as a self-conscious reflective being, is alienated from Nature.” Therefore, it is reflection which raises problem that we must resolve by showing that Nature is visible Spirit and Spirit is invisible Nature, and that the Absolute in the ideal order is also the Absolute in the real order. In Nature, “the lower level is the necessary foundation for the higher, and the latter subsumes the former in itself…. When we understand this, we see that the opposition between mechanism and the organic sphere disappears.” Schelling considers a conception of nature as a balance of opposed forces or tendencies: a balance that leads to strife and activity when it is disrupted. “In the dead object everything is at rest – there is in it no conflict, but eternal equilibrium.” When this equilibrium is disturbed and physical forces divide, living matter is gradually formed in the struggle of divided forces. He challenges the Newtonian atomists treating matter as if it were independent of force by separating force from matter. Matter is constructed from the equilibrium between attraction and repulsion, but particular qualities of matter derive to upset this equilibrium and dominate one of these forces over the other. “All
quality of matter rests wholly and solely on the intensity of its basic forces.” The qualities are essentially those of elasticity (with the repulsive forces) and mass (with the attractive forces). Using the principles of dynamic chemistry, Schelling goes on to give his account of chemical processes and chemical affinity, which occurs between bodies with opposite degrees of basic forces; such bodies will enter into chemical reactions in order to restore their imbalance of basic forces to an equilibrium. The chemical product from this combination will be a median of the basic forces of the two opposed bodies. Schelling views that nature is a division of an original unity rather than its polarity in his second edition in 1803. “Matter, too, like everything that exists, streams out from the eternal essence, and represents effects in appearance, albeit indirect and mediate only, of the eternal dichotomizing into subject and object, and of the fashioning of its infinite unity into finitude and multiplicity.” Thus, the first unity or potency of Nature is in the interaction between forces of attraction and repulsion, the second is in universal mechanism and its dynamic process, and the third is in the organism with the synthesis of the two others.

(b) **System of Transcendental Idealism** (1800): It starts from the Ego with self-consciousness inspired by the influence of Fichte. It begins with that “All knowledge is founded upon the coincidence of an objective with a subjective.” To him, Nature is in external, objective, unconscious, or necessary realism; and the self, the intelligent, or Spirit is in internal, subjective, conscious, or free-thinking idealism. The two conceptions are mutually opposed, but a reciprocal concurrence is necessary: the objective precedes a subjective, or vice versa. First, the tendency of all natural science is to move from nature to intelligence, which is “the intelligence out of nature” in nature-philosophy. Second, the proposition “I exist” is certain to all individuals in terms of the absolute preconception that is transcendental cognition, in which the object banishes into the act of knowing through intuition. The intellectual intuition is the act of non-objective self-consciousness, that becomes objective with “a constant objectifying-to-itself of the subjective.” Thus, the transcendental idea consists in “the ability to maintain oneself constantly in this duality of acting and thinking.” Seeking to actualize the ideal in the objective world, the Ego sets the will of self-determination or self-realization, which requires moral action (ethics) ruled by rational law bringing harmony into society like natural law bringing the unification of Nature. Contrasted with Fichte pursuing ethics, Schelling emphasizes the philosophy of aesthetics by adopting idea from the early Romantic thinkers whom he met in Jena.

(c) **Philosophy of Religion** (1804) and Others: The former develops the theory of the divine idea: “The nature of the Absolute itself, which as ideal is also immediately real, cannot be known by explanations, but only through intuition.” From the Absolute to the real, “there is no continuous transition; the origin of the sensible world is thinkable only as a complete breaking-away from Absoluteness by means of a leap.” In his *Philosophical Inquiries into the Nature of Human Freedom* of 1809, Shelling claims that the real and vital conception of freedom lies in possibility doing good or evil, which is decided by human being. “So each particular act comes from the freedom of spirit, from the inner needfulness of freedom itself. Possibility of good and evil gives the man choice to create himself in his own movement through the act and choice and disposing with his self-decisions and judgment self-reveal the freedom.” In his *Philosophy of Mythology* of 1857 and *Philosophy of Revelation* of 1958, Schelling elucidates that the Positive Philosophy is revealed as Philosophy of Mythology and Revelation. Philosophy of Mythology refers to pagan religion as natural religion, and Philosophy of Revelation deals with Christianity as the revealed Religion. According to Schelling, “The relation of the former to the latter is the relation of the imperfect to the perfect religion. The divine revelation in the wider sense may be found in the natural religion. The difference between natural religion and revealed religion consists in the fact that revelation is made perfect in revealed religion.”
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George W. F. Hegel (1770-1831) was born to a moderate family in Stuttgart, Württemberg in southern Germany, where his father was a secretary to the revenue office at the court, and his mother was the daughter of lawyer at the High Court of Justice. He had a sister and a brother, who died in Napoleon’s Russian campaign of 1812. Receiving an Enlightenment education at the Gymnasium Illustre, Hegel entered the Tübingen Stift, a Protestant Seminary attached to the University of Tübingen, where he spent years in 1788-93 closely with his roommates - Hölderlin and Schelling, whose friendship greatly influenced on his philosophy. They cheered the French Revolution and hoped for something similar in Germany. With the theological certificate, Hegel became a house tutor to an aristocratic family in Berne in 1793-96, when he wrote a lengthy manuscript of “The Positivity of the Christian Religion.” He moved to a similar position with a wine merchant’s family in Frankfurt in 1797-1800, when he wrote “Fragments on Religion and Love” and “The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate” though unpublished. In 1801 becoming an unsalaried lecturer at the Jena University with Schelling’s help, Hegel published The Difference between Fichte’s and Schelling’s System of Philosophy, and co-edited the Critical Journal of Philosophy with Schelling until 1803. Being promoted to an Extraordinary Professor in 1805, Hegel published his first major work, the Phenomenology of Spirit in 1807, when he moved to Bamberg as the editor of a newspaper. In 1808 he was appointed to the rector of a Gymnasium in Nuremberg, which post he held until 1816. Marrying Marie von Tucher, daughter of a Senator in 1811, He published the Science of Logic, three volumes in 1812, 1813, and 1816. He moved to the University of Heidelberg in 1816, and published The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline in 1817. He became the chair of philosophy at the University of Berlin in 1818, and published his Philosophy of Right in 1821. His lectures at the university on the philosophy of aesthetics, religion, and history were posthumously published like the Philosophy of History of 1837. Hegel was appointed Rector of the University in 1830.

(a) Phenomenology of Spirit / Phenomenology of Mind (1807): Hegel develops the concepts of absolute idealism through a dialectic process from perception, consciousness, self-consciousness, reason, spirit, religion, to absolute knowledge: influencing on “the development of existentialism, communism, fascism, death of God theology, and historicist nihilism.” Consciousness is the immediate existence of spirit that embraces two opposite factors: subjective thought and objective being. If the object is fully revealed, the subject-object distinction vanishes and the Absolute is formed as the unity of the theoretical and the practical. Thus, consciousness is adjusting the internal self to the external reality or vice versa, which relations are explored through sensing-perceiving-understanding. Sense-certainty faces an inherent conflict between the True and immediate knowledge. Since knowledge involves in changing time and place, the True cannot be identified with any definite state of things but can be understood by universality. Now the Thing itself is the unity or universality of the object, having the subsistence of the many diverse and independent properties (individuality of the subject); so that the Thing contains an opposite truth in its own self. In other words, “The conscious Ego becomes the common medium in which all sense aspects of the Thing are brought together” into a unity or unconditioned absolute universality - the Absolute Idea in which the nature of the Thing is the nature of Understanding. Self-consciousness recognizes the existence of another self: the pure undifferentiated ‘I’ is its first immediate object; the satisfaction of desire is the reflection of self-consciousness into itself; and the truth of this certainty is the duplication of self-consciousness. Reason induces the synthesis of the first two phases: “Hegel starts with the lowest levels of human consciousness and works dialectically upwards to the level at which the human mind attains the absolute point of view and becomes the vehicle…of infinite self-conscious Spirit,” that is embraced by Religion since God is Spirit, and so finally reach at the Absolute knowledge of phenomenology.
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(b) **Science of Logic** (1812, 1813, 1816): Hegel wrote about three attitudes of thoughts to objectivity with three doctrines of being, essence, and the notion. The first attitude of thought to objectivity is in belief with no doubts and no sense of the contradiction in thought, which is found in pre-Kantian Metaphysics. The second is in empiricism believing that whatever is true must be in the actual world and present to sensation, which is analyzed by the Kantian system. The third is in intuitive knowledge for which he argues that the truth based on mere fact of consciousness has no other basis than subjective, all superstition or idolatry is allowed to be truth, and God is understood in part of cognition and the significance of religion is reduced to a minimum. Hegel defined three sides of his logical doctrine: the action of understanding is to investigate its subject-matter with the form of universality; that of dialectic is a subjective see-saw of arguments *pro* and *con*; and the speculative stage concludes a unity from contradictory propositions in terms of a definite and positive content. His *Logic* focuses on three doctrines. **Being**: The Absolute is being as the sum of all realities, while it is nothing since the thing-in-itself is the indeterminate without form and content. The truth of being and of nothing is the unity of two, which is becoming. The becoming collapses into the unity in which two contradictory elements are absorbed, resulting in being determinate. **Essence**: It is reflection-into-self as the form of identity, while it is reflection-into-another containing the characteristic of difference such as diversity and variety. The ground is the unity of identity and difference, which is synthetic essence as a totality of existence; there is contraction of appearance in contents and forms, and actuality of relationship in substantiability, causality, and reciprocity. **Notion**: It is a form of thought being treated as a general conception that is the principle of all life possessing a character of thorough concreteness. Since Reason involves Being and Essence, the total wealth of both merges into the unity of thought. The doctrine of notion divided into three parts: subjectivity, objectivity, and the idea that is the unity of subjectivity and objectivity - the absolute truth.

(c) **Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Science** (1817): Hegel outlines the science of logic, the philosophy of nature, and the philosophy of spirit. The first (logic) is the summary discussed in his *Logic*. The second (nature) covers mathematics, inorganic physics, and organic physics - geological nature, vegetable nature, and the animal organism. The third (spirit) has the subjective spirit - soul, consciousness, and spirit; and the objective spirit - law, morality, and ethics; which are mostly discussed in his *Phenomenology*. Hegel later published the *Philosophy of Right* that formulates his political views in shaping the German state in the post-Napoleonic era. He defines that the basis of right is in the free will, which is the absolute unity of both objective universality and subjective individuality. Hegel divides the absolutely free will into three divisions: abstract right, morality, and ethical life. Abstract right deals with property, contract, and wrongdoing; morality considers purpose and responsibility, intention and welfare, and good and conscience; and ethical life views three aspects of family, civil society, and state. The family is completed by three phases: marriage, family property and capital, and education of children and dissolution of the family. Civil society contains three moments: the system of needs, the administration of justice, and the police and the corporation. The state has immediate domestic actuality of constitution, and foreign relations with others by international law. The mature or well-developed state preserves the principle of private liberty in the ordinary sense; “the will of the state must prevail over the particular will when there is a clash between them,” and “the concept of civil society is not simply cancelled out in the concept of the state.” Hegel like Fichte views the constitutional monarchy as the most rational form of political organization as he recognizes the Prussian state of his time. It is believed that “a more rational constitution means a more liberal constitution, at least in the sense that it must explicitly allow for the free development of individual personality and respect the rights of individuals.”
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(d) Hegel delivered lectures in 1822 and later that were compiled and published posthumously by his son in *The Philosophy of History* (1837). He suggests three methods of studying history: original, reflective, and philosophical history. In original, historians transfer what was passing in the world around to the realm of representative intellectual: “An external phenomenon is thus translated into an internal conception.” In reflective, the mode of representation is not confined by the limits of the time to which it relates, but whose spirit transcends the present. Its variety of species includes universal, pragmatic, critical, and fragmental history. In the philosophical, Hegel justifies the thoughtful consideration of humanity in history in terms of three themes. Reason governs the world: the Greek Anaxagoras attempted to give a scientific knowledge by bringing philosophy from Ionia to Athens. Reason teaches the ultimate design of the world, the abstract characteristics of the nature of spirit, which means that spirit uses in order to realize the idea and so the shape of the state is the perfect embodiment of spirit. Reason guides the course of the world history that is the development of spirit in time and the development of nature in space; it is important to understand the thought involved in spiritual transition. Contrasted with universality and individuality of the spiritual world, the natural existence of people falls under the category of time and space, allowing the geographical basis of history. The new continentals like America and Australia are distinguished by the old Europe; and the more distinctions are made by the elevated land, the valley plains, and the coast land. Hegel views that “The first political form we observe in history is Despotism, the second Democracy and Aristocracy, and the third Monarchy.” He divides the world history into four realms: the Oriental world is created without advancing to subjective freedom; the Greek world is based on morality impressed on individuality; the Roman world is the realm of abstract universality without freedom of national individualities; and the Germanic world begins with the reconciliation in Christianity and fully developed the character of Spirit with its perfect maturity and strength.

The critical understanding of Hegel’s philosophy turns upon two points: first, the dialectic is a new method revealing relationships in society and history; and second, his political philosophy is based on nationalism, by discarding the individualism and the cosmopolitanism prevailed in the eighteenth century, which becomes the German political theory in the nineteenth century. The purpose of the dialectic is attached to historical necessity. Hegel generalizes his dialectic in history: “Opposition and contrariety are universal properties of nature; this is at once a law of the cosmos and of thought. Everywhere forces grow into their opposites. But whereas theories of the mixed constitution had assumed that the balancing of opposites could be made a key to stability and permanence, Hegel thought of the world as an endlessly moving equilibrium. Contrary forces supply the dynamic of history but balance can never be permanent; it merely gives a continuity and direction to change. Consequently, as he thought, the opposition is never absolute. The destruction of one position in a controversial situation is never complete. Both sides are partly right and partly wrong, and when the rights and the wrongs have been properly weighed, a third position emerges which unites the truth contained in both.” Thus, “This principle of an opposition of forces, moving in orderly equilibrium and emerging in a pattern of progressive logical development, appears to Hegel general enough to supply a formula for all nature and all history.” The dialectic is useful for Hegel to develop his philosophy by using logical contradiction. It is much easier to understand history by clarifying the necessity of historical development despite its extreme generality making possible errors. Hegelianism was developed to Marxism becoming the later history of communist theory by transforming it into dialectical materialism. Hegelianism became “an important factor in the revision of English liberalism by the Oxford idealists.” Finally in Italy, Hegelianism was adopted in the early stages of fascism “to provide a philosophy for that highly pragmatic movement.”
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(e) Other Writings: Hegel expressed his political views more in other writings and speeches than his Right and History above. His pamphlet The Magistrates Should Be Elected by the People of 1798 emphasizes that German citizens participate in the political process: “The chief priority is to place the right of election in the hands of a body of enlightened and upright men who are not dependent on the Court.” In his pamphlet The German Constitution of 1798-1802, Hegel proposes the Cities Bench of the Imperial Diet representing the middle class with more public spirit in addition to the College of Electors and of Princes. The feudalism degenerated into despotism in France, political anarchy in the German Empire, but differently evolved into a constitutional monarchy in Britain. Hegel favors a range of British-style reforms since London had maximized the liberty of the citizens by balancing and adjusting the claims of positive law to the private rights of individuals and interest groups. Hegel intends to be a philosopher of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) in his Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Law of 1802-3 that specifies the relation of natural law to the positive science of right in connecting legality to morality. He explains “how privatizing process in economics, property law, and morality produced a class of citizen-proprietors whose primary interest lay more in acquiring economic possessions and securing them legally than in participating in public life through membership of a political association.” Hegel views that the individuality of the whole and the specific character of a nation enable us to recognize the whole system into which the absolute totality is organized, so we can “recognize how all the parts of the constitution and legislation and all determinations of ethical relations are completely determined by the whole.” This implies that human beings can realize their communal natures “only when they begin to envisage themselves as spiritual rather than natural beings.”

In his Inaugural Address of 1818, Hegel pleads for a shift in the focus of philosophy from feeling to thinking with spiritual substance of ethical life in terms of more German and more Protestant: “The courage of truth and faith in the power of the spirit is the primary condition of philosophical study; man should honor himself and consider himself worthy of the highest.” In his Augsburg Confession of 1830, Hegel criticizes the doctrine of the older Church demanding “namely blind obedience and mental servitude,” and emphasizes Protestant norms lying in the values of a liberal humanist who wishes to turn Lutheranism inside out by insisting that subjective freedom can be realized in the world only through ethical life. In his Relationship of Religion to the State of 1831, Hegel views that their conflict necessarily arise and cannot be settled in any true way. “Religion demands the suspension of the will, whereas the secular principle treats the will as fundamental; if such religious principles come into play, the only possible course is for the government to resort to force and suppress the opposing religion or treat its adherents as a political party.” The philosophers were in the center of German nationalism though with different explanation of ontology, cosmology, psychology, and theology. On the English Reform Bill of 1831, Hegel analyzes the bill intending “to bring justice and fairness into the way in which the various classes and sections of the populace are allowed to participate in the election of Members of Parliament.” He sees that all modern states exist through representation of nobility and commoners, so that if the state constitution ignores the rise of the middle class, the people may seek non-political ways to achieve social justice, which leads to revolution rather than reformation as shown in France. His mainly discusses about four types of modern political regime: “(i) the laissez-faire regime of liberal political economy; (ii) the interventionist regime of qualified liberalism; (iii) the political regime of French revolutionary democracy; and (iv) the ethico-political regime of Sittlichkeit.” It is observed that the first, second, and fourth types constitute an evolutionary pattern which moves modern societies on towards true liberty; and that the third regime is considered as a threat to liberal values, and the last regime as the mature expression of a liberal progression in history. Hegel’s influence was immense also in the other sciences.
Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) is regarded as the founder of modern utilitarianism as a philosopher, jurist, and social reformer in Britain. Born to a moderately successful attorney in London, he was able to write Latin at five and read Voltaire at six. He attended the Westminster School, and entered the Queen's College of Oxford where he completed his Bachelor's degree in 1763 and Master's degree in 1766. He was trained as a lawyer passing the bar in 1769, though never practiced. He was philosophically a child of the Enlightenment who attended the lectures of William Blackstone at Oxford. Reconstructing Blackstone's arguments on law, Bentham anonymously published A Fragment on Government in 1776. His first essay in economics was Defense Usury published in 1787, and his popular work An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation appeared in 1789. It contains the important statement of the foundations of utilitarian philosophy and a pioneering study of crime and punishment, “both of which remain at the heart of contemporary debates in moral and political philosophy, economics, and legal theory.” The scope and range of his interest was remarkable and his writings were influential as demonstrated in his almost sixty publications like “The Panopticon (1787), Essay on Political Tactics (1791), Manual of Political Economy (1793), Chrestomathia (1816), and Handbook of Political Fallacies (1825).” He was a philosophic reformer rather than either a philosopher or a politician, and his incisive criticisms were acute and often effective, but “his fascination with an immense variety of inventions and schemes of reform was largely divorced from considerations of political strategy.” Among his many proposals for legal and social reforms, Bentham spent some sixteen years of his life in developing and refining his ideas for a design of the Panopticon that is a type of prison building allowing a watchman “to observe all inmates of an institution without being able to tell whether or not they are being watched.” Although the prison was never built, his concept was influential on the later generations of thinkers.190

James L. Wiser summarizes Bentham’s reform efforts in four ways: first, the basic task of government was to create and maintain an ordered and rational legal system, so the duties and rights of its citizens should be clear and consistent; second, government should concerned with securing the wealth and prosperity of its citizens by guaranteeing that each individual receives those rewards; third, government should attempt to moderate their extreme forms whenever possible, that must be guided by the principles of utility; and finally, government should make an effort to cultivate a spirit of benevolence among its citizens.191 In his Fragment on Government, Bentham criticizes Blackstone’s Commentaries, through which he attacks the whole legal profession and the Whig conception of British government. A late twentieth man in an amateur capacity intentionally tackles the foremost legal writer of the day to his irrelevant small portion of his writing. Blackstone glorifies the British constitution and its supposed division of powers among three government branches in his Commentaries. Bentham accuses that he ignores the logical distinction between the realm of de facto concerned with the law as it is and that of de jure concerned with the law as it ought to be; and insists on that the legal reform of existing law is necessary. He outlines his ideas in formation of government, forms of government, British constitution, right of the supreme power to make laws, and its duty. Bentham views that power of making laws constitutes the supreme authority moving from a state of nature to civil society by the means of social contract, but such explanation appears to be meaningless fictions because the existence of political society is based on the principle of utility or utilitarianism; citizens only obey because the pain of disobedience is greater than the pleasure of obeying. The happiness of the people is doubtful because the most mischievous method of governing is in opposition to it; a King may impair it without violating the letter of any single Law; extraordinary occasions may now and then occur by acting in opposition to the Law; and without any single violation of the Law, a breach of his part of the contract can properly be taken by him.192

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In his *Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*, Bentham approaches three main issues on morals and legislation: the principle of utility, an analysis of human action, and a penal code. It is defined that “utility tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness or to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness to the party whose interest is considered” by the community at large or a particular individual, while the interest of the community is the sum of the interest of the several members who compose it. Bentham views that the nature of mankind is governed by pleasure to be maximized and pain to be minimized, so the principle of utility is a sufficient foundation as the external standard of right and wrong that reasonable men would accept for evaluation of the individual’s conduct and legislation for a community. He considers four types of sources to which pleasure or pain are belonging as a binding force to law or rule of conduct: physical, political, moral, and religious. “Pleasures or pains which may be expected to issue from the physical, political, or moral sanctions, must all of them be expected to be experienced, if ever, in the present life; those which may be expected to issue from the religious sanction, may be expected to be experienced either in the present life or in a future. Bentham tries to quantify the amount of pleasure, but complexity arises in specific external circumstances and individual differences of sensitivity. He considers circumstances influencing sensibility, motives, and human dispositions regarding acts and consequences. “All punishment in itself is evil,” but the threat of pain is more efficient cause than is the promise of pleasure. Bentham favors lower punishment as an incentive to commit a less rather than serious offence, but acknowledges the harsh punishment for moral wickedness of an offence. He views that equality is subordinate to security so that rapid movements toward equality should not threaten security of one’s life and property because the former is a necessary condition to achieve the general happiness. Crime and punishment need to be discussed separately.

James Mill (1773-1836) was Bentham’s disciple making his ideas into practice. Born to a shoemaker in Scotland, Mill received a first-rate education studying at the University of Edinburgh during 1790-94, where he learnt in the day and tutored in the evening. Finishing the college, he continued to study for the ministry and was ordained as a minister of the Church of Scotland in 1798. Moving to London in 1802, he became a journal editor and engaged in writings such as *The History of British India* during 1806-1818. It analyzes the culture of Indian people with the physical influence of the climate, and criticizes the East India Company and British administration in India. Despite his criticism, he was hired as an examiner of the India House in London, when he became closer to Bentham, who made him the Secretary of the utilitarian school. In his *Essay on Government* of 1820, Mill views that the task of government is to “increase to the utmost the pleasure, and diminish to the utmost the pains, which men derive from one another.” If not possible, government should be redesigned. Moreover, if a democracy is impossible and an aristocracy or monarchy necessarily oppressive, the fewer oppressors the better and therefore an absolute monarchy is the best. The utilitarians pursued radical reforms in politics by limiting the influence of the Monarchy and the House of Lords in British society. Mill played a prominent role to establish the University of London in 1825. In his *Elements of Political Economy* of 1921, Mill disseminated Ricardo’s ideas as his disciple and the book was used as the first textbook on economics. Paralleled with Malthus, he views that the growth of population tends to outrun the growth of capital. In his *Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind* of 1829, Mill views that our experience is either a knowledge of feelings or that of the order in which they follow each other. We have ‘sensations’ and ‘ideas’ in terms of a copy of sensations, both which will form the whole elements of our consciousness. Mill deals with memory, belief, and judgment separately, those which are arbitrarily associated, that is the doctrine of indissoluble association, that was further developed by his son. Utilitarianism is further discussed in Book V.
Endnotes


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54 *Ibid.*, 305. “The Jacksonians finally accepted the reality that most officeholders in America could no longer be leisured aristocrats serving out of a sense of honor and an obligation of rank.”


57 *Ibid.*, 86-119, from which all quotes in this paragraph came.


60 Thomas Paine, *Common Sense*, x.


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73 Will and Ariel Durant, Rousseau and Revolution (Norwalk, CT: The Easton Press, 1992), 83.
75 Will and Ariel Durant, Rousseau and Revolution, 84.
77 Will and Ariel Durant, Rousseau and Revolution, 84.
79 Ibid., accessed the same.
85 Ibid., 222.
86 Ibid., 17.
89 Ibid., 358.
94 Ibid., accessed the same.
96 Will and Ariel Durant, Rousseau and Revolution, 895-6.
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109 Ibid., 100.


112 Will and Ariel Durant, Rousseau and Revolution, 101.

113 Ibid., 100.


120 The parts (a) through (e) are quoted from or based on David Lieberman, "The Mixed Constitution and the Common Law" in The Cambridge History of Eighteenth-Century Political Thought (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 504-7.


122 The parts (a) through (e) are quoted from or based on David Lieberman, "The Mixed Constitution and the Common Law" in The Cambridge History of Eighteenth-Century Political Thought (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 504-7.


129 Ibid., 221.


133 Ibid., 50 and 187-98.


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138 Lee Cameron McDonald, Western Political Theory, 399-410.
141 Harvey Mansfield, Jr., “Edmund Burke” in History of Political Philosophy, ed. Leo Strauss, 687.
157 Joseph de Maistre, accessed 10 March 2013, the same.
163 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (Norwalk, CT: The Easton Press, 1995), 43.
164 Will Durant, Rousseau and Revolution, 535-40. Kant was awakened by reading Hume’s Enquiry.
165 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 114, 153, 359, 318-27, and 359 all for the same page.
167 Ibid., 25.

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173 Ibid., 135 and 139.
176 Addresses to the German nation, accessed 22 April 2013, http://www.archive.org/stream/addressestothege00fichuoft/addressestothege00fichuoft_djvu.txt.
179 Ibid., 179.
183 Ibid., 111-21.
189 Ibid., xviii.
190 James L. Wiser, Political Philosophy (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1982), 292. At first, in 1794, the English Parliament accepted Bentham’s scheme, but in 1811 it rejected the concept and voted to pay him 23,000 English pounds in compensation for his time and expenses.
191 Ibid., 294.
194 Ibid., 165-74.
195 Ibid., xxxii.