# Chapter V. Summary and Conclusion

## 1. SUMMARY

Politics and Religion; Economy and Society; Political Philosophy; and Economic Thought

## 2. CONCLUSION

The Renaissance; the Reformation; Geographic Discovery; the Scientific Revolution; Interactions between Politics and Economy; Relations between Theory and Practice

## APPENDIX: A STUDY OF CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY

- Part I. Moral Philosophy or Ethics 559
- Part II. Social and Political Philosophy 565
- Part III. Philosophy of Mind and Action: Psychology 571
- Part IV. Philosophy of Language: Logic 575
  - Part V. Metaphysics 580
  - Part VI. Epistemology 585
  - Part VII. Philosophy of the Sciences 590

(PLEASE CLICK EACH LINE TO SEE THE FIRST PAGE OF CONTENTS)
Chapter V. Summary and Conclusion

CHAPTER V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

As discussed in Book II, the Middle Ages were into three periods. In the Early Middle Ages (750-1000), the external invasions of Vikings, Magyars, and Muslims weakened political power of the king and strengthened that of the provincial lords. In the absence of protection from war and the lack of currency circulation, voluntary contracts between landlords and laborers created the feudal system forcing the serfs to belong to the land. However, in the High Middle Ages (1000-1300), the agricultural production increased because of warmer climate, cultivated land, and technological changes. The rising population raised food prices that made agriculture profitable, and the farm surplus stimulated industry and commerce. The proper supply of money caused the serfs to be wage earners or free peasants who favored to pay rents rather than to provide servile labor, so that the feudal system began to collapse. The European kingdoms were centralized as the economy revived; the Church began to reform in spiritual quality, religious discipline, and educational function; and the Crusades fought against the Muslims for two centuries despite its final failure. In the Late Middle Ages (1300-1400), famine and plague killed more than a half of the population in many areas of Europe and rising wages and falling rents caused the manorial system to decline further, and law and order was loosened, that intensified social tensions and revolts. The One Hundred Years’ War imposed the heavy burden of taxes, while the English infantry was more successful than the French cavalry, which reduced the necessity of knights. Finally, the Church was supreme in spiritual and secular affairs, and the popes intervened in European politics in various ways. France wanted to impose taxes on clerical revenues and to judge some clerical crimes at the royal court; that caused the Great Schism. Hence, the pope and the church gradually became part of the state or society. Meanwhile, Europe was undergoing political, economic, and intellectual changes towards the Renaissance and the Reformation.

Book III dealt with the period from 1400 to 1715. Passing the Dark Ages, the European states suffered from the aftermath of the Black Death and the Hundred Years’ War ongoing between the axes of England and of France until the mid-fifteenth century. But the population began to rise from 1450 that expanded the economy until 1600. Meanwhile, the Renaissance pursued human dignity by restoring ancient Greco-Roman civilization, which spread from Italy to Western Europe. The Reformation challenged the papal system and divided Protestants and Catholics, which caused religious wars mixed with political differences between European states. The discovery of new lands expanded the transoceanic trades: the Portuguese opened the spice trade with Asia, while the Spanish imported bullion from America. In the seventeenth century, the Dutch became dominant in the overseas trade, while the England entered the trade competition with the Anglo-Dutch Wars. If the Renaissance was in search for humanity to be free from the medievalism, and the Reformation was in search for religious freedom by challenging the corrupt papal system; the discovery caused the rise of mercantilism for national gain. In science, Isaac Newton proved the Copernican system to be true, and the old concept of heaven in the Bible became vague and God’s theory proved to be incorrect, that caused a huge impact on Christian faith. In philosophy, Hugo Grotius developed the law of nature that was influential on the progress of English common law, while natural rights became powerful in political reality. In methodology, Rene Descartes developed the deductive method of rationalism; Francis Bacon introduced the inductive method of empiricism; and Isaac Newton synthesized both methods by applying quantitative verification with practical experiments. In economics, the influx of precious metals caused high inflation in Europe that stimulated an idea of the quantitative theory of money. The European states focused on mercantilist policies—export monopoly, control of foreign exchanges, and the favorable balance of trade—based on wealth and power, which were not mutually exclusive.
1. SUMMARY

Politics and Religion: In the Renaissance period, Italy was divided into five major powers: the Dutch of Milan, Venice, Florence, the Papal State, and the Kingdom of Naples. They used foreign forces to maintain the balance of power on the peninsula. The French army invaded the Kingdom of Naples by an invitation of Milan, but the Spanish expelled them and ruled both for two centuries. The Hundred Years’ War resulted in depopulation, desolate farmlands, ruined industry and commerce, and independent nobles. Obtaining the right to levy direct taxes on properties, Charles VII strengthened the authority of the king and secured the control over the church in France from the pope. Charles VIII and Louis XII were engaged in the Italian wars, and Francis I also invaded Italy but was captured and detained in Spain for months. He negotiated with the pope to obtain the right to nominate the prelates in France. In England, the War of the Roses gave the throne to the Yorkists, but Henry VII challenged and founded a new Tudor dynasty in 1485 and strengthened the royal power during his reign until 1509. In Spain, Isabella of Castile married Ferdinand of Aragon in 1469, ruled two kingdoms as equal partners, and finally unified Spain. They conquered Granada and expelled the Muslims and Jews from Spain in 1492, when Isabella allowed the expedition of Columbus. Being engaged in the Italian wars, Spain gained and ruled Milan and the Kingdom of Naples until 1713. The Holy Roman Empire includes princely states, ecclesiastical states, some fifty of imperial free-states, and some thousands of imperial knights. The emperors were elected by seven electors set by the Golden Bull of 1356. The emperors such as Albert II, Frederick III, and Maximilian were rooted to the Habsburgs, which had gained territories through marriages, so that Charles V of Spain became the emperor in 1519. Meanwhile, the Ottoman Turks founded the empire of vassal states in the Balkans and Anatolia: Mehmed II conquered Constantinople in 1453. The Turks threatened Hungary and Austria in the 1520s.

The demand for reformation of the papal system was accumulated, exploded, and advanced by the combined forces of the state and society. In the early Renaissance, rejecting papal claims on temporal authority and property, Wycliffe and Hus attacked corrupt church. The Reformation rooted in mysticism of Groote and Kempis and humanism of Erasmus and More, emphasizing “a true inner piety into Christian faith” by following the life of Christ in the Bible, which was more important than the external forms of religion. Martin Luther issued the Ninety-Five Thesis in 1517 against the abuses of selling indulgence by the pope. He views that works cannot glorify God, and faith alone brings complete salvation without works; there is no difference between clergy and laity so that the temporal estate should exercise its power over the spiritual estate; and every Christian is a priest to interpret the Bible that is final authority for doctrine and practice. Luther suggested no annual tribute to Rome, marriage of priests, and reformation of sacraments; but he faced problems with internal radicalism, external opposition, and social revolution. He was against revolts and supported complete obedience to the state enforcing law and order. Charles V failed in containing the spread of Lutheranism because of the French, the Turks, the pope, and the Lutherans in Germany. Other movements appeared in Zwinglians, Anabaptists, Calvinists, and Anglicans. In the mid-sixteenth century, Lutheranism gained roots in parts of Germany and Scandinavia; Calvinism rose in parts of Switzerland, France, the Netherlands, and Eastern Europe; and England created a protestant church of Anglicanism by splitting with Rome. The Peace of Augsburg in 1555 was a turning point of reformation in history allowing that Lutheranism is legally equal to Catholicism in Germany. The papal system had been challenged by internal and external demand for reformation: the Society of Jesus was successful in reform by establishing highly disciplined schools around the world. The Council of Trent reestablished the Catholic doctrine in 1563, and unified the Catholic Church under the papal supremacy.
In the sixteenth century, geographical discoveries gave opportunities for Portugal and Spain to expand political power to and to exploit economic gains in Asia and America, followed by the Dutch, English, and French. Meanwhile, the Reformation caused the wars of religion in Europe until 1648. In France, the conflict between Calvinism and Catholicism ignited a civil war: the duke of Guise killed thousands of Huguenots in 1572. Henry of Navarre became Henry IV in 1589 by converting into Catholic and issued the Edict of Nantes in 1598 allowing religious co-existence in France. In Spain, Philip II ended Italian wars with France and England in 1559 that secured the Spanish control over Italy; and expelled 5,000 of Moriscos from Castile in 1568. Forming a Holy League with Venice and Rome, Philip won the war against the Turks at Lepanto in 1571. He invaded and occupied Portugal during 1580-1640, when the Dutch and English attacked the Portuguese who dominated the Atlantic slave trade and the spice trade with Asia. In the Low Countries, the Calvinist movement ignited anti-Spanish revolts in 1566, and Philip sent Alva with 10,000 troops to the Spanish Netherlands to secure the law and order. In 1579, the southern provinces formed a Catholic union accepting Spanish rule, while the northern formed a Protestant union opposing it, which was supported by 6,000 of English troops. Philip sent the Spanish Armada of 130 ships to invade England but was defeated by the English navy at near Calais in 1588. Spain finally recognized the United Provinces at a truce of 1609. In England, Elizabeth settled religious problems with a moderate Protestantism, but Catholics and Puritans were dangerous to the Anglican Church, while the Puritans became the majority of the House of Commons in the 1570s. She aided French Huguenots and Dutch Calvinists to weaken France and Spain. In Germany, the conflict between Lutherans and Catholics caused the Thirty Years’ War from 1618, which developed to war between Bourbon and Habsburg for hegemony rather than religious conflict. The war ended by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, which recognized that the Protestants were legally equal to the Catholics in Europe.

Religious wars, rebellions, and crises weakened the creditability of Christianity, secularized society, and centralized politics. In the seventeenth century, there appeared absolute monarchy in France, Spain, Germany, and eastern and northern Europe; limited monarchy in England and Poland; and the republic in the United Provinces. In France, Louis XIV consolidated his power and entered wars to conquer new lands in the Netherlands, to secure natural borders along the Rhine, and to make peace in the War of Spanish Succession. He revoked the Edict of Nantes in 1685 to suppress Huguenots. In Spain, Philip III expelled all remaining Moriscos of 250,000 to North Africa in 1609, which caused an economic crisis. In the War of Spanish Succession, Spain lost all possessions in Italy and the Netherlands. When Germany became free from the Holy Roman Empire by the peace of Westphalia, Frederick William of Brandenburg built the standing army of 40,000 by 1678 by requiring Junkers to serve him as army officers or civil leaders; that became the foundation of Prussia. Leopold I of Austria extended the Habsburg’s possessions, created an imperial standing army, and consolidated the Austrian administration. In Russia, Peter the Great westernized its old system, and built a new standing army of 210,000 and the navy of 28,000 by 1705. Peter won the war with Charles XII of Sweden at Pultava of Ukraine in 1709 but lost the war with the Turks and withdrew by giving up Azov in the Black Sea in 1711. Peter invaded Sweden and gained some lands in 1721 which secured the control of the Baltic. The Ottoman Empire advanced to Vienna in 1697, but the Austrian army defeated them at Senta of Serbia; and Austria and Russia continuously forced the Turks to leave the Balkan. England experienced the Civil War between Charles I and Parliament during 1642-46. The Navigation Act of 1651 caused the Anglo-Dutch Wars during 1652-74 that restricted the Dutch expansion. The Glorious Revolution of 1688 offered the throne to William and Mary, who accepted the Bill of Rights confirming England to be constitutional monarchy based on social contract.
Economy and Society: The population in Europe declined from 73 million in 1300 to 45 million in 1400 due to famines, diseases, and wars; but reviving from 1450 recovered to 81 million in 1500 and 105 million in 1600; and the rising pace of growth was disturbed down to 115 million in 1700 because of the recurrences of the same. In agriculture, the old feudal system rapidly declined in the sixteenth century due to the impoverishment of the landed aristocracy and the massive loss of inhabitants. Liberating the serfs by 1500, most countries in the west of the Elbe like Germany and France developed a tenant farmer system; and rural society in countries like England was transformed into a three-tier structure: landlords, the tenant farmers, and the agricultural laborers. However, countries in the east like Poland, Russia, or Rumania restored the feudal system benefiting from the recurrence of wars by forcing serfs not to leave the land. During 1350-1450, the falling population reduced the demand for food stuffs, which caused their prices to fall, and resulted in low rents and high wages in production. The land owners adjusted the use of land by switching from labor-intensive farming to land-intensive pasturing or planting of cash crops. During 1450-1600, the rising population caused the opposite, so that high rents and low wages caused overpopulation problems to be resolved by two ways: increasing production and reducing population. The ways increasing agricultural output are in the more cultivated area, the more frequency of cropping, shifting to higher yielding crops, technical advance in farming, the division of labor and regional specialization, and domestic industry and seasonal migration. The ways of demographic adjustments are fertility control, migration, and mortality. The agrarian production was affected by weather conditions, available land and soil fertility, a wide range of corps and rotation, plant or animal diseases, advanced tools and equipment, proper knowledge and management skill. Colonial crops were introduced into Europe like maize and potato; and European crops and livestock were transferred to America such as sugar-cane, vine, and cattle. Asian spices and beverages were also introduced and spread into Europe and America.

The industries were affected and expanded by the rising population, the discovery of new lands, the longer period and the larger scale of wars, and more by technical achievements with the use of water and wind powers. In mining, a reversible water wheel was built with ten meters in diameter that was able to lift 100 cubic meters in 8 hours. The production of precious metals was greatly increased after the German experts transferred mining skills to America. In the iron industry, there were three key innovations: the substitution of coal for charcoal, the use of water- or wind-powered bellows and hammers, and an improvement of the blast furnace. Abraham Darby’s new furnace replacing coal for charcoal revolutionized iron industry. In the textile sector, the spinning wheel was improved with a flyer, and the weaving process by increasing the number of threads; and the cotton industry followed the same processes used in the woolen and linen industries. The Dutch introduced a lighter and cheaper fabric, which skill was transferred to England and Germany by Dutch immigrants. In building, fortifications for war influenced on the construction of walls, towers and gateways encircling towns; the dyke-building used wind-mills to pump water; dwelling houses and shipbuilding demanded saw-mills driven by water-power; and making glass and pottery spread widely in the sixteenth century. In shipbuilding, the Portuguese developed carrack for capacity of 400 to 600 tons with 3 to 4 masts and guns during 1450-1500; and invented a galleon in 1535 as a superior fighting ship. Both Dutch and English modified the Portuguese models for their own ships, and the Dutch became to lead shipbuilding in the seventeenth century by producing large mercantile fleet with cheaper raw materials. The emergence of naval artillery with efficient shipbuilding contributed to the technical progress of naval warfare, while navigation skills were improved. The innovation of the printing process expanded the demand for paper, which induced the growing number of paper mills. The mass production of food and beverage appeared in armies and navies with rising consumption.
Chapter V. Summary and Conclusion

In commerce, during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the Champagne fairs connected the industrial cities of Italy to the Hanseatic towns in the Low Countries by land. The progress of shipbuilding and navigation skills linked them directly by sea in the fourteenth century, which caused Italian ports of Venice and Genoa to rise, while the towns of Champagne fairs declined due to bypassing of fair towns in France. Hence, Venice-Bruges-London running from south to north became the main axis of European trade. The Portuguese invented the carrack in the second half of the fifteenth century, which made them possible to explore African coasts and to discover the sea route to the East Indies via the Cape. While the Portuguese secured the sea route to the East Indies and monopolized the spice trade, the Spanish discovered America and had imported huge amounts of precious metals for over a century. They used Antwerp as the trading center, while the Mediterranean trade declined and Venice began further to fall because of the rise of the Ottoman Turks. In 1576, Philip II intervened in the Spanish Netherlands, and the southern population moved to the United Provinces, so that Amsterdam became a new trading center substituting Antwerp. In 1596, the Dutch designed a new commercial vessel to maximize carrying capacity and to minimize constructing and operating costs. Portugal and Spain were dominant sea powers in the sixteenth century but was challenged by the Dutch who replaced them in the world trade in the seventeenth century. The Dutch, by naval blockade and capture, took control over the Portuguese bases in the East Indies, and stepped in America as carriers for Spain and Portugal. The Dutch was regularly engaged in the Baltic and North Sea trades with 735 ships in 1670. Meanwhile, the English entered the trade competition with Asia and America. The English Navigation Act of 1651 ignited the three Anglo-Dutch Wars during 1652-74, which constrained the expansion of commercial power of the Dutch. As a result, the Dutch declined and the English naval and commercial power began to rise in the eighteenth century. In the meantime, the French entered the competition in Asia and America with mercantilist strategies.

In finance, local small land holders borrowed money from town-businessmen who were entitled to seize the property in pledge if repayments were defaulted. In the fifteenth century, Italian cities established the “mount of piety” that offered loans from the charitable donations at a low interest to the poor; the Netherlands introduced municipal pawnshops in Amsterdam in 1614; and Sweden established a private bank in Stockholm in 1664 accepting deposits and providing loans. Many private banks appeared in Florence and Bruges in the fourteenth century, but the number was much reduced because of financial mismanagement, defaults of government loans, and the stigma of usury. Charles V legalized commercial loans at 12 percent of interest by 1541, which trend was prevailed in the major European countries. The bill of exchange linked sellers and buyers through the banks of each side, and the promissory notes (transferable bonds) were circulated from hand to hand. The fairs of exchange were an international clearing system in which all merchants from different areas to settle all transactions by credit first to minimize cash payments. Nevertheless, the progress of commodity wholesale trading throughout the year required a regulated banking system where merchants could safely deposit and withdraw their assets. Venice authorized a public bank in 1584, Amsterdam opened the Exchange Bank in 1609, and there appeared 25 public banks in Europe by 1697. In company finance, marine partnership appeared by sharing the cost of ship and its cargo in two ways: a basic capital (corpo: share) and an additional capital (sopracorpo: bond). As the partnership became transferable by trading the shares, joint-stock companies were founded such as the English or Dutch East India Company that also issued bonds. In public finance, the state governments had always faced budget deficit financed by borrowing due to high inflation as well as larger and longer wars. The repayments of public debts were often restructured into annuity: for example, Philip II converted all the floating state debts into redeemable annuities with 5 percent interest in 1557.
Political Philosophy: As France, England, and Spain developed centralized governments, Italy was divided into city-states which invited foreign forces into the peninsula for the balance of power, causing the Italian wars. They hired mercenaries who plundered the countryside and exploited their employers. Nicholo Machiavelli conducted diplomatic negotiations and military operations for the Florentine Republic until the Medicis finally overthrew the Republic in 1512 by an alliance with Rome and Spain. Machiavelli observed politics of Europe and developed his political ideas from history which were different from traditional philosophy. He was based on practical realism, while conventional theorists presented an analysis of the best political regime. Machiavelli views that “an adequate understanding of history provided the only reliable guide for the present, and the useful political scientist, therefore, would be the one who could draw the appropriate lessons from the past.” Since the prince learns lessons from the deeds of great historical figures, the political scientists should provide useful examples for the prince to achieve the same for himself. Among his several writings, *The Prince* deals with absolute monarchies, but the *Discourses on Livy* deals with the expansion of the Roman Republic. In *The Prince*, he analyzes the particular strength and weakness of the various types of political regimes and discusses about general methods for ruling with good laws and good arms. He understands the important role of virtue; but as a realist, he suggests another course to secure the princedom in case: “he will find that there may be a line of conduct having the appearance of virtue, to follow which would be his ruin, and that there may be another course having the appearance of vice, by following which his safety and well-being are secured.” This might create his image as “a ruthless and immoral practitioner of power politics.” In the *Discourses*, Machiavelli views that republics are preferable because they promote liberty that is secured in a mixed regime in which the nobles and the people are represented. In republics, the goodness emerges through the virtue of a man or through the virtue of an order, which is achieved by educating citizens.

In the Reformation, both Luther and Calvin taught the passive obedience to the government based on the two-sword theory, and Luther took the side of princes at the time of peasant revolts, but John Knox rejected the passive obedience. The Protestants attacked on absolutism in France where the civil wars divided into two camps by believing the descending or ascending theory. First, in the ascending or constitutional theory, Francis Hotman views that “the people have no less power and authority over the king than the king has over the people.” Juan de Mariana thinks that a constitutional hereditary monarchy is the best form of government compatible with the nature of man, which is good to maintain stability without periodic anarchy. Francis Suarez views that political power is derived from the community so that any form of political obligation cannot be absolute. Second, in the descending or divine right theory, James I wrote the book intending to restate two principles: divine right and passive obedience. Jacques Bossuet insists on that God establishes king as his ministers and reigns through them over the people so that the royal throne is not the throne of a man but the throne of God himself. Hence, one must obey the prince by reason of religion and conscience. Third, in the mixture of medieval and modern, Jean Bodin, advocating religious toleration, believes that the state is created by a powerful group of families conquering others and the leader of the victors becomes the king; the monarchy controls the state with absolute and perpetual power, and no government is sovereign if it is subject to any laws except divine and natural laws. Richard Hooker views that men associate together and the people set up an authority by common consent; and if a king’s power is given by human law, it must be exercised in accordance with it, not with divine law. Fourth and finally, Puritan constitutionalism is more radical than constitutional monarchism in England. Thomas Smith asserts that “authority for everything that is done in English government and that parliament was the most high and absolute power of the realm.” But wise government must be popular government.
The history of natural law is as old as philosophy, but Hugo Grotius was a turning point to establish its theoretical foundation. He views that the primary laws of nature are natural law expressing the will of God, and secondary laws of nature are civil law depending on human reason; and the law of nature always remains unchanged and even God himself cannot change it. Thomas Hobbes views that all men are equal to each other by nature. Having the right of self-preservation, each man has the right to use any means necessary to that end, which creates merciless competition due to limited resources that turns into a violent struggle causing a war of everyman against everyman. The fear of death seeks allies for peace that is acquired by force or by consent. By consent, two or more persons transfer their rights to a man or an assembly, which union makes civil society. Hence, the sovereign power is the right to command each of citizens who transferred all his own force and power to the chosen man or assembly. Similarly, Samuel Pufendorf views that law is divided into divine and human, and each citizen agrees to form a perpetual association and to administer their safety by a man or assembly defending its members, while all others become subjects. The citizens individually agree with the ruler to obey him by taking on a range of civic duties, and the ruler reciprocally agrees to take care of the state and to exercise supreme authority in accordance with the contract for the sake of common security and safety. John Locke views that all men are naturally in a state of perfect freedom to order their actions or to dispose of their possessions as they think fit, within the bounds of natural law. In the state of nature, men enjoy natural freedom and equality in peace and good-will under the law of nature, while their self-preservation is threatened not by the violent nature of men but by the poverty and hardship of their natural conditions. Men are naturally induced to seek communion and fellowship with others, which was the cause of men uniting themselves at first in political society. By their own voluntary consents, they make themselves the members of political society ruled by the law of nature to protect themselves. Locke views that self-defense is a part of the law of nature.

Modern philosophy developed two methods of studies - empiricism and rationalism – to gain concepts of our knowledge. On the one hand, English scholars like Bacon, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, discarding the traditional method - logic of syllogism, inclined to empiricism by applying the inductive method for practical experiments from raw sense data to generalization. Francis Bacon views that a series of experiments is a tool for investigating nature. John Locke believes that metaphysics cannot acquire true knowledge since humans cannot experience any substantive reality without physical sensation. On the other hand, continental scholars like Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz inclined to rationalism by applying the deductive method stressing the role of reasoning to obtain knowledge. Rene Descartes suggests four rules to approach the truth: never to accept anything for true; to divide each of difficulties into many parts; to start with the simplest and easiest to know; and to review the outcome to assure that nothing is omitted. He established Cartesian dualism separating mind and matter; that made scientists possible independently to investigate the matter by reason rather than the whole organism. Benedict de Spinoza similarly applies a deductive method: first sets definitions and axioms and proves propositions by reasoning. He suggests that there are three kinds of knowledge: opinion or imagination, rational knowledge, and intuitive knowledge. The first alone is the cause of error; the second is in adequate ideas; and the third proceeds from an idea to the knowledge. Gottfried Leibniz also inclined to rationalism against John Locke. Locke sees that ideas are images, but Leibniz separates them into two parts: truths of reason and truths of fact by seeing that ideas are not the form of the thought but the inner object of thought. Viewing that faith can be reconciled with reason; Leibniz justifies the use of reason in theology. Isaac Newton synthesizes empiricism with rationalism by applying inductive and deductive methods together for the final conclusion. Newton first takes practical experiments, which results were reexamined and proved by mathematical or rational verification.
Economic Thought: In the sixteenth century, the expansion of overseas trade with Africa, Asia, and America caused two economic ideas: the quantity theory of money and mercantilism. The continuous and massive influx of bullion from America into Spain caused the same effect as the supply of money, which resulted in high inflation in Spain as well as in Europe. Since the price revolution brought serious problems, economic thinkers in Europe developed the quantity theory of money. Michael Navarrus views that money is worth more when and where it is scarce than abundance; and Thomas Gresham states that bad money drives out good one because people spend bad money first by hoarding good one. Jean Bodin views that the principal reason that raises the price of goods is the abundance of gold and silver, but he did not consider the velocity of money (that was considered by John Locke later) in his theory. Meanwhile, major European states faced serious financial problems because of war expenditures far beyond the tax revenues, which caused budget deficits to be financed by borrowing. Therefore, those countries established government policies to maximize public revenues, which invited state intervention in markets such as export monopoly, exchange control, and the balance of trade. Mercantilism was a means of economic nationalism in favor of the positive balance of trade by encouraging exports and discouraging imports. The East or West India Companies were the frontier corporations to execute mercantilist policies in Asian and America. Thomas Mun, who served the English East India Company during 1615-41, advocated the mercantilist policies. He views that one of the true causes of economic distress is the devaluation of foreign currency; and suggests twelve ways and means to increase exports and to decrease imports in his treatise. Similarly, Gerard de Malynes stresses on exchange rates that “if a country’s currency is devaluated, the prices of foreign goods increases, which causes more exports and less imports” and if it is appreciated, the opposite would happen. Edward Misselden views bullion exports to Asia as “the bottomless pit” and proposed a number of mercantilist policies including the devaluation of English currency.

In the seventeenth century, there appeared another two economic ideas: the application of quantitative methods and the liberalization of economic thought. The conversion of taxes and other obligations into monetary payments required quantitative aggregates; and the statistical estimates became valuable instruments in calculating the balance of payments at a national level. The invention of analytical geometry by Descartes and of differential calculus by Newton and Leibniz encouraged quantitative methods; and the development of inductive empiricism and deductive rationalism contributed to the quantitative methods in economic studies. William Petty attempted to measure the relative wealth and income of England, France, and Holland to show the English economic positions. On the other hand, a development of political philosophy into the theory of natural law liberalized economic thought. Josiah Child opposed to monopolistic restrictions that were harmful to the interest of the state; and rejected laws and regulations to restrict or control all manufacturing and trading activities including prices, wages, admission of foreigners, or religious toleration. John Locke, based on his liberal political thought, was against high interest rate that raises the production cost which reduces its demand and trade volume: the legal interest rate should be set in accordance with the natural or market rate because no other way is effective. Richard Cantillon wrote about the nature of commerce in three parts: economy, money, and trade. In economy, land generates three rents equally divided for the landowner, the farmer, and the farm workers; and income and population are positively correlated. In money, the quantity of money needed for circulation in a state may be greater or less according to the mode of living and the rapidity of payments, which is the velocity of money circulation. In trade, the positive balance of trade increases the quantity of silver circulating in a state, which raises rents and wages so that the production costs will rise. As a result, the foreigners will cease to buy them; which causes manufacturing to decline, so do the employment and income.
Chapter V. Summary and Conclusion

2. CONCLUSION

The Renaissance in Italy is "not a unique phenomenon but a representative of one species within a genus labeled encounters" so that it is not limited to a single dimension of space but is expanded to the dimension of time. In the field of politics, the Hellenic civilization was pursued by the Holy Roman Empire of Charlemagne in 800 and reappeared in the democratic city-states in Italy after two or three centuries, in Flanders and in Germany after two centuries more, and even in the French Revolution. The Renaissance in Italy was based on various factors reflecting problems of the medieval structure pursuing a theocratic feudalism by forming a European world state subordinating the kings to the popes. In politics, the fragmentation of Italy into city-states was favorable to the Renaissance since a large unified state required disciplined power rather than liberalized literature or arts. In fact, the papal system feared a unified state from Alps to Sicily that would make the pope a prisoner, so that Rome had manipulated politics to keep the balance of power on the Italian Peninsula: local independence weakened the centralized defense capacity against foreign invasion, though many Italians had kept a dream to restore the old republic. In economy, the Italian city-states became prosperous by the growth of industry and commerce in the thirteenth century, and their wealth could finance the activities for literature and arts; which movement turned the passage of culture from rural peace to urban vitality. In society, increasing wealth relaxed traditional restraints; the contact with Islam in trade and Crusades gave a new tolerance for other beliefs and ways; the rediscovery of the pagan world undermined medieval morality; so that medievalism was ready to decline toward liberalized ways of thinking and acting in society and culture. In literature and arts, the Renaissance was based on an esthetic development such as in sonnets; an improvement of vernacular languages and the passion for recovering and studying the Greco-Roman classics. Byzantine mosaics were abandoned to study man and women.2

The Italian Renaissance was led by the humanists who captivated the mind of Italy, "turned it from religion to philosophy, from heaven to earth, and revealed to an astonished generation the riches of pagan thought and art"3 while the humanist movement spread their spirits and ideals throughout Europe. The Italian Renaissance waned by its falling economy due to the Italian wars, a new trade route to India, the Ottoman Turks, and the Great Schism; but its impact was significant. First, since Italy had been divided into city-states, the humanists proclaimed a common Italy; however, the ecclesiastical state was a permanent obstacle to national unity, and the Italian wars removed the hope for a unified state, though local patriotism was a poor equivalent. Second, the Renaissance pursued freedom of personality that enhanced the individual development towards the all-sided man through high education as seen in Leon Battista Alberti and Lenardo da Vinci. Third, the Renaissance humanists contributed to the revival of antiquity standing to paganism like works of Cicero and Seneca: Dante in the Divine Comedy, Petrarch in styles of Latin poetry, Boccaccio in the Decameron, and Chaucer in the Canterbury Tales; and the princely families in part learned humanity through the study of antiquity for certain years at the universities. Fourth, the spirit and endeavor of the Renaissance stimulated not only the discovery of the new world with appropriate funds, but also the study of the intellectual side of human beings: the discovery of man and nature in literature and arts. Fifth, the Renaissance pursued the equality between classes and between men and women: the conviction, that "birth decides nothing as to the goodness or badness of a man,"4 was widely prevailed in Italy in the fifteenth century, when the education given to women in the upper class was essentially the same as that given to men. Sixth and finally, the worldliness of the Renaissance contrasted to medievalism owing to the flood of new thoughts by the diffusion of antiquity and paganism, of individualism as the belief in human freedom, and of rationalism in philosophy and science, in favor of the Reformation.
Chapter V. Summary and Conclusion

**The Reformation.** The fourteenth century was in famine, plague, and wars; causing political instability, economic turmoil, and social upheaval with rebellions. In theology, Scholastics like Thomas Aquinas approached God and religion from “outward effects” relying on reason for the highest truth but distrusting the emotions; while mystical theologians such as Meister Eckhart and Gerard Groote stressed “internal effects” as the highest good trusting the affections and believing “that love could reach farther than reason and help the mind transcend its natural limitations.” Boniface VIII issued the *Unam Sanctum* in 1302 that pushed Philip VI of France to intervene in the election of the pope, which caused the Great Schism ended by 1417 that damaged the papal system with the rise of the conciliar theory of church government. Also, Marsilius of Padua in his *Defender of Peace* argues that the church is only a part of the secular state and must confine itself solely to spiritual affairs; and William of Ockham in his *Dialogue* views that since men have a natural right freely to arrange their materials for survival, prior to the church’s institution, the property boundary is legally a matter of the state, not of the church. In addition, John Wycliffe attacked the abuses and corruption of church and opposed to clerical celibacy, transubstantiation, image worship, pilgrimages, and others; and John Hus publicly questioned the existence of purgatory and protested against the church selling indulgence. In the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, the humanists like Desiderius Erasmus and Thomas More criticized corrupt church and suggested reformation within the papal system, while Christian humanists in line with mysticism believed that religious reform was necessary to remove the shortcomings of society and to revitalize Christianity. There had also been favorable progress for the Reformation: political consolidation of major states, economic growth with transoceanic trades, secularization of society with the Renaissance and others, and the scientific revolution particularly in printing and Copernican astronomy. Martin Luther ignited on the common desire for social changes of the time through his famous Ninety-Five Theses in 1517.

The Reformation era from 1500 to 1650 was “above all else an age of religious faith” when religion penetrated almost the whole life of the people, whether they were supportive or not for the Protestant movement. It was not only the rise of Protestantism but also resulting changes in politics, economy, and socio-culture affecting all of the people and institutions. In politics, the Reformation was not a political revolution, but influenced the balance of political power locally or internationally. There were two powers, either supportive or oppressing. Charles V missed the time to suppress the Lutheran movement in Germany due to the French, the Turks, and Rome; while Luther was supported by the Protestant princes in line with the common desire of their people for changes though he stressed passive obedience. The European states were divided into two axes of Catholics and Protestants, causing domestic or foreign wars that lasted for a century until 1648. In economy, those wars devastated lands, killed people, and destroyed the economy. In the absence of toleration, 250,000 Moriscos were expelled from Spain in 1609 and 200,000 Huguenots fled from France to foreign countries after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685; which was a serious loss of labor and capital reducing their growth particularly in Spain. It was a sad history for innocent people to suffer from unnecessary wars and expulsion from their homelands because of their faith in religion. In society, all properties of Catholic churches and monasteries in Protestant states were confiscated by the state to sell to the public by bargain prices; and monks and friars or nuns were dispersed. In England only in 1536, Henry VIII closed 578 monasteries and 130 convents: 6,521 monks or friars and 1,560 nuns were forced to disperse. In religion itself, new doctrines and theories were established on the basis of humanization; and the traditional ritual framework was destroyed or simplified though minor differences appeared between sectors. The Reformation “encouraged people to resist religious tyranny; many scholars view it also as a major force for political freedom and social justice.”

Book III. From the Renaissance to the Scientific Revolution, 1400-1715 551
The geographical discovery opened the medieval eyes to the new world outside Europe. Since about 1400 the Portuguese had been engaged in exploration of the Atlantic islands and African coasts with associated skills of navigation, cartography, and shipbuilding. Inventing the carrack running by 3 to 4 masts with capacity of 400 to 600 tons, the Portuguese discovered a new trade route to the East Indies and monopolized the spice trade with Asia in the sixteenth century; while the Spanish discovered the West Indies and America and colonized new lands. The Dutch developed highly specialized cargo-carrier fluyt in the sixteenth century that required much less costs in production and operations with more shipping capacity protected by guns; which allowed them to dominate sea transport throughout the world. The Dutch took over the Portuguese spice trade by force, and monopolized shipping transport in America by low costs. After the Anglo-Dutch Wars during 1652-1674, however, the Dutch began to decline, and the English ascended to the supreme in both Atlantic and Indian Oceans in the eighteenth century. The main motives of the discovery lay in material gains and religious zeal but some individuals inclined to personal love of adventure and political or social desire for reputation. In the East, the Ottoman Turks centralized politics in the feudal society of Anatolia, expanded their domain westward by capturing Constantinople in 1453, and threatened the Christian world in two ways. The Turks recognized the Orthodox Church and suppressed the Catholic Church throughout their realms; and closed the overland route to the east and monopolized the spice trade with India so that their prices were highly expensive. The Portuguese were interested in the possibility of reaching Asia by sea, so that Vasco da Gama landed in India 1498. Isabella of Castile, on the other hand, conquered Muslim Granada and expelled the Jews from all Spain in 1492, when she approved the exploration plan of Columbus. Isabella promised him to be Admiral of the Ocean Sea, Viceroy and Governor of lands that he may discover with ten percent of expected profits as rewards. Moreover, the spread of Christianity to natives was an essential part of exploration.

The Portuguese captured Goa along the Malabar Coast, Malacca, and Ceylon during 1510-15 and extended their trade to Macao and Kyushu in Japan within three decades. They intended to found no colonies in Asia but established governorship in Brazil in 1500. The Spanish spent the first two decades as an age of explorers and the next three decades as of conquistadors. They instituted the system of ecomienda in the colonies in America, allowing the colonists to collect tribute from the natives, to use them as laborers by paying wages for protection; but in reality the natives in the plantations were exploited particularly in mines. Following Portugal and Spain, the Dutch, the English, and the French entered trade competition in America and Asia, but they were not much different from the Spanish. The significance of the geographical discovery in human civilization was in the opening of “the first imperial age” in terms of colonization and exploitation. First of all, the Europeans opened Asian markets by bombardments from the ship to native ports on the one hand and conquered the natives in America with advanced civilization such as iron sword with horses or negotiations on the other hand. They established plantations, and their leading groups became the aristocracy of new colonies ruling the natives, which were indirectly controlled by the mother countries in Europe. Second, the population exploded in Europe during 1450-1600: the overpopulation problem was resolved by emigration to their colonies. The Europeans oppressed and exploited the colonial natives for material gains by selling their manufacturing goods for raw materials and other profitable goods to be sold in European markets. The transoceanic trades tremendously expanded the European economies. Third, the development of shipbuilding and navigation with guns was important in the age of colonization as experienced particularly in the Netherlands in the seventeenth. It is much significant that the English focused on overseas trade with colonies, while the French remained more on European affairs, though the sea power and naval strategies became influential in the coming centuries.
Chapter V. Summary and Conclusion

In the scientific revolution, there have been conflicts between science and religion as well as reason and faith throughout centuries in history. In the High Middle Ages, Thomas Aquinas views that “Human reason cannot participate in the dictate of the Divine reason fully, but only in its own way and imperfectly.” Despite his efforts to balance between reason and faith, Aquinas worries about that reason might undermine faith. In the middle of the Reformation, Melanchthon views that knowledge comes from intuitive and abstract cognition: the former is available to God and the latter to man, so that human reason cannot discover theological truths. The relations between philosophy and theology as well as reason and faith had been an important issue throughout the ages. More seriously, the Copernican revolution shook the entire basis of the intellectual world and the Christian belief based on the Ptolemaic system. In 1616, Galileo was summoned by Rome and the papal authority warned that he should abstain from teaching or defending the Copernican theory: if he does not follow, he would be imprisoned. Soon after the Holy Office published its edict that “The view that the sun stands motionless at the center of the universe is foolish, philosophically false, and utterly heretical, because contrary to Holy Scripture. The view that the earth is not the center of the universe and even has a daily rotation is philosophically false, and at least an erroneous belief.” However, Galileo finally confronted the papal authority by publishing his Dialogue on the Two Chief World Systems in 1632. Being summoned by Rome in 1633, the Inquisition sentenced him guilty of heresy and disobedience, and sent him to “the prison of this Holy Office for a period determinable at our pleasure.” It might be either because the papal authority had no valid knowledge to accept the new findings or because its leaders were fearful to manage the radical changes against the Bible. Nevertheless, Galileo was allowed to move to his own villa near Florence in the same year where he was free to pursue his studies, teach pupils, write books, and receive visitors like Milton in 1638 within his residence.

Another conflict to be considered is between political philosophy and economic thought – between natural law and mercantilism. The theory of natural law basically lies in liberal thought in politics. As noted previously, Hugo Grotius views that liberty of the sea is fundamental and key aspect of communications for the people and nations; and that man is an animal by nature fitted for peace and war, so that right reason and the nature of society do not prohibit necessary violence. Thomas Hobbes views that all men are equal to each other by nature and have equal right to choose necessary means that creates merciless competition due to limited resources. Similarly, Samuel Pufendorf views that man is an animal with an intense concern for his own preservation. John Locke views that men are by nature all free, equal, and independent so that no one can be put out of his estate and subjected to the political power of another without his own consent. However, mercantilism basically emphasizes control and restrictions in economy and business such as trade monopoly, exchange control, and the balance of payments in foreign trade. Thomas Mun of the East India Company suggests the twelve ways and means to increase exports and to decrease imports; Gerard de Malynes also suggests higher import duties, prohibition of bullion exportation, and the control of exchange rates. Edward Misselden views that monopoly is the restraint of the liberty of commerce to someone or few, the setting of the price at the pleasure of the monopolian to his private benefit, and the prejudice of the public. From the point of present economics, mercantilism is not beneficial for both exporters and importers in the long run, which is against the self-adjustment of trade surplus or the balance of trade. The theory of natural law liberalized political philosophy as well as economic thought. Josiah Child favors laws that are not in opposition to nature but along with nature; and John Locke was against high interest rates that increase production costs and reduce its demand. Moreover, Richard Cantillon views that the positive balance of trade is naturally adjusted by the market function. The relations between natural law and mercantilism were adjusted in the eighteenth century.

Book III. From the Renaissance to the Scientific Revolution, 1400-1715 553
Interactions between Politics & Economy: (a) The European Explosion: Columbus linked the Americas with Europe in 1492, and the Spaniards proceeded to explore, conquer, and colonize the New World with extraordinary energy with missionary idealism. “Cortez destroyed the Aztec state in 1519-21; Pizarro became master of the Inca Empire from 1531 and 1535. Within the following generation, less famous but no less hardy conquistadores founded Spanish settlements along the coasts of Chile and Argentina, penetrated the highlands of Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela, and Central America, and explored the Amazon basin and the southern United States. As early as 1571, Spanish power leaped across the Pacific to the Philippines.” Meanwhile, the Portuguese had flung around Africa and across the southern seas of the Eastern Hemisphere.

“Exactly a decade elapsed between the completion of Vasco da Gama’s first voyage to India (1497-99) and the decisive Portuguese naval victory of Diu (1509). The Portuguese quickly exploited this success by capturing Goa and Malacca, which together with Ormuz on the Persian Gulf (occupied from 1515) gave them the necessary bases from which to dominate the trade of the entire Indian Ocean…Portuguese ships followed the precious spices to their farther sources in the Molucca without delay (1511-12); and a Portuguese merchant-explorer traveling on a Malay vessel visited Canton as early as 1513-14. By 1557, a permanent Portuguese settlement was founded at Macao in the south China coast; and trade and missionary activity in Japan started in the 1540s. On the other side of the world, the Portuguese discovered Brazil in 1500 and began to settle the country after 1530. Coastal stations in both west and east Africa, established between 1471 and 1507, completed the chain of ports of call which held the Portuguese empire together.”

Nevertheless, the two Iberian nations did not long enjoy the new wealth that their enterprise had won. “From the beginning, the Spaniards found it difficult to protect their shipping against French and Portuguese sea raiders. English pirates offered an additional and formidable threat after 1568, when the first open clash between English interlopers and the Spanish authorities in the Caribbean took place. Between 1516 and 1568 the other great maritime people of the age, the Dutch, were subjects of the same Hapsburg monarchs who ruled in Spain and, consequently, enjoyed a favored status as middlemen between Spanish and north European ports. Initially, therefore, Dutch shipping had no incentive to harass Iberian sea power.”

“This naval balance shifted sharply in the second half of the sixteenth century, when the Dutch revolt against Spain (1568), followed by the English victory over the Spanish armada (1588), signalized the waning of Iberian sea power before that of the northern European nations. Harassment of Dutch ships in Spanish ports simply accelerated the shift; for the Dutch responded by dispatching their vessels directly to the Orient (1594), and the English soon followed suit. Theirafter, Dutch naval and commercial power rapidly supplanted that of Portugal in the southern sea. The establishment of a base in Java (1618), the capture of Malacca from the Portuguese (1641), and the seizure of the most important trading posts of Ceylon (by 1644) secured Dutch hegemony in the Indian Ocean; and during the same decade, English traders gained a foothold in western India. Simultaneously, English (1607), French (1608), and Dutch (1613) colonization of mainland North America, and the seizure of most of the smaller Caribbean islands by the same three nations, infringed upon Spanish claims to monopoly in the New World.”

Outside of Europe, movements from the Eurasian steppes continued to make political history: the Uzbek conquered Tansoxiana (1507-12), the Mogul conquered India (1526-1688), and the Manchu conquered China (1621-83). Meanwhile, Muslim power took over Constantinople (1543), and continued to penetrate new territories in southeast Europe, India, Africa, and southeast Asia. Significant territorial setbacks were achieved only in the western and central steppe. The Chinese, Muslim, and Hindu worlds were not yet really reflected from their earlier paths of development. In the period of 1500-1650, Europe entered upon a veritable social explosion.
(b) **Politics 1500-1650:** (i) Spain was born with the union or marriage of Ferdinand of Aragon with Isabella of Castile in 1469 as the most successful and influential state of Europe. Allying with the Catholic Church, the Crown used the Spanish Inquisition to consolidate political power by punishing opposition to the royal as religious heterodoxy. American treasure as well as a hardy professional soldiery also contributed to the strength of Spain. Charles V (1519-56) ruled Castile and Aragon simultaneously as the first king of Spain and as the Holy Roman Emperor. He won the Italian Wars over France and gained Milan and Naples but was forced to concede the Peace of Augsburg of 1555 which divided Germany on confessional lines. Philip II (1566-98) allowed to create the Dutch Republic (1581) and lost the Spanish Armada against England due to storms and logistical problems. (ii) France: Henry IV (1589-1610) restore the monarchy after a long bout of civil and religious wars. “The state remained officially Catholic; but French national interests were kept carefully distinct from the cause of the papacy or of international Catholicism. Cardinal Richelieu, chief minister of the French king, did not hesitate to intervene on the Protestant side in the Thirty Year’s War when it suited French interests to do so.” Louis XIII (1610-43) centralized administration by destroying castles and subduing towns. The Thirty Years’ War (1618-48) ended by the Peace of Westphalia, allowing the Netherlands and Swiss Confederation to be independent republics as well as religious toleration for Catholic, Lutheran, and Calvinist. (iii) England: With the gaining power of the gentry class, victory in the English Civil Wars (1640-49) against a royal absolutism allowed parliament to make good its right to supervise government finances and through its control of the purse parliament became able to control administration in general. This gave the gentry and merchants of England a far more active and direct role in high policy-making than their counterparts in France could achieve under absolute monarchy.

(c) **Economy:** (i) “The economic development of Europe proceeded with political consolidation and differentiation. As larger sovereignties emerged and as state regulation supplanted or superseded guild and municipal regulation, economic enterprise could operate more freely over wider territories. Hence merchants, miners, and manufacturers were often able to extend the geographical scale of their activities without running afoul of logical discrimination against outsiders or entangling themselves in mutually contradictory systems of law. Further, the responsiveness of most European governments to mercantile and financial interest, and the direct initiative many governments took to establish new manufactures and skills within their territories probably accelerated economic development.” (ii) Interregional European commerce intensified during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and was supplemented by an increasing volume of trans-oceanic trade. “Overland portage from northern Italy to the entrepots of southern Germany constituted no insuperable obstacle to such trade, which had long constituted a mainstream of European commerce. Consequently, profits accumulated in Italy and southern Germany, so that, when money-lending became a semi-reputable occupation, international banking firms, which played an important role in developing European mining and other economic activities. This pattern of trade and finance was supplemented and eclipsed in importance by international exchanges centering in the Low Countries.” (iii) In the seventeenth century, bulk trade in cheaper commodities definitely surpassed the older style of commerce; and the European exchange economy thereby definitively attained the vulgar character that distinguished it from trade patterns elsewhere. (iv) Finally, “a rapid advance in prices strongly reinforced by the unexampled influx of gold and silver from the Americas, acted as a powerful solvent to all traditions economic and social relationships. When prices doubled, trebled, or even quadrupled within a century, rentiers and wage earners, together with governments, suffered a serious erosion of real income, while entrepreneurs of all sorts tended to benefit. This price revolution helps therefore to explain the rise of the middle classes to political eminence in northwestern Europe.”

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*Book III. From the Renaissance to the Scientific Revolution, 1400-1715*
(d) The Case of the Anglo-Dutch Wars. “In 1628 Admiral Piet Heyn was the only one to successfully capture a large Spanish treasure fleet. Thus, the Dutch replaced the Portuguese as the main European traders in Asia. The Dutch, taking over most of Portugal's trade posts in the East Indies, gained control over the hugely profitable trade in spices. This coincided with an enormous growth of the Dutch merchant fleet, made possible by the cheap mass production of fluyts. Soon the Dutch had the largest mercantile fleet of Europe, with more merchant ships than all other nations combined, and a dominant position in European, especially Baltic, trade. Though less spectacularly so, gradually the Dutch navy also grew in power. From January 1631 Charles I of England engaged in a number of secret agreements with Spain, directed against Dutch sea power. He also embarked on a major program of naval construction, enforcing ship money to build such prestige vessels as HMS Sovereign of the Seas. Charles's policy was not very successful however. Fearing to endanger his good relations with the powerful Dutch stadtholder Frederick Henry, Prince of Orange, his assistance to Spain limited itself to allowing Habsburg troops on their way to Dunkirk to employ neutral English shipping; in 1636 and 1637 he made some halfhearted attempts to extort North Sea herring rights from Dutch fishermen until intervention by the Dutch navy made an end to such practices. When in 1639 a large Spanish transport fleet sought refuge in the English Downs moorage, Charles did not dare to protect it against a Dutch attack; the resulting Battle of the Downs undermined both Spanish sea power and Charles's reputation.”

“The English Civil War, commencing soon thereafter, severely weakened England's naval position. Its navy was as internally divided as was the country as a whole; the Dutch, as superior on land as they were at sea, even took over much of England's maritime trade with its North American colonies. Between 1648 and 1651 however the situation reversed completely. In 1648 the United Provinces concluded the Peace of Münster with Spain. Due to the division of powers in the Dutch Republic, the army and navy were a main powerbase of the stadtholder, although the budget allocated to the military was set by the States General. With the war gone, it decided to decommission most of the Dutch army and navy. This led to a conflict between the major Dutch cities and the new stadtholder William II of Orange, bringing the Republic to the brink of civil war; the stadtholder's unexpected death in 1650 only added to the political tensions. Meanwhile, Oliver Cromwell united his country into the Commonwealth of England and in a few years created a powerful navy, expanding the number of ships and greatly improving organization and discipline. England was ready to challenge Dutch trade dominance.”

“The mood in England was rather belligerent towards the Dutch. This partly stemmed from old perceived slights: the Dutch were considered to have shown themselves ungrateful for the aid they had received against the Spanish by growing stronger than their former English protectors; they caught most of the herring off the English east coast; they had driven the English out of the East Indies committing presumed atrocities such as the Amboyna Massacre while vociferously appealing to the principle of free trade to circumvent taxation in the English colonies. But there were also new points of conflict: the decline of Spanish power at the end of the Thirty Years' War in 1648, the colonial possessions of Portugal, and perhaps even of a beleaguered Spain, were up for grabs. The Dutch had after 1648 quickly replaced the English in their traditional Iberian trade. Cromwell feared the influence of the Orangist faction and English exiles in the Republic because the stadtholders had always supported the Stuarts; the Dutch abhorred the decapitation of Charles I. Early in 1651 Cromwell tried to ease tensions by sending a delegation to The Hague proposing that...the Dutch would assist the English in conquering most of Spanish America for its extremely valuable resources. The pro-Stuart Orangists incited mobs to harass the envoys. When the delegation returned, the English Parliament, feeling deeply offended by the Dutch attitude, decided to pursue a policy of confrontation.” It explains interrelations between politics and economy.
Relations between Theory and Practice: (a) Humanism in Renaissance: Theories are largely based on practices experienced by various authors. Some of the first humanists were great collectors of antique manuscripts. Many worked for the Church and were in holy orders, while others were lawyers and chancellors of Italian cities. “Renaissance humanism was a response to the utilitarian approach and what came to be depicted as the narrow pedantry associated with medieval scholasticism. Humanists sought to create a citizenry able to speak and write with eloquence and clarity and thus capable of engaging in the civic life of their communities and persuading others to virtuous and prudent actions. This was to be accomplished through the study of the studia humanitatis, today known as the humanities: grammar, rhetoric, history, poetry, and moral philosophy…Humanism was a pervasive cultural mode and not the program of a small elite, a program to revive the cultural legacy, literary legacy, and moral philosophy of classical antiquity. ”

The Renaissance also links to Humanism, since the humanistic phrase of the Renaissance naturally inspired a revival of ancient philosophy in its various forms, before the Christianity dominated. Nicholo Machiavelli wrote The Prince in 1513 just after the Florentine republic was overthrown by a Spanish army. As discussed previously, some readers claimed that the author is teaching evil, and providing evil recommendations to tyrants to help them maintain their power, with which this author does not agree though. It is argued that Machiavelli’s audience for this work was not even the ruling class but the common people because the rulers already knew these methods through their education. He eagerly hoped Italians be rescued from barbarous oppressions, but he believed that Italian unification would be impossible without soldiers. The Prince must be a reflection of Italian political situations under the Spanish rule.

(b) Natural Law theorists try to separate faith from reason to emancipate secular thought from the monopoly of theology: “what is true in philosophy may be false in theology, and vice versa.” They developed ideas of natural law according to the change of environment: the rise of humanism throughout the Renaissance, the consolidation of absolute monarchy with the collapse of old feudalism, the reformation and the rise of Protestantism, the discovery and expansion of the new world, the emergence of the mercantile class, and the scientific revolution. In general, the concepts of political change and political values must be considered in relationship to five terms as follows from the left to the right. Radicals are people who find themselves extremely discontented with the status quo; so that they wish an immediate and profound change in the existing order, advocating something new and different. Liberals are less dissatisfied than the radicals, but still wishing to change the system significantly: they enjoy a philosophical base which is divided into classical and contemporary eras. Moderates find little wrong with the existing society; but Conservatives are reluctant to change the existing system. Reactionaries favor institutions of previous era, so that reject modern values and adopt former political norms and policies.

(c) Mercantilism: Theory and Practice: “Mercantilism was the dominant school of economic thought in Europe throughout the late Renaissance and early modern period (from the 15th to the 18th century). Mercantilism encouraged the many intra-European wars of the period and arguably fueled European expansion and imperialism - both in Europe and throughout the rest of the world - until the 19th century or early 20th century. Evidence of mercantilistic practices appeared in early modern Venice, Genoa, and Pisa regarding control of the Mediterranean trade of bullion. However, as a codified school of economic theories, mercantilism's real birth was marked by the empiricism of the Renaissance, which first began to quantify large-scale trade accurately. England began the first large-scale and integrative approach to mercantilism during the Elizabethan Era (1558–1603). An early statement on national balance of trade appeared in Discourse of the Common Weal of this Realm of England, 1549: ‘We must always take heed that we buy no more from strangers than we sell them, for so should we impoverish ourselves and enrich them.’
period featured various but often disjointed efforts by the court of Queen Elizabeth to develop a naval and merchant fleet capable of challenging the Spanish stranglehold on trade and of expanding the growth of bullion at home. Queen Elizabeth promoted the Trade and Navigation Acts in Parliament and issued orders to her navy for the protection and promotion of English shipping. A systematic and coherent explanation of balance of trade was made public through Thomas Mun's argument *England's Treasure by Foreign Trade, or the Balance of our Forraign Trade is The Rule of Our Treasure*. It was written in the 1620s and published in 1664.

“These efforts organized national resources sufficiently in the defense of England against the far larger and more powerful Spanish Empire, and in turn paved the foundation for establishing a global empire in the 19th century. The authors noted most for establishing the English mercantilist system include Gerard de Malynes and Thomas Mun, who first articulated the Elizabethan system, which in turn was then developed further by Josiah Child. Numerous French authors helped cement French policy around mercantilism in the 17th century. This French mercantilism was best articulated by Jean-Baptiste Colbert (in office, 1665–1683), though policy liberalized greatly under Napoleon. In Europe, academic belief in mercantilism began to fade in the late 18th century, especially in Britain, in light of the arguments of Adam Smith and the classical economists. The repeal of the Corn Laws by Robert Peel symbolized the emergence of free trade as an alternative system. Neomercantilism is a 20th-century economic policy that uses the ideas and methods of neoclassical economics. The new mercantilism has different goals and focuses on more rapid economic growth based on advanced technology. It promotes such policies as substitution state taxation, subsidies, expenditures, and general regulatory powers for tariffs and quotas, and protection through the formation of supranational trading blocs.”

“Most of the European economists who wrote between 1500 and 1750 are today generally considered mercantilists; this term was initially used solely by critics, such as Mirabeau and Smith, but was quickly adopted by historians...The bulk of what is commonly called mercantilist literature" appeared in the 1620s in Great Britain. Smith saw the English merchant Thomas Mun (1571–1641) as a major creator of the mercantile system, especially in his posthumously published *Treasure by Foreign Trade* (1664), which Smith considered the archetype or manifesto of the movement. Perhaps the last major mercantilist work was James Steuart's Principles of Political Economy, published in 1767. Mercantilist literature also extended beyond England. Italy and France produced noted writers of mercantilist themes.”

“Adam Smith rejected the mercantilist focus on production, arguing that consumption was paramount to production. He added that mercantilism was popular among merchants because it was what is now called rent seeking. However, John Maynard Keynes argued that encouraging production was just as important as encouraging consumption, and he favored the new mercantilism. Keynes also noted that in the early modern period the focus on the bullion supplies was reasonable. In an era before paper money, an increase in bullion was one of the few ways to increase the money supply. Keynes said mercantilist policies generally improved both domestic and foreign investment - domestic because the policies lowered the domestic rate of interest, and investment by foreigners by tending to create a favorable balance of trade. Keynes and other economists of the 20th century also realized that the balance of payments is an important concern. Keynes also supported government intervention in the economy as necessity, as did mercantilism. As of 2010, the word mercantilism remains a pejorative term, often used to attack various forms of protectionism. The similarities between Keynesianism and mercantilism have sometimes led critics to call them neo-mercantilism. Indeed, Paul Samuelson, writing within a Keynesian framework, defended mercantilism, writing, "With employment less than full and Net National Product suboptimal, all the debunked mercantilist arguments turn out to be valid."21
In Book I and II of History of Politics and Economy, this author attached an Appendix, a summary of twelve volumes of A Study of History written by Arnold J. Toynbee published during 1935-75. Now in Book III, I summarize The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy of 2005 edited by Frank Jackson and Michael Smith in order for the readers to widen their scope of knowledge in philosophy. In the same regard, in Book IV dealing with the eighteenth century including the French Revolution, I will summarize The Oxford Handbook of Political Thought of 2006 edited by John S. Dryzek, Bonnie Honig, and Anne Phillips. With the same token, in Book V covering the nineteenth century of industrialization and socialism, I will summarize The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy of 2006 edited by Barry R. Weingast and Donald A. Wittman. My History investigates politics and religion, economy and society, political philosophy, economic thought, and other intellectual developments in each historical period, but it would be significant to visit each academic field independently and more intensively. In this Appendix, The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy consists of seven parts: moral philosophy (ethics); social and political philosophy; philosophy of mind and action (psychology); philosophy of language (logic); metaphysics (with ontology); epistemology; and philosophy of the sciences. Each part includes three to five articles written by specialized scholars in each field. I summarized the contents of articles by using author’s original words without quotation marks as follows.

Part I. Moral Philosophy (Ethics)

1. Meta-Ethics by Michael Smith: (a) Introduction: When we judge actions to be morally right or wrong, or people to be morally good or bad, or outcomes to be just or unjust, we engage in the practice of moral appraisal. The principles engaging in moral appraisal are normative ethics, and the method reflective equilibrium can much quarantine skepticism about our specific judgments as a method of justification in normative ethics. In meta-ethics, the focus is not on the substance of morality, but is rather on a range of interrelated semantic, metaphysical, psychological, and epistemological questions about the practice of making moral judgments themselves. In this regard, we should focus more explicitly on issues concerning the nature of our psychological state and capacities. (b) Why meta-ethicists should focus on meta-level questions about reasons and rationality: Meta-ethics is just one area in which we can raise the host of interrelated semantic, metaphysical, psychological, and epistemological questions about the practice of making moral judgments themselves. In this regard, we should focus more explicitly on issues concerning the nature of our psychological state and capacities. (b) Why meta-ethicists should focus on meta-level questions about reasons and rationality: Meta-ethics is just one area in which we can raise the host of interrelated semantic, metaphysical, psychological, and epistemological questions. The issue here is whether moral norms reduce to norms of reason or rationality. Advocates of rationalism, like Kang (1786), hold that they do, whereas advocates of anti-rationalism, such as Hume (1740), insist that they do not. Another point is often given within jurisprudence for supposing that legal norms reduce to moral norms, so that moral norms reduce to norms of reason or rationality. If moral norms don’t reduce to norms of reason or rationality, we must ask in what sense moral norms could be authoritative. (c) Deontic concepts versus evaluative concepts: Within normative domains in general, and in the domain of reason and rationality in particular, common sense distinguishes between two broad families of concepts: evaluative concepts and deontic concepts (relating to the moral obligation). The former is the concepts of the good and the bad, the desirable and the undesirable, the better and the worse, and so on; while the latter is the concepts of obligatory, the forbidden, and the permissible. The distinction is a generalization of the distinction between the right and the good. The definitional questions about the relationship between evaluative concepts and deontic concepts are much difficult to adjudicate: whether, within the normative domain of reason and rationality, evaluative concepts or deontic concepts are prior in definition.
Chapter V. Summary and Conclusion

(d) Moore’s definition of the deontic: According to Moore, there are two crucial elements in the definition of deontic concepts. One element is evaluative: being obligatory, permissible, and forbidden are all a matter of an act’s standing in a certain relation to the best outcome. The other element concerns our capacities: we are obliged, permitted, and forbidden to act in certain ways only if we can act in those ways. The fact that someone experiences pain is a bad thing, but it is not as such responsibility-implicating because there is so far nothing for the person to give an account of. The fact that someone brings about his own experience of pain when he had the option of acting so as not to have this experience, by contrast, is responsibility-implicating. This is a great virtue of the Moorean definition: an agent’s reasons for action are defined in terms of the values of the outcomes of the action that the agent can perform.

(e) Sidgwick’s definition of the evaluative: The Sidgwickian definition of good is a buck-passing theory. It entails that there is no metaphysically independent property of goodness, but rather that something’s being good is a matter of its being an object of the desires that the subject would have if that subject had an idealized psychology. The definitional buck is in this way passed from the concept of goodness to the concept of an idealized psychology. Though the Sidwicikian definition of good is given in deontic terms, the deontic terms to which it appeals are very different from the deontic terms that Moore is trying to define with his definition of ought. The Moorean definition of ought and the Sidgwickian definition of good can therefore be happily combined. This means the Sidgwickian definition of good can be used to help diagnose the flaw in the argument we considered earlier from the Moorean definition of ought to the conclusion that all reasons for action are characterizable in on-egocentric terms. Finally, the Sidgwickian definition of good is immensely plausible in its own right and is made even more plausible by its ability to explain why goodness and badness are structured in the way they are and why facts about goodness and badness differ from facts about reasons for action in the way that they do.

(f) Cognitivism or Non-cognitivism? Psychology is one that meets all rational requirements, and ideals of reason is not a priori, but is rather a matter of decision. We are committed to a non-cognitive account of the definitionally most basic concepts in the domain of norms of reason and rationality, not a cognitive account. The proper conclusion to draw is that we have misconceived the way in which psychologies evolve to meet requirements and ideals of reason. This is not underwritten by a desire to have a certain sort of psychology. Rather, it is underwritten by a distinct capacity to have a psychology that meets requirements. The crucial point is simply that whatever psychological state their judgment expresses, its role in our psychological economy is secured by the agents’ possession and exercise of the capacity to have a psychology that meets the requirements and ideals of reason. It is this capacity that they have in so far as they are rational, not a desire to have a certain sort of psychology. We have given no good reason to doubt the completely flat-footed reason given at the outset for supposing that the judgment that an agent’s psychology meets all rational requirements and ideals of reason represses a belief rather than a desire.

(g) Conclusion: Meta-ethicists should adopt the working hypothesis that moral norms reduce to norms of reason and rationality. The payoff doing so is now apparent. For we have seen good reason to be cognitivists about normative judgments within the domain of norms of reason and rationality. If moral norms reduce to norms of reason and rationality, then it seems that we have equally good reason to be cognitivists about moral judgments as well. Moreover, we have seen that judgments about what we have all-things-considered reason to do, understood in the Moorean terms in which we have understood them, have a familiar consequentialist structure. This in turn suggests that, when we reduce moral norms to norms of reason and rationality, that consequentialist structure will be preserved. Meta-ethicists should adopt not just the working hypothesis with reason and rationality, but that all moral theories are forms of consequentialism.22
2. Normative Ethics by Julia Driver: (a) Introduction: Normative ethical theories have traditionally been divided into teleological theories defining moral quality in terms of the achievement of some good or avoidance of some bad, and deontological account specifying moral quality in terms of goodness achieved, but rather as a function of something that binds or adheres to principles that are agreed upon by rational agents. (b) Values: In normative ethics, well-being is often taken to be the ultimate good for a person. Well-being is captured by appeal to subjective states – and thus reject both hedonism and desire or preference satisfaction approach to value – in favor of some sort of objective list theory. In fact, knowledge forms a part of our well-being. (c) Consequentialism is a moral theory determining the rightness of an action, solely by a consideration of the consequences generated by the action in question; the most prominent version of which is utilitarianism which holds that the right action maximizes the good. To understand utility, there are problems: first is whether to maximize average utility or total utility; second is the issue of justice or fairness; third is either maximizing or optimizing demandingness of utilitarianism. The subjective consequentialist holds that the moral agent must consciously try to maximize the good, whereas the objective consequentialist need not recommend a particular mode of decision-making since all that matters is actually getting it right, whatever decision procedure is used.

(d) Deontological ethics: Deontological approaches are contrasted with consequentialist approaches in that the right is not defined in terms of the good. Instead, while consequences may or may not be relevant to a determination of rightness, consequences are not the sole determinant. Further, the deontologist will recognize certain agent-relative factors or elements as relevant to determinations of rightness. These features are often said to contrast with consequentialism. (i) Kantian ethics is based on moral duty: there is some end that has unconditional value in rational nature, so that only rational beings can be moral agents. (ii) Intuitionistic approaches: Another body tries to arrive at substantive principles on the basis of intuitive reactions to cases. (iii) Doing and allowing: There is morally significant distinction between doing harm and allowing harm. Killing (doing harm) is worse than letting die (allowing harm). (iv) Intending harm: There is a morally significant distinction between intention and foresight. The classic case summoned to motivate this doctrine is that of a bomber pilot during wartime who has no intention of killing innocent civilian when he drops a bomb on a military target, though he can certainly foresee that some innocent civilians will be killed as an unintended side-effect of the bombing. (v) Contractarian and contractualist ethics: The contractarian approach proceeds with the acknowledgement that normative ethics guides action in a social world. The contractualist approach avoids a serious intuitive difficulty associated with the contractarian approach.

(e) Virtue ethics: Abstract normative concepts such as ought or moral obligation make no sense outside a legislative context. There should be greater focus on moral psychology and the virtues. “An action is right iff it is what a virtuous agent would, characteristically, do in the circumstances, except for tragic dilemmas, in which a decision is right iff it is what such an agent would decide, but the action decided upon may be too terrible to be called right or good.” (f) Feminist ethics: Female experience was said to be more particularistic, caring, and nurturing, commensurate with the sort of experiences most females have and the norms that tend to govern their relationship with others. Feminist conceptions of moral theory cover a very wide range of different views with varying theoretical commitments. (g) Conclusion: Normative ethical theory has undergone a transformation in the last generation. Challenges have been made to normative ethical theory – particularly to the commitment to impartiality and the view that there is a single moral principle sufficient to guide action. Greater focus on relationships, virtues, and less abstract issues has transformed the development of the major theories. Consequentialism, in particular, has shown greater resilience in meeting the challenges posed by critics.23
3. Moral Epistemology by Karen Jones: (a) Introduction: Meta-ethics comprises three branches: semantics, metaphysics, and epistemology. However, while epistemological concerns drive much of contemporary meta-ethical theorizing, epistemology tends to receive less explicit attention than semantics and metaphysics. General epistemology and philosophy of science has long recognized the importance of social factors – both contextual and institutional – in transmitting and justifying belief. Moral epistemology ought to be moving towards a more social epistemology. (b) The case for asymmetrical skepticism: All claims to empirical knowledge are vulnerable to challenge by global skeptical hypotheses, which can be used to motivate skepticism regarding claims to moral knowledge, but the most interesting forms of moral skepticism are local rather than global and are motivated by apparent dis-analogies between ethics and paradigm kinds of inquiry. The putative dis-analogies that motivate skepticism about ethics without supporting general skepticism include the following: (i) Moral discourse is action-guiding in a way that the fact-stating discourses of science and commonsense are not. (ii) In ethics there appears to be persistent, rationally unresolvable disagreement. (iii) An inference to the best explanation requires that we posit unobservable scientific entities to explain our scientific observation and beliefs. (c) Theory acceptance and justified belief: The central question in moral epistemology is the question of whether and if so under what conditions our moral beliefs are justified. Intuitively, these can be distinguished by nothing the difference between when moral belief is justified and when people are justified in believing them. More technically, the distinction is marked as the difference between doxastic justification and propositional justification. The former concerns the justification of an individual’s belief; while the latter applies to belief types: a belief is propositionally justified on the basis of a body of evidence, argument, or the like. (d) Intuitionism: It is accepted that intuitionism in ethics is motivated by foundationalism together with a claim about the autonomy of ethics and the desire to avoid moral skepticism. The argument begins with the familiar problem of the regress of justification. The core claim of intuitionism can be developed along different axes into distinct varieties of intuitionism depending on, among other things, the generality of the propositions belief in which it is claimed to be justified without inference. The core move in intuitionism consists in providing an account of self-evidence. A self-evident proposition is a truth such that the understanding of it is sufficient for one’s being justified in believing it, and sufficient for knowing the proposition provided one believes it on the basis of understanding it. (e) Coherentism in epistemology offers an alternative to foundationalist conceptions of the structure of justification; in particular it offers an alternative solution to the problem of the regress of justification. Coherentism in ethics can be motivated by a global commitment to a coherentist epistemology, or by the observation that moral inquiry takes a form of a search for reflective equilibrium. Within moral epistemology, the chief defenders of coherentism are also advocates of a naturalist, non-reductive, version of moral realism. We concern about filtering obvious forms of prejudice, which improves moral judgment. Sociology and history reveal the ideological function of many moral claims: we filter our input sets by subjecting them to ideology critique and by examining the plausibility of possible genealogies of those beliefs. (f) Contextualism is a recent arrival on the map of positions in moral epistemology. It is self-conscious in its recognition of the importance of social facts in determining whether an agent is justified in holding a belief. Social facts come in twice over: in determining what beliefs require justification, and in determining what standards and conditions an agent has to meet in order to have justification. Normative standards of epistemic practice will require self-reflexive strategies of criticism; which must always be actively engaged. As a matter of fact, much of our ordinary moral epistemic assessment is correct even when it is considered by the standards of day-to-day justification.
4. Moral Psychology by R. Jay Wallace: (a) Introduction: Moral psychology is the study of morality in its psychological dimensions. Its unity and interest as a subject derive from its connection to the larger subject of moral philosophy, conceived as the study of normative demands on action in general, and moral demands on action in particular. Moral psychology explores a variety of psychological phenomena through the unifying prism of a concern for normativity. (b) Motivation and desire: Morality is distinctively connected to reasons: explanatory and normative reasons raise issues within moral psychology. Explanatory reasons are reflected in an agent’s motivations to action, which are constituted by psychological states of some kind, either desires or beliefs. Normative reasons cast actions in a favorable light from the perspective of agency. Once normative and explanatory reasons have their place, it seems plausible that these two kinds of reason should systematically diverge. (c) Reason and desires: When we deliberate about what to do, it is facts about our situation and the actions that are open to us seem to have direct normative significance, not facts about our present states of desire and belief. This conclusion can be reinforced by further reflection on what desires are. There are two aspects of such desires. First, such desires involve a kind of phenomenal attraction, an elusive sense of being drawn to an object or possibility for action. Second, such desires induce thought that are normatively colored or structured. One point of controversy has been the version of internalism to the effect that A can have reason to do X only if it would be possible for A to acquire the motivation to do X through a rational deliberative process. If X is objectively the right or best thing for A to do, then perhaps we should say that there is reason for A to do X even if A could only acquire the corresponding motivation by a non-deliberative process, such as conversion or habituation. The most promising alternative to this position would maintain that normative reasons are based on the value of the actions that are open to a given agent. What gives a given agent reason to do X is the fact that X-ing would be good or worthwhile in some way or other. (d) Moral motivation: A traditional focus of concern for ethics has been to make sense of the distinctive forms of motivation that enable agents to internalize and respond effectively to moral standards. The idea that virtuous behavior and conduct require distinctive motivations to action suggests that morality is a source of internal reasons that are conditioned by the subjective motivation of the agent requiring quite special forms of desire to be complied with. But even if we deny that moral requirements are conditioned by special forms of desire, there will be distinctive patterns that emerge in the intentions and motivations of those who are responsive to moral requirement and values. There will also be distinctive patterns of emotion and feeling that such agents are subject to, which reinforce their tendencies to moral behavior in a variety of ways. (e) Identification, alienation, and autonomy: Persons are distinguished by the capacity for reflexive assessment of their own mental states, and they are identified fully with a given first-order attitude. We are identified with motivating attitudes to the extent that they reflect and accord with our judgments about what it would be good or worthwhile to do. The differences between various approaches may reflect in part differences in interpretation of the notion of identification. (f) Weakness and strength of will: The issue of identification and alienation come to a head in reflection on the phenomenon of weakness of will. Weakness of will appears to be a form of irrationality, a breakdown of the connections between authoritative judgment and appropriate response that apparently undergird rationality across the board, in both the theoretical and the practical spheres. (g) The moral emotions are a particular focus of concern within moral psychology. It can be argued that reactive emotions are essential to our understanding of morality. The moral judgments express the acceptance of norms that govern these reactive emotions. A susceptibility to the reactive moral sentiments structures our interpersonal relations. A different kind of issue concerns the rational assessment of the reactive sentiments. 25
5. Empirical Perspectives on Ethics by John M. Doris & Stephen P. Stich: (a) Introduction: Ethical theorizing should be *a posteriori* inquiry informed by relevant empirical considerations. An intellectually responsible philosophical ethics is one that continuously engages the relevant empirical literature. (b) Character: In the second half of the twentieth century, the ethics of virtue became increasingly alternative to the Kantian and utilitarian theories that had for some time dominated normative ethics. Virtue-centered approaches emphasize the psychological character of actors. Virtue ethics usually presupposes a distinctive account of human psychology. Genuinely virtuous action proceeds from firm and unchangeable character rather than from transient motives; while the good person may suffer misfortune that impairs his activities. A large body of research indicates that cognition and behavior are extraordinarily sensitive to the situations in which people are embedded. (c) Moral motivation: A familiar version of internalism is broadly Kantian, which emphasizes the role of rationality in ethics: reason is both the pilot and the engine of moral agency. It not only guides one toward actions in conformity with one’s duty, but also it produces the desire to do one’s duty and can invest that desire with enough strength to overrule conflicting impulses of appetite and passion. A notorious difficulty of internalism is suggested by a person, who recognizes that the unjust and dishonest acts he contemplates are wrong but is completely unmoved by this realization. Internalists may adopt two different responses to this challenge: either conceptually or the other empirical: conceptually, a person cannot really believe that an act is wrong if he has no motivation to avoid performing it; or empirically, a person insists that their existence is psychologically impossible, even if moralists are conceptually possible. (d) Moral disagreement: Numerous contemporary philosophers have proposed dispositional theories of moral rightness or non-moral good, which make matters of value depend on the affective dispositions of agents. In present ethical theory, an impressive group of philosophers are moralists, who resist the argument form disagreement and reject its relativist conclusion. For instance, Smith’s moral realism requires the objectivity of moral judgment, where objectivity is construed as the idea that moral questions have correct answers, that the correct answers are made correct by objective moral facts, that moral facts are determined by circumstances, and that, by engaging in moral argument, we can discover what these objective moral facts are. The author introduces two experimental studies to revisit idealization condition in terms of impartiality, full factual information, and normality or free from abnormality. (e) Thought experiments: Ethical reflection is often held to involve comparing general principles and responses to particular cases; commitment to a principle may compel the renunciation of a particular response, or commitment to a particular response may compel modification or renunciation of a general principle. One of the most famous of philosophical conundrums - that of determinism and responsibility, can be derived from the juxtaposition of three claims that are individually quite plausible, but seem impossible to hold jointly. (i) Moral responsibility thesis: Human beings are sometimes morally responsible for their behavior; (ii) Causal thesis: All human behavior is linked to antecedent events by deterministic causal laws; (iii) Principle of alternate possibilities: A person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. There are a couple of ways in which philosophers can avoid the sorts of empirical difficulties. First, they can deny that responses to particular cases have evidential weight in ethical theory choice, as some utilitarians have been inclined to do. Alternatively, they can appeal to the result of thought experiments in an expository rather than an evidential role; for example, a thought experiment might be used by an author to elucidate her line of reasoning without appealing to the responses of an imagined audience like many of us. Such solutions will seem rather methodologically draconian, threatening to isolate ethical theory from the experience of ethical life. Erecting a general methodological standard, we can see philosophical ethics interface with the human sciences.
Chapter V. Summary and Conclusion

Part II. Social and Political Philosophy

6. Liberalism and Diversity by Linda Barclay: (a) Introduction: Liberalism does better than merely accommodate diversity; it celebrates and promotes it. Its approach to diversity signals its most decisive advantage over its rivals such as Marxism and communitarianism. According to recent critics, liberalism destroys diversity, particularly the differences among people that matter most to them. It imposes homogenizing values that have the potential to kill off unique ways of life, even whole societies. Contemporary liberals value diversity secured in two ways. First, equal opportunities understood as an absence of discrimination and a fair distribution of resources enable people to participate in the main institutions of society regardless of their race, ethnicity, sex, religion, and so on. Secondly, extensive liberties enable people to make individual choices about the good life and to participate in the various civil groups and organizations of their choice, such as churches, sporting groups, and ethnic associations, without fear of penalty or persecution. (b) Individuals: A standard understanding among defenders of multiculturalism is that removal of explicitly discriminatory laws is insufficient to secure genuine equality of opportunity. To defenders of multiculturalism, laws that disadvantage only some Jews, Muslims, or Sikhs, and not the Christian majority, are paradigmatic of discrimination. All laws impact differently on different people just because the essence of laws is that they protect some interests and not others. Most liberals who defend neutrality do not believe that the state’s laws must be neutral in their effects. Liberals defend neutrality of justification: the state should not adopt a particular law simply for the reason that the way of life or activity it burdens is less worthy than those it does not burden. (c) Associations: (i) Voluntary associations: Liberals have always assumed that individuals will form associations and have explicitly sought to enable this. There are tensions between freedom of association and equality that encompassing associations cannot be exempt from numerous liberal requirements regarding education, the distribution of resources, and the physical and psychological treatment of their vulnerable members if they are to be properly classified as voluntary and thus defended on grounds of liberty and free association. To many people, cultural, or ethnic, or religious identity is extremely important. (ii) Non-voluntary associations: two problems are focused in attempting justification of self-government rights, both of which reveal the constraints faced by a liberal defense of self-government rights for national minorities. The first problem is that very few groups will actually qualify for self-government rights given the liberal justification. While the state can avoid interfering in the marketplace of voluntary associations, it does not and cannot avoid promoting one social culture at the expense of others. The diffusion of common language and common education is central to all modern nation-building activity. The second problem of self-government rights is also connected to liberal concerns. Unlike voluntary associations, one cannot just leave if one no longer likes the rule. Moreover, once national minorities acquire a degree of self-government power, then they exercise political power and political power must be exercised liberally. On this liberal premises, self-governing national minorities have even less latitude than voluntary associations to run themselves illiberally. (d) Historical justice and communitarianism: There appear to be good grounds for liberal egalitarians to distance themselves from historic claim, both to avoid approaches to justice, and to avoid consent-based justification for political power. But it is the claims of communitarians that appear to be most decisively haunting liberal sympathy for self-government protections. Liberal principles concerning choice and equality are nothing more than another culturally specific view about the good life for communities, and it would be wrong to impose them on communities without sharing. While individuals can move in and out of ethnic, cultural, and religious communities if they wish, there will certainly be many losers.27
7. Law by Jeremy Waldron: (a) The Irrelevance of natural law: Analytic legal philosophy addresses the nature of legal norms, their relation to moral and other reasons, and their interpretation and application by courts. Questions about the nature of law have long been dominated by the classic dispute between legal positivists and theorists of natural law. Positivists hold that whether a legal system exists in a given society, and if so what the answer is in that society to any particular legal question, are matters of fact about how power is exercised in that society. Natural lawyers believe that law is in the first instance a set of moral norms embodied in the way things are; they associate law with objective principles of justice and right, accessible to reason, which can be used as standards to judge the exercise of human power. So according to natural law theory, we cannot say whether an edict enforced in a particular society has the status of law without considering whether it passes a certain threshold of objective right – *lex iniusta non est lex* – whereas according to legal positivism, the judgment that something is the law is a judgment of social fact which commits us to no such evaluation.

(b) The normativity of conventional rules: According to *The Concept of Law* written by H. I. A. Hart, a legal system is a system of rules followed generally in a society, rules whose formation and application is governed by secondary rules (rules about rules), practiced among a powerful group that we may refer to as the officials of the society. His two-layered account of legal rules – primary rules of conduct, and secondary rules identifying the primary rules, regulating their application, and constituting processes for legal change – has been enormously fruitful. Certainly, it is an improvement on the older positivism of Jeremy Bentham and John Austin, which defined law as the command of a sovereign, with command defined as the expression of a wish plus the threat of a sanction, and sovereign defined as a powerful person or agency that the bulk of the members of a given society were in the habit of obeying. The Bentham-Austin account had the advantage of enabling us to describe the laws of other countries without committing ourselves to the norms that they embody. But it seems to misrepresent what Hart referred to as the internal aspect of rules, i.e. their normativity for those who actually regard themselves as bound by them. According to the practice conception, a rule exists when the behavior of a group of people under certain circumstances converges and when they monitor their own and each other’s behavior in those circumstances in a way that can be captured in a normative proposition. Hart uses this conception to characterize both primary rules and secondary rules, and though he argues that in a mature legal system it is needed only for the characterization of the secondary rules.

(c) Incorporationism and the sources thesis: Positivism is commonly associated with a view about the separability of legal judgment. It is no sense a necessary truth that law reproduce or satisfy certain demands of morality, it ought to be possible, on the positivist account, to determine what the law of a given jurisdiction is on any given topic without making a moral judgment about that topic. Thus, we can say that a law of a state provides capital punishment for murder or that it enforces contracts extracted by economic duress even while we condemn these outcomes or even while we are uncertain about how to respond to them morality. This distinction between moral judgment and legal judgment – the Separability Thesis – has been crucial to the self-image of positivism, and indeed it is partly definitive of the issue between positivism and natural law. In modern jurisprudence, the Separability Thesis is often associated with another claim, which positivists call the Sources Thesis. The Sources Thesis holds that the system of positive law depends for their operation on secondary rules of recognition. The positivist may say that we still use source-based criteria to recognize the norms, but the author argues that this is not comfort for two reasons he explains. One may say that no inconsistency exists between the core tenets of legal positivism and the existence of moral criteria for legality in general or for legal determinations in particular. Some positivists respond that their legal theory is purely descriptive or conceptual.
(d) Descriptive and normative jurisprudence: Important social functions may be served by positive law’s framing and facilitating certain moral debates. My aim was to expand our sense of the functions that positive law as such may perform, in order to rebut the view that the functionality of a legal provision depends on its offering guidance that supersedes first-order moral reasoning by those to whom the law is addressed. This brings us to a general issue which has dominated modern legal philosophy. This can be developed generally as a point about fact-value separation, or it can be developed specifically with reference to legal phenomena. One way of pursuing the latter option is to consider the relation between the concept of law and the political ideal of the Rule of Law. The impulse that has led some positivists to deny that their jurisprudence has a normative tendency has led them also to question whether it is a defining feature of a legal system that it serves the values associated with the Rule of Law.

(e) Interpretation: Besides the question “What is law?” general jurisprudence directs us to some narrower issues about the interpretation of legal materials and the proper role of a judge. Law is a practical discipline. It exists in order to be applied to particular cases, and it is the judge who determines its formal application and who in that sense brings the law to life. We do not have to see judges as legislators to apprehend the role that they play in the legal system; and the nature of courts is such that the appropriate way for the judge to behave directly determines the appropriate way for counsel to argue, and so it also affects our general understanding of the specific nature of legal reasoning. Interpretation can be approached from two directions. On one approach, interpretation refers to the way courts are supposed to deal with abstract, vague, ambiguous, or otherwise indeterminate legal provisions. On the other approach, interpretation refers to the way in which the values, opinions, or inclinations of one legal agency (a judge, for example) are supposed to be related to the determinations of another legal agency (the legislature or perhaps the framers of the constitution). The first approach begins from the acknowledged indeterminacy of the language used in the law. The second approach reminds us that the problem is not just linguistic and it is not enough to respond to charges of indeterminacy to point to the core of agreed meaning for most natural language terms. Abandoning the idea of legislator’s intent need not involve abandoning the idea of legislative purpose. If judges or officials are bringing their own values to the interpretation of the texts, the idea of authority and the associated willingness to subordinate one’s own values seem to have been abandoned. But interpretative disputes about law can only be disputes about what makes it better or best as a whole.

(f) Following precedent: There is a connected set of issues in adjudication having to do with the desire for stability and consistency in the law, even when the interpretation of authoritative texts is not the focus of legal argument. I refer to the doctrine of stare decisis – the principle that decisions by higher courts are binding on lower courts and perhaps even binding on coordinate courts addressing the same or a similar issue at a later time. Defense of stare decisis falls into two broad categories; arguments about the importance of consistency and arguments about the importance of predictability. The common association between following precedent and making the law predictable is surely important, up to a point. The need for a predictable social environment is one of the leading values associated with the Rule of Law, and it might be thought that a practice of flowing established precedents that have already been made public serves this need better than a practice allowing judges to decide cases in whatever way they think best. Consistency in governmental decision-making is valued more in some areas than in others.

(g) Special jurisprudence: One aspect concerning normative concepts used in law like right and duty can be seen in the principle of tort law: that a person who breaches what the law calls a duty of care to another, causing injury or damage, must compensate the other person for his loss: what if the cost of compensation would be less than the cost of avoiding the injury.28
8. Democratic Theory by David Estlund: (a) Introduction: One of the fundamental philosophical issues in democratic theory is now important - it is that political decisions are good decisions, and how important it is that they may be made by good or appropriate procedures. The issue is interesting because these criteria can conflict. In principle, the procedure that would make the best decisions could be utterly elitist or authoritarian. From the democratic point of view, the superior decision would have been made by a bad procedure. If bad procedures might produce good decisions, and good procedures might produce bad decisions, then what are the relative roles of these two considerations in the best theoretical account of the importance of democratic political institutions? (b) Proceduralism in general: The terminology of procedure and substance is vague for our purposes. Roughly, a substantive value in this context is one that is procedure-independent. One possible strong claim is that normative political theory should not appeal to any procedure-independent values at all – that the only available value is the value of democracy itself. The weaker, more limited claim is only that normative political theory should not appeal to any procedure-independent values in the evaluation of political outcomes – for this specific purpose only the value of democracy is available. The value of democratic procedures cannot ultimately be accounted for in terms of their promoting or aiming at independently good outcomes as an intended means. Intrinsic democratic proceduralism - Only democratic political arrangements are legitimate, and the value of their being democratic does not depend on any qualities of democratic decisions other than whether they are democratic in two senses: (i) decisions must be made by democratic procedures, and (ii) they must also not unduly undermine or threaten the possibility of democratic procedure in the future. It insists on evaluating outcomes only for whether they are democratic. Substantive outcome standards are impermissible in normative democratic theory, which will be inadequate unless it avails itself of some standards for the evaluation of political outcomes beyond those that can be derived from the value of democratic procedure itself. (c) Rawls on democracy: A Theory of Justice of Rawls includes a distinctive approach to the relation between democratic procedures and substantive justice. This is clearest in the obvious application of his principles of justice to the outcomes of legislative processes. Rawls does say that a law’s being unjust is not enough to deprive it of practical authority. A law’s justice can be distinguished from its practical authority – legitimacy, since even unjust laws might be legitimate. The idea of legitimacy retains a certain vagueness, but generally connotes the moral permissibility of coercive enforcement of law and/or some strong and distinctively political moral reason for those addressed by the law to comply with it. He views that legitimacy does not require justice. The legitimacy of outcomes is not determined by direct application of the standards of justice, and yet those standards have a definite role in the standard of legitimacy itself. (d) Normative social choice theory is often said to study social choice theory’s study of preference rules to the evaluation of voting processes, in which votes are cast, gathered, and counted. It judges them by their tendency to obey certain abstract aggregation rules. (e) Deep deliberative democracy names the idea that political authority depends on a healthy application of practical intelligence in reasonably egalitarian public deliberation. It emphasizes the social processes that form individual attitudes, where social choice theory emphasizes rules for aggregating attitudes (i.e. preference). The critics of social choice theory’s model of politics have often targeted the quality of individual preferences themselves and called for more attention to how these preferences are formed. (f) Conclusion: Normative social choice theory and deep deliberative democracy treat democracy as a kind of correspondence between outcomes and certain individual interests of the citizens, who have very different conceptions. The author views that normative democratic theory cannot be radically democratic if this means that political decisions are to be evaluated entirely according to whether or not they democratic.
9. Feminism in Philosophy by Rae Langton: (a) Dualism: Feminists have been bothered by a kind of dualistic thinking that informs many philosophical projects, Cartesian or not. Feminists have claimed that there is something gendered about oppositions between body and mind, between emotion and reason. Mind and reason have been associated with the masculine; body and emotion with the feminine; and these associations, overt in the work of past philosophers, continue covertly even in philosophy today. Faced with a gendered opposition between mind and body, it is not enough to say that women have minds too. (b) Androcentrism: One famous feminist contribution to ethics has been the charge of androcentrism brought by Carole Gilligan against the co-called Justice perspective, a standard of moral maturity. Feminists have not hesitated to mine philosophy in their efforts to understand better the problems that bother them as feminists. (c ) Treating someone as an object: Nussbaum names seven features that form the cluster concept of objectification: instrumentality – one treats it as a tool of one’s own purposes; denial of autonomy – one treats it as lacking in autonomy and self-determination; inertness – one treats it as lacking in agency and activity; fungibility – one treats it as interchangeable with other things of the same type and with things of other types; violability – one treats it as lacking in boundary-integrity, as something that it is permissible to break up, smash, break into; ownership – one treats it as something that is owned by another, can be bought or sold, etc.; and denial of subjectivity – one treat it as something whose experience and feelings need not be taken into account. In addition: reduction to body – one treats it as identified with its body or body parts; and reduction to appearance – one treats it primarily in terms of how it looks or how it appears to the sense.

10. The Feasibility Issue by Geoffrey Brennan and Philip Pettit: (a) Philosophy and ideal theory: The resent philosophical tradition is social and political theory distinguishes between analytical and normative theory. The analytical branch of the discipline is seen as an enterprise of modeling explanatory concepts like power and status, and evaluative concepts like freedom and justice and democracy. The normative branch involves an attempt to spell out the form that the state and related institutions would take were they fully to satisfy such evaluative concepts – were they to exemplify values like freedom or justice or democracy. In the earlier part of the twentieth century, the analytical enterprise was dominant, at least in Anglo-Saxon circles; typical of the issues routinely debated was the question of whether freedom is best cast. Nevertheless, A Theory of Justice (1971) served to shift the focus quite dramatically from the analytical to the normative. John Rawls maintained that the best way to articulate a theory of justice was to try, in a process of reflective equilibrium, to identify institutional principles that would best satisfy, on the one hand, general ideas about the nature of justice and, on the other, considered judgments about the acceptability of their concrete implications. Rawls suggested that in thinking about desirable institutions, for example, just or free or democratic arrangements, we should ask first about the institutions what would appeal in a world where everyone is disposed to internalize and comply with whatever principles of organization the theory favors. He persuaded the tradition that ideal theory is the sort of approach that political philosophy should take in the first instance and that we should look only as a secondary matter to the question of how to deal with problems of non-compliance. The author argues that Rawls continued to exemplify and promote ideal-world rather than real-world normative theory. His vision did abstract from the problem that almost any set of principles for the organization of society, and certainly any principles of justice, are going to be burdensome for its members and so are not going to attract universal compliance – compliance constraints. The danger of the ideal-theory abstraction is that it will lead philosophers to go for a soft, visionary focus in their normative thinking and to argue for an idealized system – an idealized democracy or an ideally just society – that is nowhere to be found and that might be counter-productive to try to establish. It generalizes to all forms of optimization subject to constraints.
Chapter V. Summary and Conclusion

(b) Economics and incentive-compatibility: The issue of feasibility that philosophers ignore is the problem of incentive-compatibility, which is the problem of how to ensure that whatever arrangements are put in place. The assumption that people are relatively self-regarding in their desires shows up in the fact that economists and rational choice theorists tend only to invoke relatively self-regarding desires in their explanations and predictions. (This is not different from utility theory of economics to maximize an objective function subject to all given constraints). (c) A philosophical objection to the incentive-compatibility approach starts from the manifest fact, that ordinary people do not conduct their lives in the relentless consideration of what is more likely to do well by them or theirs. Suppose that people are generally content in non-market context, as the objection says, to let their actions be dictated by the cultural framing of the situation in which they find themselves. The picture of agents as rational and relatively self-regarding becomes perfectly plausible once it is taken to posit, not an active pattern of minute-by-minute calculation, but a pattern of just virtual control. The idea is that rational self-interest intrudes itself in human reasoning only on a need-to-intrude basis. Let things evolve under cultural framing so that there is no salient offence to an agent’s self-interest, and rational calculation will stay off the scene. Let them cease to evolve in that way, it will more or less reliably make an appearance. Rational self-interest can have an important shaping effect on what people do and yet it may normally figure only as a standby cause that is waiting to be activated. It may generally stay out of the ratiocinative cockpit and still serve to determine where the pilot of reason and habit leads.

(d) An empirical objection to the incentive-compatibility approach: The assumption behind this approach is not that people are ordinarily knavish but rather that virtuous motivation is not necessarily going to be available at ideal levels. Not everybody is going to be virtuously motivated all of the time, even if most are well motivated most of the time. And so there is going to be a need to have institutions, so the idea goes, that guard against such failure of virtue, however temporary or local in character. Moreover, even those relatively rare individuals who are entirely uncorrupt and so disposed to act as political virtue requires may still be corruptible. What we must seek in institutional design is a pattern of incentive that serves on the one hand to support the virtue that is already there in the community but on the other to substitute for virtue in those cases where virtue fails. (e) Virtue-friendly incentive: Our discussion in the previous section suggests that the ideal compliance-incentives which we might hope to put in place would have features like the following. They would operate in such a way that the fact that someone is virtuously motivated, if indeed they are so motivated, will not be hidden; thus, their operation would not erode the person’s image, including their self-image, as a virtuous person. The economic tradition tends to think in terms of rewards and penalties of this kind, looking to the invisible hand of the market or the iron hand of management – including the management of the law – to ensure compliance with relevant institutions. But there is older tradition of thinking according to which very different incentives routinely play the role of eliciting people’s compliance with the institutions under which they live. (f) Conclusion: Ideal theory runs the risk of leading us to recommend institutions that may be incapable of surviving in the world of mostly human motivation. The institutions may be prone to collapse as a result of wholesale non-compliance and to leave the society worse off than if they had never been tried. The only possible response to this problem is to consider issues of incentive-compatibility as well as inherent desirability in assessing the merits of rival institutional arrangements. Political philosophy cannot ignore institutional design, leaving that project to more economic schools of thought. It has to give serious attention to the issues of stability that were at the center of earlier concerns within the discipline but that have recently tended to disappear from the scene. But real-world approach to political theory, so we saw, need not mean treating human beings as centers of relentless calculation about matters of self-interest. 31
Chapter V. Summary and Conclusion

Part III. Philosophy of Mind and Action (Psychology)

11. Intentionality by Gabriel Segal: (a) Introduction: (i) Brentano’s problem: Brentano was concerned with the problem of how we can represent things that don’t exist outside of the mind, such as unicorns. His original idea was that if one thinks about a unicorn, then one’s thought has an intentional object that does exist. However, the object is not a concrete inhabitant of external reality, but an ephemeral entity, existing in the mind only. (ii) Frege’s problem: The reference of an expression is what it contributes to the truth-value of sentences in which it appears. Reference is a real relation between an expression and an object, the expression’s referent. If a refers to b, then both a and b exist. The referent of a singular term is what one would ordinary think the term stands for. The referent of a sentence is its truth-value and predicative expressions refer to functions from objects to truth-values. Since an expression’s referent is what it contributes towards determining the truth-values of sentences, reference is governed by principle (P): Co-referring expressions may be inter-substituted in any sentence without altering the truth-value of that sentence. For example, given that Hesperus and Phosphorus refer to the same thing: (1a) Spike believes that Hesperus is a planet; then (1b) Spike believes that Phosphorus is a planet. This is to the apparent violation of (P) – PARs by proposing that expressions in their content sentences refer to their senses, instead of their normal referents. (iii) Russell’s solution: Bertrand Russell provided the obvious solution to the problem of the least rapidly convergent series; and other empty definite descriptions. Definite descriptions are complex expressions and their parts may be significant. As long as they all have reference, all should be well, even for a fundamentally reference-based semantics. All that is required is an account of how these referents combine to render significant the description as a whole. Russell’s theory of descriptions achieves that. 

(b) Names and name-concepts: (i) Kripke’s objection: If a name has the semantic content of an associated description, then the description must at least describe the name’s bearer. Kripke offers a different picture of how a name gets its reference, among the various descriptions that speakers associate with a name. (ii) The Neo-Russellian problematic: Since PARs make up the canonical discourse of ordinary common-sense psychology, neo-Russellianism has consequences for our understanding of psychological explanation. For example, [(2) is an example of a typical psychological explanation: (2a) Willow wants to fly to Hesperus; (2b) Willow believes that the USS Evening Star is about to depart for Hesperus; (2c) Willow attempts to board the USS Even Star. If Neo-Russellianism is correct, then (2) is semantically equivalent to (3): (3a) Willow wants to fly to Hesperus; (3b) Willow believes that the USS Even Star; (3b) Willow believes that the USS Evening Star is about to depart for Phosphorus, so (3c) Willow attempts to board the USS Evening Star.] The author considers rationality and mental syntax, and empty singular concepts.

(c) Natural kind concepts: In 1750 Putnam asked us to imagine a Twin of Earth. Philosophers have reacted with two broad categories: internalism and externalism. Internalism believes that every psychological state has a narrow content; and externalism denies internalism by holding that some psychological states have wide contents and no narrow contents. Many internalists have been motivated by the thought that narrow content is required in an account of psychological explanation, while externalists are skeptical that every concept has a narrow content. There are serious grounds of questioning externalism such as a problem for social externalism and about kind concepts. (d) Conclusion: It is worth considering the possibility that the role of other people and the world in determining the meanings of an individual’s words and the concepts and thoughts that are available to her is very limited. With the exception of fixing, the reference of singular concepts, maybe other people and the world can only make a difference to the contents of an individual’s mind by the normal methods, that is, by having some causal impact on her.
12. Consciousness by Frank Jackson: (1) Introduction: There is a difference between being conscious and being unconscious. (2) On being a materialist: recent philosophy of mind has dominated by two questions: whether or not, somewhere in this story is to be found consciousness; and where is the section of the account that is about consciousness. (3) Realism about mental states and consciousness: almost everyone is a realist about mental states and consciousness in the sense that they grant that people on occasion really are in mental states and really are conscious. (4) Where does consciousness fit into the inventory of mental states? The phenomenal mental states have positions in similarity spaces: the phenomenon of consciousness resides in the fact that there are mental states with phenomenal character. But there is a separate distinction: that between being in a mental state simpliciter and that between, for example, reflecting on, being aware of, or making influences from some mental state you are in. (5) Why the physical story seems to leave out the phenomenal side of mental life: There are many ways of sharpening the line of thought. One way appeals to the idea of a zombie (or imitation person): it is logically possible that I have a twin who is exactly like me in every physical respect as identical twins. But it seems logically possible that my twin be a zombie in that it lacks consciousness in the sense of phenomenal experiences. (6) The knowledge argument against physicalism: A physical information painted by black and white colors limits one’s image but his discussions on TV can demonstrate his great intellectual capacity. Hence, physicalism is false. The reason for resisting is that our knowledge of the sensory side of psychology has a causal source. Seeing yellow and feeling pain impact on us, leaving a memory trace which sustains our knowledge of what it is like to see yellow and feel pain on the many occasions where we are neither seeing yellow nor feeling pain. (8) Objections to the knowledge argument: One objection is on the phenomenon of egocentric knowledge. There is knowledge directed towards who and where one is, and when it is, and one can have complete knowledge of the first kind while being seriously deficient in knowledge of the second, egocentric kind. A second objection starts from the point that the very same things, facts, and events can be known under many guises. The third objection can be introduced by reference to the example of hard-to-spot patterns. The difference between, on the one hand, being in a situation where patterns in data are very hard to grasp although available in principle and, on the other hand, being in a situation where it is literally impossible to make the classifications is not always transparent. (9) Intentionalism about sensory experience: Diaphanousness is the thesis that the qualities of experience are properties of the object of experience. Intentionalism is the thesis that the qualities of experience are properties of an intentional object in the sense that they are properties of the way things are being represented to be; the yellowness or squareness of a sensory experience resides in its representing that something is yellow or square. Both doctrines say that the properties are properties of the object of experience but intentionalism adds that the object is an intentional object, which is the version of diaphanousness. (10) Variety of representationalism: There are two reasons for denying the composite picture of an experience’s nature once you have embraced the idea that experience is essentially representational. First, it is hard to make sense of a phenomenal overflow from the representational content. Second, if experience consisted of a representational bit and a non-representational extra, we should be able to vary the extra while leaving the representational content unchanged. This would mean that an experience’s nature could vary without any change in how it represents things to be. (11) Diaphanousness says that the qualities of experience are nothing more than certain qualities of an object. There are three possibilities: the qualities in question are the qualities of an intentional object and not of a non-intentional object; the qualities are qualities of a non-intentional object and not of an intentional object; and the qualities are properties of both an intentional and a non-intentional object. But minimal representationalism take us from diaphanousness to intentionalism.
Chapter V. Summary and Conclusion

13. Action by Alfred R. Mele: (a) Introduction: The philosophy of action has two central questions regarding the nature of action and the explanation of actions. (b) Causalism may be in conjunction with that an event’s being an action depends on how it was caused; and proper explanation of actions are causal explanation. (c) Three alleged problems for causalism: (i) Causal deviance: The most common examples of deviance divide into two types. Cases of primary deviance raise a problem about a relatively direct connection between mental antecedents and resultant bodily motion. Cases of secondary deviance focus on behavioral consequences of intentional actions and on the connection between these actions and their consequences. (ii) Negative actions: Alleged examples of negative actions include not moving one’s body and not voting in an election, when it is intentional on one’s part, or for a reason, that one does not do these things. In so far as intentional and for a reason apply in this way to a not-doing, it is claimed that not-doing is an action, a negative one. An apparent problem lies in that some alleged negative actions are successful tryings, in which case they are not negative in a way that is problematic for causalism or for the account just sketched; and that no alleged desired or intended negative actions that do not involve trying are actions. My limited survey of various types of alleged negative actions has consistently turned up either non-actions or positive actions misdiagnosed as negative ones. (iii) Vanish agents: Some philosophers claim that causalism is inconsistent with there being any actions at all, that it makes agents vanish. The author quotes that “It is futile to attempt to explain conduct through the causal efficacy of desire – all that can explain is further happenings, not actions performed by agents…There is no place in this picture…even for the conduct that was to have been explained.” Locating interesting differences between some human actions and the actions of non-human animals is an important project. Good work on it will continue to emerge, including work exploring potential roles for higher-order attitudes and other relatively sophisticated attitudes in understanding philosophically interesting differences.

(d) Intentional action – target of analysis: Intentional action is of primarily importance in the philosophy of action. If there were no intentional actions, actions would attract little interest at best and perhaps there would be no actions at all. In discussions of freedom of action, intentional action occupies center state: we are much less concerned with conditions for the freedom of non-intentional actions. And although we are morally accountable for some unintentional actions, as in cases of negligence, moral assessment of actions is focused primarily on intentional actions. An impressive body of literature is devoted to the project of analyzing intentional action. This section identifies a source of disagreement about the nature of intentional action that requires attention in future work on the topic. This disagreement raises an important question. A theorist whose primary concern with intentional action is understanding its aetiology (cause of a disease) may feel comfortable about setting aside widely shared folk judgments about what is done intentionally that are strongly influenced by factors having little or no bearing on the production of action. Such a theorist may not have the goal I identified, and that may be fine. There may be a middle ground between intentional and unintentional action. Here I have limited the discussion to issues concerning which the philosophy of action is largely autonomous. Even within those boundaries, I have set aside many important matters, including deciding, ability, sub-intentional action, basic action, and group action. However, given the centrality of action explanation and the nature of action and intentional action to the philosophy of action, it made good sense to organize my discussion around these topics. In so far as I have advocated a positive major thesis here, it is that causalism is true. Offering an adequate defense of that thesis in a single chapter is impossible. As I see it, given the nature of the philosophical issues, the best way to defend causalism it to develop a detailed causal theory of action and its explanation that one shows to be immune to the objections that have been raised against causalism and to be clearly superior to competing extant theories.\textsuperscript{34}
14. **Cognitive Science by Martin Davies:** (a) **Introduction:** A century ago, psychology was in the process of separating from philosophy and becoming an experimental science, while also distinguishing itself from physiology. The so-called cognitive revolution in American psychology owed much to developments in adjacent disciplines, especially theoretical linguistics and computer science. Indeed, the cognitive revolution brought forth not only a change in the conception of psychology, but also an interdisciplinary approach to understanding the mind, involving philosophy, anthropology, and neuroscience along with computer science, linguistics, and psychology. (b) **Personal and sub-personal levels of description:** (i) Dennett’s distinction: At the personal level, we explain what people do in terms of their sensations, desires, beliefs, and intentions. These personal-level explanations are of a distinctive, not straightforwardly causal, kind and they do not work by elaborating accounts of mental processes. Still less do they work by postulating physical mechanisms underpinning the activities of persons. An account of the physical mechanisms that are involved when a person withdraws his hand from a hot stove belongs at a quite different level of description and explanation. (ii) **Intentional systems:** Descriptions of persons in terms of beliefs and desires — intentional descriptions — exhibit the logical property of intentionality; descriptions that figure in the physical sciences are, in contrast, extensional. It could be asked whether the extensional description could be upgraded into an intentional description. (c) **Intentionality and the foundations of cognitive science:** (i) The performance of cognitive task can be secured by having subsystems perform parts of the task. These subsystems are to be thought of initially as intelligent homunculi whose functions are in turn discharged by sub-subsystems and so on. But the crucial point is that these are ever less intelligent homunculi with ever simpler tasks to perform. So, in the end, the simplest tasks can be performed by mere mechanical devices, the homunculi are discharged, and the threat of an infinite regress is avoided. (ii) Indicator aboutness and sub-doxtastic aboutness; (iii) Personal-level intentionality and sub-personal-level representation; and (iv) Philosophy and cognitive science (all others skipped). (d) **Tacit knowledge challenged and defended:** (i) Chomsky’s project. (ii) Wittgensteinian worries and Quine’s challenge; and (iii) Evans’s response and an account of tacit knowledge. (e) **The language of thought hypothesis:** Intentional realism and syntactic properties: We can assume that personal-level events of conscious thought are underpinned by occurrences of physical configurations belonging to types that figure in the science of information-processing psychology. These physical configurations can be assigned to the contents of the thoughts that they underpin. The language of thought hypothesis: underpin thoughts have syntactic properties, and the same goes for other states in the domain of information-processing psychology. (f) **Computational psychology and levels of explanation;** (g) **Informational encapsulation and the modularity of mind;** (h) **Modules and cognitive neuropsychology;** (i) **The challenge from connectionism (skipped all).** (j) **Prospects for the philosophy of cognitive science:** In analytic philosophy of cognitive science may face the important elements of challenges, mainly two as below. First, the classical approach to cognitive science faces challenges, not only from connectionism, but also from neuroscientific reductionism and from approaches that draw on evolutionary psychology, robotics, dynamic system theory, and artificial life, and, more generally, from approaches that stress the idea that cognition as we know it is an activity of minds that are both embodied and embedded in a worldly environment. Second, according to the view of the relationship between philosophy and cognitive science that was suggested earlier, philosophical theory may reveal that our conception of ourselves as persons has built into it commitments to particular kinds of cognitive structures and processes. Empirical research in cognitive science reveals whether those commitments are met. If they are met, then we learn how an aspect of our personhood is possible. If they are not met, then we are obliged to revise our philosophical theory or our conception of ourselves.  

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**Book III. From the Renaissance to the Scientific Revolution, 1400-1715**

574
Chapter V. Summary and Conclusion

Part IV. Philosophy of Language (Logic)

15. Reference and Description by Scott Soames: (a) The revolt against descriptivism: (i) The modern discussion of reference begins with a revolt, led by Saul Kripke, against theories of the meaning and reference of proper names inspired by Gottlob Frege (1970) and Bertrand Russell (1905). In Naming and Necessity (1980) Kripke attacked both the view that the meanings (semantic contents) of names are given by descriptions associated with them by speakers, and the view that their referents are determined (as a matter of linguistic rule) to be the objects that satisfy such descriptions. The view about reference is taken to follow from the view about meaning, but not vice versa. Thus, all of Kripke’s arguments against descriptive theories of reference are also arguments against descriptive theories of meaning, but some arguments against the latter do not apply to the former. (ii) Natural kind terms: The challenge to descriptivism is not limited to proper names, having been pressed by Kripke and Hilary Putnam against descriptive analyses of natural kind terms. (iii) Indexicals, quantification, and direct reference. (iv) Philosophical implications: Although it seems evident that the propositions expressed by (5) are knowable only a posteriori, it appears to be a consequence of the non-descriptive semantics of names, natural kind terms, and the actuality operator that each of these sentences expresses a necessary truths, if it is true at all. [(5a) Saul Kripke <not => David Kaplan; (5b) Lightning is electricity; (5c) If Thomas Jefferson existed, then the person who actually wrote the Declaration of Independence was Thomas Jefferson. Since we know that (5a) through (5c) are true, it follows that they are examples of the necessary a posteriori. The best examples of the contingent a priori are sentences like: (6) If someone wrote the Declaration of Independence, then the person who actually wrote the Declaration of Independence wrote something.] It is false to state that Thomas Jefferson wrote nothing and someone else wrote the Declaration of Independence. In this regard, not all necessary truths are a priori, and not all a priori truths are necessary.

(b) An attempt to revive descriptivism: (i) Motivations: Despite the attack on descriptivism, some believe that the anti-descriptivists conclusions are too extreme, and that properly modified descriptive analyses are capable of withstanding their arguments. This view is fueled by three main factors. First is the conviction that anti-descriptivists have not adequately addressed Frege’s puzzle about substitution of co-referential terms in attitude ascriptions and Russell’s problem of negative existentials. The second factor motivating descriptivists is their conviction that critics like Kripke have focused on the wrong descriptions. The third factor motivating a descriptivist revival involves the inability of some to see how any single proposition could be either both necessary and a posteriori, or both contingent and a priori, and anti-descriptivists maintain. (ii) Strategy: The main strategy for constructing descriptive analyses of names and natural kind terms combines attempts (1) to find reference-fixing description capable of withstanding Kripke’s semantic arguments; (2) to avoid the model argument, either by rigidifying these descriptions, or by insisting that they take wide scope over modal operators in the same sentence; and (3) to use two-dimensional semantics to avoid the epistemological argument, and explain away putative examples of the necessary a posteriori and the contingent a priori. The most popular strategy for finding reference-fixing description is causal descriptivism, which involves extracting a description from Kripke’s causal-historical account of reference transmission. (iii) Strong two-dimensionalism: The best-known formal two-dimensionalist model provides explicit semantics for a very simple language – a modal version of the propositional calculus with a normal necessity operator, an actuality operator, and a new operator that takes one outside the usual modal model in a certain way. Accordingly, the necessary a posteriori and the contingent a priori are, in effect, linguistic illusions, born of equivocation between primary and secondary intension.
(c) Critique of the descriptivist revival: (i) Problem with strong two-dimensionalism: (1) According to strong two-dimensionalism, epistemic attitude ascriptions a knows-believes that S report that the agent bears the knowledge/belief relation to the primary intention of S. (2) Let the F and the G be two contingently co-designative, non-rigid descriptions. Since for every context C, the character of the F = the actual G expresses a truth with respect to C iff the character of the actual F = the actual G does too, the two primary intentions are identical. Thus, the ascriptions a knows-believes that the actual F = the actual G and a knows-believes that the F = the G are necessarily equivalent. (3) Hence, the truth-value of Necessarily [if the actual F = the actual G and Mary believes that the actual F = the actual G, then Mary believes something true] is the same as the true-value of Necessarily [if the actual F = the actual G and Mary believes that the F = the G, then Mary believes something true]. Since the latter modal sentence is false, so is the former. (4) Similarly, the truth-value of Necessarily [if Mary believes that the actual F = the actual G, and if that belief it true, then the actual F = the actual G] is the same as the truth-value of Necessarily [if Mary believes that the F = the G, and if that belief is true, then the actual F = the actual G]. Since the latter model sentence is false, so is the former. (5) Since, in fact, the initial modal sentences in (3) and (4) are true, the strong two-dimensionalism is false; moral and epistemic operators in English do not take systematically different objects.

(ii) Why one should not expect to find reference-fixing descriptions: It is an error to assume that descriptions semantically fixing the referents of names and natural kind terms must be available. Instead of looking for some a priori guarantee, one must consider candidate descriptions case by case. There are three problems in the reference-fixing descriptions. First, I might use Zaza to refer to a certain dog in the neighborhood, having forgotten that I introduced the name myself, and wrongly thinking that I picked it up from someone else. Since in such a case I use the name to refer to the dog, though I may never have heard it used by anyone else, there is some difficulty with Lewis’s first description. The second problem is common to both descriptions, and to certain versions of the causal-historical theory of reference from which they are extracted. Not all the cases in which a speaker successfully uses a name n to refer are cases in which he has either introduced n himself or acquired n from someone else with the intention of preserving the reference of his source. The third problem is that egocentric, metalinguistic descriptions associated with names are no more parts of their meanings than similar egocentric, metalinguistic descriptions are parts of the meanings of other words in the language. Standardly, when a speaker uses any word, he intends to use it in accord with the linguistic conventions of the community. He intends to use it to refer to, or express, whatever other competent members of the community do. In the case of proper names, it is recognized both that a given name may be used by only a subpart of the community, and that different members of the relevant sub-community may associate it with different descriptive information without the name meaning something different.

(iii) Why the modal and epistemological arguments can’t be avoided: Even if the causal descriptivist could provide reference-fixing descriptions for names and natural kind terms, the semantic contents of these terms could not be given by rigidifying these descriptions using the actuality operator. When one considers the standard reading in which attitude ascriptions report relations between agents and the propositions semantically expressed by their complement clauses, the situation changes. Only remaining alternative for dealing with the argument involves analyzing names as descriptions that are required to take wide scope over modal operators, while retaining small scope when they occur embedded under verbs of propositional attitude. To adopt this strategy is to give up appealing to a two-dimensionalist framework, since the alleged difference between behavior of a sentence containing a name when embedded under a modal operator and its behavior when embedded under an epistemic operator is now attributed simply to scope.36
16. Meaning and understanding by Ian Rumfitt: (a) Introduction: Something that a theorist of language may hope to understand is the notion of meaning, at least as it applies to sentence, words, and other linguistic expression. We cannot hope to understand the notion of an expression’s meaning unless we enjoy at least a basic understanding of the nature of human speech. We cannot hope to understand speech unless we take account of the aim of communication. (b) Grice on meaning: Mean is used to specify the significance of a linguistic expression. “Sentence S means that P in U’s idiolect” as meaning “U has in his repertoire the following procedure: to utter a token of S if U intends (wants) A to believe that P.” The sentence S is said to mean that P among members of a group (as opposed to having that meaning in an idiolect) if some members of the group have the relevant procedure in their repertoire, the retention of this procedure being for them conditional on the assumption that at least some (other) members of the group have, or have had, this procedure in their repertoires. The characteristic intended effect of meaning is understanding, but understanding is not the sort of effect that is included in Grice’s example of effects.

(c) Uptake in communication: There is a range of relational speech acts. A speaker may say something when soliloquizing, with no communicative intent. So given our intended focus on communication, we shall need a correspondingly general notion of say something to someone, which is understood to cover all the more specific communicative speech acts of telling someone something, asking him something, ordering him to do something, etc. We may then ask how the hearer must respond if a speaker is to succeed in saying something to him. Human communication has some extraordinary properties, not shared by most other kinds of human behavior. One of the most extraordinary is this (α) If I am trying to tell someone something, then (assuming certain conditions are satisfied) as soon as he recognizes that I am trying to tell him something and exactly what it is that I am trying to tell him, I have succeeded in telling it to him. Furthermore (β), unless he recognizes that I am trying to tell him something and what I am trying to tell him, I do not fully succeed in telling it to him. In the case of illocutionary acts, we succeed in doing what we are trying to do by getting out audience to recognize what we are trying to do.

(d) Rhetic understanding and truth: Wittgenstein wrote that to understand a declarative sentence in use means to know what is the case if it is true. Cognate formulae may be used to explicate the cognate level of understanding for non-declarative utterances. Thus: to understand a command (or a request) is to know what will be the case if it is obeyed (or compiled with). To understand an optative utterance (such as Would that he were here now) is to know what is the case if it is gratified. To understand a yes-no question is to know what is the case if it may be truly answered in the affirmative. We often have reason to believe that a speaker is telling the truth about some matter even though we have no antecedent reason to believe what he is telling us – antecedent. Understanding what an utterance say also allows reasons for believing what it says to spread back to provide reasons for taking it to be true. Understanding what an utterance says also allow reasons for disbelieving what it say to spread b back to provide reasons for taking it to be false.

(e) Meaning revisited: We started from the idea that an expression’s meaning was best understood in terms of communicative speech. Having delineated the conditions for successful communication, how are we to elucidate the notion of meaning? Attaining a rhetic understanding of an utterance is largely a matter of ascertaining what the speaker intends to say, or to ask, or to order one to do. Sometimes, the circumstances will enable one to do that even when unfamiliar words, or unfamiliar constructions, are being used. In general, however, ascertaining what rhetoric act the speaker is performing will only be possible when speaker and hearer have undergone a similar habituation in the words and the constructions that are employed. That habituation will result in knowledge – common knowledge – of some features of the words and constructions that help to explain how it is that a hearer can apprehend the rhetic intention of the speaker.
Chapter V. Summary and Conclusion

17. Truth by Paul Horwich: The most important trend of the last fifteen years in this area has been away from traditional approaches, which have taken for granted that truth is some sort of substantive property, and towards the development of so-called deflationary theories in which that assumption is rejected. Therefore, I shall focus on the differences between these two general perspectives, on the reasons for favoring the deflationary point of view, and on the relative merits of the alternative accounts of this type. I will argue that the best of the deflationary proposal is the one known as minimalism, according to which our possession of the concept of truth derives from our regarding each proposition as equivalent to the proposition that it is true. (i) At the level of pragmatics, concerning its function: our word true has an idiosyncratic conceptual function, an unusual kind of utility. What exactly that function is supposed to be varies from on deflationary account to another: the truth predicate is said to be a device of emphasis, or concession, or generalization, or anaphora. But there is agreement that we must distinguish its raison d’etre from that of other terms, and that we must especially beware against assimilating it to empirical predicates, whose utility resides in their role in prediction and causal explanation. (ii) At the level of philosophical import, concerning the alleged theoretical profundity of the notion it expresses: truth is not a deep concept and should not be given a pivotal role in philosophical theorizing. (iii) At the level of semantics, concerning the way in which its meaning is fixed: The non-predictive non-explanatory role of the truth predicate implies that its meaning is not empirical – i.e. its deployment is not based on a rule that instructs us to accept <x is true – x is F>, where F articulates some observable characteristic. (iv) At the level of metaphysics, concerning what sort of property, the truth predicate stands for, and what the fundamental facts are concerning that property: we can appreciate a priori that there will be no reductive analysis of truth to empirical properties. Similarly, the fundamental facts about truth will not be laws relating it to empirical phenomena.

Judged by this cluster of criteria, the following well-known accounts of the truth cannot qualify as deflationary: The correspondence theory, whereby “x is true” means “x corresponds to a fact”. The proof theory, whereby “x is true” means “xi is provable”. Note that if coherence amongst beliefs is taken to provide empirical proof, the proof theory of truth subsumes the coherence theory. The pragmatic theory, whereby “x is true” means “x is useful to believe”. Davidson’s theory, whereby truth is indefinable but plays a vital role in the causal explanation of verbal behavior. None of these accounts attributes any peculiar non-predictive, non-explanatory role to the truth predicate. None insists on its theoretical unimportance. None of them supposes its meaning to be captured by something more or less tantamount to a disquotational schema. And none regards it as unreasonable to look for a theory of the truth-facts that goes significantly beneath such trivialities. The author introduces the most prominent and promising deflationary accounts: the redundancy theory, minimalist theory, Tarski’s theory, sentence-variable analysis, prosentential theory, and disquotation theory. These accounts met my four conditions for being deflationary. First, their advocates typically stress some distinctive, mundane function of out truth predicate. Secondly, the theoretical work that is given to it is confined by this view of its function. Thirdly, they each take the fundamental use of the word to be the assumption that every statement articulates its own truth condition. And fourthly, these theories concur in denying that the property of truth has any naturalistic reductive analysis, and in denying that its character may be captured by principles relating it to empirical phenomena. In sum, (i) the best way of establishing a theory is to derive it from uncontroversial premises; (ii) another good strategy is to defend it against objections; (iii) a third approach is to criticize alternative theories in support of minimalism. The author does not suggest that competition-bashing is all that needs to be done but gives the present approach a certain priority. By placing minimalism in opposition to its alternatives, we help clarify what it is not, so what it is in favor of it and respond adequately to objections leveled against it.38
18. Pragmatics by Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson: (a) Introduction: Pragmatics is often described as the study of language use and contrasted with the study of language structure. In this broad sense, it covers a range of loosely related research programmes from formal studies of deictic expressions to sociological studies of ethnic verbal stereotypes. In a more focused sense, pragmatics contrasts with semantics, the study of linguistic meaning, and is the study of how contextual factors interact with linguistic meaning in the interpretation of utterances. (b) Three approaches to pragmatics: The first is that sentence meaning is a vehicle for conveying a speaker’s meaning, and that a speaker’s meaning is an overtly expressed intention which is fulfilled by being recognized. In developing this idea, Grice opened the way for an inferential alternative to the classical code model of communication. The second foundational idea defended by Grice is that, in inferring the speaker’s meaning, the hearer is guided by the expectation that should meet some specific standards. The standards were based on the assumption that conversation is a rational, cooperative activity. The third is inferential comprehension, in which speakers are expected to follow a cooperative principle, backed by maxims of quantity (informative-ness), quality (truthfulness), relation (relevance), and manner (clarity) which are such that in paradigmatic cases, their observance promotes and their violation dis-promotes conversational rationality. (c) Literalism and contextualism in semantics: Grice’s distinction between saying and implicating is a natural starting point for examining the semantics-pragmatics distinction. One of Grice’s aims was to show that his notion of speaker’s meaning could be used to ground traditional semantic notions such as sentence meaning and word meaning. In his framework, a speaker’s meaning is made up of what is said and what is implicated. What speaker says is determined by truth-conditional aspects of linguistic meaning, plus disambiguation, plus reference assignment. (d) Explicit and implicit communication: In much of contemporary philosophy of language and linguistics, the notions of saying and literal meaning are seen as doing double duty, characterizing, on the one hand, the output of semantics, and, on the other, what is explicitly communicated by an utterance. We have already argued that the traditional notions of say and literal meaning are inadequate for semantic purpose: sentence meaning is much more schematic than literalist approaches to semantics suggest. They are also inadequate for pragmatic purposes: what is explicitly communicated by an utterance typically goes well beyond what is said or literally meant and may be vaguer and less determinate than is generally assumed. (e) Lexical pragmatics-metaphor, approximation, and narrowing: The claim that an utterance does not encode the speaker’s meaning but is merely a piece of evidence for it has implications at the lexical level. Metaphors and other tropes are the most obvious cases where the meaning conveyed by use of a word goes beyond the linguistically encoded sense. Relevance theory gives a quite different account of these lexical pragmatic phenomena from the standard Gricean one. Gricean pragmatics is often seen as having shed new light on the distinction between literal and figurative meaning. (f) Procedural meaning: speech acts, presuppositions, and indexicals: Many aspects of explicit truth-conditional content are not encoded at all, and utterances do not always communicate the concepts they encode. Moreover, a wide range of linguistic constructions contribute to other aspects of speaker’s meaning than explicit truth-conditional content or encode aspects of meaning that are not plausibly analyzed in conceptual terms. (g) Conclusion: When pragmatics emerged as a distinct discipline at the end of the 1960s, analytic philosophy was dominated by philosophy of language, and the cognitive sciences were still in their infancy. Since then, as the cognitive science have matured and expanded, priority in philosophy has shifted from philosophy of language to philosophy of mind. As pragmatics has developed, the gap between sentence meaning and speaker’s meaning is wider than Grice himself thought, and that pragmatic inference contributes not only to implicit contents but also to truth-conditional aspects of explicit content.
19. Causation by Ned Hall: (a) Introduction: Hume (1748) took causation to consist in constant conjunction. Since then, the core idea that causation consists in the instantiation of lawful regularities received an update from Davidson (1967), who argued that the regularity or law in question need not be explicit: the truth conditions for a claim of the form “event C caused event E” are simply that there be some feature of C and some feature of E such that the two events are covered by a causal law relating events with these features. Mackie (1965) took the regularity approach in a slightly different direction, arguing that C is a cause of E just in case it is an essential part of a condition lawfully sufficient in the circumstances for E. Lewis (1973) developed a very different idea suggested by Hume, drawing on successes in the clarification of the semantics of counterfactual conditionals in order to analyze causation by means of them: event E counterfactually depends on event C just in case if C had not occurred, E would not have; causation itself Lewis took to be the ancestral of counterfactual dependence. Lewis in 2004 modified this approach to incorporate a different kind of counterfactual relation. (b) Primary versus Secondary causal locutions: There is a widespread consensus that the right way to handle such profusion – variety of causal locations – is to single out a narrow class of locutions as the most important ones, the ones that an account absolutely has to get right. This decision about which locutions to consider primary and which secondary typically goes hand in hand with some metaphysical claim to the effect that certain items are the fundamental causal relata (being related to the reference).

(c) The causal relata - events versus facts: The two candidates are these. Events: The primary location is ‘Event C causes event E’; the fundamental causal relata are thus events. Facts: The primary location is ‘The fact that P causes it to be the case that Q’; the fundamental causal relata are thus facts. In the literature, Events seems to be the odds-on favorite. Regrettably, that literature fails to provide any particularly compelling reasons why this should be so. Often, one encounters the opinion that Facts does not even merit refutation, since facts are abstract in a way that automatically renders them unsuitable to be causes or effects. (d) Reductionism versus non-reductionism: One way to be a reductionist is to look for what I call a nomological entailment relation that can hold between events, and then identify causation with that relation. In each case that the author considered, the analysis displays something that we might call an entailment relation between the fact that the cause occurs and the fact that the effect occurs – where that relation is, crucially, mediated by the fundamental laws. (e) Methodological issues: The author raised two questions: What is the proper aim of a philosophical account of causation? And what are the proper methods of investigation for achieving this aim? To the second question, (i) there are intuitions about the causal structures of specific hypothetical cause: one describes such a case, and then elicits intuitive judgments – ideally firmly held, widely agreed upon intuitive judgments – about what causes what. (ii) There are intuitions about cases that are harder to classify, but that are called upon not so much to refute some specific proposal but to establish some sweeping claim about causation. (iii) There are intuitions about the general principles that govern the causal relation, such as shown in transitivity, intrinsic-ness, locality, omissions, and dependence. (f) The case for nomological entailment accounts: (i) An account applies across a wide range of possible worlds, especially worlds with different laws from our own. (ii) An account of causation needs to be level-neutral: it needs to respect the insight that causal relations obtain at and across a wide variety of levels of description. (iii) The nature of dependence is an intricate and subtle matter: an account of causation should not render it a complete mystery. (iv) We should hope for an account that does some useful theoretical work. (g) Nomological entailment accounts and the crucial examples. (h) The value of Further work (skipped).
Chapter V. Summary and Conclusion

20. Modality by Lloyd Humberstone: In the 1950s and 1960s several philosophers became aware of the structural similarities between the sets of relationships between quantificational constructions charted by the traditional Square of Opposition and the sets of relationships obtaining between various notions expressed by certain one-place sentence operators. For understanding modal talk in general, then, it is helpful to bear in mind the distinction between cases in which the syntactically simplest way of negating a claim produces a contrary rather than a contradictory claim. The article includes followings: 1. Introduction; 2. Modal constructions and the square of opposition; 3. Contrariety and subcontrariety; 4. Modal logics; 5. Kripke semantics; 6. Reflections on the semantics; 7. One philosophical reaction to the semantics. The paper is so much discussed in a technical way that I skip further discussions here.41

21. Time by D. H. Mellor: (a) Space, Time, and Relativity: Special relativity does not assert a new unity of time and space. It should never have been news that time and the dimensions of space resemble each other more than they resemble any other way of ordering things, e.g. by their temperatures. To see this, consider first that, at any one time, space is or embodies an array of possible ways (namely, spatial points) by which things can be in contact, and so can interact immediately (at those points). What makes this array three-dimensional is the fact that there are only three independent ways in which two things a and b can fail to be in contact at any one time, e.g. by a’s being north-or-south, east-or-west, or above-or-below b. This fact about space provides the extended sense in which any array of possibilities may be called a space. It is in this sense that time combines with space to constitute the space we call space-time. For whatever else time is, it too is a way in which a and b can fail to be in contact when in the same place, by being there at different times. And this is the only non-spatial way in which contact can fail. For whenever a and b (or their surfaces) share any spatial location, they are then and there in contact, and able thereby to interact immediately, however much they may differ in other ways. Adding time to space thus completes a four-dimensional array of possible ways (space-time points) by which things can be in contact. This is what marks off time and space from everything else: the fact that people and things can contact each other by, and only by, being in the same place at the same time. The most important part of the answer to the question ‘What is time?’

Relativity uses the speed of light to give spatial and temporal distances a common measure, as when stars and galaxies are said to be N light years away. (1) \(d^2 = s^2 - (ct)^2\) where c the speed of light, which provides a fixed exchange rate between spatial and temporal components s and t of a fixed space-time separation d of any two events e and f; s and t vary from one reference frame to another, and a frame may be defined by crediting any object, that is not accelerating, with a specific velocity (which may be zero). Now let e and f be events that are sometime t apart at the North Pole, so that, taking the earth to be at rest, \(s=0\). So as t is positive, say \(t_0\). \(d^2 = -(c t_0)^2\) must be negative. Next take a reference frame in which the earth is moving, thus making s positive, say \(s_1\). Then as d is a constant, \(t^2\) in this frame, \(t_1^2\), must equal \(t_0^2 + (s_1/c)^2\). Similarly, for all other pairs of frames: to keep d constant, \(s_2^2\) and \(t_2^2\) must differ by amounts (2) \(\Delta s^2 = c^2 \Delta t^2\). This is what I mean by calling “c” an exchange rate between s and t for any e and f; its square is the ratio of the differences in their squares between any two reference frames. The fact that (2) states an exchange rate, not an identity, is not always so obvious, especially when t is measured in years and s in light years. For then, as \(c = 1\), (2) reduces to \(\Delta s^2 = \Delta t^2\), which can look like an identity statement implying that t is as spatial as s. The quickest way to see that this is not so, and that (2), and hence (1), do not make t spatial, is to relate s to its components in any three orthogonal directions, e.g. the north-south, and up-down distances s, \(y\), and \(z\) between e and f. Using that relation, we get (3) \(s^2 = x^2 + y^2 + z^2\), to expand (1) into (4) \(d^2 = x^2 + y^2 + z^2 - (ct)^2\) that shows differently special relativity treats the spatial and temporal components of space-time separations.

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(b) Cosmology and the present: The theories of which relativity poses a problem are those that confine reality to the present, or to the past and present, so that to become present is to come to exist. Now whether something far off exists can hardly depend on a factually unconstrained choice of reference frame; yet if distant simultaneity does so, then so does what is present at a distance, since to be present there is to be simultaneous with what is present here. Such theories therefore need a suitably privileged frame to define absolute simultaneity. This may be generated by inferring from our inability to measure a one-way speed of light that its having one, the same in all directions, is not a fact but a convention. If it is, then we could, without denying any facts, give our reflection \( r \) the earthly date 2390 in all frames by taking light to travel out and back of one-way speeds which, by convention, we take to vary appropriately from frame to frame, and to differ from each other in nearly all frames other than ours. However, this will not do. For first, it is obviously not a convention but a fact that light has a one-way speed, the same in all directions and in all frames. If it was a mere convention, then whether something exists at a distance could no more credibly depend on it than on a factually free choice of reference frame. This is why few of those who take existence to depend on presence now rely on this verificationist reading of special relativity. Instead, they either deny that its non-spatial dimension is time, modify the theory to yield a suitably privileged reference frame, or look to other physics, especially cosmology, to remedy its deficiencies.

(c) Time and change: The existence of many equally good pairs of \( A \)- and \( B \)-series may make it hard to deny reality to parts of them; but it is, as McTaggart sees, no objection to the series themselves. Nor does it vitiate his claim that, for the non-spatial dimension of space-time to be temporal, it must be the dimension of change. Time is certainly the dimension of change: variations must be temporal to be changes. But why is spatial variation not change? Admittedly, some properties, like size and shape, cannot vary spatially across an object. But some can, yet their spatial variations – like a poker’s being hot at one end and cold at the other – are still not changes. Why not? It is not enough to say that temporal variation is what change means, since that does not explain why we limit its meaning in this way. So why do we, and what light can our doing so shed on how time differs from space? (d) The ontology of the \( A \)-series; (e) The semantics of the \( A \)-series; (f) What \( A \)-beliefs do for us. (d through e are skipped).

(g) Time and causation: In calling temporal variations in our \( A \)-beliefs changes, I have again assumed that time is the dimension of change. But I have still not said what makes it so if time does not flow. What the, if not the flow of time, distinguishes time from space, and makes it the dimension of change? The obvious answer to the first question is causation. It is after all a striking fact that most causes and effects are separated in time as they need not be in space. Many effects are where their causes are, as when heating water causes it to boil. And those that are not may be in any spatial direction from their causes, as when fires throw out heat all round, whereas none are known to precede them. Hence the theory of Robb (1914) and Reichenbach (1928) that time is the dimension of causation and that what distinguishes earlier from later is the fact that causes precede their effect. Whether this theory will do depends on what we mean by causation. It will not do if, with Hume (1748), we define a cause as an object, followed by another, since this uses time and its direction to define causation. Nor will it do if, like Mackie (1974), we think effects are fixed by their causes becoming present, for then causation gets its direction and efficacy from the flow of time. Others, like Lewis (1973), who do not use time to distinguish causes from effects, can without circularity use causation to give time a direction. Thus, while Tooley (1997) links causation to the flow of time, as Mackie does, he uses the former to define the latter and, by denying that the future exists, enables causes not merely to fix their effects by making them present but to bring them into existence. Causal theories my thus be held without circularity. 42
22. Constitution by Mark Johnston: Constitution, at first glance, the relation between an item and its components or parts, is a topic-neutral relation of vast generality, applying wherever the notion of complexity gets a foothold. Accordingly, it is a great mistake to restrict prematurely the scope of one’s account of constitution to a few categories such as material object and arbitrary aggregates. 1. Mereology has proved crucial in motivating and implementing the account of persistence as perdurance. Its credentials seemed so secure that David Lewis (1991) was prompted to try to reduce set theory to mereology plus the theory of the singleton. One way to introduce mereology is to start with the notion of a part and then introduce two definitions, thus (D1) x and y overlap just in case they have a common part. Otherwise they are entirely distinct. (D2) An item is a fusion of some other items just in case it has all of them as parts of has no part that is distinct from each of those items. The characteristic axioms of mereology are then stated as follows: that the parthood is transitive; that there is no restriction on the formation wholes; that the wholes so formed are unique; and from these three axioms a fourth crucial postulate concerning parthood follows, namely that parthood is reflexive, i.e. every item is a part of itself. 2. Of any item in any category, be it a state, event, process, material object, artefact, organism, person, quantity of stuff, property, state of affairs, set, or mereological sum, we may inquire whether it is simple or complex, in the sense of having parts. Of anything that is complex, we may inquire as to what principle unifies those parts into the whole that is the complex item. The principle had better not be merely another part, for the question would remain: Consider that part along with the other parts, what condition is such that its holding of all these parts gives us the whole? 3. As to the parts of any item, since they in their turn are item in some category of other, we may inquire as to whether they are simple or complex. If they are complex, we may inquire as to their principles of unity and their parts. And so on, either without end or terminating in simples. 4. A fundamental, although oft-neglected, distinction in the theory of parts and wholes is the distinction between a principle of unity for any given composite item and a mere principle of division for that item. This generates a distinction between the parts of an item unified by a principle of unity for that item and the parts of the item only disclosed by a mere principle of division for that item. For short, let us call these u-parts and d-parts. It will transpire that items can have the same simplest parts, the same atomic parts if you will, and yet be distinct in virtue of having different u-parts and d-parts. One consequence of this is that spatiotemporal coincidence of distinct items is more much common than is widely supposed. 5. What then of d-parts, parts disclosed only by a mere principle of division for the item? The account of what it is for a certain item to exist may centrally involve a second item, a whole, of which the first is a part. So it is with, say, the lower half of a personal flesh, understood as a varying organic item that remains as the person grows and acquires or loses weight. What it is for the (variable) lower half of a person’s flesh to exist is for the person’s flesh to exist and for it to have lower half. 6. Reductionist theses with respect to items of a given sort can now be seen to admit of differing degrees of reductive ambition. There is a reductionism of parts: a claim to the effect that all u-parts of the items in some interesting category lie in some other interesting category, such as the mental or the physical. And there is a reductionism of principles, a claim that all the principles of unity of items in some interesting category are reductive and invoke properties that lie in some other interesting category. Neither of these reductionist theses involve claims about identity, a happy result since reduction is an asymmetric relation and identity is a symmetric relation. 7. The distinction among u-parts and d-parts means that there are at least two relevant notions of a simple. A simple could be something with no parts, neither u-parts nor d-parts. Or a simple could be something with no u-parts. It counts as a simple because it has no parts united by a principle of unity. Still, it could have d-parts, parts disclosed by a mere principle of division.
8. Given the distinction between u-parts and d-parts, we may now begin to consider how the supposed axiomatic claims about parts fare when variously interpreted as applying to either kind of part. Most arbitrary temporal slices or segments of a given activity will be merely d-parts of that activity. We may allow that there is such a thing as last night’s dinner party between 9.00 and 9.01 p.m., but there be no relation between that slice of the dinner party and the minute-long slices before and after it, such that the relation is properly cited in a unity condition for dinner parties. Accordingly, the determinable relation of being a part of is not reflexive, for it has determinates, such as a relation of being a u-part of, which are not reflexive. A principle of unity may be self-sustaining, in that the causal explanation of its holding of some parts will appeal to its having held of those parts. A principle of unity may be static, in that its holding of certain parts requires that the parts it holds of remain as they are and remain ordered as they are. A principle of unity may instead by dynamic, in that its holding of certain parts may allow or require that the parts it holds of vary over time, either by those very parts undergoing intrinsic change, or by their being replaced with parts of the same kind, or by their being shed without replacement. Many physical systems are like organism in that they have principles of unity that are self-sustaining and dynamic. Stars may be taken as an illustrative case.

10. Of the many kinds that items fall under, some kinds are such that the items that exemplify them contingently, while other are such that the items that exemplify them do so necessarily. There are kinds that admit of both sorts of exemplification. We are briefly, and so contingently, fluid-dwellers, while krill is permanently and necessarily so. In the face of this apparent disorder, the following explanatory strategy suggests itself: (i) the members of each such kind share a fully determinate essence, (ii) the full analysis or real definition of the conditions on membership in the kind would exhaust the essence of its members, and (iii) the patterns of necessary exemplification of kinds by items are entailed by their assignment to real kinds; that is, entailed by their essences. In any event, this explanatory ambition should be taken as fixing the notion of a real kind. 11. We have seen that generalizing the account of an idiosyncratic kind of item, the mereological sum, so as to arrive at a general theory of constitution arguably goes wrong with respect to the reflexivity and transitivity of parthood. And this is because sums have utterly undemanding principles of unity. In the case of a sum, any principle of division will have as its inverse something that is a principle of unity for the sum. So a sum has only u-parts. Any division of the sum, however arbitrary, will be a division into parts that exist at some time or other and so satisfy a condition of unity for the sum. Accordingly, a sum, unlike a set of sets or almost every other kind of item, has no articulated structure, at least none that does not derive from the individual structures of the items that are its parts. 12. This means that if their wholes other than mereological sums then it is certainly the case that two or more items can be in the same place at the same time, even though they share a decomposition into the same ultimate parts. Consider a word token, say ton. What it is for that word token to exist is for certain letters to exist and for them to be arranged in a certain order. We can also decompose the token into its material atomic parts. The sum of those atomic parts will be in the same place as the word token. 13. Still, our marginalizing of sums may now make this kind of co-occupancy seem irrelevant to what was really being denied by those who insisted that you cannot have two material items in the same place at the same time. To the extent that sums have utterly undemanding and non-structuring principles of unity, they may seem to be degenerate sorts of material items. So sums of material tings aside, can there be two or more distinct material items in the same place at the same time? Attention to principles of unity shows that contrary to the dogmas of the day there is no general obstacle to two or more distinct items having the very same parts, be they u-parts of d-parts, throughout their entire careers. (skipped)
23. Knowledge and Skepticism by Timothy Williamson: Skepticism is a disease in which healthy mental processes run pathologically unchecked. Our cognitive immunity system, designed to protect our conception of the world from harmful errors, turns destructively on that conception itself. Since we have false beliefs, we benefit from the ability to detect our mistakes; removing our errors tend to do us good. Our cognitive immunity system should be able to destroy bad old belief, not just prevent the influx of bad new ones. But that ability sometimes becomes indiscriminate and destroys good beliefs to. That can happen in several ways.

Case I: Sometimes we can detect an error in ourselves by suspending belief in the proposition at issue, while we assess its truth or falsity on the basis of our remaining beliefs and any new ones that we may form in the process of investigation. Since belief is not a purely voluntary matter, we cannot just abandon a belief at will, but we can still avoid reliance on it in a particular inquiry. The phrase ‘suspend belief’ will be applied to that case too. In this sense, suspending belief in p is consistent with believing p. The suspension test often takes a dialectical form. One tries to convince an opponent who does not already accept the belief; one needs a starting point that the opponent will accept. Even when we have no opponent, we can imagine one. Sooner or later we arrive at beliefs so central that their suspension would leave us too cognitively impoverished to accomplish anything useful. One form of skepticism exploits our vulnerability to the suspension test. The skeptic derives us to apply the test to ever more central beliefs. In so far as we are willing and able to abide by the results of the test, we are forced step by step to abandon our whole system of beliefs. In effect, the skeptic’s challenges force us down a regress of justifications.

Case II: Sometimes, without suspending my belief in any proposition, I reach a conclusion about the objective correlation, or lack of it, between the conditions under which I believe some proposition and those under which it is true. A sufficiently poor correlation indicates that the proposition is not known to be true, for some kind of reliability is a necessary (if insufficient) condition for knowledge. Suppose, for example, that my review of my past performance indicates this: my believing one day that it will rain the next day provides no evidence at all for rain the next day. My weather predictions do not better than chance. Then my belief that it will rain tomorrow hardly constitutes knowledge that it will rain tomorrow. More precisely, let us say that a proposition q is evidence for a proposition p if and only if the conditional probability of p on q is higher than the unconditional probability of p: that is, q raises the probability of p. Thus, if the conditional probability that it will rain given that I believe that it will rain is no higher than the unconditional probability of p, then I believe that it will rain is not evidence that it will rain, and the status of the belief as knowledge is endangered.

Above two cases represent quite distinct routes into skepticism. Unlike case I, case II does not depend on the suspension of belief. Even if one is certain that one is not in the skeptical scenario, and reasons accordingly, one must still concede that the belief is falsity-indicative. But the differences between (I) and (II) do not preclude mixed strategies for testing one’s beliefs by a combination of the two methods. According to contextualism, sentences involving know express different propositions with different truth-values as used in different contexts, because the reference of know varies with the context of utterance, even if the reference of every other constituent is held fixed. A similar contextualist line might be taken about other epistemic terms, such as justified. Once skeptics have manipulated the context, in the epistemology seminar, contextualists are apt to console themselves with the thought that although most denials of knowledge in that context of skepticism are correct, in everyday contexts many assertions of knowledge are also correct. However, the skeptic styles of argument are so limited.
Using strategy (I), I start by testing my belief that I feel dizzy. I suspend it, and others relevantly related to it, but then immediately recover them by my usual methods for forming beliefs about my current mental states. I decide to test my belief that my methods for forming beliefs about my current mental states are reliable. Once I have suspended that belief, and others relevantly related to it, and the use of the methods themselves, can I really recover them from what remains? Such opportunism is less intellectually impressive than the willingness of extreme sceptics to deny that I know or a justified belief, that I am feeling dizzy. With strategy (II), my belief that I feel dizzy looks at first sight better off, for how could one construct a skeptical scenario in which I appear to myself to feel dizzy without actual feeling dizzy? However, SS be a skeptical scenario in which I am a brain in a vat but appear to myself to feel dizzy nor believe myself to feel dizzy; in SS, I neither feel dizzy nor appear to myself to feel dizzy nor believe myself to feel dizzy; in SS, I believe that I am not in SS. How things appear to me in SS is utterly different from how they actually appear to me. In actuality, as well as in SS, I believe that I am not in SS. Both in actuality and in SS, my belief that I am not in SS is falsity-indicative, for exactly the same reason that applies to any other belief that one is not in a special scenario. My belief that I am not in SS lowers the probability that I am not in SS. The crucial point for strategy (II) is that I believe in the skeptical scenario that I am not in it, whatever my actual mental state. Thus, if not being falsity-indicative is necessary for a belief to constitute knowledge, I do not know that I am not in SS. Similarly, if not being falsity-indicative is necessary for a belief to be justified, my belief that I am not in SS is not justified. Thus, my belief that I feel dizzy is vulnerable to strategy (II).

Moderate skeptics will protest that they have been misinterpreted. In effect, they concede that a falsity-indicative belief can constitute knowledge or be justified. So even for a skeptical scenario that matches one’s actual situation in its appearance to one, they cannot claim that its agreed feature, that in it one believes that one is not in it, by itself prevents one from knowing or having a justified true belief that one is not in it. If such knowledge or justified true belief is blocked, it must be for a more specific reason.

What should our attitude be to our skeptical intuitions, if we have them? It may help to consider other cases in which intuitions conflict. Contextualism supplies a perfectly general strategy for resolving any apparent disagreement whatsoever. Since some disagreements are genuine, we should not always follow that strategy. The conflict of intuitions does not always disappear on further reflection. Some intuitions are mistaken. Surely the same phenomenon can occur for epistemic concepts too. Whether one knows (or one’s belief is epistemically justified) also depends on the balance between many complexes, unquantifiable, subtly interacting considerations. The concept of knowledge or of epistemic justification provides no algorithm for weighing all these factors against each other or integrating them into a final verdict. No wonder that the skilled skeptic can present the considerations that favor a negative verdict so vividly that they intuitively appear to outweigh the considerations on the other side. It does not follow that the skeptic is right, even in the context of the epistemology seminar; the case may not even be borderline. Nor does it follow that the skeptic is wrong, even in the everyday context. If we are sensitive to many complex considerations when we assess matters of knowledge or justification, does it follow that our concept of knowledge or our concept of justification is analyzable in terms of our concepts of those complex consideration? The answer is no. Suppose that we grasped the concept of knowledge or of justification simply by means of examples of situations in which someone knows or is justified and of the opposite. The comparative similarities or differences depend on many complex considerations, so that our concept of knowledge or of justification would not be analyzable in terms of our concepts of those complex considerations. A constraint on an assignment of reference makes our intuitive beliefs count as knowledge.
24. Perception by M. G. F. Martin: (a) Introduction: Different views about perception are commonly distinguished by the claims they make about the direct or immediate objects of perception. Direct realists affirm that we directly or immediately perceive physical objects and that these objects are mind-independent. Indirect realists accept that there are mind-independent objects and that we refer to them and have knowledge of them but suppose us only to have indirect or mediated contact with them. Phenomenalists have insisted that the objects of sense must be immediately or directly apprehended, and consequently have questioned whether there are mind-independent objects for us to think about in the first place. Typically, philosophers, who have thought that there is a distinction to be drawn between direct and indirect perception, have thought it also obvious that we cannot directly perceive the objects around us which we suppose ourselves to know about through perception even if we do not perceive mere representatives of them in the form of sense-data, impressions, or percepts.

(b) Seeing one thing in virtue of seeing another: Frank Jackson identifies a number of different threads in defenders of the immediatemediate or direct-indirect distinction: one invoking the presence or absence of inference; that what is immediately perceived is that which is entirely known through perception; or that what is immediately perceived is that which is entirely perceived at a time. Jackson replaces these with a clear account of the contrast, an account applicable directly to the perception of objects rather than facts, and one that does no presuppose that there are sense-data or other non-physical intermediaries in perception. Moor and Broad assume that visual perception of physical objects is at least mediated by visual perception of their surfaces. Further argument or reflection may then show that such perception is mediated by non-physical sense-data as well. Jackson, in common with this tradition, supposes that our seeing the surfaces of objects mediates our seeing the objects themselves.

(c) Now you see it; now you don’t – seeing and context-sensitivity: Understanding the distinction between direct and indirect perception in this way does not yet give us the materials properly to interpret the traditional debate. Even if it were clear that one only saw the table before one through seeing a surface of the table, this still does not show that one only sees the surface or the table because one sees some other non-physical thing. Thompson Clarke (1965) argues that the discussion here ignores the context-sensitivity of talk of perceiving and appearing. If one ignored the role that context plays here, we would simply have a clash of intuitions about what one sees: we both have the intuition that the orange is seen and the intuition that merely the surface is seen. Consistency could be restored by marking a context-independent distinction between immediate and mediate perception, but that would require that we have a context-independent way of fixing what one perceives or what is apparent to one and responsible for how the sense books. The contextualist challenge then develops through insisting, first, that there is a prima facie clash in our intuitions and then that there is no context-insensitive way of resolving the clash.

(d) The argument from Hallucination: The contextualists like Clarke concerning the verb ‘see’ are moved by the thought that were the objects of perception not properly part of the perceptual situation from the subject’s own point of view, one would be much worse position perceptually than we ordinarily take ourselves to be. When initially we think of our perceptual situation it includes the orange, but when we consider the reasoning that leads to the contrast between immediate and mediate perception, we are left with the thought that strictly speaking we are only aware of the surface, and so at a disadvantage with respect to the position we initially took ourselves to be in. Elaborating on this, we might suggest that we not only think of perceiving objects, seeing feeling, hearing, or smelling, as relations to what is perceived, but also that the mental episode or experience involved in so perceiving is a relation. The naïve realist conception of sense experience is inconsistent with assumption that must be false.
(e) Indirect realism again: experiential naturalism and the common kind assumption taken together rule out naïve realism about all aspects of sense experience. One way of responding to the argument is to hold on to the assumption that sense experience is a relation of awareness, but in the light of the constraints from experiential naturalism, suppose that the only objects of awareness are mind-dependent entities, sense-data, or impressions. If ordinary perception is constituted through one’s sensory awareness, such a view will be close to indirect realism about perception. Sense awareness will be constituted by awareness of mind-dependent entities, and through that one will count as perceiving some of the environmental causes of this state of awareness. The view will count strictly as a form of indirect realism, if one supposes that the sensuous awareness one has in having an experience is itself a mode of perceiving or sensing; for then one can apply the contrast between immediate and mediate perception introduced above. On the other hand, the theorist may as easily resist the claim that we perceived these objects of awareness – after all, our sense organs are not affected by them and we don’t interact with them in the ways we do with the ordinary objects of perception. The theory will simply claim that what it takes to perceive objects at all is to have a sense experience and then go on to claim that such experience is the awareness of mind-dependent entities and qualities.

(f) Intentional theories of perception as direct realism: The alternative response is to deny that sense experience has a relational character at all. For if there need be no object of awareness in the case of hallucinatory experience, there is no reason to suppose that there must be anything mind-dependent involved in sense perception at all. It would seem to deny that the sense-datum theorist is right to suppose that there is anything we are thereby aware of when we have sense experience, and hence to reject the naïve realist’s starting point as well. A representational or intentional approach to perception, on the other hand, promises to offer an account that addresses these concerns. The minimum commitment of an intentional theory of perception is simply to attribute representational or intentional contents to sense experience: these states represent objects or one’s environment as being a certain way, and the sense experience will count as veridical to the extent that how matters are represented coincides with how they are.

(g) Disjunctivism about appearances: In rejecting the common kind assumption, the disjunctivist might be seeking to deny that there is anything really in common with respect to being an experience, or being a mental state, that perceptions, illusions, and hallucinations need have in common. This would be to deny even that the idea of a perceptual experience defines a proper mental kind, since all parties to the debate agree that this is a notion we can apply equally to veridical perceptions, illusions, and hallucinations. Denying the common kind assumption is, for example, (I) that no instance of the specific kind of experience I have now, when seeing the orange for what it is, could occur were I not to perceive such a mind-independent object as this; and (II) that the notion of a visual experience of an orange on a table is that of a situation being indiscriminable through reflection from a veridical visual perception of an orange on a table as what it is. Once one accepts that (I) and (II) are both true, then one must also deny that two experiences, one of which is indiscriminable from the other, must share phenomenal character. It is consistent with accepting these two principles that one hold that such experiences would nonetheless share a phenomenal character. But a disjunctivist ought to reject even that claim. (h) Perceptual contact: We started the discussions with the idea that perception can relate us to the ordinary mind-independent objects we take ourselves to perceive, and that it is those objects that figure in our sense experience, where that is conceived as what is reflectively accessible to us when perceiving. Revealing the falsity of this account, a disjunctive approach seeks to preserve the idea that sense experience really is a relation to the ordinary objects of perception in cases of veridical perception, when it denies that we can be having the same kind of experience.45
Chapter V. Summary and Conclusion

25. The a Priori by Christopher Peacocke: (a) Introduction: The terms of a priori and a posteriori are philosophical terms of art popularized by Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. A priori knowledge or justification is independent of experience, as with mathematics (3+2=5), tautologies (All bachelors are unmarried), and deduction from pure reason. A posteriori knowledge is dependent on experience or empirical evidence, as with most aspects of science and personal knowledge. The author raises five general questions about the a priori: (i) How is the concept of the a priori to be characterized? What is the correct form to be taken by any true statements about what is a priori? (ii) What is the scope or extent of the a priori? (iii) What is the source of a priori status? (iv) The existence of the a priori has been regarded as incompatible with some compulsory kind of naturalism. (v) What is the philosophical significance of the a priori? (b) Characterizing the a priori: One core notion of an outright a priori belief is a belief for which the thinker’s operative justification or entitlement is independent of the content or kind of any of his particular perceptual experiences. One distinction of theoretical interest is the difference between perceptual experience and other mental states. A second distinction is the distinction between all conscious states, and everything else. “I am in pain” and “I am in an enthusiastic mood” are not a priori one under which we generalize from perceptual experience to all conscious states in the original paradigm. A third distinction that may exercise a theorist is the boundary between that which is justified by a specific, particular perceptual experience, and that which is justified by perceptual experience in general. (c) The scope of the a priori: The range and diversity of true a priori propositions places demands on any general explanation of the a priori. If any such explanation is possible, it must be sufficiently general to cover this range, and I have also to be sufficiently flexible to be capable of adaption to the distinctive feature of each of these many special kinds of case. (d) The source of the a priori: The initial, pre-theoretical attraction of understanding-based views lies simply in the fact that when we consider examples of a priori contents, grasp of those contents, and whatever is involved in that grasp, seem sufficient to permit a priori knowledge of those contents. In the examples of the a priori, we have not needed to appeal to mysterious mechanisms connecting thinkers who have a priori knowledge with a third realm of concepts. The meta-semantic theory, properly developed, can thus be at the service of a moderate rationalism. The moderate rationalist holds that any case of a priori status can be explained as such by appeal to the nature of the concepts involved in the content known a priori, and without postulating mechanisms connecting thinkers with the third realm. (e) Naturalism, the a priori, and a surrogate notion: It is hard to formulate a credible version of naturalism and a plausible view of the a priori on which there is any incompatibility at all. We are in some kind of causal contact with abstract objects, and that this is the source of some of our a priori knowledge, is certainly non-naturalistic. There are at least three ways in which any empirical theory involves the a priori. (i) The methodology which is applied in reaching the theory has a fundamentally a priori status, even if the theory is empirical. The canons of confirmation, of inductive reasoning, and of abduction have an a priori status. (ii) Rational acceptance of any scientific theory rests ultimately upon some persons or other taking perceptual experience and memory at face value. The defeasible entitlement to do so also has an a priori status. (iii) Almost any theory beyond the rudimentary must include some kind of logic, which also has an a priori status. Though the matter is controversial, in my judgment no one has developed a thorough epistemological and semantical account on which the result of essentially empirical investigation could make it reasonable to revise one’s logic. (f) Philosophical significance and further tasks: If true propositions are a priori, that will have large effects on our metaphysics and epistemology; and it is natural to conjecture that all instance of the entitlement relation are fundamentally a priori.
26. Scientific Realism by Michael Devitt: (a) What is scientific realism? Science appears to be committed to the existence of a variety of unobservable entities – to atoms, viruses, photons, and the like – and to these entities having certain properties. The central idea of scientific realism is that science really is committed and is, for the most part, right in its commitments. Scientific realism is about unobservable entities. Science appears also to be committed to lots of observable entities – to a variety of plants, molluscs, moons, and the like. A skepticism that extends to observables is extreme. The issue of scientific realism arises only once such doubts about the observable world have been arrayed. The general doctrine of realism about the external world is committed not only to the existence of this world but also to its mind-independence: it is not made up of ideas or sense data and does not depend for its existence and nature on the cognitive activities and capacities of our minds. Scientific realism committed to the unobservable world enjoying this independence. We might call this the independence dimension of realism. Some other philosophers think that scientific entities are not independent but are somehow constructed – this is constructivism. The struggle between constructivism and realism is appropriately conducted at the level of observables. We can define a doctrine of scientific realism as follows: (SR) Most of the essential unobservables of well-established current scientific theories exist mind-independently; (SSR) Most of the essential unobservables of well-established current scientific theories exist mind-independently and mostly have the properties attributed to them by science.

(b) Arguments for scientific realism: The most famous argument for realism is the argument from the success of science. Scientific theories tend to be successful in that their observational predictions tend to come out true. The realist has a number of responses. First, the success of a theory can be challenged: although it was thought to be successful, it was not really so. But unless the criterion of success is put so high that not even contemporary theories will qualify. Secondly, it can be argued that a theory was not well established and hence not the sort that the realist is committed to; or that entities it posited were not essential to its success. Thirdly, the realist can insist that there are many other past theories, for which the realist’s explanation works fine.

(c) Arguments against scientific realism: (i) The un-determination argument: (EE) T has empirically equivalent rivals. (SU) T has rivals that are equally supported by all possible observational evidence for it. So realist doctrines like SR and SSR are unjustified. Some preliminaries. First, what exactly is it for two theories to be empirically equivalent? The basic idea is that they have the same observational consequences. Secondly, where EE talks simply of T having equivalent rivals, the premise of the argument is sometimes that T has indefinitely many rivals and sometimes that it has at least one. For convenience, I shall mostly treat EE as if it were only committed to one rival because its commitment to more does not seem to make a significant difference to the conclusions we should draw. Thirdly, SU should not be confused with various other under-determination theses, including the weak and obviously true one that leads to the challenge of extreme skepticism: (WU) Any theory has rivals that entail the same actual given observational evidence. (ii) The pessimistic meta-induction (skip).

(d) Conclusions: Scientific realism is best seen as a straightforwardly metaphysical doctrine along the lines of SR or SSR. Various explanationist arguments of scientific realism succeed provided that the realist is entitled to abduction. I have suggested that the realist is entitled. The under-determination argument against realism fails because we have no good reason to believe an empirical equivalence thesis that would serve as its premise. The pessimistic meta-induction, with its attention to past theoretical failures, does pose a problem for realism. But the problem may be manageable. The anti-realist must argue that past failures are extensive in history.48
27. Laws by Nancy Cartwright and Others: Two main questions about laws in philosophy of science are: “Can one reasonably take a realist stand about the laws of science? And “What distinguishes a law from other kinds of truths, especially from universal and statistical truths that are not laws? (a) Traditional views: (i) The regularity account and its critique: David Hume’s empiricist treatment of causality is usually credited as an inspiration for this view. Hume took causal relations to be nothing but relations of constant conjunction between a cause and its effect, plus spatio-temporal contiguity. He granted that we feel a certain necessity in the causal connection between, say, kicking a ball and the ball moving, so that we are able to say that if the ball was not kicked it would not have moved. (ii) The necessitarian view – motivation, theory, and problems: One attempt to overcome the problems associated with the regularity view is to admit that laws of nature are not contingent, but necessary. Indeed, regularity theorists often slide necessity or other modal notions through the back door when answering the standard objections. (iii) Laws as best systems: Some necessitarians sought to justify their postulation of universals and relations between them by pointing out the advantages of this view over the regularity theory and claiming that universals are the best explanation for law-hood. However, such metaphysical extravagance did not suit the tastes of more traditional response to necessitarians, motivated to maintain an austere ontology of occurrent facts. The best balance of strength and simplicity; and Explanatory power and unificationism (skipped). (iv) Recent revivals of laws: Two recent approaches that continue to set laws center-stage in science are in Marc Range and Michael Friedman. The former takes laws to be empirical though necessary principles, while the latter formulates a Kantian view of laws. Traditional empiricist view supposes that laws must be general or repeatable in the sense of having a large and varied stock of instances.

(b) Science without laws: (i) Models: One reason that models play a central role in philosophy of science nowadays is the semantic view of theories: the doctrine, popular throughout Anglophone philosophy of science but most articulated and well-illustrated by the German structuralists, that a theory is not a set of claims as the Logical Positivists maintained but rather a set of models. In opposition to laws some authors are explicit in arguing that models that constitute theory and that satisfy its law are not the models that provide our best description of the world. The theory is at best a foundation from which more accurate models are build, by improvement and correction, models that in the end no longer satisfy the laws. (ii) Symmetries of entities, equations, processes, etc. pick out their invariances under certain groups of transformations. Basically, a symmetry is an operation that leaves some properties of an object unchanged. John Earman pursues takes symmetries to be important for physical theory, but not in a way that dispenses with laws. For Earman pure philosophical analysis is incapable of providing result relevant to current scientific practice. His arguments start rather from fundamental issues in the foundations of physics. Laws of physics are the set of true principles that from a strong but simple unified system that can be sued to predict and explain. Symmetries function at a meta-level, helping to pick-out the set of truths we should count as laws. (iii) The special sciences, ceteris paribus principles, and pragmatic laws (skip). (iv) Causal principles: Causal principles differ from laws in at least three ways: (1) Causes make their effect happen. So the idea of necessitation is built right into the relation between the antecedent and the consequent in a causal principle; it is not added on as in empiricist-based notions of law. (2) Causal principles can express themselves in regularity, but these regularities need not be universal and they can have a ceteris paribus character. (3) Causal principles need not be eternal nor hold everywhere. (v) Powers, capacities, and mechanisms: For Aristotle, the regularities of the world do not result from the governance of law but rather on account of substances acting according to their natures, which are constituted by their distinctive powers and dispositions. The question always arises: which is more powerful between laws and powers?"
Chapter V. Summary and Conclusion

28. Philosophy of Biology by Philip Kitcher: (a) Origins and evolution: Philosophy of biology has evolved in a number of directions, sometimes attempting to illuminate the general philosophy of science, sometimes offering new perspectives on old philosophical problems, sometimes entering the theoretical fray within biology, sometimes participating in controversies about the social implications of biological findings. Although it’s useful to consider these four varieties of philosophical work, it would be artificial and misguided to attempt to classify every article or book as exemplifying just one of them. (b) The units of selection debate. (c) Concepts and methods of evolutionary theorizing. (d) The neglected elephant. (e) The uses and abuses of biology. (b through e are skipped). (f) An Apologetic Conclusions: The notion of a law of nature was central to logical empiricist philosophy of science, and, since the 1970s, a number of philosophers have attempted to characterize laws without imposing on themselves the human scruples that logical empiricists tried to honor. Philosophy of biology has contributed to this debate both by raising question about the contingency of laws, and by reviving the controversy about the sense of law in which biology can lay claim to laws of its own. Here we can recognize the impact of the philosophy of biology on general philosophy of science. There have also been consequences for other areas of philosophy such as in the philosophy of mind by a richer understanding of neurobiology. The last thirty years have witnessed so many diverse and fruitful interactions between philosophy and biology that it has become impossible for any philosopher of science to write in ignorance of the main concepts and themes of the life sciences. Philosophy owes a debt to the pioneers who saw the importance of biological research.  

29. The Foundations of Physics by David Albert: The quantum-mechanical measurement problem has been a busiest topic within the traditional concerns of philosophy of physics and elsewhere as well, which is branched out some into stuff about the foundations of statistical mechanics and about the theory of relativity. (a) Quantum mechanics more or less boils down to three general principles: 1. A principle of the evolutions of the quantum states of physical systems in time. 2. A principle that connects the physical properties of such systems at any given moment to their quantum states at that moment, there literally fails to be any determinate matter of fact whatever about value of P and T for a system whose state at T is a superposition of differently valued eigenstates of the operator associated with P. 3. A principle that connects the probabilities of given outcomes of given measurements on such system to their quantum states at the moment just before those measurements occur. These principles, taken together, amount to what is by far, and beyond all dispute, the most empirically successful theory in the history of physics. (b) There is a famous tension between fundamental microscopic physical theory and everyday macroscopic human experience about the question of precisely how the past is different from the future. The physical furniture of the universe consists entirely of point particles. The only dynamical variables of such particles are their positions; consequently, a list of what particles exist, of what sorts of particles they are, and of what their positions are at all times, is a list of absolutely everything there is to say about the physical history of the world. Newtonian mechanics has a number of what are referred to in the literature as fundamental symmetries. What that means is the Newtonian mechanics entails (that F = ma entails) that there are certain sorts of facts about the world which don’t make any dynamical difference. The Newtonian law of motion is that a certain mathematical relation holds, at every instant, between mass and force and acceleration. (c) The foundations of the special and general theories of relativity are based on the ontological structure of space and time. In the character of motion in Newtonian mechanics, the physical furniture of the universe consists entirely of particles. The only spatial facts about the world are the ones about the distances between arbitrary pairs of particles – that there are no facts about the position of any particular particle simpliciter. The sizes of effects depend on things like the velocity of earth.
Chapter V. Summary and Conclusion

Endnotes

33. Frank Jackson, “Consciousness,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy, 310-33.*
Chapter V. Summary and Conclusion

44 Timothy Williamson, “Knowledge and Skepticism,” in The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary, 681-700.
50 Philip Kitcher, “Philosophy of Biology,” in The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy, 819-47.

Photo V-3-1. Merchants in Venice