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Photo III-0-1. Rhetoric: A Lecture at a Knight Academy painted by Pieter Isaacs
Accessed 5 February 2016,
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/54/Knight_academy_lecture_%28Rosenborg_Palace%29.jpg

CHAPTER III
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY FROM 1400 TO 1715
Chapter III. Political Philosophy

Figure III-0-1. For Posterity: Political Philosophy
Accessed 5 February 2016, http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-HgOUlb9C23s/UG2SneEtI0I/AAAAAAAAChE/0cDbqRzjRx8/s1600/PoliticalPhilosophicalCompus.png

Photo III-0-2. Literature and Philosophy 1500-1700
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CHAPTER III. POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY FROM 1400 TO 1715

The pre-Socratic philosophers discovered nature from the cosmos, which was a pre-scientific phase of thought. Philosophy began with Socrates, and his ethical analysis was in “the shift of interest from Nature to Man” for the subject of studies. Plato views that a state consists of three classes – the guardians, the warriors, and the common people – and is ruled by the philosopher king (in the Republic) or laws as the second best (in the Laws); that man and woman are equally educated for their happiness with virtues; and that guardians and soldiers should own common properties. His ideas distinguish knowledge and opinion or absoluteness and relativeness, and he views that the discovery of absoluteness is the end of the intellectual world; human senses disturb the acquisition of knowledge; and true existence is revealed in thought, not in sense. Aristotle was a political scientist rather than a philosopher. In the Metaphysics, he views that the Platonic theory is metaphysical, but the change and movement should be quantitatively and qualitatively explained by verifiable empirical data. Epicureanism and Stoicism served salvation in the Hellenistic and Roman periods, but Neo-Platonism of Porphyry actually played in the final stage of Greek thought by combining its philosophy and Christian religion. He views that virtue (justice) is attaining of likeness to God (holiness), but Christian philosophers never considered the same.

In the Middle Ages, philosophers rediscovered Aristotle, and Aristotelianism was reasonably re-distinguished from Platonism, Epicureanism, Stoicism, and Neo-Platonism. Thomas Aquinas adopted Aristotelianism for Christian faith and recognized philosophy as a rational science that was distinct from Christian theology: reason proves that God is not only true but the very truth itself. John Duns Scotus was nearer to Platonism than Aquinas by viewing that the intellectual activity transcends the power of sense and matter. William of Ockham said that there was no property in the Garden of Eden and property emerged only after people created society, assigning the legal right to use certain things. In the fourteenth century, philosophers believe that factual knowledge comes from immediate observation or science, and nominalists (like Albert Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, and John Duns Scotus) criticized metaphysics by insisting that only physical particulars in space and time are real and all universals are abstract objects, but realists (like William of Ockham) thought that universals do exist over and above particulars. The medieval schoolmen, either Dominicans or Franciscans, tried to harmonize philosophy with theology, but the conflict existed between reason and faith, particularly in the Judeo-Christian doctrine of creation and the metaphysical proofs for the existence of God.

In the fourteenth century, the authority of Church declined while that of science increased. In Italy, a small number of scholars and artists tried to rediscover Greek philosophy and arts. The Renaissance started from the rediscovery of Plato: the substitution of Plato for the Aristotle was expedited by contact with Byzantine scholarship. Their humanistic activities toward the Renaissance were linked to the rejection of ecclesiastical authority. In the fifteenth century, the anomaly in moral and politics of Italy gave rise to the doctrines of Machiavelli, who once served for the Florentine government on diplomatic negotiations and military operations. The humanists including John Wycliffe and John Hus believed that the papal corruption should be corrected by abolishing indulgences, the source of Church finance. In the sixteenth century, Erasmus and Thomas More aimed at ecclesiastical reform within the papal system, but Martin Luther and John Calvin challenged the papal power by rejecting the doctrine of indulgence; and Loyola pursued papal self-reformation. The Reformation brought political and theological disputes: Mariana and Suarez remained in hereditary monarchism. The rise of science transformed the intellectual world from the philosophical into the scientific stage, which was emancipation from the traditional religious authority toward individualism with free thinking and free behaving.
In science, the geocentric system of Ptolemy was challenged by the heliocentric theory of Copernicus published in 1543, which was difficult to prove because of the absence of stellar parallax and the invariable vertical location of falling bodies. Kepler, Brache, Galileo, and Newton scientifically proved their theories to be true. When Luther came to know it, he himself was shocked. The papal authority imprisoned Galileo in a separate house for nine years until his death to avoid the heliocentric shock, which inquisition could not stop the spread of the Copernican theory, but was successful for the Italian universities to control scientific studies particularly in astronomy. Newton achieved many things in science, and his laws of motion and universal gravitation became the basis of modern physics and astronomy. About 1590, two Dutchmen, Zacharias Janssen and his son Hans, discovered the microscope, and another Dutchman named Lippershey invented the telescope in 1608, which Galileo used for his observation of stars. Galileo invented thermometer and his pupil Torricelli the barometer. The air pump was invented by Guericke, clocks were greatly improved, and Gilbert published his book on the magnet in around 1600. In medicine, Harvey discovered the circulation of the blood which was published in 1628; and Leeuwenhoek discovered spermatozoa and bacteria through microscopic observations. Bertrand Russell views that “In 1700 the mental outlook of educated men was completely modern; in 1600, except among a very few, it was still largely medieval.” The proved solar system changed the intellectual world: the planets were originally hurled by the hand of God, but everything went on by itself without further intervention of God. God might remain as Creator (even though doubtful), but the conception of man’s place in the universe was profoundly changed in the Newtonian world. As a result, the light of God was overshadowed by the light of Newton or Newtonian science that is similar to that Newtonian mechanics is later replaced by quantum physics of Einstein, where motion and space are purely relative: the amalgamation of space and time into a different dimension of space-time from the Newtonians.

The Renaissance philosophers discovered the idea of nature as “a self-sufficient unity as a system unified by all-pervading forces of sympathy and attraction and animated by a world-soul rather than,….an external manifestation of God.” The ancient Greeks thought that the universe is governed by an eternal law; and the Stoics viewed that the universe is governed by reason or rational principles following nature. Christian philosophers adapted Stoic concept of natural law to the law of God: Thomas Aquinas considered natural law as part of the eternal law of God. Hugo Grotius viewed that primary laws of nature is natural law expressing the will of God, and secondary laws of nature is civil law depending on human reason. The theory of natural law gave rise to a concept of natural rights by Thomas Hobbes, Samuel Pufendorf, and John Locke. In the state of nature, human beings are free and equal, but insecure in their freedom. Entering political society, they surrender such rights as are necessary for their security and common good. The theory of natural rights provided a philosophical basis for both the American and the French revolutions. Natural law is unwritten law based on human reason and moral principles which are common to all humankind as judgment of conscience; while positive law is the legal enactments of a particular society. Meanwhile, the development of science was accompanied by different methods of studies. The empiricists like Bacon, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume focused on the observation of practical data by the inductive method. The rationalists like Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz emphasized the role of reason in obtaining knowledge by the deductive method. In political philosophy, the absolutism or the theory of the divine right of kings was developed in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, which was not really a philosophical theory, although some thinkers like Robert Filmer and Jacques Bossuet inclined to it. However, the rise of absolutism negatively reflected on natural law and natural rights; which stimulate the idea of social contract employed by Althusius, Grotius, Hobbes, and Locke with different ways.
Chapter II

1. Political Philosophy

In the fourteenth century, politics and economy remained in the medieval structure with local activities: a large political territory was not governable without any type of federalism sharing part of king’s power with local units due to limited transportation and communications; and trade consisted of specified goods moving through fixed routes by monopolized sellers to ports and markets controlled by local governors. In the fifteenth century, trade was rapidly expanded with large returns by the discovery of new lands with reduced constraints, but trade had been protected and encouraged by the local governments. By the sixteenth century, when economic changes were politically significant, absolute monarchy became the prevailing type of government in Western Europe by overturning the feudal system. As ecclesiastical rulers were subjected to royal control more, church’s legal authority over the state disappeared. In Spain, Aragon and Castile merged by marriage and created the most powerful monarchy in Europe until the rule of Philip II. In England, Henry VII founded a strong monarchical government, which initiated Tudor absolutism largely strengthened by Elizabeth. This tendency was delayed in Germany but later followed by Prussia and Austria. In France, after the Hundred Years’ War, a rapid consolidation of royal power won the subjection of three provinces including Burgundy, Brittany, and Anjou before 1500, and the absolute monarchy was firmly established by Louis XIV.

The rise of the modern diplomatic system was a product of the Italian Renaissance from around 1300. “The use of ambassadors became a political strategy in Italy during the 17th century. The political changes in Italy altered the role of ambassadors in diplomatic affairs. Because many of the states in Italy were small in size, they were particularly vulnerable to larger states. The ambassador system was used to disperse information and to protect the more vulnerable states. This practice then spread to Europe during the Italian Wars. The use and creation of ambassadors during the 15th century in Italy has had long-term effects on Europe and, in turn, the world's diplomatic and political progression. Europe still uses the same terms of ambassador rights as they had established in the 16th century, concerning the rights of the ambassadors in host countries as well as the proper diplomatic procedures. An ambassador was used as a representative of the state in which he is from to negotiate and disseminate information in order to keep peace and establish relationships with other states. This attempt was employed in the effort to maintain peaceful relations with nations and make alliances during difficult times.”

In the first three Italian wars (1494-1526), the Italian peninsula was in the anarchy of institutions, but no one but Machiavelli could observe the necessity of national unity. Milan was the first Italian state maintaining a resident embassy at the court of Sigismund, king of Hungary and Holy Roman Emperor, during 1425-32. Before the French invasion over Italy in 1494, Ludovico Sforza of Milan had accredited resident ambassadors to the Spanish and English courts in 1490, the court of Charles VIII of France in 1493. When the war broke out, Sforza could well prepare to the changing environment with information delivered by his ambassadors.

This section discusses political thought of revived Platonism, Aristotelianism, Nicholas of Cusa; philosophy of nature and the scientific movement; and political philosophy of Nicholo Machiavelli. Nicholas of Cusa was Papal legate to Germany, and appointed cardinal for his merits by Pope Nicholas V in 1448 and Prince-Bishop of Brixen two years later. In 1459 he became vicar general in the Papal States. His mystical writings about Christianity include On Learned Ignorance (1440), The Vision of God and On the Peace of Faith (both 1453), and De Concordantia Catholica (1433). Machiavelli was a Renaissance historian in Italy, politician, diplomat, philosopher, and humanist writer. With good experiences in real politics, he wrote The Prince (1313), Discourses on Livy (1517), The Art of War (1521), and Florentine History (1525).
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Photo III-1-1. Fifteenth Century Philosophy, Humanism
Accessed 7 February 2016,

Photo III-1-2. Humanism in Philosophy: A Great Cultural Movement, 1400
Accessed 7 February 2016,
Source: http://www.adnetworkperformance.com/a/display.php?r=338133&cb=1455032917773
Chapter III. Political Philosophy

1-1. The Revival of Platonism, Aristotelianism, and Nicholas of Cusa

In the thirteenth century, Thomas Aquinas asserted an independence of philosophy as a separate branch of study, while in the fourteenth century, theology and philosophy tends to fall apart “as a result of nominalist criticism of traditional metaphysics.” But we consider them as theologians more than philosophers, including William of Ockham and Marsilius of Padua. In the fourteenth century, Meister Eckhart and John Tauler, influenced by Neo-Platonism, established the German mysticism, emphasizing the primacy of mystical theology. At the dawn of the Renaissance, Dante wrote “somewhat bold and unstylistic commentaries” from the standpoint of a medieval; Petrarch set himself against the cult of Aristotelian dialectic and promoted the revival of the classical, and favored “through his vernacular sonnets the growth of the spirit of humanistic individualism;” Boccaccio followed the same; and Chaucer criticized the corruption of the church and pursued all of humanity through entire stories of his Tales. As Florence became the center of new culture, the humanist movement was led by Salutati, de’ Niccoli, Bruni, Valla, and Bracciolini.

One of the most important features in the Italian Renaissance was the rise of a new style and ideal of education, represented by Vittorino da Feltre (1378-1446) and Guarino of Vorona (1370-1460). “The humanistic educational ideal at its best was that of developing the human personality to the full. Ancient literature was regarded as the chief means of education; but moral training, development of character, physical development and awakening of the aesthetic sensibility were not neglected; nor was the ideal of liberal education regarded as in any way incompatible with the acceptance and practice of Christianity. This, however, was the humanistic ideal at its best. In practice, the Italian Renaissance became associated to a certain extent with a growth of moral or amoral individualism and with the pursuit of fame; while in the later stages of the Renaissance, the cult of classical literature degenerated into Ciceronianism, which meant the substitution of the tyranny of Cicero for that of Aristotle. The exchange was scarcely a change for the better. Moreover, while a man like Vittorino da Feltre was a convinced and devout Christian, many figures of the Renaissance were influenced by a spirit of skepticism.”

The ideal of reform did not spring from the Renaissance, which was dominantly cultural, aesthetic and literary in character, although the literary renaissance was allied with efforts to achieve moral and social reformation, and there was a greater emphasis on popular education. “The northern Renaissance lacked much of the splendor of the Italian Renaissance and it was less aristocratic in character; but it was more obviously allied with religious and moral purposes.” Rudolf Agricola (1443-85) was a humanist of the northern Low Countries; Alexander Hegius (1443-98) was a German humanist, as a headmaster for a school at Deventer in the Netherlands, founded by the Brethren of the Common Life. Jacob Wimpfeling (1450-1528) made the University of Heiderberg a center of humanism in western Germany. Among many, Desiderius Erasmus (d. 1436) and Thomas More (d. 1535) devoted to humanism in Europe as discussed in Chapter I. The reformers stressed the need of education, but their motives were mainly in religion rather than humanistic education, as appeared in Martin Luther, Philip Melanchthon, and John Calvin. In the counter-Reformation, humanistic ideal was prominent in the educational system developed by the Society of Jesus. On the other hand, the humanistic phase of the Renaissance naturally inspired a revival of ancient philosophy in its various forms. The Platonic Academy of Florence was founded by Cosimo de’Medici under the influence of George Gemistus Plethon (d. 1464), who adhered to the Platonic or Neo-Platonic tradition; and John Argyropoulos (d. 1486) played a prominent role in the revival of Greek philosophy in Italy. Joh Bessarion of Trebizond (d. 1472), as an Aristotelian, was sent from Byzantium together with Plethon to take part in the Council of Florence (1438-45), and worked for the reunion of the Eastern Church with Rome.
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The Revival of Platonism: John Argyropoulous translated into Greek *De ente et essential* of Thomas Aquinas. “Plethon looked to the renewal of the Platonic tradition for a renewal of life or a reform in Church and State; and if his enthusiasm for Platonism led him into an attack on Aristotle which even Bessarion considered to be somewhat immoderate, it was what he regarded as the spirit of Platonism and its potentialities for spiritual, moral and cultural renewal which inspired him, rather than a purely academic interest in, for example, the Platonic affirmation and the Aristotelian denial of the theory of Ideas. The Platonists considered that the world of the humanistic Renaissance would greatly benefit in practice by absorbing such a doctrine as that of Man as the microcosm and as the ontological bond between the spiritual and the material.”

Marsilius Ficinus (1433-99) was an Italian scholar and Catholic priest who was one of the most influential humanist philosophers of the early Italian Renaissance. He was the first translator of Plato’s complete extant works into Latin, in touching with major academic thinkers and writers of his day. “When Cosimo decided to re-found Plato’s Academy at Florence he chose Ficino as its head. In 1462, Cosimo supplied Ficino with Greek manuscripts of Plato's work, whereupon Ficino started translating the entire corpus to Latin (published 1484). Ficino also produced a translation of a collection of Hellenistic Greek documents found by Leonardo da Pistoia and called Hermetica, later called the Hermetic Corpus...and the writings of many of the Neoplatonists, for example Porphyry, Iamblichus, Plotinus, et al. Ficino tried to synthesize Christianity and Platonism.” The Florentine Academy had great influence on the direction of the Italian Renaissance and the development of European philosophy. His main original work was his treatise on the immortality of the soul, written during 1469-74 and published in 1482: “the main concern of the work is to argue for the existence of an immortal human soul. Ficino employs a number of arguments to do so, including recasting those made by Plato for example in the Phaedo. Ficino ascribes to the human soul a middle position in a five-part division of things: between God and angelic beings on the one side, and qualities and bodies on the other.” He published his *De religione christiana* his most important philosophical work in 1482. He became a priest at his age of forty, and dreamed of drawing atheists and sceptics to Christ by means of the Platonic philosophy.

John Pico della Mirandola (1463-94) was an Italian Renaissance nobleman and philosopher. Learning Latin and Greek, he went to Bologna to study canon law and to Ferrara to study philosophy. He was influenced by Marsilius Ficinus, and the Neo-Platonism and the Pseudo-Dionysius. “He is famed for the events of 1486, when at the age of 23, he proposed to defend 900 theses on religion, philosophy, natural philosophy, and magic against all comers, for which he wrote the *Oration on the Dignity of Man*, which has been called the Manifesto of the Renaissance, and a key text of Renaissance humanism and of what has been called the Hermetic Reformation.” However, a papal commission, “denounced 13 of the theses as heretical, and the assembly was prohibited by Pope Innocent VIII. Despite his ensuing Apologia for the theses, Pico thought it prudent to flee to France but was arrested there. After a brief imprisonment he settled in Florence, where he became associated with the Platonic Academy, under the protection of the Florentine prince Lorenzo de’ Medici. Except for short trips to Ferrara, Pico spent the rest of his life there. He was absolved from the charge of heresy by Pope Alexander VI in 1492. Toward the end of his life he came under the influence of the strictly orthodox Girolamo Savonarola, martyr and enemy of Lorenzo. Pico’s unfinished treatise against enemies of the church includes a discussion of the deficiencies of astrology. Though this critique was religious rather than scientific in its foundation, it influenced the astronomer Johannes Kepler, whose studies of planetary movements underlie modern astronomy. Pico’s other works include an exposition of Genesis under the title Heptaplus, indicating his seven points of argument, and a synoptic treatment of Plato and Aristotle, of which the completed work *De ente et uno* (Of Being and Unity) is a portion.”
John Francis Pico della Mirandola (1469-1533), in his De praenotionibus, discussed the criteria of divine revelation, finding the chief criterion in an inner light. In regard to philosophy, he sharply attacked the Aristotelian theory of knowledge in his work. “He argued that the Aristotelian bases his philosophy on sense-experience, which is supposed to be the source even of those most general principles which are employed in the process of proof. But sense-experience informs one about the conditions of the percipient subject rather than about objects themselves, and the Aristotelian can never proceed from his empiricist basis to a knowledge of substances or essences.”

Leo Hebraeus (1460-1535) was a physician, philosopher, and poet; born in Lisbon and died at Venice. He accompanied his father, Isaac Abravanel, when the latter went to Spain and afterward to Naples, and became physician in ordinary to the Spanish captain-general Gonsalvo de Cordova. Thence he went to Genoa and later to Venice, where he finally settled. He never abandoned the faith of his forefathers. “His most important work, Dialoghi di Amore (Dialogues of Love) was written about 1502, and published at Rome 1535. Its polished Italian and the lofty Platonic spirit with which it is imbued made it very popular. In the space of twenty years it went through five editions and was translated twice into French, three times into Spanish, and once into Latin; later also into Hebrew. Beside this work, he wrote, at the request of Pico de Mirandola, an astronomical work, which has remained unpublished, and several Hebrew poems, which have been embodied in the works of his father. He wrote also an elegy on the vicissitudes of the age in which he lived. This book was quite recently published.”

John Reuchlin (1455-1522) was a learned German, who not only mastered Latin and Greek languages, but also was introduced into Germany and promoted the study of Hebrew, studied in France and Italy, where, at Rome, he came under the influence of John Pico della Mirandola. “In 1520 he became professor of Hebrew and Greek at Ingolstadt; but in 1521 he moved to Tubingen. Looking on the function of philosophy as the winning of happiness in this life and the next, he had little use for the Aristotelian logic and philosophy of nature. Strongly attracted by the Jewish Cabbala, he considered that a profound knowledge of the divine mysteries is to be obtained from that source; and combined his enthusiasm for the Cabbala with an enthusiasm for neo-Pythagorean number-mysticism. In his view Pythagoras had drawn his wisdom from Jewish sources. In other words, Reuchlin, though an eminent scholar, fell a victim to the attractions of the Cabbala and of the fantasies of number-mysticism; and in this respect, he is more akin to the German theosophists and occultists of the Renaissance than to the Italian Platonists. However, he was certainly influenced by the Platonic circle at Florence and by John Pico della Mirandola, who also thought highly by Pythagoreanism, and...he can be mentioned in relation with Italian Platonism.”

“It is clear that the revived Platonism of Italy might just as well, or better, be called Neo-Platonism. But the inspiration of Italian Platonism was not primarily an interest in scholarship, in distinguishing, for example, the doctrines of Plato from those of Plotinus and in critically reconstituting and interpreting their ideas. The Platonic tradition stimulated and provided a framework for the expression of the Renaissance Platonists’ belief in the fullest possible development of man’s higher potentialities and in their belief in nature as the expression of the divine. But though they had a strong belief in the value and possibilities of the human personality as such they did not separate man either from God or from his fellow-men. Their humanism involved neither irreligion nor exaggerated individualism. And though they had a strong feeling for nature were characteristic of the renaissance; but for a pantheistic view of nature we have to turn to other phases of Renaissance thought and not to the Florentine Academy nor, in general, to Italian Platonism. Nor do we find in the Italian Platonists an individualism which discards the ideas of Christian revelation and of the Church.”

Thus, the humanistic movement in Florence inspired a revival of ancient philosophy towards either Platonism or Aristotelianism as below.
Aristotelianism in the Renaissance: A number of humanists attacked the scholastic method and the Aristotelian logic. As noted previously in Chapter I, Laurenzo Valla (1407-57) taught rhetoric at the University of Pavia, where he published his De voluptate (On Pleasure), in which he contrasted the principles of the Stoics with the tenets of Epicurus, openly proclaiming this sympathy with those who claimed the right of free indulgence for man’s natural appetites. He lived at Milan and Genoa before settling down, in 1435, as royal secretary and historian at the court of Alfonso of Aragon, king of Naples. He remained 13 years in Alfonso’s service. During 1439-40, he wrote an essay, Declamatio, demonstrating a false documentation of the Donation of Constantine. “As King Alfonso was at war with Pope Eugenius IV at this time, it was politically convenient to attack the foundation of papal claims to temporal power in Italy. The book was first printed in 1517 in Germany, the same year that Martin Luther circulated his Ninety-five Theses, criticizing papal policies.” Valla wrote other books in his years at Alfonso’s court. “In his brief dialogue De libero arbitrio (On Free Will), Valla attacked the stoic philosopher Boethius (d. 525), who had attempted to reconcile man’s free will with God’s foreknowledge; and in his Dialecticae disputationes (Dialectical Disputations), Valla reduced Aristotle’s nine categories to three (substance, quality, and action, which corresponded to noun, adjective, and verb) and denounced as barbarisms a number of the technical terms of scholastic philosophy, such as entity and quiddity. Valla preferred the language of ordinary people to the jargon of professional philosophers. His Disputations was at once a rhetorician’s attack on logic and an attempt to reduce philosophical problems to linguistic ones.” Valla’s ideas on logic were taken up by Rudolf Agricola and by Luis Vives (d. 1540), a Spanish humanist, who rejected any adherence to the scientific, medical or mathematical ideas of Aristotle. Valla’s Elegantiae linguae Latinae (Elegances of the Latin Language), printed in 1471, was the first textbook of Latin grammar to be written since late antiquity; it became highly popular in grammar schools all over Europe.11

Marius Nizolius (1498-1576) was an Italian humanist scholar, “known as a proponent of Cicero. He considered rhetoric to be the central intellectual discipline, slighting other aspects of the philosophical tradition. “His major work was the Thesaurus Ciceronianus, first published in 1535 in Brixen but not under this title, and running into many further editions. It was a lexicon of Latin words used in Cicero’s works. It was adopted by Renaissance extremists who considered that writing in Latin could only be correct within this restricted vocabulary. His Antibarbarus philosophicus (Parma, 1553) was edited by Leibniz in 1670 with an important Preface. It was a reply in a controversy with Marco Antonio Maioragio (d. 1555), and going back to a dispute from the mid-1540s over the Paradoxes of Cicero.12 Petrus Ramus (1515-72) was an influential French humanist, logician, and educational reformer. A Protestant convert, he was killed during the St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre in 1572. (i) Padagogue: In his Dialecticae partitiones of 1543 and other writings, Ramus was against Aristotelian philosophy by reinvigorating a sense of dialectic: he recommends “the use of summaries, headings, citations and examples.” (ii) Logician: His logic enjoyed a great celebrity for a time, but there is little ground for his claim to supersede Aristotle. He amends the syllogism. (iii) Rhetorician: Ramus narrowed the range of rhetoric, by divorcing rhetoric from dialectic (logic). “Contemporary rhetoricians have tended to reject Ramus’s view in favor of a more wide ranging (and in many respects, Aristotelian) understanding of the rhetorical arts as encompassing a broad range of ordinary language practices.” (iv) Mathematician: He was known as a mathematician, a student of Johannes Sturm. “He considered Euclid’s theory on irrational numbers to be useless. The emphasis on technological applications and engineering mathematics was coupled to an appeal to nationalism.” (v) Ramism: His teaching had a broadly based reception well into the seventeenth century. “Later movements, such as Baconianism, pansophism, and Cartesianism, in different way built on Ramism.”13
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The anti-Aristotelian logic turned to the Aristotelian logic by two scholars, who promoted the study of the writings of Aristotle and opposed the Italian Platonism. George of Trebizond (1395-1484) translated and “commented on a number of Aristotle’s works, and attacked Plethon as the would-be founder of a new neo-Platonic pagan religion.” Theodore of Gaza (1400-78) became a convert to Catholicism and opposed to Plethon. Hermolaus Barbarus (1454-93) also translated works by Aristotle and commentaries by Themistius: saying that “St. Albert, St. Thomas, and Averroes were all philosophical barbarians.” The Aristotelian camp became divided into two groups: the mind of Averroes and the mind of Alexander of Aphrodisias. (i) The Averroist party: Nicoletto Vernias, who lectured at Padua during 1471-99 maintained the Averroistic doctrine of one immortal reason in all men; but later on he abandoned his theologically unorthodox view and defended the position that each man has an individual immortal rational soul. His pupil Agostino Nipho (1473-1546) defended the Averroistic doctrine in his works. (ii) The Alexandrist group: Pietro Pomponazzi (1462-1525) was educated in philosophy and medicine at the University of Padua, and he taught philosophy there intermittently from 1487 to 1509. He also taught at Ferrara and at Bologna until his death. "His treatise on the immortality of the soul, Tractatus de immortalitate animae (1516), was attacked but not officially condemned; and he was allowed to publish a defense of his position in his Apologia (1518) and Defensorium (1519). He contended that the immortality of the individual soul cannot be demonstrated on the basis of Aristotle or of reason, but must be accepted as an article of faith. In developing this view, he maintained that moral action is the only proper goal of human life. Appealing to the Stoic philosophers, rather than to Aristotle, he declared that virtue is its own reward and vice its own punishment...Pomponazzi was also the author of the lengthy treatises De incantationibus (1556; On Incantations), which proposed a natural explanation of several reputedly miraculous phenomena, and De fato (1567; On Fate), which discusses predestination and free will.”

Pomponazzi’s doctrine was followed by Simon Porta of Naples (d. 1555) concerning the mortality of human soul; by Andrew Cesalpino (1519-1603) reconciling the two parties; and Caesar Cremoninus (1550-1631) seeing the idea of nature as a more or less independent system – insisting on the autonomy of physical science; and by Lucilius Vanini (1585-1619) who embraced a kind of pantheism, though he was accused of atheism, and burnt as a heretic at Toulouse. Philip Melanchthon (1479-1560), although an associate and collaborator of Martin Luther, distinguished himself as a humanist. “Educated in the spirit of the humanistic movement, he then fell under Luther’s influence and rejected humanism; but the fact that this narrowness of outlook did not last very long shows that he was always a humanist at heart. He became the leading humanist of the early Protestant movement and was known as the Praeceptor Germaniae (Teacher of Germany) because of his educational work. For the philosophy of Aristotle, he had a lively admiration, though as a thinker he was somewhat eclectic, his ideal being that of moral progress through the study of classical writers and of the Gospels. He had little interest in metaphysics, and his idea of logic was influenced by that of Rudolf Agricola.” In his works, he endeavored to bring Aristotelianism into harmony with revelation and to supplement it by Christian teaching of innate principles, particularly moral principles, and of the innate character of the idea of God, both of which are intuited by means of the lumen naturale. Melanchthon maintained the freedom of the will; this doctrine was at variance with the true theology of original sin. In spite of his great influence, there was always a certain tension between rigid Protestant theology and the Aristotelian philosophy. “Luther himself did not deny all human freedom; but he did not consider that the freedom left to man after the Fall is sufficient to enable him to achieve moral reform. It was only natural, then, that controversy should arise between those who deemed themselves in his Aristotelianism, which was somewhat of a strange bedfellow for orthodox Lutheranism.”

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Justus Lipsius (1547-1606) was a Flemish philologist and humanist. He wrote a series of works designed to revive ancient Stoicism in a form that would be compatible with Christianity. Michel de Montaigne (1533-92) “was one of the most significant philosophers of the French Renaissance, known for popularizing the essay as a literary genre.” He was born to a wealthy family in Aquitaine of France, studied law at the University of Toulouse. Being appointed counselor of the Parlement in Bordeaux (a high court), he became a close friend of humanists. In 1580 Michel de Montaigne (1533-92) published The Complete Essays of Montaigne that was a collection of a large number of short subjective treatments of various topics, inspired by his studies in the classics, especially by the works of Plutarch and Lucretius. “Montaigne's stated goal is to describe humans, and especially himself, with utter frankness. Montaigne's writings are studied as literature and philosophy around the world. Inspired by his consideration of the lives and ideals of the leading figures of his age, he finds the great variety and volatility of human nature to be its most basic features. He describes his own poor memory, his ability to solve problems and mediate conflicts without truly getting emotionally involved, his disdain for the human pursuit of lasting fame, and his attempts to detach himself from worldly things to prepare for his timely death. He writes about his disgust with the religious conflicts of his time. He believed that humans are not able to attain true certainty. The longest of his essays, Apology for Raymond Sebond, contains his famous motto, ‘What do I know?’ Montaigne considered marriage necessary for the raising of children, but disliked strong feelings of passionate love because he saw them as detrimental to freedom. In education, he favored concrete examples and experience over the teaching of abstract knowledge that has to be accepted uncritically…The Essais exercised important influence on both French and English literature, in thought and style. Francis Bacon's Essays, published over a decade later, in 1596, are usually assumed to be directly influenced by Montaigne’s collection, and Montaigne is cited by Bacon alongside other classical sources in later essays.”

From Montaigne, Pierre Charron (1541-1603) acquired his skeptical tendency, coupled with traditional Roman Catholicism, noted in his two major works, Les Trois Vérités (1593; The Three Truths) and De la sagesse (1601; On Wisdom). In the Three Truth being intended as a Counter-Reformation tract against the reformed theology of John Calvin, “Charron claimed that the nature and existence of God are unknowable because of God’s infinitude and man’s weakness. Faith, not reason, he claimed, is necessary for acceptance of Christianity, and only the authority of the traditional Roman Catholic church could make up for the human weaknesses inherent in the reformer’s attempts to know God. In De la sagesse Charron examined further the possibility of knowledge outside of revealed truths, concluding again that the wise man doubts completely because his mental capacities are unreliable. Such skepticism has two benefits, according to Charron: it frees men from prejudices, and it frees men to receive revealed truths. Consequently, the skeptic cannot be a heretic; having no opinions, he cannot have incorrect ones.”

Francis Sanchez (1552-1632) was a Portuguese by birth, who studied at Bordeaux and in Italy and taught medicine first at Montpellier and afterwards at Toulouse. In his Quod nihil scitur of 1580, he maintained that “the human being can know nothing, if the word know is understood in its full sense, that is to say, as referring to the perfect ideal of knowledge. God alone, who has created all things, knows all things. Human knowledge is based wither on sense-perception or on introspection. The former is not reliable, while the latter, though assuring us of the existence of the self, can give no clear idea of it; our knowledge of the self is indefinite and indeterminate. Introspection gives us no picture of the self, and without a picture or image we can have no clear idea. On the other hand, though sense-perception provides us with definite images, these images are far from giving a perfect knowledge of things. Moreover, as the multiplicity of things forms a unified system, no one thing can be perfectly known unless the whole system is known.”
Nicholas of Cusa (1401-64): He was one of the first German proponents of Renaissance humanism, making spiritual and political contribution in European history. “His father was a prosperous boat owner and ferryman. He entered the Faculty of Arts of the Heidelberg University in 1416 as "a cleric of the Diocese of Trier", studying the liberal arts. He seemed to have left Heidelberg soon afterwards, as he received his doctorate in canon law from the University of Padua in 1423. In Padua, he met with the later cardinals Julian Cesarini and Domenico Capranica and became friends with the mathematician Paolo dal Pozzo Toscanelli. Afterwards, he entered the University of Cologne in 1425 as a doctor of canon law, which he appears to have both taught and practiced there…Following a brief period in Cologne, Nicholas returned to his hometown and became secretary to Otto of Ziegenhain, the Prince - Archbishop of Trier. Otto appointed him canon and dean at the stift of Saint Florinus in Koblenz affiliated with numerous prebends. In 1427 he was sent to Rome as an episcopal delegate. The next year he travelled to Paris to study the writings of Ramon Llull…He acquired great knowledge in the research of ancient and medieval manuscripts as well as in textual criticism and the examination of primary sources. In 1433 he identified the Donation of Constantine as a fake, confirmed by Lorenzo Valla a few years later, and revealed the forgery of the Pseudo-Isidorian Decretals.19

At the Council of Basel in 1432, he gained recognition for his opposition to the candidate put forward by Pope Eugenius IV for the archbishopric of Trier. “To his colleagues at the council he dedicated De concordantia catholica (1433), in which he expressed support for the supremacy of the general councils of the church over the authority of the papacy. In the same work he discussed the harmony of the church, drawing a pattern for priestly concord from his knowledge of the order of the heavens. By 1437, however, finding the council unsuccessful in preserving church unity and enacting needed reforms, Nicholas reversed his position and became one of Eugenius’ most ardent followers. Ordained a priest about 1440, Cusa was made a cardinal in Brixen, Italy, by Pope Nicholas V and in 1450 was elevated to bishop there. For two years Cusa served as Nicholas’ legate to Germany, after which he began to serve full-time as bishop of Brixen. A model of the Renaissance man because of his disciplined and varied learning, Cusa was skilled in theology, mathematics, philosophy, science, and the arts. In De docta ignorantia (1440; On Learned Ignorance) he described the learned man as one who is aware of his own ignorance. In this and other works he typically borrowed symbols from geometry to demonstrate his points, as in his comparison of man’s search for truth to the task of converting a square into a circle.20

“Among Cusa’s other interests were diagnostic medicine and applied science. He emphasized knowledge through experimentation and anticipated the work of the astronomer Copernicus by discerning a movement in the universe that did not center in the Earth, although the Earth contributed to that movement. Cusa’s study of plant growth, from which he concluded that plants absorb nourishment from the air, was the first modern formal experiment in biology and the first proof that air has weight. Numerous other developments, including a map of Europe, can also be traced to Cusa…left an extensive library that remains a center of scholarly activity in the hospital he founded.” “Shortly after the Fall of Constantinople in 1453, Nicholas wrote De pace fidei, On the Peace of Faith. This visionary work imagined a summit meeting in Heaven of representatives of all nations and religions. Islam and the Hussite movement in Bohemia are represented. The conference agrees that there can be una religio in varietate rituum, a single faith manifested in different rites, as manifested in the eastern and western rites of the Catholic Church. The dialog presupposes the greater accuracy of Christianity but gives respect to other religions. Less ironic but not virulent, is Cusanus’ Cribratio Alchorani, Sifting the Koran, a detailed review of the Koran in Latin translation. While the arguments for the superiority of Christianity are still shown in this book, it also credits Judaism and Islam with sharing in the truth at least partially.”21
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(a) *De docta ignorantia* (On Learned Ignorance, 1440): Learned ignorance means that “since mankind cannot grasp the infinity of a deity through rational knowledge, the limits of science need to be passed by means of speculation. This mode of inquiry blurs the borders between science and ignorance. In other words, both reason and a supra-rational understanding are needed to understand God. This leads to the *coincidentia oppositorum*, a union of opposites, a doctrine common in mystic beliefs from the Middle Ages.” Simply bypassing much of traditional Scholastic theology, Nicholas opened the way to the astronomy of Galileo, Kepler, and Copernicus and to modern science: “Only when it was believed that everything outside of God was of the same limited and finite value could the shift from quality to quantity, from evaluation to measurement, which characterizes modern science, take place.”

(b) *De vision Dei* (The Vision of God, 1453) represents a shift from the theological-objective mysticism to the psychological-subjective mysticism that has developed since the Middle Ages. *De pace fidei* (On the Peace of Faith, 1453) writes on religious toleration. After the fall of Constantinople to the Turks, “God is prevailed upon to convene in Jerusalem under angelic auspices – a Greek, an India, a Jew, a Persian, a Spaniard, a Turk, a Syrian, a Germany, etc. – to try to reduce all diversity of religion to one.” This unity in diversity is possibly related to political thought of Nicholas, as he frequently referring to both organized society and the community of faith. He assumed that human mind seeks truth eventually led to the truth of Christ, the Trinity, and the universal Church. The Church has three dimensions: Triumphant, suffering, and militant; while man is threefold: spirit, mind, and body. “Nicholas sees the universe as an indicate balance of opposites that finds an ultimate resolution in an unscrutable God. But God does spear in the world: the world is a contraction of the divine. God’s unity unfolds in the multiplicity of the world and finite nature is potentially infinite. These tenets all implied that nature is a worthy and fit object of study for its own sake. It was philosophies like that of Nicholas of Cusa, rather than philosophies like that of William of Ockham, which actually formed the mental background of the age in which the great scientists…lived and worked.”

(c) *De Concordantia Catholica*: Book I begins with a discussion of the hierarchical and triadic character of the universe: “From the one peaceful King of infinite concordance flows a sweet and spiritual harmony in different grades and series to all subordinate members united with Him…The Church is a fraternity bound together in common consent. But, then, other institutions are also bound together by means of the strange chemistry that transforms private persons into public persons, that creates a sense of group unity through individual feelings of agency.” Book II contains the defense of consent. “The idea of consent had long played a role in medieval legal theory, even as the ideal of the rule of one man – the wise prince – dominated political theory. Nicholas, trained in canon law as well as steeped in conciliarist arguments, is able to combine the differing elements. Therefore since all men are by nature free, then every rulership whether it is by written law or by living law through a prince, which restrains the subjects from evil and directs their freedom to good though fear of punishment can only come from the agreement and consent of the subjects…The defense of both the rule of wisdom and the need for consent was based on an appeal to natural law…Natural law and divine law tended to merge in Nicholas and consent was seen as a common factor in uniting Christ and his Church as well as the prince and his people.” Book III writes on the Empire: “Legislation ought to be adopted by all or a majority of those who are bound by it…What touches all ought to be approved by all…priests should be elected by congregations, bishops should be elected by priests with the consent of congregations, bishops should elect metropolitan, and metropolitan should elect cardinals.” He sees that the social, political, and religious ills are faulty and inefficient taxation, administrative confusion, dereliction of duty, warfare for selfish interests, and general lack of concord; so reform is needed.”
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1-2. Philosophy of Nature and the Scientific Movement of the Renaissance

There remained differences in idea of nature between Nicholas of Cusa and the other philosopher of nature which appeared at the time of the Renaissance. “Nicholas’s idea of nature was theocentric; and in this aspect of his philosophy, he stands close to the leading philosophers of the Middle Ages; but we have seen how in his thought the idea of Nature as an infinite system, in which the earth occupies no privileged position, came to the fore. With a number of other Renaissance thinkers, there arose the idea of nature considered as a self-sufficient unity, as a system unified by all-prevailing forces of sympathy and attraction, and animated by a world-soul, rather than, as with Nicholas of Cusa, as an external manifestation of God. By these philosophers, nature was regarded practically as an organism, in regard to which the sharp distinctions, characteristic of medieval thought, between living and non-living and between spirit and matter, lost their meaning and application. Philosophies of this type naturally tended to be pantheistic in character. In certain respects, they had an affinity with aspects of the revived Platonism or Neo-Platonism of the Renaissance; but whereas the Platonists laid emphasis on the supernatural and on the soul’s ascend to God, the philosophers of nature emphasized rather nature itself considered as a self-sufficient system. This is not to say that all the Renaissance thinkers who are usually regarded as natural philosophers’ abandoned Christian theology or looked on themselves as revolutionaries; but the tendency of their thought was to loosen the bonds which bound nature to the supernatural. They tended to naturalism. It is, however, rather difficult to make general judgments about those Renaissance thinker whom historians are accustomed to classify as natural philosophers or philosophers of nature; or perhaps one should say rather that it is dangerous to do so.”

On the other hand, the scientific development also profoundly influenced on European life and thought at the time of the Renaissance. Philosophy does not pursue an isolated path of its own, without any contact with other factors of human culture. “When, however, it is seen that it does not develop in the same way as science, the realization of fact is likely to give rise to the question whether the prevalent conception of philosophy should not be revised. Why is it, as Kant asked, that science progresses and that universal and necessary scientific judgments can be made and are made, while philosophy in its traditional form does not lead to comparable results and does not seem to progress in the way that science progresses?” Frederick Copleston explains “that philosopher cannot increase our knowledge of things in the way that the scientist can, though he may still perform a use function in the province of logical analysis…Thus the concrete progress of the sciences may lead to the development of a new field of philosophic analysis, which could not have been developed apart from actual scientific studies and achievements, since it takes the form of reflection on the method actually use in science. Further, one can trace the influence of a particular science on a particular philosopher’s thought. One can trace, for example, the influence of mathematics on Descartes, of mechanics on Hobbes, the rise of historical science on Hegel or of biology and the evolutionary hypothesis on Bergson…But my object in making these remarks was simply the general one of illustrating, even if in an inevitably inadequate manner, the influence of science upon philosophy. Science is not, of course, the only extra-philosophical factor which exercises an influence upon philosophic thought. Philosophy is influenced also by other factors in human culture and civilization. So, too, is science for the matter of that. Nor is one entitled to conclude from the influence of science and other factors upon philosophy that philosophic thought is itself powerless to exercise any influence upon other cultural elements. I do not think that this is in fact the case. But the point which is relevant to my present purpose is the influence of science upon philosophy…anything very definite can be said about the influence of Renaissance science in particular on philosophic thought something must be said about…”
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Philosophy of Nature (I): (a) **Girolamo Francastoro** (1483-1553) was celebrated Italian physician, poet, astronomer, and geologist. He was born in Verona, Venice, and educated at Padua where at 19 he was appointed professor at the University; where Fracastoro was a colleague of the astronomer Copernicus. “As a physician, he maintained a private practice in Verona. He is best-known for *Syphilis sive morbus Gallicus* (1530; Syphilis or the French Disease), a work in rhyme giving an account of the disease, which he named. He made an intense study of epidemic diseases, and, while in the service of Pope Paul III at the Council of Trent (1545–63), he provided the medical justification for the removal of the council to the papal state of Bologna by pointing out the danger of plague in the north Italian town of Trent. Fracastoro outlined his concept of epidemic diseases in *De contagione et contagiosis morbis* (1546; On Contagion and Contagious Diseases), stating that each is caused by a different type of rapidly multiplying minute body and that these bodies are transferred from the infector to the infected in three ways: by direct contact; by carriers such as soiled clothing and linen; and through the air. Although microorganisms had been mentioned as a possible cause of disease by the Roman scholar Marcus Varro in the 1st century BC, Fracastoro’s was the first scientific statement of the true nature of contagion, infection, disease germs, and modes of disease transmission. Fracastoro’s theory was widely praised during his time, but its influence waned, and it fell into general disrepute until an experimental version was later elaborated by German physician Robert Koch and French chemist Louis Pasteur.”

The germ theory of disease states that some diseases are caused by microorganisms, which invade humans, animals, and other living hosts, in which their reproduction cause a disease. “The germ theory was proposed by Girolamo Fracastoro in 1546, but scientific evidence in support of this accumulated slowly and Galen's miasma theory remained dominant among scientists and doctors. A transitional period began in the late 1850s as the work of Louis Pasteur and Robert Koch provided convincing evidence; by 1880, miasma theory was largely abandoned by scientists. This led to a golden era of bacteriology in which the theory quickly led to the identification of the actual organisms that cause many diseases. Viruses were discovered in the 1890s.”

Regarding knowledge and nature, in his *De sympathia et antipathia rerum* (1542), Fracastoro postulated “the existence of sympathies and antipathies between objects, that is, of forces of attraction and repulsion, to explain the movements of bodies in their relations to one another. The names sympathy and antipathy may appear perhaps to be symptomatic of a romantic outlook; but Fracastoro explained the mode of operation of these forces by postulating *corpuscula* or *corpora sensibilia* which are emitted by bodies and enter through the pores of other bodies. Applying this line of thought to the problem of perception, he postulated the emission of *species* or images which enter the peripient subject. This theory obviously renewed the mechanical theories of perception put forward in ancient times by Empedocles, Democritus and Epicurus, even though Fracastoro did not adopt the general atomistic theory of Democritus. A view of this kind emphasizes the passivity of the subject in its perception of external objects, and in his *Turrius sive de intellectione* (1555), he says that understanding (intellection) is but the representation of an object to the mind, the result of the reception of a *species* of the object. From this he drew the conclusion that understanding is probably purely passive. It is true that he also postulated a special power, which he named *subnotio*, of experiencing or apprehending the various impressions of a thing as a totality possessing relations which are present in the object itself or as a meaningful whole. So one is not entitled to say that he denied any activity on the part of the mind. He did not deny the mind’s reflective power nor its power to construct universal concepts or terms. Moreover, the use of the term species was obviously derived from the Aristotelian-Scholastic tradition. Nonetheless, Fracastoro’s theory of perception has a strongly marked naturalistic character. Perhaps it is to be associated with his interests as a medieval man.”
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(b) **Girolamo Cardano** (1501-76), born in Pavia of Milan, was a physician, mathematician, and astrologer who gave the first clinical description of typhus fever and whose book *Ars magna* (The Great Art; or, The Rules of Algebra) is one of the cornerstones in the history of algebra. “Educated at the universities of Pavia and Padua, Cardano received his medical degree in 1526. In 1534 he moved to Milan, where he lived in great poverty until he became a lecturer in mathematics. Admitted to the college of physicians in 1539, he soon became rector. His fame as a physician grew rapidly, and many of Europe’s crowned heads solicited his services; however, he valued his independence too much to become a court physician. In 1543 he accepted a professorship in medicine in Pavia. Cardano was the most outstanding mathematician of his time. In 1539 he published two books on arithmetic embodying his popular lectures, the more important being *Practica arithmetica et mensurandi singularis* (Practice of Mathematics and Individual Measurements). His *Ars magna* (1545) contained the solution of the cubic equation, for which he was indebted to the Venetian mathematician Niccolò Tartaglia, and also the solution of the quartic equation found by Cardano’s former servant, Lodovico Ferrari. His *Liber de ludo aleae* (The Book on Games of Chance) presents the first systematic computations of probabilities, a century before Blaise Pascal and Pierre de Fermat. Cardano’s popular fame was based largely on books dealing with scientific and philosophical questions, especially *De subtilitate rerum* (The Subtlety of Things), a collection of physical experiments and inventions, interspersed with anecdotes. Cardano’s favorite son, having married a disreputable girl, poisoned her and was executed in 1560. Cardano never recovered from the blow. From 1562 he was a professor in Bologna, but in 1570 he was suddenly arrested on the accusation of heresy. After several months in jail he was permitted to abjure privately, but he lost his position and the right to publish books. Before his death he completed his autobiography, *De propria vita* (The Book of My Life).^{30}

Cardano's philosophy is influenced by characteristic trends of late scholastic Aristotelianism, with a strong penchant for Averroist interpretations. “Cardano shows a great interest in Averroist opinion that one intellect would perform intellective functions for all human beings. However, he tends to provide a historicized version of this radical view, in that he looks at the one intellect as the varying amount of learning accumulated by mankind throughout the centuries rather than simply justifying it from a purely epistemological point of view. Cardano's philosophy also displays clear traces of Platonic influences, absorbed through the reading of Marsilio Ficino's recent translations and commentaries, especially Plotinus and Iamblichus. Together with his impressive knowledge of astrological and medical literature, both scholasticism and Platonism give a characteristically vitalistic slant to his cosmological views. Cardano's philosophy has often been described as suggestive and rich in original intuitions, but cluttered and inconsistent as a whole. In fact, his philosophical work is yet another example, common during the Renaissance, of how different philosophical traditions could converge into one composite but coherent picture. Throughout his life, from his early endeavors in the 1540 to the last philosophical attempt, Cardano demonstrated a distinctive commitment to a certain number of philosophical issues: the relationship between oneness and multiplicity, with the notable corollaries dealing with order and disorder, determinism and chance, life and decay; the view of the intellect as the ultimate principle of reality and knowledge; a general theory of celestial heat, described as the main formative agent in nature; the interplay of nature and the soul in the organization of the universe; a general doctrine of the immortality of the soul, seen as the foundation of both cognitive clarity and moral certitude. As a whole, the originality of Cardano's eclecticism lies in the unique way in which he characterizes the interdependence of life, knowledge and matter, in which a pronounced sense of reality and truth is constantly being questioned and jeopardized by a realistic view of human nature, mercilessly presented as prone to fear, delusion and deceit.”^{31}
(c) **Bernardino Telesio** (1509-88) was a philosopher and natural scientist who inaugurated the Renaissance empiricist reaction against the practice of reasoning without reference to concrete data. “Born of noble parentage, Telesio received a doctorate in 1535 and joined the group of thinkers known as the *Accademia Cosentina*. After spending nine years in a monastery, he lived in Naples and Cosenza. The first two books of his major work, *De natura juxta propria principia* (On Nature According to Its Own Principles), were published in 1565, and the complete edition of nine books appeared in 1586. Although Telesio had been encouraged in his writings by contemporary Roman Catholic popes, this work and two of his minor works remained on the Roman Catholic Church’s Index of Forbidden Books from 1596 until 1900. “According to Telesio, the fundamental causes of natural events are the warm and cold elements, the opposition between which is concretely represented by the traditional antithesis between heaven and earth. In addition to these two elements Telso postulated a third, passive matter, which becomes distended or rarified through the activity of the warm and compressed through the activity of the cold element. In the bodies of animals and men, there is present the spirit, a fine emanation of the warm element, which passes throughout the body by means of the nerves though it is properly situated in the brain. This idea of spirit goes back to the Stoic theory of the *penuma* which was itself derived from the medical schools of Greece, and it reappears on the philosophy of Descartes under the name animal spirits. The spirit, which is a kind of psychological substance, can receive impressions produced by external things and can renew them in the memory. The spirit has thus the function of receiving sense-impressions and of anticipating future sense-impressions; and analogical reasoning from case to case is grounded in sense-perception and memory. Reasoning beings, then, with sense-perception and its function is to anticipate sense-perception, in that its conclusions or anticipations of future experience must be empirically verified...On the other hand, he admitted the idea of empty space, which is not a thing but rather the system of relations between things.”

“The fundamental natural drive or instinct in man is that of self-preservation. This is the ruling instinct in animals as well, and even in an organic matter, which is non-living only in a comparative sense, as is shown by the omnipresence of motion, a symptom of life...Thus love and hate are feelings directed respectively towards that which promotes and that which hinders self-preservation, while joy is the feeling attendant on self-preservation. The cardinal virtues, prudence, for example, and fortitude, are all various forms in which the fundamental instinct expresses itself in its fulfillment, whereas sadness and kindred emotions reflect a weakening of the vital impulse, We have here an obvious anticipation of Spinoza’s analysis of the emotions. Telesio did not thin, however, that man can be analyzed and explained exclusively in biological terms. For man is able to transcend the biological urge to self-preservation; he can even neglect his own happiness and expose himself freely to death. He can also strive after union with God and contemplate the divine. One must postulate, therefore, the presence in man of a *forma superaddita*, the immortal formal soul, which informs body and spirit, and which is capable of union with God. The professed method of Telesio was the empirical method; for he looked to sense-experience for knowledge of the world and regarded reasoning as little more than a process of anticipating future sense-experience on the basis of past experience. He may thus be regarded as having outlined, even if somewhat crudely, one aspect of scientific method. At the same time, he propounded a aspect of scientific method. At the same time, he propounded a philosophy which went far beyond what could be empirically verified by sense-perception...emphasized by Patrizzi...But the combination of a hostility towards Scholastic abstractions not only with an enthusiasm for immediate sense-experience but also with insufficiently-grounded philosophical speculations was not uncharacteristic of Renaissance thought, which was in many respects both rich and undisciplined.”
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(d) Francesco Patrizzi (1529-97) was born to a noble family today in Croatia. “As a young man, he traveled the Mediterranean with his uncle, who commanded a galley in the wars against the Ottoman Empire. He gained the patronage of the Greek Orthodox Bishop of Cyprus, who brought him to Venice, where his abilities were immediately recognized. He studied economy in Venice, then he moved to study in Ingolstadt under the patronage of his cousin. Then he went to study medicine and philosophy at the University of Padua. Here he was elected twice as a representative of the students from Dalmatia. After graduation he lived in different cities in Italy: Ancona, Rome, Bologna, Ferrara, Venice. He later moved to Cyprus where he spent seven years. Here he attended upon the Bishop of Cyprus who send him back to Italy, where he traveled to Venice, Padua, Genoa, and even to Barcelona. He finally went to live in Ferrara, a center of Platonism in Italy, where he was appointed to the chair of philosophy at the University of Ferrara by Duke Alfonso II. He was subsequently invited in Rome by Pope Clement VIII in 1592, where he spent five years as the chair of Platonic philosophy. Here he became a member of the Council of St. Jerome, at the Illyrian College of St. Jerome.”

In spite of his continual controversies with the Aristotelians, Patricius managed to make a comprehensive study of contemporary science, publishing in 15 books a treatise on the New Geometry (1587), as well as works on history, rhetoric and the art of war. “He studied ancient theories of music, and is said to have invented the thirteen-syllable verse form...In his philosophy he was mainly concerned to defend Plato against the followers of Aristotle. His two great works, *Discussionum peripateticorum libri* XV (Basel, 1571), and *Nova de universis philosophia* (New Philosophy of Universes, Basel, 1591), developed the view that, whereas Aristotle’s teaching was in direct opposition to Christianity, Plato, on the contrary, foreshadowed the Christian revelation and prepared the way for its acceptance. In the earlier treatise he attacks the life and character of Aristotle, impugns the authenticity of almost all his works, and attempts to refute his doctrines from a theological standpoint. In the second and greater work he goes back to the theories and methods of the Ionians and the Presocratics in general. Patricius’ theory of the universe is that, from God there emanated Light which extends throughout space and is the explanation of all development. This Light is not corporeal and yet is the fundamental reality of things. From Light came Heat and Fluidity; these three together with Space make up the elements out of which all things are constructed. This cosmic theory is a curious combination of materialistic and abstract ideas; the influence of his master Bernardino Telesio, generally predominant, is not strong enough to overcome his inherent disbelief in the adequacy of purely scientific explanation. His practical work included a scheme for diverting a river to protect Ferrara and military strategy.”

In other words, Patrizzi had recourse to the ancient light-theme of the Platonic tradition. “God is the original and uncreated light, from which proceeds the visible light. This light is the active, formative principle in nature, and as such it cannot be called wholly material. Indeed, it is a kind of intermediary being which constitutes a bond between the purely spiritual and the purely material and inert. But besides light it is necessary to postulate other fundamental factor in nature. One of these is space, which Patrizzi describes in a rather baffling manner. Space is subsistent existence, inhering in nothing. It is, the, a substance? It is not, say Patrizzi, and individual substance composed of matter and form, and it does not fall within the category of substance. On the other hand, it is a substance in some sense; for it inheres in nothing else. It cannot therefore be identified with quantity. Or, if it is, it is not to be identified with any quantity which falls under the category of quantity: it is the source and origin of all empirical quantity...It is neither purely spiritual; nor is it on the other hand a corporeal substance; that is it incorporeal body, abstract extension which precedes, logically at least, the production of distinct bodies and which can be logically constructed out of minima or points.” The boundary of his philosophy is curious.
(e) **Tommaso Campanella** (1568-1639): Entering the Dominican order in 1583, he was influenced by the work of Italian philosopher Telesio, an opponent of Scholastic Aristotelianism. Without permission from his order, Campanella went in 1589 to Naples, where he published *Philosophia sensibus demonstrata* (1591; Philosophy Demonstrated by the Senses). Reflecting Telesio’s concern for an empirical approach to philosophy, it stressed the necessity for human experience as a basis for philosophy. The work resulted in his arrest, trial, and brief imprisonment for heresy. On his release, he went to Padua, where he was arrested, charged with sodomy (1593), acquitted, and then charged with having engaged a Jew in a debate over matters of Christian faith. Sent to Rome for trial, he renounced in 1596 the heresy of which he had been accused. Campanella’s interest in pragmatism and in political reform were already evident in such early writings as *De monarchia Christianorum* (1593; On Christian Monarchy) and *Dialogo politico contra Luterani, Calvinisti ed altri eretici* (1595; Political Dialogue Against Lutherans, Calvinists, and Other Heretics), in which he asserted that sinful humanity can be regenerated through a religious reformation founded on establishment of a universal ecclesiastical empire. These abstractions yielded to a more limited, though still utopian, plan of reform after his return to Stilo in 1598, where the misery of the people moved him deeply. In accordance with this plan, Campanella became in 1599 the spiritual leader of a plot to overthrow Spanish rule in Calabria. The plot was discovered, and he was arrested and taken to Naples. Forced under torture to confess his leadership in the plot, he feigned madness to escape death and was sentenced to life imprisonment. In prison Campanella reverted...and wrote his celebrated utopian work, *La città del sole*. His ideal commonwealth was to be governed by men enlightened by reason, with every man’s work designed to contribute to the good of the community. Private property, undue wealth, and poverty would be nonexistent, for no man would be permitted more than he needed.

His philosophical works include *Philosophia sensibus demonstrata* (1591), *De sensu rerum* (1620), *Atheismus triumphatus* (1631) and *Philosophia universalis seu metaphysica* (1637). “He insisted on the direct investigation of nature as the source of our knowledge about the world. He tended also to interpret reasoning on the same lines as those laid down by Telesio. But the inspiration of his thought was different. If he emphasized sense-perception and the empirical study of nature, he did so because nature is, as he put it, the living statue of God, the mirror or image of God. There are two main ways of coming to a knowledge of God, first the study with the aid of the sense of God’s self-revelation in nature, and secondly the Bible. That nature is to be regarded as a manifestation of God was, of course, a familiar theme in medieval thought...But the Renaissance Dominican laid stress on the actual observation of nature. It is not primarily a question of finding mystical analogies in nature, as with St. Bonaventure, but rather of reading the book of nature as it lies open to sense-perception...Arguing against skepticism, Campanella maintained that we can at least know that we do not know this or that, or that we doubt whether this or that is the case. Moreover, in the act of doubting one’s own existence is revealed...in the consciousness of one’s own existence, there is also given the consciousness of what is other than oneself: in the experience of finitude is given the knowledge that other being exist.” “We come to recognize the primary attributes of being through reflection on ourselves. Every man is aware that he can act or that he has some power, that he can know something and that he wills or has love. We then ascribe these attributes of power, wisdom and love to God, the infinite being, in the highest possible degree, and we find them in non-human finite things in varying degrees. This is an interesting point because it illustrates Campanella’s tendency to imply that we interpret nature on an analogy with ourselves. We perceive the effects of things on ourselves, and we find ourselves limited and conditioned by things other than ourselves. We attribute to them, therefore, activities and functions analogous to those we perceived in ourselves.”

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*Book III. From the Renaissance to the Scientific Revolution, 1400-1715*
Giordano Bruno (1548-1600) was the son of a professional soldier. In 1562 Bruno went to Naples to study the humanities, logic, and dialectics. In 1565 he entered the Dominican convent of San Domenico Maggiore in Naples. Because of his unorthodox attitudes, he was soon suspected of heresy. Nevertheless, in 1572 he was ordained as a priest, and sent back to the Neapolitan convent to continue his study of theology. In July 1575 Bruno completed the prescribed course, which generated in him an annoyance at theological subtleties. He had read two forbidden commentaries by Erasmus and freely discussed the Arian heresy, so a trial for heresy was prepared against him. Bruno fled to Rome in February 1576 and abandoned the Dominican Order, and, after wandering in northern Italy, he went in 1578 to Geneva, where he earned his living by proofreading. He formally embraced Calvinism; after publishing a broadsheet against a Calvinist professor, but he discovered that the Reformed Church was no less intolerant than the Catholic. He was arrested, excommunicated, rehabilitated after retraction, and finally moved to France, first to Toulouse and then in 1581 to Paris. “In Paris Bruno at last found a congenial place to work and teach. Despite the strife between the Catholics and the Huguenots, the court of Henry III was then dominated by the tolerant faction of the Politiques...he received the protection of the French king, who appointed him one of his temporary lecteurs royaux. In 1582 Bruno published three mnemotechnical works, in which he explored new means to attain an intimate knowledge of reality. He also published a vernacular comedy, Il candelaio (1582; The Candlemaker), which, through a vivid representation of contemporary Neapolitan society, constituted a protest against the moral and social corruption of the time. In the spring of 1583 Bruno moved to London with an introductory letter from Henry III for his ambassador... He was soon attracted to Oxford, where, during the summer, he started a series of lectures in which he expounded the Copernican theory maintaining the reality of the movement of the Earth. Because of the hostile reception of the Oxonians, however, he went back to London as the guest of the French ambassador.”

In early 1584, Bruno started writing his Italian dialogues: three cosmological on the theory of universe, and three moral. “In the Cena de le Ceneri (1584; The Ash Wednesday Supper), he not only reaffirmed the reality of the heliocentric theory but also suggested that the universe is infinite, constituted of innumerable worlds substantially similar to those of the solar system. In the same dialogue he anticipated his fellow Italian astronomer Galileo Galilei by maintaining that the Bible should be followed for its moral teaching but not for its astronomical implications... In the De la causa, principio e uno (1584; Concerning the Cause, Principle, and One) he elaborated the physical theory on which his conception of the universe was based: form and matter are intimately united and constitute the one. Thus, the traditional dualism of the Aristotelian physics was reduced by him to a monistic conception of the world, implying the basic unity of all substances and the coincidence of opposites in the infinite unity of Being. In the De l’infinito universo e mondi (1584; On the Infinite Universe and Worlds), he developed his cosmological theory by systematically criticizing Aristotelian physics; he also formulated his Averroistic view of the relation between philosophy and religion, according to which religion is considered as a means to instruct and govern ignorant people, philosophy as the discipline of the elect who are able to behave themselves and govern others. The Spaccio de la bestia trionfante (1584; The Expulsion of the Triumphant Beast), the first dialogue of his moral trilogy, is a satire on contemporary superstitions and vices, embodying a strong criticism of Christian ethics - particularly the Calvinistic principle of salvation by faith alone, to which Bruno opposes an exalted view of the dignity of all human activities. The Cabala del cavallo Pegaseo (1585; Cabal of the Horse Pegasus), similar to but more pessimistic than the previous work, includes a discussion of the relationship between the human soul and the universal soul... In the De gli eroici furori (1585; The Heroic Frenzies), Bruno, making use of Neoplatonic imagery, treats the attainment of union with the infinite One.”
In October 1585 returning to Paris, Bruno entered into a polemic with a protégé of the Catholic party, and in May 1586 he dared to attack Aristotle publicly in his *Centum et viginti articuli de natura et mundo adversus Peripateticos* (120 Articles on Nature and the World Against the Peripatetics), so Bruno left Paris. “He went to Germany, where he wandered from one university city to another, lecturing and publishing a variety of minor works, including the *Articuli centum et sexaginta* (1588; 160 Articles) against contemporary mathematicians and philosophers, in which he expounded his conception of religion - a theory of the peaceful coexistence of all religions based upon mutual understanding and the freedom of reciprocal discussion. At Helmstedt, however, in January 1589 he was excommunicated by the local Lutheran Church. He remained in Helmstedt until the spring, completing works on natural and mathematical magic (posthumously published) and working on three Latin poems - *De tripli minimo et mensura* (On the Threefold Minimum and Measure), *De monade, numero et figura* (On the Monad, Number, and Figure), and *De immenso, innumerabilibus et infigurabilibus* (On the Immeasurable and Innumerable) - which re-elaborate the theories expounded in the Italian dialogues and develop Bruno’s concept of an atomic basis of matter and being. To publish these, he went in 1590 to Frankfurt am Main, where the senate rejected his application to stay.” In August 1591, Bruno went to Venice and to Padua in the late summer of 1591 to teach a private course for German students, and composed the *Praelectiones geometricae* (Lectures on Geometry) and *Ars deformationum* (Art of Deformation), but he returned to Venice, and took part in the discussions of progressive Venetian aristocrats who, like Bruno’s philosophy. Bruno’s liberty came to an end when Mocenigo denounced him to the Venetian Inquisition in May 1592 for his heretical theories. Bruno was arrested and tried in Rome. During the trial period, he failed to defend himself, but was burnt at the stake.

Bruno’s thought was not simply inspired by the Neo-Platonic tradition as interpreted in a pantheistic sense, but also deeply influenced by the astronomical hypothesis of Copernicus. “Bruno was not a scientist, and he cannot be said to have contributed to the scientific verification of the hypothesis; but he developed speculative conclusions from it with characteristic boldness, and his ideas acts as a stimulus on other thinkers. He envisaged a multitude of solar systems in limitless space. Our sun is simply one star among others, and it occupies no privileged position: still less does the earth. Indeed, all judgments about position are, as Nicholas of Cusa said, relative; and no one star or planet can be called the center of the universe in an absolute sense. There is no center, and there is absolute up or down. Moreover, from the fact that the earth is inhabited by rational beings we are not entitled to draw the conclusion that it is unique indignity or that it is the center of the universe from the valuational point of view: for all we know, the presence of life, even rational beings like ourselves, may not be confined to this planet. The solar systems rise and perish, but all together they form one developing system, indeed one organism animated by the world-soul. Bruno did not confine himself to maintaining that the earth moves and that judgments of position are relative: he linked up the Copernican hypothesis of the earth’s movement round the sun with his own metaphysical cosmology. He thus entirely rejected the geocentric and anthropocentric conception of the universe both from the astronomical point of view and in the wider perspective of speculative philosophy. In his system, it is nature considered as an organic whole which stands in the center of the picture, and not terrestrial human being who are circonstanze or accidents of the one living world-substance, even if from another point of view each is a monad, mirroring the whole universe.” 39 “Bruno’s cosmological vision certainly anticipates some fundamental aspects of the modern conception of the universe: his ethical ideas, in contrast with religious ascetical ethics, appeal to modern humanistic activism; and his ideal of religious and philosophical tolerance has influenced liberal thinkers. On the other hand, his emphasis on the magical and the occult has been the source of criticism.”
(g) Pierre Gassendi (1592-1655): “Born into a family of commoners, Gassendi received his early education at Digne and Reiz. He studied at universities in Digne and Aix-en-Provence and received a doctorate in theology at the university in Avignon in 1614. After being ordained a priest in 1616 he was appointed professor of philosophy at Aix-en-Provence. There he delivered critical lectures on the thought of Aristotle from 1617 to 1622, when the new Jesuit authorities of the university, who disapproved of Gassendi’s anti-Aristotelianism, compelled him to leave. Gassendi’s work (Paradoxical Exercises Against the Aristotelians), the first part of which was published in 1624, contains an attack on Aristotelianism and an early version of his mitigated skepticism. Gassendi thereafter engaged in many scientific studies with his patron, Nicolas-Claude Fabri de Peiresc, until the latter’s death in 1637. A considerable portion of his researches during this period involved astronomical observations, including his discovery in 1631 of the perihelion of Mercury (the point of the planet’s closest approach to the sun). In 1641 the theologian and mathematician Marin Mersenne invited Gassendi and several other eminent thinkers to contribute comments on the manuscript of René Descartes’s Meditations (1641); Gassendi’s comments, in which he argued that Descartes had failed to establish the reality and certainty of innate ideas, were published in the second edition of the Meditations (1642) as the fifth set of objections and replies. Gassendi enlarged upon these criticisms in his work (1644; Metaphysical Disquisition). In 1645 Gassendi was appointed professor of mathematics at the Collège Royal in Paris. During the remainder of the decade he published a work on the new astronomy Astronomical Instruction (1647), as well as two of his three major works on Epicurean philosophy - On the Life and Death of Epicurus (1647) and Observations on Book X of Diogenes Laërtius (1649)."

In his final Epicurean work Syntagma philosophicum (Philosophical Treatise), published posthumously in 1658, Gassendi attempted to find what he called a middle way between skepticism and dogmatism. He argued that, while metaphysical knowledge of the essences (inner natures) of things is impossible, by relying on induction and the information provided by appearances one can acquire probable knowledge of the natural world that is sufficient to explain and predict experience. Adopting a view characteristic of ancient Skepticism, Gassendi held that experienced events can be taken as signs of what is beyond experience. Smoke suggests fire, sweat suggests that there are pores in the skin, and the multitude of events suggests that there is an atomic world underlying them. The best theory of such a world, in Gassendi’s opinion, is the ancient atomism expounded by Epicurus, according to which atoms are eternal, differently shaped, and moving at different speeds. Gassendi argued that such atoms must have some of the physical features of the visible objects they constitute, such as extension, size, shape, weight, and solidity. The atoms collide and agglomerate, resulting in events in the perceptible world. A mechanical model of atomic movement and agglomeration, ultimately based on experience, would allow one to discover probabilistic empirical laws, to make predictions, and to explain relationships between different kinds of phenomena. Because the phenomenal world is thus related to the atomic world, there is no need to explain events in terms of purposes, goals, or final causes, as in Scholastic and Aristotelian teleology. Gassendi believed that there was no conflict between his mechanistic atomism and the doctrines of Roman Catholicism; indeed, he took pains to emphasize their compatibility. Although he was a heliocentrist, he presented…with the teachings of the church.”

“Gassendi rejected the Epicurean account of the human soul, according to which it is material but composed of lighter and more subtle atoms than those of other things. Souls are genuinely immaterial, and their existence is known through faith. Likewise, his theology, unlike Epicurus’s, did not conceive of God as a material body. God’s existence is proved by the harmony evident in nature. Following Epicurus, Gassendi held that the proper goal of human life is happiness, which consists in the peace of the soul and the absence of bodily pain."
Philosophy of Nature (II): (a) *Cornelius Agrippa von Nettesheim* (1486-1535) was “court secretary to Charles V, physician to Louise of Savoy, exasperating theologian within the Catholic Church, military entrepreneur in Spain and Italy, acknowledged expert on occultism, and philosopher. His tempestuous career also included teaching at Dôle and Pavia universities, appointment as orator and public advocate at Metz (until denounced for defending an accused witch), banishment from Germany in 1535 (after battling with the inquisitor of Cologne), and imprisonment in France (for criticizing the Queen Mother).” His best known books include below: (i) *Declamation Attacking the Uncertainty and Vanity of the Sciences and the Arts*, 1526; printed in Cologne 1527, a skeptical satire of the sad state of science. This book, a significant production of the revival of Pyrrhonian skepticism in its fideist mode, was to have a significant impact on such thinkers and writers as Montaigne, René Descartes, and Goethe. (ii) *Declamation on the Nobility and Preeminence of the Female Sex*, 1529, pronouncing the theological and moral superiority of women. Edition with English translation, London 1670. (iii) *De occulta philosophia libri tres* (Three Books Concerning Occult Philosophy), Book 1 printed Paris 1531; Books 1-3 in Cologne 1533. This summa of occult and magical thought, Agrippa’s most important work in a number of respects, sought a solution to the skepticism proposed in *De vanitate*. In short, Agrippa argued for a synthetic vision of magic whereby the natural world combined with the celestial and the divine through Neoplatonic participation, such that ordinarily licit natural magic was in fact validated by a kind of demonic magic sourced ultimately from God. By this means Agrippa proposed a magic that could resolve all epistemological problems raised by skepticism in a total validation of Christian faith. Thus, his *De occulta philosophia* added impetus to Renaissance study of magic and injected his name into early Faust legends: so his works served the Renaissance revival of Skepticism. Agrippa was jailed and branded as a heretic. After scuttling every type of scientific knowledge, he found peaceful refuge in a simple biblical piety.

(b) *Paracelsus* (1493-1541) was a physician, taking account of other sciences like philosophy, astrology and theology together. Man is the microcosm, the meeting-place of the three worlds composing the macrocosm; and the physician will have to take this into account. “Paracelsus was an enlightened theorist; and he attacked violently the medical practice of the time. In particular, he had no use for slavish adherence to the teaching of Galen. His own methods of procedure were highly empirical, and he can hardly be called a scientific chemist, even though he was interested in chemical specifics and drugs but he had at least an independent mind and an enthusiasm for the progress of medicine. With this interest in medicine, however, he combined an interest in astrology and in alchemy. Original matter consists of or contains three fundamental elements or substances, Sulphur, mercury and salt. Metals are distinguished from one another through the predominance of this element rather than that; but since they all consist ultimately of the same element, it is possible to transform any metal into any other metal. The possibility of alchemy is thus a consequence of the original constitution of matter. Although Paracelsus may have tended to mix up philosophical speculation with science and also with astrology and alchemy in a fantastic manner, he drew a sharp distinction between theology on the one hand and philosophy on the other. The latter is the study of nature, not of God Himself. Yet nature is a self-revelation of God; and we are thus able to attain to some philosophical knowledge of Him. Nature was originally present in God, in the great mystery or divine abyss; and the process by which the world is built up is one of differentiation, that is, of the production of distinctions and oppositions. We come to know only in terms of oppositions. For example, we come to know joy in its opposition to sorrow, health in its opposition to sickness. Similarly, we come to know good only in opposition to evil and God only in opposition to Satan. The term of the world’s development will be the absolute division between good and evil, which will constitute the last judgment.”

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(c) John Baptist van Helmont (1577-1644): “Van Helmont was born into a wealthy family of the landed gentry. He studied at Leuven, where he finished the course in philosophy and classics, and then flirted with theology, geography, and law before finally taking a doctorate in medicine in 1599. He later referred to his education as reaping straw and senseless prattle, gave away or threw away his books, and set out to try to find true knowledge. Van Helmont traveled to Switzerland and Italy (1600–02) and to France and England (1602–05), gaining practical medical skills that he put to use during an outbreak of plague in Antwerp in 1605. It was apparently during these sojourns that he came to know and appreciate some of the theories of the German-Swiss physician Paracelsus. He received several offers - from princes, an archbishop, and an emperor - to become a private physician, but he turned them down...In 1609 van Helmont married into a noble family, thereby becoming the manorial lord of several estates. He retired to one of them for the next seven years dedicated himself to chemical research and to the relief of the poor.”

He discovered carbon dioxide, which is emitted by burning charcoal. He combined interests in physiology and medicine. His son Francis Mercury (1618-99) developed a monadology. “Each monad may be called corporeal in so far as it is passive, and spiritual in so far as it is active and endowed with some degree of perception. The inner sympathies and attractions between monads cause groups of them to form complex structures, each of which is governed by a central monad. In man...there is a central monad, the soul, which rules the whole organism. This soul shares in the imperishable character of all monad; but it cannot achieve the perfection of its development in one lifetime, that is to say, in the period in which it is the controlling and directing power in one particular set or series of monads. It therefore enters into union with other bodies or sets of monads until it has perfected itself. It then turns to God, who is the monas monadum and the author of the universal harmony of creation. The mediator between God and creatures is Christ.”

(d) Sebastian Franck (1499-1542): The German mystical tradition found a continuation in Protestantism with Sebastian Franck and Valentine Weigel (1533-88). The former was a fellow student of the Reformer Martin Bucer at Heidelberg. About 1525 he joined the Lutherans at Nürnberg to become a preacher for the Reformation. “Franck became disappointed by the moral results of the Reformation, however, and moved away from Lutheranism. At Nürnberg he evidently came in contact with the Anabaptist Hans Denck’s disciples, but he soon denounced Anabaptism as dogmatic and narrow. Increasingly at odds with Lutheran doctrines, dogmatism in general, and the concept of an institutional church, Franck moved in 1529 to Strasbourg, which was then a centre of the spiritual movement in Protestantism. There he became a friend of the Reformer and mystic Kaspar Schwennfeld, who furthered Franck’s development as a fierce antidogmatician. Franck’s major work, Chronica: Zeitbuch und Geschichtsbibel (1531; Chronica: Time Book and Historical Bible), is a wide-ranging history of Christianity that seeks to give heresies and heretics their due. After a short imprisonment for his views, Franck was expelled from Strasbourg by the civil authorities. He traveled throughout Germany and in 1533 moved to Ulm, where he established himself as a printer. Luther regarded Franck as a man who wanted to avoid both belief and commitment, and the Lutherans at Ulm compelled Franck to leave that city in 1539. Franck combined the humanist’s passion for freedom with the mystic’s devotion to a religion based on the inner illumination of the spirit. He believed the Bible was full of contradictions in which true and eternal messages could be unveiled only by the spirit, and he considered dogmatic controversy meaningless. He asserted the extremely anti-dogmatic notion that Christians need know only the doctrines found in the Ten Commandments and the Apostles’ Creed. In the end he became a solitary figure who found no realm of truth left but the inner life of the mystics. Franck’s unbiased search for God in various cultures and historical traditions and his emphasis on nondogmatic, nonsectarian, noninstitutional forms of religion mark him...”
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(e) Jakob Böhme (1575-1624) was a German Christian mystic and theologian. He was an original thinker within the Lutheran tradition, and his first book, commonly known as Aurora caused a great scandal. He was born at Altsheidenberg in Silesia. "When he was 14 years old, he was sent to Seidenberg, as an apprentice to become a shoemaker. His apprenticeship for shoemaking was hard; he lived with a family who were not Christians, which exposed him to the controversies of the time. He regularly prayed and read the Bible as well as works by visionaries such as Paracelsus, Weigel and Schwenckfeld, although he received no formal education. After three years as an apprentice, Böhme left to travel…In 1592 Böhme returned from his journeyman years. By 1599, Böhme was master of his craft with his own premises in Görlitz. That same year he married…Böhme's mentor was Abraham Behem who corresponded with Valentin Weigel. Böhme joined the Conventicle of God's Real Servants - a parochial study group organized by Martin Möller. Böhme had a number of mystical experiences throughout his youth…In 1610 Böhme experienced another inner vision in which he further understood the unity of the cosmos and that he had received a special vocation from God. The shop in Görlitz, which was sold in 1613, had allowed Böhme to buy a house in 1610 and to finish paying for it in 1618. Having given up shoemaking in 1613, Böhme sold woolen gloves for a while…regularly visit Prague to sell his wares." 45 Twelve years after the vision in 1600, he began to write his first book, Aurora. A manuscript copy of the unfinished work was loaned to Karl von Ender, a nobleman, who had copies made and began to circulate them. A copy fell into the hands of Gregorius Richter, the chief pastor of Görlitz, who considered it heretical and threatened Böhme with exile if he continued working on it. As a result, Böhme did not write anything for several years; however, at the insistence of friends who had read Aurora, he started writing again in 1618.

Bohme used its alchemical terms for nature mysticism without experiences. "Reconstructing his theological views, he wrote a series of devotional tracts dealing with penitence, resignation, regeneration - traditional themes of German mysticism. In 1622 his friends had several of these devotional tracts printed in Görlitz under the title Der Weg zu Christo (The Way to Christ), a small work joining nature mysticism with devotional fervor. Publication of this tract brought about the intense displeasure of Richter, who incited the populace against Böhme. In 1623, the year of his maturity, he wrote two major works: The Great Mystery and On the Election of Grace. The former explained the creation of the universe as told in Genesis in terms of the Paracelsian three principles (including the mystical elements salt, sulfur, and mercury), thus joining Renaissance nature mysticism with biblical religion. The latter, more philosophical, gave exposition in terms of dialectical insight to the problem of freedom that Calvinist predestination was then making acute. This theme later was taken up by the idealist philosopher Friedrich Schelling and by a German theologian, Franz von Baader, whose commentary for On the Election of Grace is still held in high regard by scholars. Böhme continued his writing at hectic pace, perhaps freed from business obligations by financial help from his friends. Between 1619, when he defiantly renewed his writing, and 1624, when he died, he produced at least 30 works. His defiance of the town council of Görlitz brought him further difficulty, and he was banished, being cited to the elector’s court in Dresden, where, to all appearances, he found vindication because he returned to his home. Although vindicated by the theologians who had examined his views, he was not free from the rancorous moods of his neighbors who were instigated in their attacks by Richter. Esteemed by his friends among the nobility, physicians, and intellectuals, he fled to one of the neighboring castles where he clearly was the central figure in some kind of secretive group. There he fell sick, and, sensing that his end was near, he was taken back home to Görlitz where, attended by his wife and sons, he began to weaken. He was examined by ecclesiastical authorities and found orthodox enough to be given the sacrament, and in a mood of charismatic expectancy, he died." 456
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Scientific Movement of the Renaissance: The development of science and technology is mainly discussed in a separate section of Chapter IV, so our discussions here are limited to the impact of scientific development on philosophy. The dispute between Galileo and the theologians was a case of conflict between science and theology or between the heliocentric and the geocentric hypotheses. “Moreover, it was a hypothesis which could not be verified by the type of controlled experiment which is possible in some other sciences. It was not possible for astronomy to advance very much on the basis of observation alone; the use of hypothesis and of mathematical deduction were also required.” The connection of scientific theory and empirical data is “probably always obvious in the case of some sciences, whereas in the case of other sciences it may become far from obvious as the science reaches a high degree of development. But it is likely to be insisted on in the earlier stages of the development of any science, and this is especially the case when explanatory theories and hypotheses are put forward which conflict with long established notions. Thus at the time of the Renaissance, when the Aristotelian physics were being discarded in favor of fresh scientific conceptions, appeal was frequently made to the empirical data and to saving the appearances. We have seen that the philosophers of nature often stressed the need for the empirical study of the facts, and it scarcely needs pointing out that medicine and anatomy, not to speak of technology and geography, would not have made the progress which they actually did make in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries without the aid of empirical investigation.” In this regard, for example, “One cannot construct a useful map of the world or give a valid account and explanation of the circulation of the blood by purely a priori reasoning.”

The result of actual observation may be seen particularly in the advance of anatomy and physiology. “Leonardo da Vinci (1452-1519) anticipated speculatively the discovery of the circulation of the blood, which was made by William Harvey about 1615; and in optics he anticipated the undulatory theory of light. He is also well known for his plans for flying-machines, parachutes and improved artillery. But it is his anatomical observation which is relevant in the present context. The results of this observation were portrayed in a large number of drawings; but as they were not published they did not exercise the influence which they might have done. The influential book in this connection was the De fabrica humani corporis (1543) by Andreas Vesalius, in which he recorded his study of anatomy. This work was of considerable importance for the development of anatomy, since Vesalius did not set out to find evidence in support of traditional theories but was concerned to observe for himself and to record his observations.”

Copernican Revolution: Nicholas Copernicus (1473-1543) first realize that the apparent movement of the sun from east to west is no conclusive proof. “Copernicus discussed the philosophical implications of his proposed system, elaborated it in full geometrical detail, used selected astronomical observations to derive the parameters of his model, and wrote astronomical tables which enabled one to compute the past and future positions of the stars and planets. In doing so, Copernicus moved heliocentrism from philosophical speculation to predictive geometrical astronomy - in reality it did not predict the planets' positions any better than the Ptolemaic system. This theory resolved the issue of planetary retrograde motion by arguing that such motion was only perceived and apparent, rather than real: it was a parallax effect, as a car that one is passing seems to move backwards against the horizon.” Tycho Brahe (1546-1601) opposed the hypothesis and invented one of his own as in the Ptolemaic system. However, John Kepler (1571-1630) had been convinced that the Copernican hypothesis was true, and he defended it in his graphicum. It was Galileo Galilei (1564-1642) who was the foremost exponent of the experimental method among the Renaissance scientists. His crude experimental results suggest a simple law. Indeed, his discoveries of the heliocentric system were one of the most powerful influences which discredited the Aristotelian physics, so did the explanation of the Bible.
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The fruitful combination of hypothesis and verification, both in astronomy and in mechanics, would not have been possible without the aid of mathematics. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, mathematics made considerable progress. A notable step forward was taken when John Napier (1550-1617) conceived the idea of logarithms. He communicated his idea to Tycho Brahe in 1594, and in 1614 he published a description of general principle in his Mirifici logarithmorum canonis description. Shortly afterwards the practical application of the principle was facilitated by the work of Henry Griggs (1561-1630). In 1638 Descartes published an account of the general principles of analytic geometry, while in 1635 Cavalieri, an Italian mathematician, published a statement of the method of indivisibles. In 1665-6 Isaac Newton (1642-1727) discovered the binomial theorem, but did not published until 1704, which led to a celebrated dispute between Newton and Leibniz about priority in discovering the differential and integral calculus. Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716), as a philosopher, drew from the success of the mathematical method in physics the conclusion that mathematics is the key to the actual structure of reality. Galileo was strongly influenced by the mathematical ideas of Platonism and Pythagoreanism.

The aspect of Galileo’s idea of nature expressed itself in a mechanistic view of the world. He believed in atoms and explained change on the basis of an atomist theory. “He maintained that qualities like color and warmth exist as qualities only in the sensing subject: they are subjective in character. Objectively they exist only in the form of the motion of atoms; and they can thus be explained mechanistically and mathematically. This mechanistic conception of nature, based on an atomist theory, was also maintained by Pierre Gassendi, as saw earlier. It was further developed by Robert Boyle (1627-91), who believed that matter consists of solid particles, each possessing its own shape, which combine with one another to form what are now termed molecules. Finally Newton argued that if we knew the forces which act upon bodies, we could deduce the motions of those bodies mathematically, and he suggested that the ultimate atoms or particles are themselves centers of force…Hence when he showed that the force of gravity which causes an apple to fall to the ground is identical with the force which causes the elliptical movements of the planets...to show that the movement of planets and falling apples conform to the same mathematical law.”

The rise of modern science naturally had a profound effect on men’s minds, opening up to them new vistas of knowledge and directing them to new interests. “The mechanical-mathematical view naturally involved the elimination from physics of the consideration of final causes; but, whatever the psychological effect of this change on many minds may have been, the elimination of final causality. It was a consequence of the advance in scientific method in a particular field of knowledge; but this does not mean that men like Galileo and Newton regarded physical science as the sole source of knowledge.” There were two aspects of scientific development in methods: one was empiricism and the other was rationalism, to be discussed in the next section. The first aspect of scientific method for discovering causes was stressed by Francis Bacon, who emphasized on observation and induction in scientific method and the classical British empiricism. When Locke asserted that all our ideas are based on sense-perception and introspection, he was asserting a psychological and epistemological thesis, the antecedents of which can be seen in medieval Aristotelianism. But contemporary scientific advances were based on actual observation of the empirical data. The other aspect of scientific method was the deductive and mathematical aspect, which most influenced the continental rationalist philosophy of the post-Renaissance period. “The success of mathematics in the solution of scientific problems naturally enhanced its prestige. Not only was mathematics clear and exact in itself, but in its application to scientific problems it also made clear what had formerly been obscure.” For example, Descartes considered that the material world and its changes can be explained simply in terms of matter, identified with geometrical extension, and motion. Spinoza and Leibniz also developed their ideas in this line.
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1. Political Philosophy

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1-3. Political Philosophy of Nicholo Machiavelli

Nicholo Machiavelli (1469-1527) was born to a wealthy family from the thirteenth century, holding on occasion Florence’s most important offices. His father was a doctor of laws, who was neither rich nor poor. He learned Latin well and probably knew some Greek, and he seems to have acquired the typical humanist education that was expected of officials of the Florentine Chancery. “In a letter to a friend in 1498, Machiavelli writes of listening to the sermons of Girolamo Savonarola (1452–98), a Dominican friar who moved to Florence in 1482 and in the 1490s attracted a party of popular supporters with his thinly veiled accusations against the government, the clergy, and the pope. Although Savonarola, who effectively ruled Florence for several years after 1494, was featured in The Prince (1513) as an example of an “unarmed prophet” who must fail, Machiavelli was impressed with his learning and rhetorical skill. On May 24, 1498, Savonarola was hanged as a heretic and his body burned in the public square. Several days later, emerging from obscurity at the age of 29, Machiavelli became head of the second chancery, a post that placed him in charge of the republic’s foreign affairs in subject territories. How so young a man could be entrusted with so high an office remains a mystery, particularly because Machiavelli apparently never served an apprenticeship in the chancery. He held the post until 1512, having gained the confidence of Piero Soderini (1452–1522), the gonfalonier (chief magistrate) for life in Florence from 1502. During his tenure at the second chancery, Machiavelli persuaded Soderini to reduce the city’s reliance on mercenary forces by establishing a militia (1505), which Machiavelli subsequently organized. He also undertook diplomatic and military missions to the court of France; to Cesare Borgia (1475/76–1507), the son of Pope Alexander VI (reigned 1492–1503); to Pope Julius II (reigned 1503–13), Alexander’s successor; to the court of Holy Roman Emperor Maximilian I (reigned 1493–1519); and to Pisa (1509 and 1511).”

“In 1512 the Florentine republic was overthrown and the gonfalonier deposed by a Spanish army that Julius II had enlisted into his Holy League. The Medici family returned to rule Florence, and Machiavelli, suspected of conspiracy, was imprisoned, tortured, and sent into exile in 1513 to his father’s small property in San Casciano, just south of Florence. There he wrote his two major works, The Prince and Discourses on Livy, both of which were published after his death. He dedicated The Prince to Lorenzo di Piero de’ Medici (1492–1519), ruler of Florence from 1513 and grandson of Lorenzo de’ Medici (1449–92). When, on Lorenzo’s death, Cardinal Giulio de’ Medici (1478–1534) came to govern Florence, Machiavelli was presented to the cardinal by Lorenzo Strozzi (1488–1538), scion of one of Florence’s wealthiest families, to whom he dedicated the dialogue The Art of War (1521).” Machiavelli was first employed in 1520 by the Cardinal Castruccio Castracani to resolve a case of bankruptcy in Lucca, where he took the chance to write on the government and his life; then, the cardinal appointed him official historian of the republic. Meanwhile, Pope Leo X (reigned 1513-21) commissioned him to write a discourse on the government of Florence. In June 1525, Machiavelli presented his Florentine Histories to Pope Clement VII, receiving in return a gift of 120 ducats. In May 1527, when Emperor Charles V ended the war and Florence had cast off the Medici, Machiavelli hoped to be restored to his old pose at the chancery, but was denied, fell ill, and died within a month. Machiavellianism is a widely used negative term to characterize unscrupulous politicians of the sort Machiavelli described in The Prince. Machiavelli described immoral behavior, such as dishonesty and killing innocents, as being normal and effective in politics. The term Machiavellian is often associated with political deceit, deviousness, and realpolitik.”

Many commentators have argued that Machiavelli was actually a Republican, and his writings were an inspiration to Enlightenment proponents of modern political philosophy in the coming century.
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The Prince (1523): “Machiavelli’s best-known book The Prince contains several maxims concerning politics. Instead of the more traditional target audience of a hereditary prince, it concentrates on the possibility of a new prince. To retain power, the hereditary prince must carefully balance the interests of a variety of institutions to which the people are accustomed. By contrast a new prince has the more difficult task in ruling: He must first stabilize his newfound power in order to build an enduring political structure. Machiavelli suggests that the social benefits of stability and security can be achieved in the face of moral corruption. Machiavelli believed that public and private morality had to be understood as two different things in order to rule well. As a result, a ruler must be concerned not only with reputation, but also must be positively willing to act immorally at the right times. As a political theorist, Machiavelli emphasized the occasional need for the methodical exercise of brute force or deceit including extermination of entire noble families to head off any chance of a challenge to the prince’s authority. Scholars often note that Machiavelli glorifies instrumentality in state-building, an approach embodied by the saying [The ends justify the means]…Violence may be necessary for the successful stabilization of power and introduction of new legal institutions. Force may be used to eliminate political rivals, to coerce resistant populations, and to purge the community of other men strong enough of character to rule, who will inevitably attempt to replace the ruler. Machiavelli has become infamous for such political advice, ensuring that he would be remembered in history through…Machiavellian.”

The Prince consists of 26 chapters dealing with new Princedoms (1-2), mixed Princedoms (3-5), New States (6-9), how to judge the strength of Principalities (10), ecclesiastical Princedoms (11), Defense and military (12-13), the quality of a Prince (14-19), the prudence of the Prince (20-23), and prudence and chance (24-26) including liberation of Italy from the barbarians.

Chapter I-2. New Princedoms: It start with that “All the States and Governments by which men are or ever have been ruled, have been and are either Republics or Princedoms.” The Prince deals with absolute monarchies or governments and the Discourses with the Roman Republic. He suggests two principalities: hereditary states and new states. “The hereditary states, accustomed to the family of their prince, are maintained with far less difficulty than new States, since all that is required is that the Prince shall not depart from the usages of his ancestors, he will always maintain himself in his Princedom, unless deprived of it by some extraordinary and irresistible force; and even if so deprived will recover it, should any, even the least, mishap overtake the usurper…since a Prince by birth has fewer occasions and less need to give offence, he ought to be better loved, and will naturally be popular…the very antiquity and continuance of his rule will efface the memories and causes which lead to innovation.” In new princedoms, the prince needs to win the favor of the inhabitants by sharing their language, laws, and customs. The strategy of survival is to defend the weak neighbors and to weaken the strong ones. It may be harder for a prince to win over its citizens: the safest course is either to destroy them or to go and live in them.
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Chapter 3-5. Mixed Princedoms: (3) New princedoms are either totally new, or they are mixed meaning that they are new parts of an older state, already belonging to that prince. In a mixed princedom, “men, thinking to better their condition, are always ready to change masters, and in this expectation will take up arms against any ruler; wherein they deceive themselves, and find afterwards by experience that they are worse off than before. This again results naturally and necessarily from the circumstance that the Prince cannot avoid giving offence to his new subjects, either in respect of the troops he quarters on them, or of some other of the numberless vexations attendant on a new acquisition. And in this way you may find that you have enemies in all those whom you have injured in seizing the Princedom, yet cannot keep the friendship of those who helped you to gain it; since you can neither reward them as they expect, nor yet, being under obligations to them, use violent remedies against them.” When a state are acquired in a country differing in language, usages, and laws, difficulties multiply, and great good fortune, as well as address, is needed to overcome them. “One of the most efficacious methods is for the Prince who acquires it to go and dwell there in person, since this will tend to make his tenure more secure and lasting.” “Another excellent expedient is to send colonies into one or two places, so that these may become, as it were, the keys of the Provinces; for you must either do this, or else keep up a numerous force of men-at-arms and foot soldiers;” which the Romans diligently followed. “They planted colonies, conciliated weaker powers without adding to their strength, humbled the great, and never suffered a formidable stranger to acquire influence.” Machiavelli points out five errors of Louis XII of France in second Italian War in 1500: “He had destroyed weaker states, he had strengthened a Prince already strong, he had brought into the country a very powerful stranger, he had not come to reside, and he had not sent colonies.” And yet all these blunders might not have proved disastrous to him while he lived, and not deprive the Venetians of their dominions.

(4) Conquered kingdoms: The Princedoms are governed either by a sole Prince or by a Prince with his Barons. “States governed by a sole Prince and by his servants vest in him a more complete authority; because throughout the land none but he is recognized as sovereign, and if obedience be yielded to any others, it is yielded as to his ministers and officers for whom personally no special love is felt. Of these two forms of government we have examples in our own days in the Turk and the King of France. The whole Turkish empire is governed by a sole Prince, all others being his salves…The King of France, on the other hand, is surrounded by a multitude of nobles of ancient descent, each acknowledged and loved by subjects of his own, and each asserting a precedence in rank of which the King can deprive him only at his peril.” If you examine the nature of the government of Darius (Persia), you will find that it resembled that of the Turk. But kingdoms like that of France cannot be retained with the same ease. (5) Conquered free states with their own laws and orders: When a newly acquired state has been accustomed to live under its own laws and in freedom, there are three methods to govern the state: first, to destroy it - the Romans destroyed Carthage, and eventually had to do the same in Greece even though they had wanted to avoid it; second, to reside together in person or install colonies if you are a prince of a republic; third, to keep their own law and order, but install a puppet regime, subject it to a tribute, and entrusting its government to a few of the inhabitants keeping the rest your friends. However, if “the newly acquired City or Province had been accustomed to live under a Prince, and his line is extinguished; on the one hand, it will be impossible for the citizens used to obey, and deprived; on the other, those of their old ruler to agree to choose a leader from among themselves. As they know not how to live as freemen, and are therefore slow to take up arms, a stranger may readily gain them over and attach them to his cause. But in Republics there is a stronger vitality, a fiercer hatred, a keener thirst for revenge. The memory of their former freedom will not let them rest; so that the safest course is either to destroy them, or to go and live in them.”

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Chapter 6. New States: (6) Conquest by virtue: “Princes who rise to power through their own skill and resources (their virtue) rather than luck tend to have a hard time rising to the top, but once they reach the top they are very secure in their position. This is because they effectively crush their opponents and earn great respect from everyone else. Because they are strong and more self-sufficient, they have to make fewer compromises with their allies.” To reform an existing order one of the most dangerous and difficult things a prince can do, since people are naturally resistant to change and reform. Those who benefited from the old order will resist change very fiercely. By contrast, those who can benefit from the new order will be less fierce in their support, because the new order is unfamiliar and not certain in the future. “Therefore, a prince must have the means to force his supporters to keep supporting him even when they start having second thoughts, otherwise he will lose his power. Only armed prophets, like Moses, succeed in bringing lasting change.”

(7) Conquest by fortune: If a prince comes to power through luck or the blessings of powerful figures within the regime, “he typically has an easy time gaining power but a hard time keeping it thereafter, because his power is dependent on his benefactors’ goodwill. He does not command the loyalty of the armies and officials that maintain his authority, and these can be withdrawn from him at a whim. Having risen the easy way, it is not even certain such a prince has the skill and strength to stand on his own feet… Machiavelli cites Cesare Borgia as an example of a lucky prince who escaped this pattern. Through cunning political maneuvers, he managed to secure his power base.” He was made commander of the papal armies by his father, but was also heavily dependent on mercenary armies and the support of the French king. “Borgia won over the allegiance of the Orsini’s followers with better pay and prestigious government posts. When some of his mercenary captains started to plot against him, he had them imprisoned and executed. When it looked as though the king of France would abandon him, Borgia sought new alliances.”

(8) Conquest by criminal virtue: If the new prince secures his power through conquests by criminal virtue, immoral deeds, such as the execution of political rivals, “Machiavelli advises that a prince should carefully calculate all the wicked deeds he needs to do to secure his power, and then execute them all in one stroke, such that he needs not commit any more wickedness for the rest of his reign. In this way, his subjects will slowly forget his cruel deeds and his reputation can recover. Princes who fail to do this, who hesitate in their ruthlessness, find that their problems mushroom over time and they are forced to commit wicked deeds throughout their reign. Thus they continuously mar their reputations and alienate their people. Machiavelli’s case study is Agathocles of Syracuse. After Agathocles became Praetor of Syracuse, he called a meeting of the city’s elite. At his signal, his soldiers killed all the senators and the wealthiest citizens, completely destroying the old oligarchy. He declared himself ruler with no opposition. So secure was his power that he could afford to absent himself to go off on military campaigns in Africa.”

(9) Civil Princedoms: A Princedom is created either by the people or by the nobles. “When the nobles perceive that they cannot withstand the people, they set to work to magnify the reputation of one of their number, and make him their Prince, to the end that under his shadow they may be enabled to indulge their desire. On the other hand, when they see that they cannot make head against the nobles, invest a single citizen with all their influence and make him Prince, to the end that under his shadow they may be enabled to indulge their desire. On the other hand, when they see that they cannot make head against the nobles, invest a single citizen with all their influence and make him Prince, to the end that under his shadow they may be enabled to indulge their desire.” The prince supported by the favor of the nobles has greater difficulty to maintain himself than the prince supported by the people, since the former seeks to oppress but not to obey, and the latter seeks to obey but not to oppress. There are many ways in which a prince may gain the good-will of the people, but no certain rule can be laid down. A wise prince devises means whereby his subjects may at all times be favorable or adverse, feel the need of the state and of him, avoid ruling via magistrates, and then they will always be faithful to him, since all they want are simply not oppressed by rulers chosen by themselves.
Chapter 10. How to Judge the Strength of Principalities: Machiavelli views the way to judge the strength of a princedom is to see whether it can defend itself and whether it can feed the people to live. In modern terms, the state should be militarily defensive and economically self-sufficient. “The towns of Germany enjoy great freedom. Having little territory, they render obedience to the Emperor only when so disposed, fearing neither him nor any other neighboring power. For they are so fortified that it is plain to everyone that it would be a tedious and difficult task to reduce them, since all of them are protected by moats and suitable ramparts, are well supplied with artillery, and keep their public magazines constantly stored with victual, drink and fuel, enough to last them for a year. Besides which, in order to support the poorer class of citizen without public loss, they lay in a common stock of materials for these to work on for a year, in the handicrafts which are the life and sinews of such cities, and by which the common people live. Moreover, they esteem military exercises and have many regulations for their maintenance.”

Chapter 11. Ecclesiastical Princedoms: “This type of princedom refers…explicitly to the Catholic church, which is of course not traditionally thought of as a princedom. According to Machiavelli, these are relatively easy to maintain, once founded. They do not need to defend themselves militarily, nor to govern their subjects. Machiavelli discusses the recent history of the Church as if it were a princedom that was in competition to conquer Italy against other princes. He points to factionalism as a historical weak point in the Church, and points to the recent example of the Borgia family as a better strategy which almost worked. He then explicitly proposes that the Medici are now in a position to try the same thing.”

Chapter 12-13. Defense and Military: (12) Mercenaries: The main foundation of all states are good laws and good arms. You cannot have good laws without good arms. “Mercenaries and auxiliaries are at once useless and dangerous, and he who holds his state by means of mercenary troops can never be solidly or securely seated. For such troops are disunited, ambitious, insubordinate, treacherous, insolent among friends, cowardly before foes, and without fear of God or faith with man. Whenever they are attacked defeat follows; so that in peace you are plundered by them, in war by your enemies. “Hence Italy, having passed almost entirely into the hands of the Church and of certain Republics, the former made up of priests, the latter of citizens unfamiliar with arms, took foreigner into her pay.” (13) National arms: The second sort of unprofitable arms are auxiliaries, by whom troops brought to help and protect you by a potentate whom you summon to your aid. “Auxiliaries may be excellent and useful soldiers for themselves, but are always hurtful to him who calls them in; for if they are defeated, he is undone, if victorious, he becomes their prisoner.” The Emperor of Constantinople, summoned 10,000 Turkish soldiers into Greece, who refused to leave when the war was over. The prince should establish and preserve the state through his own power based on national militia, not by means of mercenary and auxiliary troops which can never be solidly or securely seated. A prince who is ignorant of military affairs, besides other disadvantages, can neither be respected by his soldiers, nor can he trust them. Hence, the prince has to develop his methods of warfare by studies and practices in times of war and peace. No princedom is safe without national arms, composed of subjects, citizens, and dependents.
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Chapter 14-19. The Qualities of a Prince: (14) A Prince’s duty concerning military affairs: The main focus of a Prince should be on perfecting the art of war: “a Prince who is ignorant of military affairs, besides other disadvantages, can neither be respected by his soldiers, nor can he trust them. A Prince, therefore, ought never to allow his attention to be diverted from warlike pursuits, and should occupy himself with them even more in peace than in war.” We can see that Francesco Sforza, from his renown in arms, rose from privacy to be Duke of Milan, “while his descendants, seeking to avoid the hardships and fatigues of military life, from being Princes fell back into privacy.” He emphasizes the qualification of a good captain: to know local terrains well, military tactics and strategies. “As to the mental training, a Prince should read histories, and in these should note the actions of great men, observe how they conducted themselves in their wars, and examine the causes of their victories and defeats, so as to avoid the latter and imitate them in the former.” A wise Prince should pursue such methods as these, never resting idle in times of peace, but seeking to turn them to account, “so that he may derive strength from them in the hour of danger, and find himself ready should Fortune turn against him, to resist her blows.”

(15) Reputation of a Prince: “The prince should, ideally, be virtuous, but he should be willing and able to abandon those virtues if it becomes necessary. Men have imagined republics and principalities that never really existed at all. Yet the way men live is so far removed from the way they ought to live that anyone who abandons what is for what should be pursues his downfall rather than his preservation; for a man who strives after goodness in all his acts is sure to come to ruin, since there are so many men who are not good. Since there are many possible qualities that a prince can be said to possess, he must not be overly concerned about having all the good ones. Also, a prince may be perceived to be merciful, faithful, humane, frank, and religious, but most important is only to seem to have these qualities. A prince cannot truly have these qualities because at times it is necessary to act against them. In fact, he must sometimes deliberately choose evil. Although a bad reputation should be avoided, it is sometimes necessary to have one.”

(16) Generosity versus parsimony: “If a prince is overly generous to his subjects, Machiavelli asserts he will not be appreciated, and will only cause greed for more. Additionally, being overly generous is not economical, because eventually all resources will be exhausted. This results in higher taxes, and will bring grief upon the prince. Then, if he decides to discontinue or limit his generosity, he will be labeled as a miser. Thus, Machiavelli summarizes that guarding against the people’s hatred is more important than building up a reputation for generosity. A wise prince should be willing to be more reputed a miser than be hated for trying to be too generous.” On the other hand: of what is not yours or your subjects' one can be a bigger giver, as were Cyrus, Caesar, and Alexander, because spending what is someone else's does not take reputation from you but adds it to you; only spending your own hurts you. “Every prince should desire to be accounted merciful and not cruel. Nevertheless, he should be on his guard against the abuse of this quality of mercy. Fear is simply a means to an end that is security for the prince. The fear instilled should never be excessive, for that could be dangerous to the prince. Therefore, a prince “should disregard the reproach of being thought cruel where it enables him to keep his subject united and obedient.” Since love and fear can hardly exist together, if we must choose between them, it is far safer to be feared than loved. Above all, Machiavelli argues, a prince should not interfere with the property of their subjects, their women, or the life of somebody without proper justification. Regarding the troops of the prince, fear is absolutely necessary to keep a large garrison united, and a prince should not mind the thought of cruelty in that regard. Hannibal's army were never rebellious because they feared their leader. Machiavelli says this required inhuman cruelty which he refers to as a virtue. But Scipio's men were known for their mutiny and dissension, due to his excessive mercy - which was however a source of glory in a republic.”
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(18) How Princes should keep faith: A prudent Prince neither can nor ought to keep his word when to keep it is hurtful to him and the causes which led him to pledge it are removed. “If all men were good, this would not be good advice, but since they are dishonest and do not keep faith with you, you, in return, need not keep faith with them; and no prince was ever at a loss for plausible reasons to cloak a breach of faith.” A Prince, most of all a new Prince, “cannot observe all those rules of conduct in respect whereof men are accounted good, being often forced, in order to preserve his Princedom, to act in opposition to good faith, charity, humanity, and religion. He must therefore keep his mind ready to shift as the winds and tides of Fortune turn, and...he ought not to quit good courses if he can help it, but should know how to follow evil course if he must.” Thus, “the prince must appear to be virtuous, and should be virtuous, but he should be able to be otherwise when the time calls for it; that includes being able to lie, though however much he lies he should always keep the appearance of being truthful.”

Avoiding contempt and hatred:

“The Prince who inspires such an opinion of himself is greatly esteemed, and against one who is greatly esteemed conspiracy is difficult; nor, when he is known to be an excellent Prince and held in reverence by his subjects, will it be easy to attack him. For a Prince is exposed to two dangers, from within in respect of his subjects, from without in respect of foreign powers. Against the latter he will defend himself with good arms and good allies, and if he has good arms he will always have good allies; and when things are settled abroad, they will always be settled at home, unless disturbed by conspiracies.” A Prince best secures himself when he escapes being hated or despised, and keeps on good terms with his people. On the side of the conspirator, “there are distrust, jealousy, and dread of punishment to deter him, while on the side of the Prince there are the laws, the majesty of the throne, the protection of friends and of the government to defend him; to which if the general good-will of the people be added, it is hardly possible” to conspire.

Chapter 20-23. The Prudence of the Prince:

(20) Whether fortresses are profitable: Fortress are useful or they injure you according to circumstances: “the Prince who is more afraid of his subject than of strangers ought to build fortresses, while he who is more afraid of strangers than of his subjects, should leave them alone...So that, on the whole, the best fortress you can have, is in not being hated by your subjects. If they hate you, no fortress will save you; for when once the people take up arms, foreigners are never wanting to assist them.”

(21) Gaining honors: Regarding two warring states, Machiavelli asserts that it is always wiser to choose a side, rather than to be neutral because “(i) If your allies win, you benefit whether or not you have more power than they have; (ii) If you are more powerful, then your allies are under your command; if your allies are stronger, they will always feel a certain obligation to you for your help; (iii) If your side loses, you still have an ally in the loser.” A Prince should never join with one stronger than himself in attacking others, unless he be driven to it by necessity.

(22) Nobles and staffs: The selection of good servants reflected directly upon the prince’s intelligence: there are three scales of intelligence: one (excellent) which understands by itself; a second (good) which understands what is known it by other; and a third (worthless) which understand neither by itself nor on the showing of others.

To keep his Minister good, the Prince should be considerate of him in various ways. (23) Avoiding flatterers: A Prince who is not wise himself cannot be well advised by others, unless by chance he surrender himself to be wholly governed by someone adviser who happens to be supremely prudent.” In this case, he may be well advised; but not for long, since such as adviser will soon deprive him of his Government. “If he listen to a multitude of advisers, the Prince who is not wise will never have consistent counsels, nor will he know of himself who to reconcile them. Each of his counsellors will study his own advantage, and the Prince will be unable to detect or correct them. Nor could it well be otherwise, for men will always grow roughts on your hands unless they find themselves under a necessity to be honest.” The prudent Prince is the answer.

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Chapter 24-26. Prudence and Chance: (24) Why the Princes of Italy have lost their states:

“If we contemplate those Lords who in our own times have lost their dominions in Italy, such as the King of Naples, the Duke of Milan, and others, in the first place we shall see, that in respect of arms they have, for reasons already dwelt on, been all alike defective; and next, that some of them have either had the people against them, or if they have had the people with them, have not known how to secure themselves against their nobles. For without such defects as these, States powerful enough to keep an army in the field are never overthrown.” “Let those Princes of ours, therefore, who, after holding them for a length of years, have lost their dominions, blame not Fortune but their own inertness. For never having reflected in tranquil times that there might come a change, when adversity overtook them, they thought not of defense but only of escape, hoping that their people, disgusted with the arrogance of the conqueror, would someday recall them.”

(25) What fortune can affect: “Machiavelli argues that fortune is only the judge of half of our actions and that we have control over the other half with sweat, prudence and virtue. Even more unusual, rather than simply suggesting caution as a prudent way to try to avoid the worst of bad luck, Machiavelli holds that the greatest princes in history tend to be ones who take more risks, and rise to power through their own labor, virtue, prudence, and particularly by their ability to adapt to changing circumstances. Machiavelli even encourages risk taking as a reaction to risk. In a well-known metaphor, Machiavelli writes that it is better to be impetuous than cautious, because fortune is a woman; and it is necessary, if one wants to hold her down, to beat her and strike her down… Machiavelli compares fortune to a torrential river that cannot be easily controlled during flooding season. In periods of calm, however, people can erect dams and levees in order to minimize its impact. Fortune, Machiavelli argues, seems to strike at the places where no resistance is offered, as had recently been the case in Italy.”

(26) Liberation of Italy: Machiavelli writes that “We see how she (meaning Italy) prays God to send someone to rescue her from these barbarous cruelties and oppressions. We see too how ready and eager she is to follow any standard were there only someone to raise it. But at present we see no one except in you illustrious House (pre-eminent by its virtues and good fortune, and favored by God and by the Church whose headship is now holds), who could be a deliverer.” Machiavelli believed that the idea of Italian unification would not be realistic without soldiers. “If then your illustrious House should seek to follow the example of those great men who have delivered their country in past ages, it is before all thing necessary, as the true foundation of every such attempt, to be provided with national troops, since you can have no braver, truer, or more faithful soldiers; and although every single man of them be good, collectively they will be better, seeing themselves commanded by their own Prince, and honored and esteemed by him. That you may be able, therefore, to defend yourself against the foreigner with Italian valor, the first step is to provide yourself with an army such this.” Machiavelli observed the strengths and weaknesses of foreign troops. Since the Swiss and the Spaniard infantry are trained on a different system, there are defects in both. The Spaniards cannot resist cavalry and the Swiss will give way before infantry if they find them as resolute as themselves at close quarters; the Spaniards cannot sustain the onset of the French men-at-arms and the Swiss are broken by the Spaniard foot; the Spanish infantry confronted the German companies, who have the same discipline as the Swiss, who were unable to defend themselves. “Knowing, then, the defects of each of these kinds of troops, you can train your men on some different system, to withstand cavalry and not to fear infantry. To affect this, will not require the creation of any new forces, but simply a change in the discipline of the old. And these are matters in reforming which the new Prince acquires reputation and importance…Let your illustrious House take upon itself this enterprise with all the courage and all the hopes with which a just cause is undertaken; so that…our country may be ennobled.”
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The Discourses on Livy (written in 1517): Machiavelli advises peoples loving republics on how to preserve liberty and to avoid corruption through lessons from Roman history. The modes and orders of ancient Rome were established “under the pressure of circumstances, by trial and error, without a coherent plan, without understanding of their reasons” so that Machiavelli supplies the reasons to correct some of old modes and orders. Contrary to The Prince advising on how for princes to seize absolute authority, the Discourses - the first source of classical republicanism - advises to the people by claiming that peoples are more stable and have better judgment than princes, and that the multitude is wiser and more constant than a prince, so that their government is better and the republic has greater life and good fortune longer than a principality. The Prince does not teach the moral but teaches wicked and tyrannical ways of ruling; but the Discourses encourages wise princes to follow the model of the Roman Republic. Regarding the Renaissance, he accepts the necessity of returning to the ancients because they are superior to the moderns: the lack of true knowledge of the histories is responsible for the failure of moderns. The Renaissance transforms the ancients into modernity: the moderns are weak but appropriate remedies can make them stronger than the ancients can. He suggests that “to create or maintain a republic in a corrupt city, it is necessary to turn it more toward a kingly state than toward a popular one” which means the dependence of republican ends on tyrannical means. Machiavelli supports the extraordinary modes on law enforcement: the law must be visibly and impressively executed. When a good forty peoples conspired against Rome, the Romans created the dictator by giving power to one man who could decide without any consultation and execute his decisions without any appeal. The remedy was useful to overcome the impending dangers, so that it was always most useful in all those accidents that arose at any time against the republic.

The republic is subject to justice, but people do not appreciate being treated justly because they believe that they deserve more. If republics behave less justly and more tyrannically, then people may more appreciate for benefits they received. The Discourses shows how to conduct a conspiracy against either a republic or a tyranny, and tells governments how to conspire against peoples: not of the justice of conspiracy but of the ways and means. Considering that the ruling class of ancient Rome used religion for their political purposes, Machiavelli suggests that princes of a republic or of a kingdom should maintain the foundations of the religion since religion helps them to maintain their republic religious, consequently good and united. Since “the church has not been powerful enough to be able to seize Italy, not permitted another to seize it, it has been the cause that Italy has not been able to come under one head but has been under many princes and lords, from whom so much disunion and so much weakness have arisen.” In Book II, Machiavelli introduces two elements which the Romans needed to acquire the empire: one is more virtue than fortune and the other is her liberal admission of foreigners to citizenship. He views three modes of Roman expanding: being a league of several republics together, being partners without commanding relations, and reducing kingdoms to provinces as direct subjects; among which he considered the alliance first. The Book III starts from the topic that if one wishes a sector or a republic to live long, it is necessary to draw it back often toward its beginning. “For all the beginnings of sects, republics, and kingdoms must have some goodness in them, by means of which they may regain their first reputation and their first increase. Because in the process of time that goodness is corrupted, unless something intervenes to lead it back to the mark, it of necessity kills that body.” In republics, the goodness emerges through the virtue of a man or through the virtue of an order; in sects, it emerges by returning to its beginning toward by St. Francis and St. Dominick whose doctrine teaches Christians the poverty like the life of Christ; and in kingdoms, it emerges by renewing themselves and bringing back their laws toward their beginnings: the restoration of the ancients is the introduction of new modes and orders.
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The Art of War (1521): Machiavelli attempted to revive classical military thought (tactics and strategies) of Vegetius, Frontinus, Polybius, and Livy in his Art of War that consists of seven books. Although the medieval soldiers thought the Christian faith as the supreme end to which all other activities were subordinate, Machiavelli had little sympathy for these medieval values as follows: (a) Citizen-Army: Machiavelli views that part-time citizen-soldiers, instead of a standing army of professionals, would be a viable substitute for foreign mercenaries in the period of war. He counted more political advantage than military advantage. “First, the armed citizenry would be a very definite obstacle in the path of anyone who contemplated seizing power. Second, a militia would always, in Machiavelli’s speculations, serve as the fundamental instrument for civic education, a means of instilling a people with respect for authority and a sense of common purpose. Third, a militia would be less costly to the state than a standing army.” But to prevent a militia from injuring others or overturning the laws and liberties of its country, it is necessary to take care that the commanders do not acquire too great an authority over their men, by changing the officers and sending them to commands in different parts every year. (b) Infantry and Discipline: Based on the Roman army, Machiavelli views that the main strength of an army lies in its infantry which is superior to cavalry since “cavalry cannot march through all roads as infantry can, and they are slower in their motions when it is necessary to change their order.” Infantrymen are often obliged to engage other infantry and cavalry together, which strengthens war power by supporting each other. He emphasizes discipline: the discipline of the Roman legion depended upon the careful selection of recruits, extensive drill and training, a hierarchical chain of command, functional arrangements defined by rules, and a code of military law. The soldiers must be trained to endure all sorts of hardship and fatigue, to be dexterous and agile, to handle their arms well, and to obey orders and to keep their ranks and stations in battle or encamping. The most suitable policy to maintain order is fear and punishment in camp, and hopes and rewards in the field. (c) Formation of the Army: In order to form an army, Machiavelli makes his pattern with the Greek phalanx and the Roman legion: 2,000 pike men in the regiment were armed like the Macedonian phalanx, and 3,000 men were equipped with swords and shields like the Roman legion. He divided the regiment into 10 battalions as the Roman legion was divided into 10 cohorts. Three principal operations of an army are the march, the encampment, and the battle. Proper tactics are essential to win the battle. We can protect infantry from the attack of artillery by avoiding them in distance, but the best remedy against it is its earliest possible seizure. (d) Military Tactics and Commandership: When the enemy is less numerous and if your army is well disciplined, you should endeavor to draw them into plains and open places; but if you have only a small and ill-disciplined army, you have to seek an advantageous location. The weather, the degree of windy and sunny, affects on forming any army for battle. Advantages may result from the negligence and misconduct of the enemy, and most prudent generals choose defense rather than offense. It is important to force the soldiers to fight: some commanders force their men to fight by depriving them of all means of saving themselves except victory; this is certainly the best method of making them fight desperately. (e) Machiavelli discusses about the march to enemies, encampment and rest in security, and towns and fortresses. He views that Italian princes have been so weak that they were unable to introduce any good military institution: they thought it sufficient “for princes to write handsome letters...” We learn lessons from that “Julius Caesar, Alexander of Macedon, and all such men and excellent princes always fought at the head of their own armies, always marched with them on foot, and always carried their own arms; if any of them ever lost his power, he simultaneously lost his life with it and died with the same virtue which he had displayed while he lived.” Machiavelli affirms “that the first state in Italy that will take up this method and pursue it will soon become master of the whole province.”
2. Political Philosophy in the Reformation

Politically, the Reformation is a transfer of many powers and functions of the medieval church to the secular state, and the most important shift lies in the movement of the loyalties of common people. The medieval church was not a place of simple communion, but a gathering place of all levels of people: the secular prince and his subjects meet priests at the church. As the power of the church declined, a new secular state filled the vacuum left by the church. The medieval church was universal without boundary having a fixed territorial frontier, but the reformation state was territorially limited to the state boundary, so that the church accepts the power of secular law within the state. There were two forerunners for the Reformation: Wycliffe and Hus. Wycliffe condemned the corruption of church and preached that the papal claim of temporal authority is not biblically valid, and the owning of property by churches or priests is a violation of the Lord’s command; and suggested that England should be independent from Rome. Moved by Wycliffe’s writings, John Hus publicly preached the non-existence of purgatory, and protested against papal collecting of indulgences. As discussed in Chapter I, there were two more humanists contributing to the Reformation: Erasmus and More. Desiderius Erasmus attacked the evils and errors of church authorities, though he had no intention to destroy the unity of the church. Thomas More criticized absurdity and injustice of the European world, and introduced the imaginary world in his Utopia, where his communism was closer to monasticism than to the socialism of the future; but he wanted to reform within the papal system. The first victorious actor for the Reformation was Martin Luther creating Lutheranism in Germany, among many protestant leaders: Ulrich Zwingli led Zwinglians, Conrad Grebe led Anabaptists, John Calvin led Calvinists, the English Crown formed the Anglican Church, and John Knox founded the Presbyterian denomination in Scotland.

In theology, there were two major developments for the success of Luther’s protest. One was in the rapid growth of mysticism of Groote and Kempis, who emphasized the teaching of Christ in the Bible and discovered Protestant elements like individualism, voluntarism, and nationalism. The other was in the theology of William of Ockham: divine will supersedes reason, which is different from Thomas Aquinas harmonizing faith and reason or philosophy and religion. Ockham views that God’s truth cannot be reached by the reason, and he strictly limited the range of human reasoning and restricted the claims of the rational sciences of his time. Another major contributor was the Conciliar Movement appeared during the Great Schism of 1378-1414. Marsilius of Padua and William of Ockham already defined the proper relations between the councils of bishops and the heretic pope. Nicholas of Cusa, appointed cardinal for Pope Nicholas V in 1448, views that the general council of bishops is a harmony of the united Christians, which would not tolerate any kind of papal absolutism. He noted that government was founded on the consent of the governed since all men are free and equal by nature. As the schism ended, however, the papal system established the monopolarchal form of church government. Luther’s movement was purely religious in nature, but his criticism was against the abuse and corruption of the clergy, which stimulated a wide spread anticlericalism in society, so that he was supported by the humanists of the Renaissance as well as the rulers of numerous kingdoms in Germany. The spread of Lutheranism was in line with the growing movement of political nationalism in Germany, where the church had been the main disturbance in the unification toward a nation state. In the sixteenth century, there appeared a substantial hostility against powers of the church due to their privileges and immunities, which became a barrier to the formation of powerful secular regimes. In addition, the German nobility had resentment towards a foreign pope, and the continuous outflow of their capital into Rome was not acceptable to them. The Lutheran Reformation was not simply in the religious matter, but also related to many issues in politics, economy, and society.
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Photo III-2-1. The Treaty of Westphalia allowed Calvinism to be Free in 1648
Accessed 25 January 2016,

Photo III-2-2. Luther at the Diet of Worms
Accessed 25 January 2016,
http://www.gordon.edu/images/2Column/dietofworms-cat_2013_02_26_10_49_02.jpg

Book III. From the Renaissance to the Scientific Revolution, 1400-1715
Political Teachings of Luther and Calvin: As discussed in Chapter I, Political thought of Luther and Calvin is based on their theology. (a) **Man’s relationship with God:** Luther and Calvin thought that the relationship between God and His followers were personal and immediate one, and the Church existed as a congregation of the faithful, and each Christian by himself is responsible for his faith to obey the commandments of Christ. There is no place for an institutional church to claim to be the representative of God on earth. Luther’s new definition of God-man relations has a huge impact on the removal of the institutional church from the temporal realm. (b) **Justification of faith:** Aquinas equalized reason and faith, which was challenged by Ockham who believed that the human reason cannot reach the God’s truth. Luther and Calvin broke with medieval scholasticism in resolving the problem of human sin - the fall of Adam planted the seeds of sin in all men because of his avarice - faith alone without works brings complete salvation as Luther wrote in *The Freedom of a Christian*. The corruption of human nature is our responsibilities, and sins are not justified by and salvation is not obtained by good works or by the merits of the saints dispensed through indulgences, but by faith alone that is a free gift of God. This was the fundamental threat to the papal finance due to denying the purgatory and indulgences; which ignited the resentment of German kingdoms against the outflow of their money into foreign countries. (c) **The authority of Scripture:** returning to the teachings of St. Paul and St. Augustine, and rejecting the medieval theology that man can earn his salvation by his own effort; Luther and Calvin preached that all authority of Christians came from the Bible: “the sole criterion of theological truth must be the revealed word of God as expressed through the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments.” Luther views that Scripture sets “the limits within which positive guidance must be sought from reason, tradition, or history,” while Calvin looks to Scripture with a positive pattern of life and action. Luther and Calvin taught the Scriptures on government in line with absolutism that requires passive obedience of the people to all rulers. (d) **Church and state relations:** according to both Luther and Calvin, man belongs to two kingdoms: earth and heaven; temporal and eternal; or law and Gospel; being capable of reason and faith. “Spiritual government leads us to love God; temporal government leads us to serve our neighbors,...Both law and Gospel, philosophy and Scripture are necessary for life in this world.” They insist on the mutual independence of Church and State. Luther stresses on the invisibility of the church focusing on internal matters such as doctrine, preaching, and the sacraments, while the secular government concerns external matters of the church. Calvin stresses on the external visibility of the church. (e) **More authority to Church:** Calvin in character was a legalist and authoritarian more than Luther was, and his church-state relation was as intimate as to emerge as in Geneva. He was in favor of the two-sword theory, but gave more weight to the independence of spiritual authority than to that of secular power in enforcing the discipline. “Hence, the first duty of government is to maintain the pure worship of God and to uproot idolatry, sacrilege, blasphemy, and heresy.” In reality, the clerical power was unlimited and the church system was vaguely representative by the elders in Geneva unlikely in Scotland. His own political convictions were aristocratic rather than monarchical. (f) **The state and law:** Luther and Calvin follow the passive obedience to the government (Romans 13.1-4): “Let every person be subject to the governing authorities; for there is no authority except from God, and those authorities that exist have been instituted by God. Therefore whoever resists authority resists what God has appointed, and those who resist will incur judgment.” In theory, there is no social contract in political teachings of Luther or Calvin: the state is God’s servant and workman on earth. In reality, his reform movement was in religious purity that was fully supported by German princes, so that Luther took the side of the princes during the peasant revolts as a returning of their supports as written in his *Against the Robbing and Murdering Hordes of Peasants*. 

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Constitutional Monarchism: Unlike Luther and Calvin, (a) John Knox (1514-72) was in line with Calvin’s principles in Protestantism, but rejected his doctrine of passive obedience due to his specific conditions in exile in Scotland under sentence of death by the Catholic power. In his Appellation to the nobility, estates, and commonality of Scotland, Knox defended resistance and justified the use of rebellion as part of the duty to sustain religious reform. The Protestants also attacked absolutism in France, where the Edict of Nantes (1598) temporarily ended the civil wars which divided people into two camps. One was the divine right theory that king’s power directly came from God (descending theory), and the other was the constitutional theory that king’s power came from the people (ascending theory). In the Holy Roman Empire, the Peace of Augsburg (1555) recognized that the Lutherans and Catholics were legal in their respective spheres, but Zwinglians, Calvinists, and Anabaptists were excluded. Meanwhile, Lutheranism spread throughout eastern Germany and Scandinavia with the support of political power. (b) In France, however, the Calvinists (Huguenots) were demanding religious liberty and their writers argued about the philosophical foundations of political power. Francis Hotman (1524-90) obtained his doctorate in law at the University of Orleans and lectured at Paris. Giving up the academic career, he married and moved to Geneva and became the secretary of Calvin in 1548. Hotman became a professor at Lausanne in 1556, Valence in 1564, and the chair of juris-prudence at Bourges in 1567. After the Massacre of St. Bartholomew in 1572, he left France with his family in favor of Geneva. In 1580, he was appointed to counselor of state to Henry of Navarre, and admitted to the Privy Council of King Henry in 1585. In his Franco-Gallia (The State of Gaul) of 1573, Hotman presented ideal of protestant statesmanship – representation and limited authority: “concerning all these Kingdoms, one thing is remarkable, and must not lightly be passed by; which is That they were not hereditary, but conferr’d by the People upon such as had the Reputation of being just Men. Secondly, That they had no arbitrary or unlimited Authority, but, were bound and circumscribed by Laws; so that they were no less accountable to, and subject to the Power of the People, than the People was to theirs; insomuch that those Kingdoms seem’d nothing else but Magistracies for Life.” The constitution of government is such that “the people have no less power and authority over the king than the king has over the people.” (c) The Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos (A Defense of Liberty against Tyrants) was an influential Huguenot tract published under the pseudonym Junius Brutus in 1581. It consists of four questions and each question has a long answer. (i) The first question was whether subjects are bound and ought to obey princes, if they command that which is against the law of God. “If then Saul, although he were a king, ought to obey God, it follows in all good consequence that subjects are not bound to obey their king by offending of God.” (ii) The second question is whether it is lawful to resist a prince which does infringe the law of God, or ruin the Church, by whom, how, and how far is it lawful. “Now after that kings were given unto the people, there was so little purpose of disannulling or disbanding the former contract, that it was renewed and confirmed forever. We have formerly said at the inaugurating of kings, there was a double covenant treated of, to wit, between God and the king and between God and the people.” (iii) The third question is whether it is lawful to resist a prince which does oppress or ruin a public state, and how far such resistance may be extended, by whom, how, and by what right or law it is permitted. Kings are made by people; the whole body of the people (the assembly of three estates) is above the king; kings receive laws from the people; the prince has power of life and death over his subjects; subjects are king’s brethren and not his slaves; and the king must be the subject to the law. (iv) The fourth question is whether neighbor princes or states may be bound by law to give succor to the subjects of other princes, afflicted for the cause of true religion, or oppressed by manifest tyranny. There have been neighboring princes to oppose tyranny and maintain the people in their rights.
(d) On the other hand, scholars of the Society of Jesus such as Mariana and Suarez favored constitutional monarchy. **Juan de Mariana** (1536-1624) was born in Talavera de la Reina, Spain and joined the Jesuits at sixteen. He was summoned to Rome to teach theology at twenty-four, and then transferred to the school of the Jesuits in Sicily and to the University of Paris. In 1574, he returned to Spain and lived and studied in Toledo until his death. In his *On the King and the Royal Institution* of 1598, Mariana defended the theory of tyrannicide: men live like animals in the wild, being free from all restraints without law and property by following natural desire seeking food and mates. Since individual human being is weak, men form a social organization to protect themselves from the external threat. The members of a group delegate their collective authority to a king while sovereignty continuously remained in the people. A national assembly with representatives checks the power of authority, provides laws for the king to follow, and controls tax revenues and expenditures. Since individual ability is not equal, democracy based on equality is not possible. Hence, a constitutional hereditary monarchy is the best form of government compatible with the nature of man, and good to maintain stability without periodic anarchy. Most importantly, the king should be limited by laws, religion and ethics, and the right of the people, who has the right to depose him if he becomes a tyrant. The king should not change laws or levy taxes without consent of the people and should not determine anything against religion because the church is superior to the state. The rich should give to the needy, and taxes should be high on superfluities and low on necessaries. He justified the assassinations of Henry III and IV: “A tyrant may be deposed; he may rightly be killed, even, in some circumstances, by an individual.” His book was burned in Paris in 1610. *On the Alteration of Money* of 1605, Mariana criticized the inflation and debasement of money against Philip III, so that he was arrested. He was a political scientist as well as an economist based on the theory of natural law, and a political thinker who thought the same a half century earlier than Hobbes.76

(e) **Francis Suarez** (1548-1617) was born in Granada and joined the Society of Jesus at Salamanca in 1564, where he studied philosophy and theology during 1565-70. He taught philosophy at Avila and Segovia, and was ordained in 1572 and taught theology at various places including Rome and Paris. He wrote numerous books on law, the relationship between church and state, metaphysics, and theology. Such as in *Disputationes Metaphysicae* of 1597, Suarez combines metaphysics into the three schools of Thomism, Scotism, and Nominalism available at that time. He says that no one can be a perfect theologian unless he has the firm foundation of metaphysics. In his *Tractatus de legibus ac deo legislatore* (Treatise on Law in the Legislator) of 1612, Suarez sees that natural law relates to the community of the mankind, but human laws may properly be enacted only for a perfect community where three conditions are met – for the common good, for the subjects, and without inequality – in order for law to be just; and that “no human power, even though it be the papal power, can abrogate any proper precept of the natural law.” He views that “all legislative as well as all paternal power is derived from God and that the authority of every law resolves itself into His. Suarez refutes the patriarchal theory of government and the divine right of kings founded upon it.….Power by its very nature belongs to no one man but to a multitude of men; and the reason is obvious, since all men are born equal.” Thus, a state is ruled by a king or in some other way, but political power is derived from the community, so that any form of political obligation cannot be absolute. Therefore, when a political society is formed, “its nature is chosen by the people involved, and they give their natural legislative power to their ruler. Because they gave this power, they have the right to take it back, to revolt against a ruler – but only if the ruler behaves badly towards them, and they're obliged to act moderately and justly.” Suarez intended to put the divine right of the pope above the secular power of the king, but the real effect was to separate politics from religious control.77 See more in natural law.
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The Mixture of Medieval and Modern: (a) Jean Bodin (1530-96) studied and taught Roman law at Toulouse and became a lawyer in Paris in 1561. He wrote the Method of the Easy Understanding of History in 1566, focusing on the philosophy of history. Bodin entered the service of Duke of Alecon (later Anjou) in 1571 and accompanied him to England. During 1576-77, he served as a delegate of the Third Estate in the Estate-General of Blois. Bodin wrote the Six Books of the Commonwealth in 1576, four years after the Massacre of St. Bartholomew. (i) Religious Toleration: After the Massacre, a growing body of moderate thinkers in line with the king hoped national unity of religious sects and political parties by envisaging the possibility of tolerating several religions within a state. Perceiving that religious persecution was ruinous and harmful to society in general, as written his manuscript of the Colloquium of the Seven, Bodin advocated religious toleration as a policy rather than as a moral principle, though religious unity was lost in France. (ii) The State and the Society: Bodin distinguishes the state from the society which is founded on the family as a natural basis. In nature, the family is patriarchal: the father has absolute power over his wife, children, and their property. However, civilization may reduce the patriarchal rights while women demand social equality to her husband. The decline of paternal authority and family discipline shakes the natural foundation of social order. Since the family is the basic unit of order and morality, no laws can take their place when its unity and discipline decay. The property right is rooted in the law of nature and private property belongs to the family rather than individual. Communism, either in theories of Plato and More or in practices of the Anabaptists, is impossible because of the nature of individual inequality. The village communities might originate in such a social contract like in Mariana, but the state is created by a powerful group of families conquering others, and the leader of the victors becomes king. (iii) Sovereignty is supreme power over citizens and subjects, and it is unlimited by law in power (absolute) or time length (perpetual). Law is not the will of the people (not the contract) but the command of the sovereign and the organized force of a government affecting all the subjects. Monarchy controls the state with absolute and perpetual power, and no government is sovereign if it is subject to any laws except divine and natural laws. “We thus see that the main point of sovereign majesty and absolute power consists of giving the law to subjects in general without their consent.” He views that “if the prince is bound to the laws of nature, and if the civil laws are equitable and reasonable, it follows that princes are also bound to civil law.” (iv) The Kinds of State: Bodin considers three kinds of state – monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. He considers that the best form of government is unlimited and hereditary monarchy to avoid wars of succession, while democracy is only briefly ruling a state because of many foolish voters. He said that “a tyrant is someone who makes himself a sovereign prince by his own authority without election, or right of succession, or lot, or a just war, or a special calling from God.” Bodin concludes that “it is never permissible for a subject to attempt anything against a sovereign prince, no matter how wicked and cruel a tyrant may be. It is certainly permissible not to obey him in anything that is against the law of God or nature – to flee, to hide, to evade his blows, to suffer death rather than make any attempt upon his life or honor.” Lee C. McDonald wrote that Bodin contributed three points to western political thinking. First, Bodin attempts to theorize about the process of historical changes in states and thereby to move beyond the cyclical theories of the ancients. He analyzes many political cases to conclude the theory on the subject matters. Second, he gives the sovereign “the power to make law” and not simply to adjudicate, administer, and enforce preexisting law. According to him, the legislative power is the chief function of sovereignty, without which modern parliaments and legislation would not be possible. Third, the conception of sovereignty contributes to the rise of the modern state by abandoning “the Roman conception of world order and the medieval conception of a unified Christian society.”
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(b) Richard Hooker (1554-1600) was educated at Oxford, where he became a fellow of Corpus Christi College in 1579 and taught logic and Hebrew. Ordained to the priesthood, Hooker was appointed to the Master of Temple Church in London in 1585. Resigning the job at the Temple and moving to the home of his father-in-law, he wrote eight books of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity – the first four in 1593, the fifth in 1597, and the last three posthumously. (i) Political Conservative: Book I deals with the idea of law, Books II and III with the tenets of Puritanism, Books IV and V with a defense of the Church of England against Catholicism, Book VI with the role of laity in the Church, Book VII with the authority of bishops, and Book VIII discusses Church-state relations. Hooker like Bodin linked the medieval to the modern in political thought at the time of religious transition in the Elizabethan period. By the Act of Supremacy (1534), Henry VIII assumed the temporal headship of the church; and by the Act of Uniformity (1549), Edward VI established the Book of Common Prayer, which intended to “unify the Country behind a single common practice of Faith.” After Mary’s ruling toward the Catholic, Elizabeth adopted the Act in 1559. The controversy about the royal headship of the church made Hooker write this treatise, in which he attempted to defend the existing power structure against the Presbyterian system of church government demanding to replace the regime of bishops. Though he was a Protestant, he rejected the Calvinists’ belief in the total depravity of man, and argued that God is capable of revealing Himself not only in Scriptures but also in many different ways. (ii) Consent: There are numerous types of law including the eternal law, the divine law, the natural law, the ordinances, and the law of reason. By nature, men are free and equal, and human reason enables man to perceive the good and his will leads him to follow it. As soon as the common good resulting from reason is understood, the rules of reason are universally accepted by the people. Though reason clearly points to perfection, the will of man is corrupted by sin; so supernatural assistance is necessary if fallen man cannot stand with reason. Society is founded since man is social, government is necessary for social life. As men associate together, they seek their own commodities by economic association, which affect others. Hooker wrote that “strives and troubles would be endless, except they gave their common consent all to be ordered by some whom they should agree upon: without which consent, there were no reason, that one man should take upon him to be Lord or Judge over another.” Consent may be given through representatives, and the law of existing state are binding upon its members for all times since “corporations are immortal.” Once the people set up an authority by consent, there is no way for society to withdraw from it. When the Puritans attacked the English church, Hooker argued that the ecclesiastical law of England is not contrary to reason or Christian faith, so that it is binding upon all Englishmen like the rest of English law. He implies that both Presbyterianism and Papalism are causes of disorder in the state and eventually in the church. His theory of consent is the opposite from the theory of the divine right of kings. (iii) Church and State: The royal supremacy once established by Henry VIII was one possible solution of problems of the time. In Laws, Hooker brings three exceptions or limitations. First, no one would imagine that a human’s power is superior to God’s. Second, if a king’s power is given by human law, it must be exercised in accordance with it, not with divine law. Third, a king can be supreme over part of community he rules, but not supreme over the entire community, which is the source of political power. The crown’s power in religion was dependent on the consent of the community as given in parliament; and his explanation was in republican conception of the Elizabethan settlement. The comparison of the headship between Christ and the king confirms that the crown is indeed subordinate to Christ, as the lordship of Christ is effective in the sacraments, ceremonies, and flawed officials of the established order. Hooker refutes “the position of Presbyterians, militant liturgical reformers, and Roman Catholics on a host of specific issues.” “He was essentially a man of the via media, and no fanatic.” 

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**The Divine Right of Kings - Absolutism:**

(a) **James I** (1566-1625) succeeded the throne from Elizabeth in 1603. He wrote major political works such as *The True Law of Free Monarchy* of 1598 and *Basilicon Doron* (Royal Gift) of 1599. His core arguments in the former rested on “no more than the analogy between a father’s authority over his children and a king’s authority over his people.” Relying heavily on scriptural references to kingly power in ancient Israel, James views that “By the law of nature the king becomes a natural father to all his lieges at his coronation: and as the father of his family is duty bound to care for the nourishing, education, and virtuous government of his children, even so is the king bound to care for all his subjects.”

(b) **Robert Filmer** (1588-1653) was educated at Trinity College, Cambridge and received legal training at Lincoln’s Inn, but devoted his life at the family estates in Kent. He wrote the *Patriarcha: A Defense of the Natural Power of Kings against the Unnatural Liberty of the People* from 1635 to 1642, and a volume was reprinted in 1679. He traced the divine authority of European kings back to Adam, the first man on earth. God gave authority to Adam over his wife Eve, over his children, and over all the possessions on the earth, then, became the first king. “And indeed not only Adam, but the succeeding Patriarchs had, but right of Father-hood, royal authority over their children….I see not then how the children of Adam, or of any man else, can be free from subjection to their parents. And this subordination of children is the fountain of all regal authority, but the ordination of God himself.” Although his book was an anachronism when it was written, he intended to restate two principles – divine right and passive obedience – against two enemies of royal power: the Jesuit and Calvinists. The royalists believed that two thieves, the pope and the people, crucified the monarchy. In the civilized world today, it is absurd to think that political power is transferred from father to son. Though his theory was against the natural freedom of mankind, English society at that time was closer to the patriarchal thought of Filmer than to the individualistic thought of the liberals and radicals.

(c) **Jacques Bossuet** (1627-1704) was born in Dijon and educated at Jesuit schools and at the College of Navarre in Paris, obtained the Master of Arts in 1643, and ordained a priest in 1652. As a chief theologian of divine-right monarchy in France in the seventeenth century, court preacher to Louis XIV, and tutor to the Dauphin of France; he wrote the *Politics Drawn from the Very Words of Holy Scriptures*, focusing on royal absolutism, consisting of ten books (the first six books were published in 1679). Bossuet believes that God is the true king, and royal authority is sacred, paternal, absolute, and intelligent. God establishes kings as his ministers and reigns through them over the people so that the royal throne is not the throne of a man but the throne of God himself. Hence, the person of kings is sacred and anything against them is a sacrilege: one must obey the prince by reason of religion and conscience. Since kings hold the place of God who is true father of the human race, kings were fashioned on the model of fathers: the true character of the prince is to provide the needs for the people. The authority of princes is absolute allowing no co-active force against them, but kings are not free from the laws despite his invincibility and firm enforcement. Bossuet distinguished the absolute from the arbitrary government: the king rules by law and should avoid the arbitrary government ruling without law. Royal authority is subject to reason since the prince’s wisdom makes the people happy. The prince should love the truth by acquiring necessary knowledge and take counselings with his council for reasonable decisions. His last five books deal with duties of subjects and of princes, and the supports of royalty. The duties of subjects toward the prince are complete obedience and the tributes. The prince’s duties are to preserve the state “by maintaining a healthy constitution; by making use of the aid which human weakness must rely on; by obtaining suitable remedies for the problems and the illnesses which may attack it.” Favoring the king, he took part in the quarrel between Louis XIV and Pope Innocent XI over the respective rights of king and pope in France.
Puritan Constitutionalism: In England, the common law, Puritan constitutionalism, and individual liberties were the restraints upon rulers. (a) **The common law:** it is a judge-made law common to all of England that was formed during the thirteenth century with the rise of a legal profession, the development of law education at the universities, followed by the secularization of the courts. The common law is a body of general rules prescribing social conduct throughout the kingdom and those rules are enforced and applied by royal courts. It develops its principles from the decisions in actual legal controversies, and extensively uses of the jury to provide the court with facts necessary for the decision of the case. The court is bound to follow the reason used in the prior decision. The common law is not a written code unlike the civil law of Rome, not the law of special groups or interests unlike cannon law, and not local custom but general rules. In most jurisdictions, “decisions by appellate courts are binding on lower courts in the same jurisdiction and on future decisions of the same appellate court, but decisions of non-appellate courts are only non-binding persuasive authority.” In fact, interactions between common law, constitutional law, statutory law, and regulatory law are not simple, but similar cases are decided according to consistent rules, so that similar results are mostly reached, which is the heart of all common law systems. Edward Coke (1552-1634) was an English jurist and Member of Parliament, educated at Cambridge. He wrote four volumes of *Institutes of the Laws of England* first published during 1628-44 that analyses legal statues, criminal law, and court jurisdiction. Coke contributed the two theories: the general principle of the supremacy of the common law and the argument for artificial reason in the law, and Coke argued against James and against Francis Bacon. He views that “Reason is the life of the law, nay, the common law itself is nothing else but reason; which is to be understood as an artificial perfection of reason, gotten by long study, observation and experience, and not as every man’s natural reason….no man out of his private reason ought to be wiser than the law, which is the perfection of reason.”

(b) **Puritan constitutionalism:** Along Calvinist lines, the Puritans wished to purify the Church of England, when worship in the Anglican Church was not much different from what had been done before the break with Rome. They were nonconformists and dissenters who objected to the practices of the Church of England, consisting of three major groups. First, the Presbyterians as the right wing of the Revolution wanted to organize the church according to Calvinist principles and supported the Solemn League and Covenant negotiated with the Scots. Second, the Independents or Separatists believed that church matters should be controlled by the hands of local congregations. Though they distrusted the Presbyterians’ conception, they cooperated with them to maintain the united front against the king. Third, various Left-wing Radicals included the secular radicals favoring democratic reform largely in the Army, and the religious fanatics and doctrinaires such as the Anabaptists. All of them shared similar convictions to God’s covenant with Abraham and the children of Israel: God protects the people of Israel if they are faithful to Him. Thomas Smith (1513-77) was an English scholar and diplomat, who asserted in his *De Republica Anglorum*, written during 1562-65 and published in 1583, that “authority for everything that is done in English government and that parliament was the most high and absolute power of the realm” which means that no other court will reverse a decision by parliament. After Charles I was beheaded in 1649, Cromwell was established as Lord Protector, to rule with the Council of State with a one-house Parliament, which was dissolved by Cromwell in 1655. His sole basis of right was that “we should keep covenant with one another.” In the beginning of American colonies, the covenant view on the constitutional structure was seen in the Mayflower Compact of 1620: “We….having undertaken for the Glory of God…., a voyage to plant the first colony in the northern part of Virginia; do by these Presents, solemnly and mutually in the Presence of God and one another, covenant and combine ourselves into a civil Body Politick….”
(c) **Individual Liberties**: The idea of individual liberties appears in each modern constitution that tries to restrict the power of centralized authority. The individual seeks the freedom to be different from others in libertarianism, but seeks the equality to be treated the same as others in egalitarianism. Roger Williams (1604-83) became a Puritan at age eleven against his father’s liking, and came to the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1631. Advocating religious toleration and separation between church and state, William pointed out that England had no right to take land away from the Native Americans, and that a religious oath should not be forced to anyone who is not voluntarily subscribing it to the religious tenets. In 1634, he became acting pastor in Salem, but entered immediately into controversies spreading “diverse, new, and dangerous opinions” that questioned the Church. He was banished in 1636 by the bill passed by the Massachusetts House. He moved south and set up the Rhode Island colony, the Providence Plantation in 1640. “In 1647, the colony on Rhode Island was united with Providence under a single government, and liberty of conscience was again proclaimed. The area became a safe haven for people who were persecuted for their beliefs – Baptists, Quakers, Jews, and others went there to follow their consciences in peace and safety. On May 18, 1652, Rhode Island passed the first law in North America making slavery illegal.”

John Milton (1608-74) was an English poet and writer, and became an official in the government of Oliver Cromwell. After restoration in 1660, he was briefly imprisoned and spent his remaining decade of his retirement life in London. He wrote many books and articles for liberty and equality. According to Milton, “I have shown that the civil power neither has right nor can do right by forcing religious things. I will now show the wrong it does by violating the fundamental privilege of the Gospel, the new birthright of every true believer, Christian liberty. 2 Cor. 3.17: Where the spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty.” He published the *Paradise Lost* in 1667, reflecting personal convictions and a passion for freedom, which tries to justify the way of God to men and explain the conflict between God’s eternal foresight and human free will.

(d) **Populism**: Wise government must be popular government. Unless ordinary people have a considerable power, the elite groups have too much power, which makes the system corrupt. No one group can have too much power in healthy government. At the time of civil war, populism was expressed by James Harrington, John Lilburne, and William Walwyn. James Harrington (1611-77), who was impressed by the Venetian Republic, published *The Commonwealth of Oceana* in 1656. He views that Machiavelli may assert that “the people are wiser and more constant in their resolutions than a prince, which is the prerogative of popular government for wisdom.” He proposes that “The centre or fundamental laws are, first, the agrarian, proportioned at £2,000 a year in land, lying and being within the proper territory of Oceana, and stating property in land at such a balance, that the power can never swerve out of the hands of the many. Secondly, the ballot conveying this equal sap from the root, by an equal election or rotation, into the branches of magistracy or sovereign power.” John Lilburne (1614-57) was the most famous leader of the Levellers, which movement is “to cut down every mark of status of privilege and level the nation to a flat and common uniformity” with justice. His *Agreement of the People* of 1649 proposes: “No member could sit for two successive Parliaments. Parliament was forbidden to legislate in the field of religion and could not grant monopolies or tax food. Prisoners were to be allowed counsel, tithes were to be abolished, and local congregations were to be free of make their own arrangements with ministers.” William Walwyn (1600-81) was more radical than other Levellers, and his pamphlet *The Power of Love* of 1643 was a defense of liberty of conscience and the use of reason in examining all religious opinions. They emphasized the virtues and rights of the common man, but constitutionalism seems to be marginal in their thought: “they were just Calvinists enough to question their own faith in the perfectibility of man and, in so doing, grant that a constitutional balance of power might be a necessary restraint on man’s sin.”
Chapter II

1. Political Philosophy

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3. Political Philosophy of Natural Law

The history of natural law is as old as philosophy. The idea of natural law emerged as divine law from which all human laws draw their force, and human reason arrives at distinction between divine law and human law. The written laws of men are always subordinate to the unwritten and unchanging laws of god. In ancient Greece, the Sophists believe that the positive law shall be right by nature. It is criticized that the existing laws are artificially constructed to serve class interests, which is not naturally moral and naturally right. All men are free and equal by nature, and the idea of the rights of man is superior to the city-state because the state is originated by a human decision like a free contract. Their arguments started from the Athenian democracy which was unjust to slaves and non-citizens in reality. Some others view that “might makes right.” Look at the animal kingdom or at warring states, many who are weak unite against their enemies, but the stronger naturally overcomes the weaker, so that natural law is the force of the stronger. Ancient Greeks and Persians are subject to the law of god. For Socrates, the unwritten laws are made by god and universally applied, and what is lawful must also be just. Plato and Aristotle consider about what is naturally just and what is legally just. They started, not from the freedom of individual, but from the ethical ideal of citizen in Athens or other city-states for their common welfare and happiness. Plato recognizes that a natural law is ideal law as a norm of the law-makers and the citizen, as a measure for the positive laws which are the product of reason. Aristotle views that the natural law originates from the essence of the just in nature, and the positive law comes from the will of the lawmakers. Political justice comes from the natural and the conventional: a rule of justice is natural, that is ethical, unchangeable, and universal; and a rule is convention that is man-made laws varying from city to city. He introduces commutative justice for individual equality and distributive justice for the welfare of the community.

The Stoics view that natural law is indifferent from the divine law. They believe that correct knowledge is the basis of ethics, and virtue is right reason which is the universal law of nature. For Cicero, natural law is the foundation of justice, government, and morality. “The nature of justice must be sought for in the nature of man….Law is the highest reason, implanted in nature, which commands what ought to be done, and forbids the opposite.” He wrote that “Nature has so constituted men that all humans share a common sense of justice….if we have received true law from nature, then we have also received true justice. In this gift of reason and the moral standards it conveys, all men are equal.” The Stoic idea of natural law passed into Roman law. Ulpian (died 228) divides private law into three parts: natural law, the common law of mankind, and particular civil code of individual states. He draws natural law from the common of humans with animals. Early Fathers like Ambrose, Jerome, and Augustine transformed Stoic reason into supreme reason of God. Ambrose believes that God gave the commandments to Moses because mankind stopped to obey natural law that is in the heart of the just man. For Jerome, God gave natural law to the whole human race because men neglected it. He distinguishes two levels of natural law. The primary natural law existed before the fallen nature of man, under which there was no government and no private property. The secondary natural law arose with original sin from the fallen nature in order to adjust to man’s corruption, which created government, private property, and even slavery. In 533 Justinian Code adopted that all men are free and equal by nature, and slavery is a violation of natural law. The Digest defines that the law is the reflection of the eternal law and God-given principles of justice and goodness, from which Christianity adopted the teaching of natural law: natural law was seen as reflection of the Divine Providence. Though the natural law precisely became the divine law in the Middle Ages, the doctrine of natural law was gradually challenged, developed, and modified by later thinkers.
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Thomas Aquinas starts from “the likeness of human nature to the divine nature” and defines the natural law in two ways. First, the natural law is “the rational creature’s participation of the eternal law” that is the reason of divine providence. Second, the natural law constitutes the basic principles of practical rationality for human beings. The precepts of the natural law are knowable by human reason and universally binding by nature anywhere and anytime. Since human law is an application of natural law to particular social circumstances, it is not true law if a positive law violates natural law. In ethics, moral virtues are natural, and virtuous acts are a subject of natural law. The Late Scholastics consider lex naturalis and ius naturale as synonyms. A half century later, William of Ockham introduces three kinds of natural law. “The first are laws that hold everywhere and always; the second hold for the state of innocence; the third hold for other states, contingently upon decisions by the persons concerned. Behind natural laws of the third kind there is a process combining reasoning and decision.” He views that “fallen man has a choice, in principle at least, between continuing to live without property or setting up economic institutions defined by positive law” which implies that natural law is positive law as divine will. The spirit of Renaissance and Reformation had made use of Ockham’s theory – separation of faith and reason to emancipate secular thought or worldly wisdom from the monopoly of theology: “what is true in philosophy may be false in theology, and vice versa.” Being grounded in reason, not in absolute power of God, the natural law becomes the essential nature of man who judges with natural reason: “Good is to be done, evil avoided” that is the basis of natural moral law. Some thinkers like Francis Suarez, Johannes Althusius, Hugo Grotius, Thomas Hobbes, Samuel Pufendorf, and John Locke developed ideas of natural law according to the change of environments: the rise of humanism throughout the Renaissance, the consolidation of absolute monarchy with the collapse of old feudalism, the Reformation and the rise of Protestantism, the discovery and expansion of the new world, the emergence of the mercantile class, and the scientific revolution.88
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Francis Suarez (1548-1617): As noted previously, Suarez was born at Granada and studied canon law at Salamanca. “He entered the Society of Jesus in 1564 and in due course began his professional career by teaching philosophy at Segovia. Afterwards he taught theology at Avila, Segovia, Valladolid, Rome, Alcala, Salamanca, and Coimbra. Suarez, who was an exemplary and holy priest and religious, was also very much the student, scholar and professor; and his whole adult life was devoted to lecturing, study and writing.” His most important writings include the two volumes of *Disputationes metaphysicae* (1597) and *De legibus* (1612); one may include his *De Deo uno et trino* (1606) and the *De opera sex dierum* (1621). (a) *Disputationes Metaphysicae*: This includes 54 disputations on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, which attempt to “provide his readers with certain conceptual tools and substantive truths required for the comprehensive and intellectually rigorous explication of Catholic wisdom aimed at by systematic theology… Even though divine and supernatural theology relies on the divine light and on principles revealed by God, still, because it is perfected by human discourse and reasoning, it is assisted as well by truths known by the natural light. And it uses those truths as aids and, so to speak, instruments in perfecting its own discourse and in illuminating divine truths. Now among all the natural sciences, the one that ranks first of all and goes by the name of First Philosophy is especially useful to sacred and supernatural theology. This is so, both because it comes the closest of all of them to the cognition of divine matters, and also because it explains and confirms those natural principles which apply to all things in general and which in some sense firm up and sustain every doctrine.”

(Disputations 1) The nature of metaphysics: The idea of first philosophy is on being as being. Though Suarez is concerned primarily with immaterial reality, he considers material reality only from the metaphysical point of view, not from the point of view of a physicist or of a mathematician. Suarez accepted the Aristotelian doctrine of the degrees of abstraction. (D 2) The concept of being: “The concept of being is really distinct from the concept of substance or the concept of accident: it abstracts from what is proper to each… it is sufficient if the mind considers objects, not as each exists in itself, but according to its likeness to other things.” (D 3) The attributes of being: There are only three such attributes, namely unity, truth and goodness. “Unity signifies being as undivided; and this undividedness adds to being simply a denial of division, not anything positive. Truth of knowledge does not add anything real to the act itself, but it connotes the object existing in the way that it is represented by the judgment as existing. But truth of knowledge is found in the judgment or mental act and is not the same as *veritas transcendentalis*, which signifies the being of a thing with connotation of the knowledge or concept of the intellect, which represents, or can represent, the thing as it is. This conformity of the thing to the mind must be understood primarily of a relation to the divine mind, and only secondarily of conformity to the human mind. As to goodness, this means the perfection of a thing, though it also connotes in another thing an inclination to or capacity for the aforesaid perfection.” (D 5) Individual Unity and its Principle: “All actually existing things are singular and individual. “Individuality adds to the common nature something which is mentally distinct from that nature, which belongs to the same category, and which constitutes the individual metaphysically, as an individual differentia contracting the species and constituting the individual.” (D 29) God’s existence can be known by reason: Every being is either made or not made. A made or produced being is produced by something else, which is itself either made or not made. In order to avoid an infinite regress or a circle, it is necessary to postulate an uncreated being. His argument does not immediately show that God exists: it has still to be shown that there is only one uncreated being; and that there is one first being by which all things are governed and from which they derive their origin. Suarez concludes that it can be proved that there must be a necessary being and that it can then be shown conclusively that there cannot be more than one necessary being.”

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(b) *De legibus ac Deo legislatore*: (i) Law and theology: theology must comprise a study of law; and being theology, it is necessarily concerned with God as law giver. For example, “the theologist considers natural law in its relation of subordination to the supernatural order, and he consider civil law or human positive law with a view to determining its rectitude in the light of higher principles or with a view to making clear the obligations bearing on the conscience in regard to civil law.” (ii) Definition: Law is a certain rule and measure, according to which one is induced to act or is restrained from acting. “Natural law relates to the community of mankind; but human laws may properly be enacted only for a perfect community. It is also inherent in the nature of law that it be enacted for the common good, though this must be understood in relation to the actual subject-matter of the law, not in relation to the subjective intentions of the legislator, which is a personal factor.” There are three conditions for law to be just: first, law must be enacted for the common good, not for private advantage; secondly, law is enacted for those in regard to whom the legislator has authority to legislate, that is, for those who are his subjects; thirdly, law must be not proportion burdens unequally, in an inequitable manner. (iii) “The eternal law is a free decree of the will of God, who lays down the order to be observed; either generally, by the separate parts of the universe with respect to the common good…or else specifically, by intellectual creatures in their free actions…The eternal law is eternal and immutable; but it is nonetheless free. In the first phase the eternal law is truly eternal; but in the second phase, it did not exist from eternity, because the subjects did not exist from eternity.” (iv) The dictates of right reason is the natural law, but the natural law consists in the actual judgment of the mind; and the natural reason or the natural light of reason may also be called natural law. “The natural law is thus a demonstrative law rather than a perceptive law; and it does not derive from God as legislator. It is independent of God.”

(v) Types of precepts belonging to the natural law: “Frist of all, there are general and primary principles of morality, such as one must do good and shun evil. Secondly, there are principles which are more definite and specific, like God must be worshipped and one must live temperately…Thirdly, there are moral precepts which are not immediately self-evident but which are deduced from self-evident propositions and become known through rational reflection.” (vi) Suarez maintains that no one can be ignorant of the primary or most general principles of the natural law. It is possible, however, to be ignorant of particular precepts, even of those which are self-evident or easily deducible from self-evident precepts. “Suarez will not admit that the natural law is subject to human power. At the same time, he maintained that nature gave the things of the earth to all men in common…Now, common ownership was a part of natural law only in a negative sense, in the sense, that is to say, that by virtue of the natural law all property was to be held in common unless men introduced a different provision. The introduction of private property was thus not against the natural law nor did it constitute a change in any positive precept of the natural law.”

(vii) Suarez distinguishes the natural law from the law of nations (*ius gentium*). The law of nations is not only indicative of what is evil but also constitutive of evil. The natural law prohibits what is intrinsically evil whereas the law of nations considered precisely as such does not prohibit intrinsically evil acts but prohibits certain acts for a just and sufficient reason and renders the performance of those acts wrong. (viii) A just war or defensive war is permitted under conditions below. First, war must be waged by a legitimate power; and this is the supreme sovereign. Second, a just war is that the cause of making war should be just. “A defensive war should be attempted; but before an offensive war is begun, the sovereign should estimate his chances of victory and should not begin the war if he is more likely to lose than to win it.” Third, the war must be properly conducted and due proportion must be observed throughout its course and in victory. Finally, after the winning of victory, the prince may inflict upon the conquered enemy such penalties as are sufficient for a just punishment; and he may demand compensation for all losses.

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Johannes Althusius (1557-1638): Althusius was born to a family of modest means in Diedenshausen, a Calvinist County of now North Rhine Westphalia. "Under the patronage of a local count, he attended the Gymnasium Philippinum in Marburg from 1577 and began his studies in 1581, concentrating in law, philosophy, and logic, first in Cologne, then in Basel and probably with study excursion in Geneva 1585/1586. In 1586, after completing his studies, Althusius joined the law faculty at the Protestant-Calvinist Herborn Academy of Nassau County, from 1592 to 1596 he changed to the Calvinist Academy in Burgsteinfurt/Westphalia, and after return he was appointed president of the Nassau College in Siegen in 1599/1600 and in Herborn in 1602, also beginning his political career by serving as a member of the Nassau (Germany) county council. For the next several years, he became involved in various colleges throughout the area, variously serving as their president and lecturing on law and philosophy, and in 1603, he was elected to be a municipal trustee of the city of Emden, in East Frisia, where he ultimately made his fame. He became a city Syndic in 1604, which placed him at the helm of Emden's governance until his death." “By the time Althusius began his formal studies in 1581, the Dutch Revolt against Spain had already come to a head, and it was not to be settled until Dutch independence was recognized in 1609. Because the nature of the conflict was largely religious – Calvinist states rebelling against their Catholic overlords – it was of especial interest to Calvinist political thinkers such as Althusius. In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, Emden in East Frisia (now Germany) was at the crossroads of political and religious activity in the region. A prosperous seaport situated between the Netherlands and the Holy Roman Empire, with convenient maritime access to England, Emden was a prominent city in the politics and policy of all three nations, and was thus able to retain a significant amount of political freedom." 94

Althusius was the most profound political thinker between Bodin and Hobbes. He views that “the association of men in groups is simply a natural fact, as much an intrinsic part of human nature as anything else, and accordingly that a society was not, in Hobbes’ phrase, ‘an artificial body’ to be explained by extraneous causes.” He considers five kinds of associations formed by human nature: the family, the voluntary corporation, the local community, the province, and the state. A series of social contracts creates various social groups to exist, some political and some not. The association of provinces or local communities is a state that is the basis of his theory of state. Viewing that a society is naturally formed by human associations, Althusius has been considered as the first federalist.95 “As each type of community corresponds to a definite human need, the constitution of a wider or more extensive community does not annul or abolish the narrower community: rather is the wider community constituted by the agreement of a number of narrower communities, which themselves remain in existence. The local community, for example, does not annul the families or the corporations composing it; it owes its existence to their agreement and its purpose I distinct from theirs. They are not, therefore, swallowed up by the wider community. Again, the state is immediately constituted by the agreement of provinces rather than directly by a contract between individuals, and it does not render the provinces superfluous or useless. From this a certain federation logically follows. It involves the right of resistance, since the power of the ruler rests on a contract. If he is faithless to his trust or breaks the contract, power reverts to the people. When this happens, the people may appoint another ruler.” Althusius assumed the sanctity of contracts, resting on the natural law; and the natural law itself he regarded, in the traditional manner, as resting on divine authority. “It was Grotius, rather than Althusius, who re-examined the idea of natural law. But Althusius’ political theory is remarkable for its assertion of popular sovereignty and the use made of the idea of contract. As a Calvinist, he insisted on the right of resistance to the ruler; but it must be added that he had no idea of religious freedom or of a State which would be officially indifferent to forms of religion.”96
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Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) was educated so early in philosophy, divinity, and civil law at Leiden. He joined the Dutch mission to France in 1598, where he earned a doctorate degree in law at Orleans, returned to Holland in 1599, and practiced law. He was appointed to Attorney General and First Public Comptroller for the courts of Holland, Zeeland, and West Friesland in 1607. In his *Free Seas* of 1609, Grotius argues that liberty of the sea is fundamental and the key aspect of communications for the people and nations, so that no country can monopolize control over the ocean. He supported the Dutch commercial expansion into the Indies. Being involved with the Calvinists, he took the Armenian cause of free will, and the failure of his attempt led him to perpetual imprisonment, but he escaped in 1621 after three years confined in a castle and exiled to Paris. He returned to Holland in 1631 with hope but was forced to flee again in 1632. Following the design of the late king Gustavo, Chancellor Oxenstern appointed him to Swedish Ambassador to Louis XIII in 1635, who served eleven years until the last year of his life.

(a) *De Indis and Mare Liberum*: The Dutch were at war with Spain and Portugal when the captain Jacob van Heemskerk captured a loaded merchant ship Santa Catarina, a Portuguese carrack off present-day Singapore in 1603. The captain had no authority to initiate the use of force, many shareholders were eager to accept the riches that he brought back to them. “The scandal led to a public judicial hearing and a wider campaign to sway public opinion. It was in this wider context that representatives of the Company called upon Grotius to draft a polemical defense of the seizure. The result of Grotius’ efforts in 1604/05 was a long, theory-laden treatise that he provisionally entitled *On the Indies*. Grotius sought to ground his defense of the seizure in terms of the natural principles of justice. In this, he had cast a net much wider than the case at hand; his interest was in the source and ground of war’s lawfulness in general. In *The Free Sea* of 1609 Grotius formulated the new principle that the sea was international territory and all nations were free to use it for seafaring trade. Grotius, by claiming freedom of the seas, provided suitable ideological justification for the Dutch breaking up of various trade monopolies through its formidable naval power.” England, competing fiercely with the Dutch for domination of world trade, opposed this idea and claimed the *Dominion of the British Sea.*

(b) *Arminian Controversy, Arrest and Exile*: In 1607 Grotius was appointed attorney general of the provinces of Holland, Zeeland, and West Friesland. “Led by Oldenbarnevelt, the States of Holland took an official position of religious toleration towards Remonstrants and Counter-Remonstrants. Grotius was eventually asked to draft an edict to express the policy of toleration. This edict, *Decretum pro pace ecclesiariwm* was completed in late 1613 or early 1614. The edict put into practice a view that Grotius had been developing in his writings on church and state: that only the basic tenets necessary for undergirding civil order ought to be enforced while differences on obscure theological doctrines should be left to private conscience. The edict imposing moderation and toleration on the ministry, was backed up by Grotius with thirty-one pages of quotations, mainly dealing with the Five Remonstrant Articles.” “As the conflict between civil and religious authorities escalated, in order to maintain civil order, Oldenbarnevelt eventually proposed that local authorities be given the power to raise troops (the Sharp Resolution of August 4, 1617). Such a measure putatively undermined the authority of the stadtholder of the republic, Maurice of Nassau, Prince of Orange. In 1618 Maurice, using his military powers in a coup d’état, ordered the arrest of Arminian leaders. Oldenbarnevelt was executed for high treason, and Grotius was sentenced to life imprisonment in the fortress of Loevestein. In 1621, with the aid of his wife, Grotius made a dramatic escape from the castle by hiding in a chest of books. He fled to Antwerp and finally to Paris, where he stayed until 1631 under the patronage of Louis XIII.” “Grotius was well received in Paris by his former acquaintances and was granted a royal pension under Louis XIII. It was there in France that Grotius completed his most famous philosophical works.”

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(c) De Jure Belli ac Pacis: Grotius published *The Rights of War and Peace* at Paris in 1625, dedicated to his current patron Louis XIII. It is not surprising that “Grotius was deeply concerned with matters of conflicts between nations and religions. His most lasting work, begun in prison and published during his exile in Paris, was a monumental effort to restrain such conflicts on the basis of a broad moral consensus. Grotius wrote: “there is a common law among nations, which is valid alike for war and in war, I have had many and weighty reasons for undertaking to write upon the subject. Throughout the Christian world I observed a lack of restraint in relation to war, such as even barbarous races should be ashamed of; I observed that men rush to arms for slight causes, or no cause at all, and that when arms have once been taken up there is no longer any respect for law, divine or human; it is as if, in accordance with a general decree, frenzy had openly been let loose for the committing of all crimes.” The treatise advances a system of principles of natural law, which are held to be binding on all people and nations regardless of local custom. In three volumes, “Book I advances his conception of war and of natural justice, arguing that there are some circumstances in which war is justifiable. Book II identifies three 'just causes' for war: self-defense, reparation of injury, and punishment; Grotius considers a wide variety of circumstances under which these rights of war attach and when they do not. Book III takes up the question of what rules govern the conduct of war once it has begun; influentially, Grotius argued that all parties to war are bound by such rules, whether their cause is just or not.”

Grotius views that “natural right is the rule and dictate of right reason showing the moral deformity or moral necessity there is in any act, according to its suitableness or unsuitableness to a reasonable nature.” Primary laws of nature are natural law expressing the will of God, and secondary laws of nature are civil law depending on human reason. The law of nature always remains unchanged - perpetual and unalterable - and God himself cannot change it. “Before property was introduced, every man had naturally a full power to use whatever came in his way; and before civil laws were made, everyone was at liberty to right him by force.” From Aristotle, he writes that “To judge of what is natural, we must consider those subjects that are rightly disposed, according to their nature, and not those that are corrupted.” He divides human rights into a civil right and a less extensive right. The civil right results from the civil power of governing the state, which is “the complete body of free persons, associated together to enjoy peaceably their rights and for their common benefits.” The extensive right, though it is not derived from the civil power, is the right of nations by its authority from the will of all or at least of many nations.

Grotius views that man is an animal by nature fitted for peace and war. Right reason and the nature of society do not prohibit necessary violence: the united force of the whole community can use violent means for self-defense. The law of nations permits us to take arms against those who are armed to attack us because to repel force by force for self-defense is naturally lawful. Therefore, wars require the consent of all people who made their laws. He suggests four cases of matters after the war. (i) If anything has been committed contrary to the articles of treaty, the king or state is obliged either to punish the offender, or to deliver him up to them that are injured. (ii) The superior ally has a right to compel the inferior to stand to the articles of the treaty, and upon refusal to punish him. (iii) Controversies in an equal confederacy are generally referred to a convention of the associates interested in the affairs in question. (iv) Associates have no right of judging. For Grotius, war is a mode of judicial procedure protecting rights and punishing wrongs, so that war should be regulated to be a “just war” though it is a necessary evil. He views three efficient causes in a war: principals who defend persons and goods from offenses, assistants who assist the injured because helping is just and good, and instruments like servants or subjects who are naturally employed in war for their master or prince. To settle disputes, proper negotiations and some compromises are desirable before starting battles because they are less expensive.
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Table III-3-1. Natural Law versus Positive Law

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“Man is a product of nature, a part of the Universe.
The Universe is operated under exact natural laws.
Man is a product of millions of years of evolution.
He adapts himself to the laws of nature or he perishes.”
By James Hervey
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Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679): He was born at Westport, England, graduated from Oxford, and became a private tutor to William Cavendish in 1608, later the second Earl of Devonshire, whom he served until he died of plague in 1628. In 1634, he settled in Paris, where he made contact and acquaintance with Descartes, and visited Galileo in Italy. Returning to England in 1637, he published the Elements of Law in 1640, which defended the absolute authority of the king as indispensable to social order and national unity. His most fear was not oppression from the excess of power, but insecurity or anarchy from lack of power. Fearing arrest, he exiled to Paris in 1640 where he published On the Citizen in 1642. Serving as a tutor in mathematics to the exiled Prince, the future Charles II, during 1646-48, Hobbes published the Leviathan in 1651 that could interpret an ideology of Cromwell, but angered both Anglicans and French Catholics. Returning to London in 1652, he was allowed to live private life. Disappointed by restoring the divine right monarchy of Charles II in 1660, Hobbes retired with a small pension. The Leviathan consists of Man, Commonwealth, a Christian Commonwealth, and the Kingdom of Darkness.

(a) Chapter XIII. Of the Natural Condition of Mankind, as concerning their Felicity and Misery: “Nature has made men so equal, in the faculties of body, and mind, as that though there be found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or of quicker mind then another; yet when all is reckoned together, the difference between man and man, is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as he. For as to the strength to the body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederacy with others, that are in the same danger with himself.”

“From this equality of ability, arises equality of hope in the attaining of our Ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their End, endeavor to destroy, or subdue on another. And from hence, it comes to pass, that where an Invader has no more to fear, than another man’s single power; if one plant, sow, build, or possess a convenient Seat, others may probably be expected to come prepared with forces united, to dispossess, and deprive him, not only of the fruit of his labor, but also of his life, or liberty. And the Invader again is in the like danger of another.”

“So that in the nature of man, we find three principal causes of quarrel. First, competition; secondly, diffidence; thirdly, glory. The first use violence, to make themselves masters of other men’s person, wives, children, and cattle; the second, to defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, or by reflection in their kindred, their friends, their nation, their profession, or their name. Hereby it is manifest that during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war, as is of every man, against every man. For war, consists not in battle only, or the act of fighting; but in the tract of time, wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known; and therefore, the notion of time, is to be considered in the nature of war; as it is in the nature of weather. For the nature of foul weather, lies not in a shower or two of rain; but in an inclination thereto of many days together; so the nature of war, consists not in actual fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is peace. Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of war, where every man is enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live without other security, than what their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them withal. In such condition, there is no place for industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain; and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation…; not knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”

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“To this war of every man against every man, this also is consequent; that nothing can be unjust. The notion of right and wrong, justice and injustice have there no place. Where there is no common power, there is no law; where no law, no justice. Force, and fraud, are in war the two cardinal virtues. Justice and injustice are none of the faculties neither of the body, nor mind. If they were, they might be in a man that were alone in the world, as well as his senses, and passions. They are qualities that relate to men in society, not in solitude. It is consequent also to the same condition, that there be no property, no dominion, no mine and thine distinct; but only that to be every man’s, that he can get; and for so long, as he can keep it. And thus much for the ill condition, which man by mere nature is actually placed in; though with a possibility to come out of it, consisting partly in the passions, partly in his reason. The passions that incline men to peace, are fear of death; desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living; and a hope by their industry to obtain them. And reason suggests convenient articles of peace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement. These articles, are they, which otherwise are called the laws of nature.”

(b) Chapter XIV. Natural Law and Contracts.

(i) Natural Law: “The right of nature... is the liberty each man has to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own nature, that is to say, of his own life, and consequently of doing anything which, in his own judgment and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto” Liberty is the absence of external impediments; “which impediments may often take away part of a man’s power to do what he would; but cannot hinder him from using the power left him, according as his judgment, and reason shall dictate to him. A Law of Nature (Lex Naturalis) is a precept, or general rule, found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do, that, which is destructive of his life, or takes away the means of preserving the same; and to omit, that, by which he thinks it may be best preserved. For though they that speak of this subject, use to confound Jus and Lex, right and law; yet they ought to be distinguished; because right consists in liberty to do or to forbear; whereas law determines and binds to one of them; so that law and right differ as much as obligation and liberty; which is one and the same matter are inconsistent. And because the condition of man is a condition of war of every one against every one; in which case everyone is governed by his own reason; and there is nothing he can make use of, that may not be a help unto him, in preserving his life against his enemies; it follows, that in such a condition, every man has a right to everything; even to one another’s body. And therefore, as long as this natural right of every man to everything endures, there can be security to any man, (how strong or wise so-ever he be) of living out the time, which nature ordinarily allows men to live. And consequently, it is a precept, or a general rule of reason that every man, ought to endeavor peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps, and advantages of war.”

The first Law of Nature is to seek peace; and the second law of nature is, by all means we can use, to defend ourselves, in way of making such peace as desired in the first law.


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The second Law of Nature is “that a man be willing, when others are so too, as far-forth as for peace, and defense of himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himself. As long as every man holds the right of doing anything he likes; so long are all men in the condition of war. But if other men will not lay down their right, as well as he; then there is no reason from any one to divest himself of his; for that were to expose himself to prey rather than to dispose himself to peace. This is that law of the Gospel; whatsoever you require that others should do to you, that do you to them (reciprocity). To lay down a man’s right to anything is to divest himself of the liberty, of hindering another of the benefit of his own right to the same. For he that renounces, or passes away his right, gives not to any other man a right which he had not before; because there is nothing to which every man had not right by nature; but only stands out of his way, that he may enjoy his own original right, without hindrance from him; not without hindrance from another. So that the effect which redounds to one man, by another mans’ defect of right, is but so much diminution of impediments to the use of his own right original...And when a man has in either manner abandoned, or granted away his right; then is he said to be obliged, or bound, not to hinder those, to whom such right is granted, or abandoned, from the benefit of it.”

“Whosoever a man transfers his right, or renounces it; it is either in consideration of some right reciprocally transferred to himself; or for some other good he hopes for thereby. For it is a voluntary act; and of the voluntary acts of every man, the object is some good to himself. And therefore there be some rights, which no man can be understood by any words, or other signs, to have abandoned or transferred. As first a man cannot lay down the right of resisting them, to assault them by force, to take away his life; because he cannot be understood to aim thereby, at any good to himself. The same may be said of wounds, and chains, and imprisonments; both because there is no benefit consequent to such patience; as there is to the patience of suffering another to be wounded, or imprisoned; as also because a man cannot tell, when he sees men proceed against him by violence, whether they intend his death or not. And lastly the motive and end, for which this renouncing and transferring of right is introduced, is nothing else but the security of a man’s person, in his life, and in the means of so preserving life, as not to be weary of it. And therefore if a man by words or other signs seems to despoil himself of the end, for which those signs were intended; he is not to be understood as if he meant it, or that it was his will; but that he was ignorant of how such words and actions were to be interpreted.”

(ii) Contract: “The mutual transferring of right, is that which men call contract. There is difference between transferring of right to the thing; and transferring to tradition, that is delivery of the thing itself. For the ting may be delivered together with the translation of the right; as in buying and selling with ready money; or exchange of goods or lands; and it may be delivered sometime after. Again, one of the contractors may deliver the thing contracted for on his part, and leave the other to perform his part at some determinate time after, and in the meantime be trusted; and then the contract on his part is called Pact or Covenant; or both parts may contract now, to perform hereafter; in which cases, he that is to perform in time to come, being trusted, his performance is called Keeping of Promise, or Faith; and failing of performance (if it is voluntary) Violation of Faith. When the transferring of rights is not mutual; but one of the parties transfers, in the hope to gain thereby friendship, or service from another, or from his friends; or in hope to gain the reputation of charity, or magnanimity; or to deliver his mind from the pain of compassion; or in hope of reward in heaven; this is not contract, but gift, free-gift, grace; which words signify one and the same thing. Signs of contract are either Express or by Inference.” “In contacts, the right passes not only where the words are of the time present, or past; but also where they of the future; because all contract is mutual translation or change of right, and therefore...”
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“If a Covenant be made, wherein neither of the parties perform presently, but trust one another; in the condition of mere nature (which is a condition of war of every man against every man) upon any reasonable suspicion, it is void; but if there be a common power set over them both, with right and force sufficient to compel performance; it is not void. For he that performs first, had no assurance the other will perform after; because the bonds of words are too weak to bridle men’s ambition, avarice, anger, and other passions, without the fear of some coercive power; which in the condition of mere nature, where all men are equal, and judges of the justness of their own fears cannot possibly be supposed. And therefore he which performs first, does but betray himself to his enemy; contrary to the right of defending his life, and means of living. But in a civil estate, where there is a power set up to constrain those that would otherwise violate their faith, that fear is no more reasonable; for that cause, he which by the Covenant is to perform first, is obliged so to do. The cause of fear, which makes such a Covenant invalid, must be always something arising after the Covenant made; as some new fact, or other sign of the will not to perform; else it cannot make the Covenant void. For that which could not hinder a man from promising, ought not to be admitted as a hindrance of performing...they that give to a man the right of government in sovereignty are understood to give him the right of levying money to maintain soldiers; and of appointing magistrates for the administration of justice” (right to the end gives right to the means).

“Men are freed of their Covenants two ways; by performing or by being forgiven. For performance is the natural end of obligation; and forgiveness, the restitution of liberty; as being a re-transferring of that right, in which the obligation consisted. Covenants entered into by fear in the condition of mere nature are obligatory...A former Covenant makes void a later. For a man that has passed away his right to one man today, has it not to pass tomorrow to another; and therefore, the later promise passes no right, but is null. A Covenant not to defend myself from force by force is always void. For no man can transfer or lay down his right to save himself from death, wounds, and imprisonment, and therefore the promise of not resisting force, in no Covenant transfers any right; nor it obliging. For though a man may Covenant thus, unless I do so, or so, kill me; he cannot Covenant thus, unless I do so, or so, I will not resist you, when you come to kill me. For man by nature chooses the lesser evil, which is danger of death in resisting; rather than the greater, which is certain and present death in not resisting. And this is granted to be true by all men, in that they lead criminals to execution and prison with armed men, notwithstanding that such criminals have consented to the law, by which they are condemned.” Thus former Covenant to one makes void the later to another; and a man’s Covenant not to defend himself is void.106

“A Covenant to accuse one’s self, without assurance of pardon, is likewise invalid. For in the condition of nature, where every man is judge, there is no place for accusation; and in the civil state, the accusation is followed with punishment; which being force, a man is not obliged not to resist. The same is also true, of the accusation of those, by whose condemnation a man falls into misery; as of a father, wife, or benefactor...The force of words, being too weak to hold men to the performance of their Covenants; there are in man’s nature, but two imaginable helps to strengthen it. And those are either a fear of the consequence of breaking their word; or a glory, or price in appearing not to need to break it. This later is a generosity too rarely found to be presumed on, especially in the pursuers of wealth, command, or sensual pleasure; which are the greatest part of mankind. The passion to be reckoned upon is fear; whereof there be two very general objects: one, the power of spirits invisible; the other, the power of those men they shall therein offend...to put one another to swear by the God he fears: which swearing or Oath is a form of speech added to a promise; by which he that promises, signifies, that unless he perform, he renounces the mercy of his God, or calls to him for vengeance on himself. Such was the heathen form: Let Jupiter kill me else, as I kill this beast. So is our form, I shall do thus, and thus, so help me God.”107
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(c) Chapter XV. Other Laws of Nature: In nature, man is free and equal, so that he is in the condition of war of everyone against everyone, in which everyone is governed by his own reason. Hence, the first Law of Nature is that man ought to endeavor peace; and the second Law of Nature is that man shall defend himself by seeking advantages of war, when he cannot obtain peace, so his safety or security is threatened. The third Law of Nature is that “men perform the Covenants made; without which, Covenants are in vain and but empty words; and the right of all men to all things remaining, we are still in the condition of war. And in this law of nature, consists the fountain and original of Justice. For where no Covenant has proceeded, there has no right been transferred, and every man has right to everything; and consequently, no action can be unjust. But when a Covenant is made, then to break it is unjust; and the definition Injustice is no other than the not Performance of Covenant. And whatsoever is not unjust, is just. But because Covenants of mutual trust, where there is a fear of not performance on either part are invalid; though the original of justice be the making of Covenants; yet Injustice actually there can be none, till the cause of such fear be taken away; which while men are in the natural condition of war, cannot be done. Therefore before the names of just and unjust can have place, there must be some coercive power to compel men equally to the performance of their Covenants, by the terror of some punishment, greater than the benefit they expect by the breach of their Covenant; and to make good that propriety, which by mutual contract men acquire, in recompense of the universal right they abandon; and such power there is none before the erection of a Common-wealth, there nothing is unjust. So that the nature of Justice, consists in keeping of valid Covenants; but the validity of Covenants begins not but with the Constitution of a civil power, sufficient to compel men to keep them and then it is also that propriety begins.” Thus justice and propriety begin with the constitution of commonwealth. And Justice of action is divided into commutative (arithmetical – equality of value) and distributive (of equal benefits).

The fourth Law of Nature is Gratitude “that a man which receives benefit from another of mere grace, endeavor that he which gives it, have no reasonable cause to repent him of his good will. For no man gives, but with intention of good to himself; because gift is voluntary; and of all voluntary acts, the object is to every man his own good; of which if men see they shall be frustrated, there will be no beginning of benevolence, or trust; nor consequently of mutual help; nor of reconciliation of one man to another; and therefore they are to remain still in the condition of war, which is contrary to the first and fundamental law of nature.” The fifth Law of Nature is Compliance, “that every man strive to accommodate himself to the rest. For the understanding whereof, we may consider, that there is in men’s aptness to society, a diversity of nature, rising from their diversity of affections; not unlike to that we see in stones brought together for building of an edifice.” The sixth Law of Nature is “that upon caution of the future time, a man ought to pardon the offences past of them that repenting, desire it. For Pardon is nothing but granting of peace; which though granted to them that persevere in their hostility, be not peace, but fear; yet not granted to them that give caution of the future time, is sign of an aversion to peace; and therefore contrary to the law of nature.” The seventh Law of Nature is “that in retributions of evil for evil, men look not at the greatness of the evil past but the greatness of the good to follow. Whereby we are forbidden to inflict punishment with any other design than for correction of the offender or direction of others.” Hobbes introduces additional laws of nature in this chapter. The Laws of Nature oblige in Conscience always, but in Effect then only where there is Security. “The laws of Nature are immutable and eternal; for injustice, ingratitude, arrogance, pride, iniquity, acception of persons, and the rest, can never be made lawful. For it can never be that war shall preserve life, and peace destroy it…And the science of them is the true and only moral philosophy,” that is good and evil in the conversation and society of mankind.
Chapter II

(d) Chapter XVII. The Causes, Generation, and Definition of Commonwealth: The final cause or the end of commonwealth is getting particular security. Why does then the man, unlike creatures, need a common power in society? Hobbes answers to this question as follows: (i) Men are “continually in competition for honor and dignity, which these creatures are not; and consequently amongst men there arises on that ground, envy and hatred, and finally war, but amongst these not so.” (ii) Amongst these creatures, “the common good differs not from the private; and being by nature inclined to their private, they procure thereby the common benefit. But man, whose joy consists in comparing himself with other men, can relish nothing but what is eminent.” (iii) These creature “having not use of reason, do not see, nor think they see any fault, in the administration of their common business; whereas amongst men, there are very many, that think themselves wiser and able to govern the public better than the rest; and these strive to reform and innovate, one this way, another that way; and thereby bring it into distraction and civil war.” (iv) These creatures, “though they have some use of voice, in making known to one another their desires and other affections; yet they want that art of words, by which some men can represent to others, that which is good, in the likeness of evil, and evil in the likeness of good; and augment or diminish the apparent greatness of good and evil; discontenting men and troubling their peace at their pleasure.” (v) Irrational creatures “cannot distinguish between injury and damage; and therefore as long as they be at ease, they are not offended with their fellows; whereas man is then most troublesome, when he is most at ease; for then it is that he loves to show his wisdom and control the actions of them that govern the common wealth.” (vi) The agreement these creatures are natural; “that of men is by Covenant only, which is artificial; and therefore it is no wonder if there be somewhat else required to make their agreement constant and lasting; which is a Common Power, to keep them in awe and to direct their actions to the common benefit.”

“The only way to erect such a Common Power, as may be able to defend them from the invasion of foreigners, and the injuries of one another, and thereby to secure them in such sort, as that by their own industry, and by the fruit of the earth, they may nourish themselves and live contentedly; is, to confer all their power and strength upon one man or upon one assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills, but plurality of voices, unto one will; which is as much as to say, to appoint one man or assembly of men, to bear their person; and every one to own and acknowledge himself to be author of whatsoever he that so bears their persons, shall act, or cause to be acted, in those things which concern the common peace and safety; and therein to submit their wills, everyone to his will, and their judgement, to his judgment. This is more than consent or concord; it is a real unity of them all, in one and the same person, made by Covenant of every man with every man, in such manner, as if every man should say to every man, I authorize and give up my right of governing myself, to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition, that you give up the right to him, and authorize all his actions in like manner. This done, the multitude so united in one person, is called a Commonwealth, in Latin Civitas. This is the generation of that great Leviathan, or rather of that Mortal God, to which we owe under the Immortal God, our peace and defense. For by this authority, given him by every particular man in the Commonwealth, he has the use of so much power and strength conferred on him, that by terror hereof, he is enabled to conform the will of them all, to peace at home and mutual aid against their enemies abroad. And in him, consists the essence of the Commonwealth; which is one person, of whose act a great multitude, by mutual Covenants on with another, have made themselves every one the author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their peace and common defense. And he that carries this person, is called Sovereign, and said to have Sovereign Power; and everyone besides, his Subject.” Sovereign Power by natural force is able to destroy them if they refuse; or by war subdues his enemies to his will.”
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(e) Chapter XVIII. *The Rights of Sovereigns by Institution*: “A Commonwealth is said to be instituted, when a multitude of men do agree and Covenant, everyone with everyone, that to whatsoever man or assembly of men, shall be given by the major part, the right to present the person of them all (that is to say to be their representative), everyone, as well he that voted for it, as he that voted against it, shall authorize all the actions and judgments, of that man or assembly of men, in the same manner, as if they were his own, to the end, to live peaceably amongst themselves, and be protected against other men.” All the rights of sovereign power are: (i) The subject cannot change the form of government; (ii) sovereign power cannot be forfeited; (iii) no man can without injustice protest against the institution of the sovereign declared by the major part; (iv) the sovereign actions cannot be justly accused by the subject; and the sovereign is judge of what is necessary for the peace and defense of the subjects; (vi) judge of what doctrine are fit to be taught them; (vii) the right of making rules, whereby the subjects may every man know what is so his own, as no other subject can without injustice take it from him; (viii) to him also belongs the right of all judicature and decision of controversies; (ix) and of making war and peace, as he shall think best; (x) and of choosing all counsellors and ministers, both of peace and war; (xi) and of rewarding, punishing and that (where no former law has determined the measure of it) arbitrary; (xii) and of honor and order. These are the rights, which make the essence of sovereignty; and which are the makers, whereby a man may discern in what man or assembly of men, the sovereign power is placed, and resides. For these are incommunicable, and inseparable; and because they are essential and inseparable rights, it follows necessary, that in whatsoever words any of them seem to be granted away, yet it the sovereign power itself be not in direct terms renounced, and the name of sovereign no more given by the grantees to him that grants them, the grants is void.”

(f) Chapter XIX. *Commonwealth and the Sovereign Power*: Hobbes views three different forms of Commonwealths according to the sovereign power representing all and every one of the people. A Monarchy is represented by one man; a Democracy by an assembly of all that will come together; and an Aristocracy by a part of the people. There are different names of government in history and books of polity when the people are oppressed by the government: Tyranny is a different name of Democracy; Oligarchy is that of Aristocracy; and Anarchy is that of Democracy. Hobbes compares Monarchy with Oligarchy and Democracy. (i) If the public interest crosses the private, one prefers the private, for the passions of men are commonly more potent that their reason. In monarchy, the private interest is the same with the public. The riches, power, and honor of a Monarch arise only from the riches, strengths and reputation of his subjects. For no King can be rich, nor glorious, nor secure; whose subjects are either poor, or contemptible, or too weak through want or dissention to maintain a war against their enemies. “Whereas in a Democracy or Aristocracy, the public prosperity confers not so much to the private fortune of one that is corrupt or ambitious, as both may times a perfidious advice, a treacherous action, or a civil war.” (ii) “A monarch receives counsel of whom, when, and where he pleases; and consequently may here the opinion of men versed in the matter about which he deliberates, of what rank or quality so-ever, and as long before the time of action, and with as much secrecy, as he will. But when a sovereign assembly has need of counsel, none admitted but such as have a right thereto from the beginning; which for the most part are of those who have been versed more in the acquisition of wealth than of knowledge; and are to give their advice in long discourses, which may, and do commonly excite men to action, but not govern them in it. Nor is there any place, or time, wherein an assembly can receive counsel with secrecy, because of their own multitude.” (iii) The resolution of a monarch are “subject to no other inconstancy than that of human nature; but in assemblies, besides that of nature, there arises an inconstancy from the number. For the absence
of a few, that would have the resolution once taken, continue firm, or the diligent appearance of a few of the contrary opinion, undoes today, all that was concluded yesterday.” (iv) A monarch cannot disagree with himself, out of envy, or interest; but an assembly may; and that to such a height, as may produce a civil war. (v) In monarchy, “there is this inconvenience; that any subject, by the power of one man, for the enriching of a favorite or flatterer, may be deprived of all he possesses; which I confess is a great and inevitable inconvenience. But the same may as well happen, where the sovereign power is in an Assembly; for their power is the same; and they are as subject to evil counsel, and to be seduced by orators, as a monarch y flatterers; and becoming one another’s flatterers, serve on another’s covetousness and ambition by turns.” (vi) It is an inconvenience in monarchy, “that the sovereignty may descend upon an infant or one that cannot discern between good and evil; and consists in this, that the use of his power, must be in the hand of another man, or of some assembly of men, which are to govern by his right and in his name; as curators and protectors of his person, and authority. But to say there is inconvenience, in putting the use of the sovereign power into the hand of a man or an assembly of men; is to say that all government is more inconvenience than confusion and civil war…all the danger that can be pretended, must arise from the contention of those that for an office of so great honor and profit may become competitors. To make it appear that this inconvenience, proceeds not from that form of government we call monarchy, we are to consider that the precedent monarch has appointed who shall have the tuition of his infant successor, either expressively by testament or tacitly by not controlling the custom in that case received; an then such inconvenience is to be attributed, not to the monarchy, but to the ambition and injustice of subjects, which all kinds of government, where the people are not well instructed in their duty and the rights of sovereignty, is the same.”

(g) Chapter XXXII. The Principles of Christian Politics: The nature of rights of a Christian Commonwealth depends much upon supernatural revelations of the will of God. When God speaks to man, it must be either immediately; or by mediation of another man, to whom he had formerly spoken by himself immediately. God had spoken to him in the Holy Scripture, but by mediation of the Prophets, or of the Apostle, or of the Church, in such manner as he speaks to all other Christian men, by dreams, visions, voice, and inspiration. “If a prophet rise amongst you, or a dreamer of dreams, and shall pretend the doing of a miracle, and the miracle come to pass; if he say, Let us follow strange Gods, which you have not known, you shall not hear to him. But that prophet and dreamer of dreams shall be put to death, because he has spoken to you to revolt from the Lord your God.” “And as miracles, without preaching that doctrine which God has established; so preaching the true doctrine, without the doing of miracles, is an insufficient argument of immediate revelation. For if a man that teaches not false doctrine, should pretend to be a prophet without showing any miracle, he is never the more to be regarded for his pretense…It is manifest that the teaching of the religion which God has established, and the showing of a present miracle, joined together, were the only marks whereby the Scripture would have a true prophet, that is to say, immediate revelation to be acknowledged; neither of them being singly sufficient…Seeing therefore miracles now cease, we have no sign left, whereby to acknowledge the pretended revelations, or inspirations of any private man; nor obligation to give ear to any doctrine, further than it is comfortable to the Holy Scriptures, which since the time of our savior, supply the place, and sufficiently recompense the want of all other prophecy; and from which, by wise and learned interpretation, and careful ratiocination, all rules and precepts necessary to the knowledge of our duty both to God and man, without enthusiasm or supernatural inspiration, may easily be deduced. And this scripture is it, out of which I am to take the principles of my discourse, concerning the rights of those that are the supreme governors on earth, of Christian Commonwealths; and of the duty of Christian subjects towards their sovereigns.”

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Samuel Pufendorf (1632-94) was born in the Erzgebirge region of Saxony and educated at Leipzig and Jena, and became a tutor in the family of Petrus Julius Coyet, one of the resident ministers of King Charles X of Sweden, at Copenhagen in 1658. Reading the writings of Hugo Grotius and Thomas Hobbes, he developed his idea of universal law. He took his professorship at the University of Heidelberg in 1661 and of Lund in 1670. Moving to Stockholm in 1677, he started his political career as privy councilor, secretary of state, and royal historian to Charles XI. Moving to Berlin in 1688, he started another career as court historian and privy and judicial councilor for Frederick William I and his son Frederick III of Prussia. His monumental classic *On the Law of Nature and Nations* appeared at the peak of his professorship in 1672, and its abridgement *On the Duty of Man and Citizen* was published in 1673. This compendium consists of two books, in which we shall find how Pufendorf differs from Grotius and Hobbes here.

There were three problems in developing natural law of Pufendorf. (i) It was unavoidable to cleanse natural law of its grounding in the concept of nature of Aristotle and Aquinas as a purposive realm ordered by intrinsic teleological dispositions. Pufendorf set forth morality and politics as the extrinsic imposition of moral concepts and laws by a superior on to an unordered realm of human movements that lack any intrinsic moral properties, and of human agents who lack any innate disposition to moral and political life. (ii) Grotius and Hobbes wrote during the Thirty Years’ War that was settled by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. A new morality should be able to gain the consent of all Europeans to the new political order and bring peace; that would have to be independent of the confessional difference which divided them, “yet also permit belief in and practice of these rival religions within the moral framework.” Therefore, a set of universal principles of right needed to be established: “a scientifically reconstructed condition common to all person, the state of nature, and the empirically verifiable self-love or concern each person has with their own preservation.” (iii) To both constraints - new morality and politics as well as universal principles of right – required a theory of the consolidating independent political societies or states, the authority of rulers, and the duties and rights of subjects. Therefore, his natural law theory imposes these standards and concepts on to the new order, throwing a unique and fascinating light on the foundation of modern politics for two main reasons. In this regard, first, Pufendorf could view the modern political configuration from within its recently established boundaries and from the other world outside its boundaries – the preceding state of war and insecurity which he had experienced as a youth. Second, the change in circumstances from the age of Grotius and Hobbes to the age of Pufendorf was accompanied by a change in theoretical perspective: the former was how to establish political society and obedience to it out of the circumstances of devastating war and insecurity; but the latter was how does one conduct oneself so as to become a useful member of such a society and polity.


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Book I. On Human Action: By duty human action is in conformity with the commands of law on the ground of obligation. Human action is initiated in the light of understanding and at the command of will. Understanding is a faculty of comprehension and judgment; and one’s will is a kind of internal impulse – either act by one’s accord or by internal necessity. “The will always seeks good in general and avoids evil in general, yet one finds in individuals a great variety of appetites and actions. This comes from the fact that all goods and evils do not appear to a man in what one may call a pure state, but mingled together, good with evil, evil with good. And different objects particularly affect what one might call different parts of a man…It is for this reason that a man perceives the first class as fitting, the second as pleasant, the third as useful. Each of these draws a man towards itself, in accordance with the strength of the motion which it impresses on him. Moreover, most people have a particular inclination towards certain things and an aversion from other…It is no wonder then that one man is attracted to what another turns away from in horror.” The effect of habit is that a certain action is done gladly and easily, so that in the presence of object, the mind seems to be as it were drawn towards it; and strongly regrets its absence. When a mind is at rest in quiet and tranquility, reason rules; while a mind shaken by the peculiar emotion, passions rule, but “a man can rise superior to them by the due use of reason and at least check them in their course before they issue in action,” although a certain intoxication may disturb the use of reason. Human actions are voluntary as they are directed by the will, but are undertaken in opposition to the will called involuntary that is compelled. The particular characteristic of human actions initiated and directed by intellect and will, is that they may be imputed to a man, or that he may rightly be regarded as their author and obliged to account for them; and that their effects also redound to him.” There is no reason why an action may be imputed to other person.117

From above premises, we shall form some particular propositions as below: (i) No actions done by others, no operation of any other things and no event can be imputed to a person except insofar as he can control them and is obliged to do so. For nothing is more common among men than that a person have the responsibility of directing another person’s actions. (ii) There are personal defects which it is not in a man’s power to acquire or not to acquire. He cannot be held responsible for these insofar as he did not take pains to make up a natural defect or to supplement the negative powers which he does have. (iii) One cannot be held responsible for actions done through invincible ignorance. For we cannot direct an action when the light of understanding does not show the way, assuming that the man could not get such a light for himself and it was not his fault that he could not do so. (iv) Neither ignorance nor mistake about the laws and the duty laid on us releases us from responsibility. The laws and the rules of duty should be suited to the subject’s understanding. (v) If by no fault of his own a man does not have the opportunity to act, he is not held responsible for not acting. (vi) A person cannot be held responsible for not doing what exceeds his powers, and which he is unable with those powers to bring about: there is no obligation to do the impossible. (vii) A person cannot be held responsible for what he does or suffers under compulsion, assuming that avoidance or escape were beyond his powers; when a stronger party uses force to make our limbs do or suffer something; and if a more powerful person threatens us at close quarters with some serious harm. (viii) Those who do not have the use of reason are not held reasonable for their actions. This is the case with actions of infants before the use of reason begins to show itself with any degree clarity. (ix) A person cannot be held responsible for what he imagines he is doing in dreams, except insofar as by dwelling with pleasure on such things during the day he allows images of them to make a deep impression on his mind. (x) We must be quite clear “that it sometimes happens that an action is not imputed to the actual doer at all, but to another person who use him merely as an instrument. It is more usual, however, for the cation to be the joint responsibility of the doer and of the other person.”118
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Book I - 2. On the Rule of Human Actions: “Human actions arise from the will. But the acts of will of an individual are not consistent in themselves; and the wills of different men tend in different directions. For mankind to have achieved order and decency therefore, there must have been some rule to which those wills might conform. For otherwise if each man, amid so much liberty to will and such diversity of inclinations and desires, had done whatever came into his mind without reflective reference to a fixed rule, the result would inevitably have been great confusion among men. This rule is called law. Law is a decree by which a superior obliges one who is subject to him to conform his actions to the superior’s prescript...obligation places a kind of bridle on our liberty, so that, though the will can in fact take different directions it yet finds itself imbued by it with an internal sense, so that it is compelled to recognize that it has not acted rightly if the subsequent action does not conform to the prescribed rule. Consequently, if anything but happens to a man for that reason, he judges that he deserves it, since he could have avoided it by following the rule, as he should have done. There are two reasons why man is fit to incur obligation: (i) he has a will capable of moving in various directions and so able to conform to the rule; and (ii) he is not free from the authority of a superior...An obligation is introduced into a man’s mind by a superior, by one who has not only the strength to inflict some injury on the recalcitrant, but also just cause to require us to curtail the liberty of our will at this discretion. When a person in this position had signified his will, fear tempered by respect must arise in a man’s mind – fear from power, respect from reflection on the reasons which ought to induce one to accept his will even apart from fear...The reasons which justify a person’s claim to another’s obedience are: if he had exceptional benefits on him; if it is evident that he wishes the other well and can look out for him better than he can for himself; if at the same time, he actually claims direction of him.”

There must be knowledge of who the legislator is and of what the law itself is, for no one will offer obedience not knowing whom he should obey or what he is obliged to do. “It is very easy to know the legislator. For natural laws, it is clear by the light of reason that their author is the author of the universe. And as for the citizen, he cannot fail to know who has authority over him. How natural laws become known will be explained presently. Civil laws reach subjects’ notice by promulgation plainly and openly made. A duty imposed on someone by law should be not only within his power but also of some use to him or to others. The duty imposed on someone by law should be not only within his power but also of some use to him or to others. It is absurd to require something of someone under threat of penalty, if it is and always has been beyond his powers. The power of granting a dispensation (exemption) belongs only to him who has the authority to make and unmak laws. Equity is very different from dispensation. It is a correction of the law where law is deficient through its universality; or a skillful interpretation of the law by which it is shown from natural reason that some particular case is not covered by a general law since an absurd situation would result if it were. In a moral rule, human actions acquire certain qualities and denominations; actions in accordance with law are called good. contrary to law bad. Justice is sometimes an attribute of actions, sometimes of persons. There is no agreement on the division of justice, but the most widely accepted is the division into universal and particular: the latter is divided into distributive justice (quality) and commutative justice (quantity). “Law is divided into divine and human; the one was made by God, the other by man. But if it is viewed in the light of whether it has, or has not, a necessary and universal congruence with men, it is divided into natural and positive. Natural law is law which is so congruent with the rational and social nature of man without it. Hence too it can be traced out and known by the light of man’s native reason and by reflection on human nature in general. Positive law is law which does not derive from the common condition of human nature, but proceeds solely from the will of the legislator...Of divine law, one kind is natural, the other positive. But all human law, strictly so called, is positive.”
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**Book I-3. On Natural Law:** “Man, then, is an animal with an intense concern for his own preservation, needy by himself, incapable of protection without the help of his fellows, and very well fitted for the mutual provision of benefits. Equally, however, he is at the same time malicious, aggressive, easily provoked and as willing as he is able to inflict harm on others. The conclusion is; in order to be safe, it is necessary form him to be sociable; that is to join forces with men like himself and so conduct himself towards them that they are not given even a plausible excuse for harming him, but rather become willing to preserve and promote his advantages. The laws of this sociality, laws which teach one how to conduct oneself to become a useful member of human society, are called natural laws. On this basis it is evident that the fundamental natural law is: every man ought to do as much as he can to cultivate and preserve sociality. Since he who wills the end wills also the means which are indispensable to achieving that end, it follows that all that necessarily and normally makes for sociality is understood to be prescribed by natural law. All that disturbs or violates sociality is understood as forbidden. The rest of the precepts may be said to be no more than subsumptions under this general law. Their self-evidence is borne in upon us by the natural light which is native to man. Though these precepts have a clear utility, they get the force of law only upon the presuppositions that God exists and rules all things by His providence, and that He has enjoyed the human race to observe as laws those dictates of reason which He has Himself promulgated by the force of the innate light. For otherwise though they might be observed for their utility, like the prescriptions doctors give to regulate health, they would not be laws. Laws necessarily imply a superior, and such a superior as actually has governance of another. The denomination that God is the author of natural law rests on natural reason, provided that we confine ourselves to man’s present state, disregarding the question whether his primeval condition was different and how the change came about.”

“Man’s nature, then, is so constituted that the human race cannot be secure without social life and the human mind is seen to be capable of ideas which serve this end. It is also clear not only that the human race, like other creatures, owes its origin to God, but also that whatever its present condition, it is encompassed by the government of God’s providence. It follows that God wills that a man should use for the preservation of his nature the powers within him in which he is conscious of surpassing the beasts; and that he also wills that human life be different from the lawless life. Since he cannot achieve this except by observance of natural law, it is also understood that he is obligated by God to observe it as the means which God Himself has established expressly to achieve this end, and which is not a product of man’s will and changeable at this pleasure. For he who obligates on to an end is held also to have obligated one to take the means necessary to that end.” “Perhaps the duties imposed on man by natural law are most conveniently divided in accordance with the objects on which those duties are to be exercised. On these lines they form three principal divisions. The first teaches, on the basis of the dictate of right reason alone, how one should behave towards God; the second towards oneself; the third towards other men. The precepts of natural law regarding others are derived primarily and directly from sociality, which we have laid down as the foundation. The duties towards God as Creator also can be deduced, indirectly, from that source, insofar as the ultimate sanction of duties towards other men comes from religion and fear of the Deity, so that a man would not even be sociable if they were not imbued with religion, and because reason alone in religion extends no further than to religions’ capacity to promote the tranquility and sociality of this life; for so far as religion procures the saving of souls, it proceeds from a particular divine revelation. The duties of a man towards himself, however, emanate from religion and sociality together. For the reason why in some matters man cannot dispose of himself at his own absolute discretion, is partly that he may be fit to worship the divinity, and partly that he may be an agreeable and useful member of human society.”


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Book II-4, 5, 6: (a) On man’s duty to God: So far as man’s duty to God can be traced out on the basis of natural reason, it has no more than two articles: to have right notions of God; and to conform our actions to His will. “Hence natural religion consists of theoretical propositions and practical propositions. Of all the notions which everyone must hold about God, the first is a settled conviction that God exists, that is, that there really is a supreme and the first being on whom this universe depends... The second notion is that God is the Creator of this universe. For since it is self-evident that all this world did not come into existence of itself, it must have a cause and that cause is what we call God... The third notion is that God exercises direction over the world as a whole and over the human race. This is clearly evident from the admirable and unchanging order seen in the universe... The fourth notion is that no attribute which involves any imperfection is compatible with God. For since He is the cause and origin of all things, it would be absurd that any creature of His could form the conception of a perfection which is not in God.” “The practical propositions of natural religion are partly concerned with the internal, partly with the external, worship of God.” The internal worship of God is to honor Him, and the external worship of God consists particularly in to give thanks to God for all the many good things men receive for Him.”

(b) On duty to oneself: Hobbes introduces an obligation of self-love. Man consists of two parts, soul and body. “The soul has the function of ruler, the body of servant and instrument; consequently we employ the mind for government and the body for service. We must care for both, but particularly for the former. Above all the mind must be formed to accept social life with ease; it must be steeped in a sense and a love of duty and goodness. Every man must also receive some education in accordance with his capacity and fortune, so that no one shall be a useless burden on the earth, a problem to himself and a nuisance to others. He must also choose in due time an honest way of life in accordance with his natural bent, his mental and physical abilities, the condition of his birth, his fortune, his parents’ wishes, the commands of the civil rulers, opportunity or necessity. Since the mind depends upon support from the body, we must strengthen and preserve the powers of the body with appropriate good and exercise. Man does not have power to terminate his own life since God gave it to him. But a citizen must often risk his own life to save the lives of many others by the order of his legitimate ruler under threat of the severest penalties not to avoid danger by flight. Though self-preservation is commended to man by the tenderest instinct and by reason, it often seem to conflict with the precept of sociality. Self-defense occurs either without injury to the party threatening us, or with injury or death.

(c) On the duty of every man to others: I can live at peace with a man doing me no positive service, and with a man doing not exchange even the commonest duties with me, provided he does me no harm. But there is no way that I can live at peace with one doing me harm. For nature has implanted in each man such a tender love of himself and of what is his, that he cannot but repel by every means one who offers to do harm to either. This duty affords protection not only to what we have from nature, as life, body, limbs, chastity, liberty, but also to what we have acquired on the basis of some institution and human convention. Harm inflicted on one man by another, or loss of any kind caused in any way, must be made good so far as possible by the person who may rightly be held responsible. “Though the concept of loss property belongs to harm to property, we take it here in a broad sense as signifying all harm, spoiling, curtailment or removal of what is ours, or usurpation of what we ought by perfect right to have had, whether it was a gift of nature or assigned to us by a supervening human act or law, or finally the omission and refusal of some payment that another party was obliged to make to us on a basis of perfect right.” If several men in conspiracy have committed a crime, each one is responsible for all of them, and all for each one. The obligation to make restitution for loss arises not only from harm done with intentional malice but also from harm done by negligence or by easily avoidable fault, without direct intention.
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Book I-7. Men's natural equality: "Man is an animal which is not only intensely interested in its own preservation but also possesses a native and delicate sense of its own value... Human nature therefore belongs equally to all and no one would or could gladly associate with anyone who does not value him as a man as well as himself and a partner in the same nature. Hence, the second of the duties of every man to every man is held to be: that each man value and treat the other as naturally his equal, or as equally a man. This equality among men consists not only in the fact that the physical strength of adult men is nearly equal to the extent that even a relatively weak man can kill a stronger man by taking him by surprise or by use of cunning and skill in arms, but also in that one must practice the precepts of natural law towards another and one expects the same in return, even though he may be better provided by nature with various gifts of mind and body; his superiority does not give him license to inflict injuries on others. On the other hand, neither the scanty provision of nature nor the niggardliness of fortune in themselves condemn one to have less access to the enjoyment of the common law than others. But what one may require or respect from others, the same, other things being equal, they should have from him; and any law that a man has made for others, it is particularly fitting that he follow himself. For the obligation to cultivate social life with others leis on all men equally; and it is not allowed to one more than any other to violate natural laws where another person is concerned." Man who wants to use the services of others to his own advantage must be ready to make himself useful to them in return. The same equality indicates how one should proceed when a right has to be distributed among others, namely to treat them as equals and to favor neither party over the other beyond the merits of the case. Common property is to be distributed among equals in equal proportions.

When a person has duly won the right to put himself above others, he is justified in exercising and protecting his right, though without empty scorn or contempt of others.

Book I-8. The common duties of humanity: "The third of the duties owed by every man to every man, to be performed for the sake of common sociality, is: everyone should be useful to others, so far as he conveniently can. For nature has established a kind of kinship among men. It is not enough not to have harmed, or not to have slighted, others. We must also give, or at least share, such thing as will courage mutual good will. We are useful to others, either in an indefinite way or in a definite way; and it either costs us something, or it costs us nothing. Someone is being useful to others in an indefinite way when he develops his mind and body to be a source of actions useful to others, or if he makes discoveries by the acuteness of his intellect for the betterment of human life. "To those who set themselves to do good to the human race, others owe duty not to be grudging nor to put obstacles in the way of their splendid endeavors. Then, even if they have no other way of repaying them, they will at least be extolling their memory and advancing their fame, which is the chief reward of toil. It is thought to be a particular odious act of ill will and inhumanity not to make freely available to others those good things which we can offer them without loss, labor or trouble to ourselves. Such things are normally recognized as beneficial and harmless; that is, things that help the recipient without burdening the giver." "It is a high degree of humanity to give something to another freely from extraordinary benevolence, if it involves expense or labor to give it and it believes his needs or is exceptionally useful to him." Thus, on the duty of every man to every man, first is not to harm others, second is to recognize men's natural equality, and third is to be useful to others for the sake of common sociality, which we have discussed above. In the later chapters in Book I, men make agreements with each other so that the duties might be performed more frequently and in accordance with fixed rules. Without mutual agreements, men would lose most of the possible advantage of mutual exchange of goods and services. The use of the same language is important for correct communications, and the use of an oath strongly confirms the binding of men with the promise.
**Book II-1. Men’s natural state:** “Men’s state is either natural or adventitious. Natural state may be considered, in the light of reason alone, in three ways: in relation to God the Creator; or in the relation of each individual man to himself; or in relation to other men. (i) Considered from the first point of view, the natural state of man is the condition in which he was placed by his Creator with the intention that he be an animal excelling other animals. It follows from this state that man should recognize and worship his Creator, admire His works, and lead his life in a manner utterly different from that of the animals. Hence this state is in complete contrast with the life and condition of the animals. (ii) From the second point of view, we may consider the natural state of man, by an imaginative effort, as the condition man would have been in if he had been left to himself alone, without any support from other men, given the condition of human nature as we now perceive it. It would have been, it seems, more miserable than that of any beast, if we reflect on the great weakness of man as he comes into this world, when he would straight away die without help from others, and on the primitive life he would lead if he had no other resources than he owes to his own strength and intelligence. One may put it more strongly: that fact that we have been able to grow out of such weakness, the fact that we now enjoy innumerable good things, the fact that we have cultivate our minds and bodies for our own and other’s benefit…the natural state is opposed to life improved by human industry. (iii) From the third point of view, we consider the natural state of man in terms of the relationship which men are understood to have with each other on the basis of the simple common kinship which results from similarity of nature and is antecedent to any agreement or human action by which particular obligations of one to another have arisen. In this sense men are said to live in a natural state with each other when they have no common master, when no one is subject to another and when they have no experience either of benefit or of injury from each other…the natural state is opposed to the civil state.”

Indeed it is obvious that the whole human race was never at one and the same time in the natural state. The human race then multiplied remarkably; men recognized the disadvantages of life apart; and gradually, those who lived close to each other drew together, at first in small states, then in larger states as the smaller coalesced, freely or by force. “Among these states the natural state still certainly exists; their only bond is the common humanity. The principal law of those who live in the natural state is to be subject only to God and answerable to none but Him. In that respect this state has the name of natural liberty. By natural liberty every man is understood to be in his own right and power and not subject to anyone’s authority without a preceding human act. This is also the reason why every man is held to be equal to every other, where there is no relationship of subjection.” “The state of nature may seem extraordinarily attractive in promising liberty and freedom from all subjection. But in fact before men submit to living in states, it is attended with a multitude of disadvantages, whether we imagine individuals existing in that state or consider the condition of separate heads of households…There is the reign of the passions, there is war, fear, poverty…: here is the reign of reason, here there is peace, security, wealth…In the natural state, if one does not do for another what is due by agreement, or does him wrong, or if a dispute arises in other ways, there is no one who can by authority compel the offenders to perform his part of the agreement or make restitution, as is possible in states, where one may implore the aid of a common judge.” “Nature herself has willed that there should be a kind of kinship among men, by force of which it is wrong to harm another man and indeed right for everyone to work for the benefit of others. However, kinship usually has a rather weak force among those who live in natural liberty with each other. Consequently, we have to regard any man who is not our fellow-citizen, or with whom we live in a state of nature, not indeed as our enemy, but as a friend we cannot wholly rely on. The reason is that men not only can do each other very great harm, but do very often wish to do so for various reasons.”

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*Chapter III. Political Philosophy*

*Book III. From the Renaissance to the Scientific Revolution, 1400-1715*
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Book II-5 through 18. Summary: (C5) The impulsive cause of constituting the state: Man is drawn to civil society by nature herself, so that he cannot and will not live without it. In becoming a citizen, a man loses his natural liberty and subjects himself to an authority whose powers include the right of life and death. The true and principal cause why heads of households abandoned their natural liberty and had recourse to the constitution of states was to build protection around themselves against the evils that threaten man from man. (C6) The internal structure of states: The individual finds in other men a more useful and effective defense against the evils that human depravity threatens to inflict on him than in fortifications, weapons or dumb animals; since a man's power is of limited extent, it was necessary for him to combine with other men to achieve that end. There has to be consensus on adopting means likely to achieve it. “First of all, when those many men who are understood to be placed in natural liberty assemble to form a state, they agree one with another individually that they wish to enter into a single and perpetual union and to administer the means of their safety and security by common counsel and leadership; in word, that they wish to become fellow-citizens. Each and every one must consent to this agreement; anyone who dissent remains outside the future state.” After this agreement, there must be a decree on the form of government to be introduced. So the measures of public safety are effectively established.

(C7) The function of the sovereign power: “The overriding purpose of states is that, but mutual cooperation and assistance, men may be safe from the losses and injuries which they may and often do inflict on each other. To achieve this purpose, the penalty must be nicely judged, so that it clearly costs more to break the law than to observe it.” (C8) The form of government: There are three forms of a regular state: where sovereignty is in hands of one man is called monarchy; in the hands of an assembly consisting of selected citizen only is called aristocracy; in the hands of an assembly consisting of all heads of household is called democracy. The first power holder is called the monarch, the nobility, and the people respectively. Personal faults occurring in any kind of state arise if those on whom the administration of government falls perform their function negligently or badly. (C10) The ways of acquiring authority: Acquisition of authority by military force, which is usually called conquest, occurs when a man relying upon a just cause for going to war and having been successfully by force of arms and fortune reduces people to the point that they are compelled thenceforth to submit to his authority. (C16) On war and peace: “The just causes of engaging in war come down to the preservation and protection of our lives and property against unjust attack, or the collection of what is due to us from others but has been denied, or the procurement of reparations for wrong inflicted and of assurance for the future. Wars wages for the first of these causes are said to be defensive, for the other causes, offensive.”

Remarks: Hence in the natural state, there is a lively and all but perpetual play of suspicion, distrust, eagerness to subvert the strength of others, and desire to get ahead of them or to augment one’s own strength by their ruin. Hence, a good man should be content with his own and not trouble others or covet their goods, so that a cautious man who loves his own security will believe all men as his friends but liable at any time to be enemies: he will keep peace with all, knowing that it may soon be exchanged for war. This is the reason why that country is considered happy although that contemplates war even in peace. Generally speaking, Pufendorf’s state of nature could be state of peace and self-improvement, while Hobbes’s civil society was state of war and self-preservation, although the former agreed with most writings of the latter. Thus, each citizen agrees to form a perpetual association and administer their safety by a single man or assembly who defends its members, while all others become subjects. The citizens individually agree with the ruler to obey him by taking on a range of civic duties, and the ruler agrees to take care of the state and to exercise supreme authority in accordance with the contract (a reciprocal obligation) and only for the sake of common security and safety.
John Locke (1632-1704): was born in Somerset and graduated from Oxford with B.A. in 1656 and M. A. in 1658, where he lectured on Greek, rhetoric, moral philosophy during 1660-64. In 1666, he met Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury, and became a confidant and medical advisor for him. In London, he resumed his medical studies and obtained a bachelor of medicine in 1674. Locke became involved in politics when Shaftesbury, a founder of the Whig movement, who became Lord Chancellor in 1672. As his Lord had fallen in politics, Locke went to France in 1675, and returned to England in 1679. As the Whigs lost power, Shaftesbury was charged of high treason; so exiled to Holland in late 1682 where he died a couple of months later. Locke lived in Holland during 1683-88, returned to England after the Glorious Revolution, and served the Board of Trade during 1696-1700. (i) Religious toleration: Locke wrote Letters Concerning Toleration (1689-92) arguing three points: “(1) Earthly judges, the state in particular, and human beings generally, cannot dependably evaluate the truth-claims of competing religious standpoints; (2) Even if they could, enforcing a single true religion would not have the desired effect, because belief cannot be compelled by violence; (3) Coercing religious uniformity would lead to more social disorder than allowing diversity.” From his political exile in Amsterdam from 1685, he supported the dissenters’ resistance to imposition of Anglican uniformity: every man may enjoy the same rights that are granted to others: “if solemn assemblies, observations of festivals, public worship, be permitted to any one sort of professors; all these things ought to be permitted to the Presbyterians, Independents, Anabaptists, Armenians, Quakers, and others, with the same liberty. Nay, if we may openly speak the truth, and as becomes one man to another, neither Pagan, nor Mahometan, nor Jew, ought to be excluded from the civil rights of the common-wealth, because of his religion.” (ii) Political theory: His Two Treatises of Government written in about 1681 is based on social contract theory. “Unlike Thomas Hobbes, Locke believed that human nature is characterized by reason and tolerance. Like Hobbes, Locke believed that human nature allowed people to be selfish. This is apparent with the introduction of currency. In a natural state all people were equal and independent, and everyone had a natural right to defend his "Life, health, Liberty, or Possessions." His political thought played a substantial role in justifying three revolutions: the Bill of Rights in England, the Declaration of Independence in America, and the Rights of the Man in France. (iii) Empiricism and epistemology: Locke published An Essay Concerning Human Understanding just after returning from exile in 1689, implying that “the only profitable intellectual pathway to the knowledge of things is through observational, experimental, and mathematical methods.” It is significant in two ways: one is the formulation of empiricism and the other is the setting of epistemology. Locke continuously published Some Thoughts Concerning Education in 1693 and The Reasonableness of Christianity in 1695. His writings on price theory and educational theories are further discussed in Chapter IV. Here our discussions are largely limited to political theory on his Two Treatises of Government.

Photo III-3-4, John Locke, painted by Godfrey Kneller in 1697
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His Two Treatises of Government includes such political thought as of constitutionalism based on the social contract, that is “promise to agree to accept the judgments of common judge (the legislature) when they accede to the compact that establishes civil society. After this, another set of promise is made – between in members of the civil society, on the one hand, and the government, on the other.” As of democracy, he adopted the essential elements of the Aristotelian classification of constitutions in the second treatise. “Unlike Aristotle, however, Locke was an unequivocal supporter of political equality, individual liberty, democracy, and majority rule.” As of liberalism, “Locke thought that revolution is justified when the sovereign fails to fulfill these obligations. Indeed, it appears that he began writing his major work of political theory, Two Treatises of Government, precisely in order to justify the revolution of two years before.” As of power basis in political philosophy, it was “John Locke, politically the most influential English philosopher, who further developed his doctrine.” As of social contract, “Lock differed from Hobbes, insofar as he described the state of nature as one in which the rights of life and property were generally recognized under natural law, the inconveniences of the situation arising from insecurity in the enforcement of shoes right. He therefore argued that the obligation to obey civil government.”

“The Two Treatises of Government were published anonymously and it was only in Locke’s will that he acknowledged the authorship of this work and others such as the Letters Concerning Toleration. As a consequence the Two Treatises had very little influence on the debates over how to justify the legitimacy of replacing King James II with William and Mary... It was supposed that since it was written by England’s greatest philosopher it must be the way things were done but few bothered to read it. Certainly conservatives such as Josiah Tucker read it and rejected its doctrines. There has been considerable scholarly debate about how much Locke’s political doctrines affected the American revolutionaries and the writing of the American declaration of independence. The original claim that Locke’s thought had considerable influence on the colonists was challenged and has more recently been reaffirmed. In France, Locke was influential through the first half of the eighteenth century and then rapidly lost influence as the French came to regard the English as conservative. In the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries Locke’s views were largely rejected and his influence was at its lowest ebb. He was regarded as one of the prophets of the American and French revolutions. The doctrines of natural rights and human rights were rejected in favor of utilitarianism. Locke’s philosophy was largely misinterpreted and rejected.” But in the twentieth century, the revival of interest appeared and will continue into the twenty-first century.

The Tow Treatises is divided into the first and second Treatises. The first Treatise is a reply to the Patriarcha written by Robert Filmer in 1637, who views that king’s rule by a divine right inherited from Adam. Locke proceeds through Filmer’s arguments, contesting his proofs from Scripture, ridiculing them as senseless, and invalidating his theory as below: “(i) That Adam had not, either by natural right of fatherhood or by positive donation from God, and such authority over his children, nor dominion over the world, as is pretended. (ii) That if he had, his heirs yet had no right to it. (iii) That if his heirs had, there being no law of nature nor positive law of God that determines which is the right heir in all cases that may arise, the right of succession, and consequently of bearing rule, could not have been certainly determined. (iv) That if even that had been determined, yet the knowledge of which is the eldest line of Adam’s posterity being so long since utterly lost, that in the races of mankind and families of the world, there remains not to one above another, the least pretense to be the eldest house, and to have the right of inheritance.” He takes political power “to be right of making laws, with penalties of death... less penalties for the regulating and preserving of property, and of employing the force of the community in the execution of such laws, and in the defense of the commonwealth from foreign injury, and all this only for the public good.” The second Treatise discusses about political power as below.
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**Book II-II. The State of Nature:** “All men are naturally in a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature without asking leave or depending upon the will of any other man. A state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another, there being nothing more evident than that creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the same advantage of nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal one among another, without subordination or subjection, unless the lord and master of them all should, by any manifest declaration of his will, set one above another, and confer on him, by an evident and clear appointment, an undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty.” In transgressing the law of nature, every man has a right to punish the offender and be executioner of the law of nature. In the state of nature, every man has a power to kill a murderer, “both to deter others from doing the like injury (which no reparation can compensate) by the example of the punishment that attends it from everybody, and also to secure men from the attempts of a criminal who, having renounced reason, the common rule and measure God has given to mankind, has, by the unjust violence and slaughter he has committed upon one, declared war against all mankind, and therefore may be destroyed as a lion or a tiger, one of those wild savage beasts with whom men can have no society nor security.” However, “it will be objected that it is unreasonable for men to be judged in their own cases, that self-love will make men partial to themselves and their friends; and, on the other side, ill-nature, passion, and revenge will carry them too far in punishing others, and hence nothing but confusion and disorder will follow, and that therefore God has certainly appointed government to restrain the partiality and violence of men.” At this point, the laws of nature do bind men, independent individuals in nature, absolutely by agreeing together mutually to enter into one community, making themselves members of some political society. The state of war: In the state of nature men live together according to reason without a common superior on earth, with authority to judge between them. But force, or a declared design of force upon the person of another – a state of enmity and destruction – “where there is no common superior on earth to appeal to for relief, is the state of war, and it is the want of such an appeal gives a man the right of war even against an aggressor, though he be in society and a fellow subject. Thus, a thief whom I cannot harm, but by appeal to the law, for having stolen all that I am worth, I may kill when he sets on me to rob me but of my horse or coat, because the law permits me my own defense and the right of war, a liberty to kill the aggressor, because the aggressor allows not time to appeal to our common judge, nor the decision of the law, for remedy in a case where the mischief may be irreparable.” But when the actual force is over, the state of war ceases between those that are in society and are equally on both sides subject to the judges. Of Slavery: The natural liberty of man is to be free from any superior power on earth, and not to be under the will or legislative authority of man, but to have only the law of nature for his rule. The liberty of man in society is to be under no other legislative power but that established by consent in the commonwealth, nor under dominion of any will or restraint of any law, but what that legislative shall enact according to the trust put in it.” “This freedom from absolute, arbitrary power is so necessary to, and closely joined with, a man’s preservation, that he cannot part with it but by what forfeits his preservation and life together. For a man, not having the power of his own life, cannot by compact or his own consent enslave himself to any one, nor put himself under the absolute, arbitrary power of another to take away his life when he pleases. Nobody can give more power than he has himself, and he that cannot take away his own life cannot give another power over it. Whenever he finds the hardship of his slavery outweigh the value of his life, it is in his power, by resisting the will of his master, to draw on himself the death he desires...the state of war and slavery ceases as long as the compact endures.”

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Book II-V. Property: Originally, there are no ownership and no property in the state of nature, but is a plenty of natural provisions a long period of time in the world with the few spenders. God gives the world to men in common, who develops common land for their food. Human labor gives a right of property (a title to it) because private labor is most of the value of things while common land is worthless without labor in the beginning. (Locke is a defender of the labor theory of value that was held by most of the classical economists and by Karl Marx but was rejected by most contemporary economists). As families increased and industry enlarged their stocks, their land possessions enlarged with the need of them. As the accumulation of land property continues, a scarcity appears in the perishable goods. When the struggle for land possession becomes evident, the stronger establishes the right of property. The invention of money allows individuals to exchange their surplus for land acquisition, and its accumulation changes the original economic conditions to the inequality of possessions. “Thus labor, in the beginning, gave a right of property, wherever any one was pleased to employ it, upon what was common, which remained a long while, the far greater part, and is yet more than mankind makes use of. Men at first, for the most part, contented themselves with what unassisted nature offered to their necessities; and though afterwards, in some parts of the world, where the increase of people and stock, with the use of money, had made land scarce, and so of some value, the several communities settled the bounds of their distinct territories, and, by laws, within themselves, regulated the properties of the private men of their society, and so, by compact and agreement, settled the property which labor and industry began. And the leagues that have been made between several states and kingdoms, either expressly or tacitly disowning all claim and right to the land in the other’s possession, have, by common consent, given up their pretenses to their natural common right.”

Book II-VI. Power: “The law that was to govern Adam was the same that was to govern all his posterity, the law of reason. But his offspring having another way of entrance into the world, different from him, by a natural birth, that produced them ignorant, and without the use of reason, they were not presently under that law.” “The first part of parental power or rather duty, which is education, belongs so to the father that it terminates at a certain season.” It was easy and almost natural for children to make way for the father’s authority and government. “The natural fathers of families became the politic monarchs of them too; and as they chanced to live long, and leave able and worthy heirs for several successions or otherwise, so they laid the foundations of hereditary or elective kingdoms under several constitutions and manors, according as chance, contrivance, or occasions happened to mold them. But if princes have their titles in the father’s right, and it be a sufficient proof of the natural right of fathers to political authority, because they commonly were those in whose hands we find, de facto, it will be strongly proved that all princes, nay, princes only, ought to be priests, since it is a certain that in the beginning the father of the family was priest, as that he was ruler in his own household.”

Book II-VII. Political or Civil Society: Conjugal society is made by a voluntary compact between man and woman, and the society between parents and children, and between masters and servant are established. “Wherever any number of men unite into one society as to quit every his executive power of the law of nature, and so resign it to the public, there and there only is a political or civil society. And this is done wherever any number of men…enter into society to make one people one body politic under one supreme government; or else when any one joins himself to and incorporates with any government already made.” It is evident that absolute monarchy, which by some men is counted for the only government in the world, is indeed inconsistent with civil society, and so no form of civil government at all. In the state of nature, man has a liberty to judge of his right, and according to the best of his power to maintain it; but whenever his property is invaded by the will and order of his monarch, he has not only no appeal, as those in society ought to have.”

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Book II-VIII. The Beginning of Political Societies: Men are by nature all free, equal, and independent; so “no one can be put out of this estate and subjected to the political power of another without his own consent, which is done by agreeing with other men, to join and unite into a community for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living, one amongst another, in a secure enjoyment of their properties, and a greater security against any that are not of it. This any number of men may do, because it injures not the freedom of the rest; they are left, as they were, in the liberty of the state of nature. When any number of men have so consented to make one community or government, they are thereby presently incorporated, and make one body politic, wherein the majority have a right to act and conclude the rest…And thus every man, by consenting with others to make one body politic under one government, puts himself under an obligation to every one of that society to submit to the determination of the majority, and to be concluded by it…Whosoever, therefore, out of a state of nature unite into a community, must be understood to give up all the power necessary to the ends for which they unite into society to the majority of the community, unless they expressly agreed in any number of greater than the majority. And this is done by barely agreeing to unite into one political society, which is all the compact that is, or needs be, between the individuals that enter into or make up a commonwealth. And thus any political society is nothing but the consent of any number of freemen capable of majority, to unite and incorporate into such a society; which could give beginning to any lawful government in the world.” Hence, their political societies all began from a voluntary union, and the mutual agreement of men freely acting in the choice of their governors and forms of government. The beginning of political society depends upon the consent of the individuals to join into and make one society, who, when they are this incorporated, might set up what form of government they thought fit. In this regard, all peaceful beginnings of government have been laid in the consent of the people.139

Book II-IX. The Ends of Political Society and Government: The chief end of men uniting into commonwealth and putting themselves under government is the preservation of their property, to which in the state of nature there are many thing wanting. “Firstly, there wants an established, settled, known law, received and allowed by common consent to be the standard of right and wrong, and the common measure to decide all controversies between them. For though the law of nature be plain and intelligible to all rational creatures, yet men, being biased by their interest as well as ignorant for want of study of it, are not apt to allow of it as a law binding to them in the application of it to their particular cases. Secondly, in the state of nature there wants a known and indifferent judge, with authority to determine all differences according to the established law. For everyone in the state being both judge and executioner of the law of nature, men being partial to themselves, passion and revenge is very apt to carry them too far, and with too much heat in their own cases, as well as negligence and unconcerned-ness, make them too remiss in other men’s. Thirdly, in the state of nature, there often wants power to back and support the sentence when right, and to give it due execution. They who by any injustice offended will seldom fail where they are able by force to make good their injustice. Such resistance many times makes the punishment dangerous, and frequently destructive to those who attempt it. Thus mankind, notwithstanding all the privileges of the state of nature, being but in an ill condition while they remain in it are quickly driven into society. Hence it comes to pass, that we seldom find any number of men live any time together in this state.” In the state of nature to omit the liberty, a man has two powers: one is to do whatsoever he thinks fit for the preservation of himself and the rest of the mankind within the permission of the law of nature; and the other is the power to punish the committed crimes in the execution of the law of nature. The power of society is obliged to secure every one’s property by providing against those three defects above mentioned that made the state of nature against the peace, safety, and public good of the people.140
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**Book II-X. The Forms of a Government:** The form of government depends upon the placing the supreme power on democracy, oligarchy, or monarchy. The legislative cannot transfer the power of making laws to any other hands, since it is a delegated power from the people. The separation of power between the legislative, executive, and federative is necessary to avoid political monopoly by the same persons. If tyrant uses power not for the people but for his own good, the people have a natural right to resist tyranny for their self-protection. Locke denies any right to resist authority where it is possible to appeal to the law. Concluding the second *Treatise*, Locke writes: “The power that every individual gave the society when he entered into it can never revert to individuals again, as long as the society lasts, but will always remain in the community; because without this there can be no community – no commonwealth, which is contrary to the original agreement; so also when the society has placed the legislative in any assembly of men, to continue in them and their successor, with direction and authority for providing such successors, the legislative can never revert to the people whilst that government lasts.”

**Book II-XI. The Extent of the Legislative Power:** The legislative is not only the supreme power of the commonwealth, but sacred and unalterable in the hands where the community has once placed it. Although the legislative be the supreme power in every commonwealth, (i) it cannot be absolutely arbitrary over the lives and fortunes of the people. (ii) The legislative or supreme authority cannot assume to itself a power to rule by extemporary arbitrary decrees, but is bound to dispense justice and decide the rights of the subject by promulgated standing laws, and known authorized judges. (iii) The supreme power cannot take from any man any part of his property without his own consent, since the preservation of property is the end of government. (iv) The legislative cannot transfer the power of making laws to any other hands, for it being but a delegated power from the people, they...cannot pass it over to others. The people alone can appoint.

**Book II-XII. The Legislative, Executive, and Federative Power of the Commonwealth:** “The legislative power is that which has a right to direct how the force of the commonwealth shall be employed for preserving the community and the members of it. There is another power in every commonwealth which one may call natural, because it is that which answers to the power every man naturally had before he entered into society; so the whole community is one body in the state of nature in respect of all other states or persons out of its community. Therefore, this contains the power of war and peace, leagues and alliances, and all the transactions with all persons and communities without the commonwealth, and may be called federative, if any one pleases. These two powers, executive and federative, though they be really distinct in themselves, yet one comprehending the execution of the municipal laws of the society within itself upon all that are parts of it, the other the management of the security and interest of the public without with all those that it may receive benefit or damage from, yet they are always almost united. Though the executive and federative power of every community be really distinct in themselves, yet they are hardly to be separated and placed at the same time in the hands of distinct persons.  

**Book II-XIII. The Subordination of the Powers:** In a constituted commonwealth, one supreme power is the legislative, to which all the rest are subordinate, yet the legislative being only a fiduciary power to act for certain ends, there remains still in the people a supreme power to remove or alter the legislative, when they find the legislative act contrary to the trust reposed in them. In some commonwealths where the legislative is not always in being, and the executive is vested in a single person, that single person may also be called supreme. It is not necessary that the legislative should be always in being; but absolutely necessary that the executive power should, because there is not always need of execution of the laws that are made. When the legislative has put the execution of the laws, they make into other hands, they have a power still to resume it out of those hands when they find cause, and to punish for any mal-administration against the laws.”

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Book II-XIV. Prerogative: As the legislative and executive power are in distinct hands, the legislator not being able to foresee and provide by laws for all that may be useful to the community, the executor of the laws, having the power in his hands, has by the common law of nature a right to make use of it for the good of the society. “This power to act according to discretion for the public good, without the prescription of the law and sometimes even against it, is that which is called prerogative; for since in some governments the law making power is not always in being and is usually too numerous, and so too slow for the dispatch requisite to execution, and because, also, it is impossible to foresee and so by laws to provide for all accidents and necessities that may concern the public, or make such laws as will do no harm, if they are executed with an inflexible rigor on all occasions and upon all persons that may come in their way, therefore there is a latitude left to the executive power to do many things of choice which the laws do not prescribe.”

Book II-XV. Parental, Political, and Despotic Power: First, parental power is nothing but that which parents have over their children to govern them, for the children’s good, till they come to the use of reason, or a state of knowledge, wherein they may be supposed capable to understand that rule, whether it be the law of nature or the municipal law of their country, they are to govern themselves by capable to know it, as well as several others, who live as free men under that law. Secondly, political power is that power which every man having in the state of nature has given up into the hands of the society, and therein to the governors whom the society has set over itself, with this express or tacit trust, that it shall be employed for their good and the preservation of their property. Thirdly, despotic power is an absolute, arbitrary power one man has over another, to take away his life whenever he pleases; and this a power which neither nature gives, for it has made no such distinction between one man and another, nor compact can convey.

Book XVI. Conquest: “That the aggressors, who puts himself into the state of war with another, and unjustly invades another man’s right, can, by such an unjust war, never come to have a right over the conquered, will be easily agreed by all men, who will not think that robbers and pirates have a right of empire over whosoever they have force enough to master, or that men are bound by promises which unlawful force extorts form them.” But supposing victory favors the right side, let us consider a conqueror in a lawful war, and see what power he gets, and over whom. (i) It is plain he gets no power by his conquest over those that conquered with him. They that fought on his side cannot suffer by the conquest, but must, at least, be as much free men as they were before. And most commonly they serve upon terms, and on condition to share with their leader, and enjoy a part of the spoil and other advantages that attend the conquering sword, or, at least, have a part of the subdued country bestowed upon them. (ii) The conqueror gets no power but only over those who have actually assisted, concurred, or consented to that unjust force that is used against him. (iii) The power a conqueror gets over those he overcomes in a just war is perfectly despotic; he has an absolute power over the lives of those who, by putting themselves in a state of war, have forfeited them, but he has not thereby a right and title to their possessions. Though in all war, there be usually a complication of force and damage, and the aggressor seldom fails to harm the estate when he uses force against the persons of those he makes war upon, yet it is the use of force only that puts a man into the state of war. Every man is born with a double right: a right of freedom and a right of inheritance. First, a man is naturally free from subjection to any government, though he be born in a place under its jurisdiction. But if he disclaim the lawful government of the country he was born in, he must also quit the right that belonged to him by the law of it, and the possessions there descending to him from his ancestors. Second, the inhabitants of any country, who are descended and derive a title to their estates from those who are subdued, and has a government forced upon them, against their free consents, retain a right to the possession of their ancestors, though they consent not freely to the government.
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Book II-XVII. Usurpation: As conquest may be called a foreign usurpation, so usurpation is a kind of domestic conquest, with this difference – that a usurper can never have right on his side. “In all lawful governments the designation of the persons who are to bear rule being as natural and necessary a part as the form of the government itself, and that which had its establishment originally from the people – the anarchy being much alike to have no form of government at all, or to agree that it shall be monarchical, but to appoint no way to design the person that shall have the power, and be the monarch – all commonwealths, therefore, with the form of government established, have rules also of appointing and conveying the right to those who are to have any share in the public authority…Nor can such an usurper, or any deriving from him, ever have a title till the people are both at liberty to consent, and have actually consented, to allow and confirm in him the power he has till then usurped.”146

Book II-XVIII. Tyranny: Tyranny is the exercise of power beyond right, which nobody can have a right to; and this is making use of the power any one has in his hands, not for the good of those who are under it, but for his own private, separate advantage. “But if either these illegal acts have extended to the majority of the people, or if the mischief and oppression has light only some few, but in such cases as the precedent and consequences seem to threaten all, and they are persuaded in their consciences that their laws, and with them, their estates, liberties, and lives are in danger, and perhaps their religion too, who they will be hindered from resisting illegal force used against them, I cannot tell.”147

Book II-XIX. The Dissolution of Governments: Usually, governments are dissolved not only by foreign force making a conquest upon them, but also by domestic force. (i) When such as single person or prince sets up his own arbitrary will in place of the laws which are the will of the society declared by the legislative, then the legislative is changed. (ii) When the prince hinders the legislative from assembling in its due time, or from acting freely, pursuant to those ends for which it was constituted, the legislative is altered. (iii) When, by the arbitrary power of the prince, the electors or ways of election are altered without the consent and contrary to the common interest of the people, there also the legislative is altered. (iv) The delivery of the people into the subjection of a foreign power, either by the prince or by the legislative, is certainly a change of the legislative, and so a dissolution of the government. (v) When he who has the supreme executive power neglects and abandons that charge, so that the laws already made can no longer be put in execution; this is demonstratively to reduce all to anarchy, and so effectually to dissolve the government. At this point, when the government is dissolved, the people are at liberty to provide for themselves by erecting a new legislative differing from the other by the change of persons, or form, or both.148

“The reasons why men enter into society is the preservation of their property; and the end while they choose and authorize a legislative is that there may be laws made, and rules set, as guards and fences to the properties of all the society, to limit the power, and moderate the dominion of every part and member of the society…Whenssoever, therefore, the legislative shall transgress this fundamental rule of society, and either by ambition, fear, folly, or corruption, endeavor to grasp themselves, or put into the hands of any other, an absolute power over the lives, liberties, and estates of the people; by this breach of trust they forfeit the power the people had put into their hands for quite contrary ends, and it devolves to the people, who have a right to resume their original liberty, and by the establishment of a new legislative, provide for their own safety and security, which is the end for which they are in society.” Locke introduces the fence of frequent rebellions: the Divine law, descended from the heaven, shuts up the people from all manner of rebellion; and the proper way to prevent the evil is to show them the danger and injustice of it who are under the greatest temptation to run into guilty of rebellion. Self-defense is a part of the law of nature: the body of the people may resist intolerable tyranny.149
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4. Modern Philosophy: Empiricism vs. Rationalism

Empiricism is a theory that states that knowledge comes only or primarily from sensory experience. “One of several views of epistemology, the study of human knowledge, along with rationalism and skepticism, empiricism emphasizes the role of experience and evidence, especially sensory experience, in the formation of ideas, over the notion of innate ideas or traditions; empiricists may argue however that traditions (or customs) arise due to relations of previous sense experiences. Empiricism in the philosophy of science emphasizes evidence, especially as discovered in experiments. It is a fundamental part of the scientific method that all hypotheses and theories must be tested against observations of the natural world rather than resting solely on a priori reasoning, intuition, or revelation. Empiricism, often used by natural scientists, says that knowledge is based on experience and that knowledge is tentative and probabilistic, subject to continued revision and falsification. One of the epistemological tenets is that sensory experience creates knowledge. The scientific method, including experiments and validated measurement tools, guides empirical research.”

“A central concept in science and the scientific method is that it must be empirically based on the evidence of the senses. Both natural and social sciences use working hypotheses that are testable by observation and experiment. The term semi-empirical is sometimes used to describe theoretical methods that make use of basic axioms, established scientific laws, and previous experimental results in order to engage in reasoned model building and theoretical inquiry. Philosophical empiricists hold no knowledge to be properly inferred or deduced unless it is derived from one's sense-based experience. This view is commonly contrasted with rationalism, which states that knowledge may be derived from reason independently of the senses.” Francis Bacon was the founder of British empiricism; though the term was not used at the time, John Locke, George Berkeley, and David Hume were the primary exponents of it; and it was developed towards phenomenalism, logical empiricism, and pragmatism in the coming centuries.

On the other hand, in epistemology, “rationalism is the view that regards reason as the chief source and test of knowledge or any view appealing to reason as a source of knowledge or justification. More formally, rationalism is defined as a methodology or a theory in which the criterion of the truth is not sensory but intellectual and deductive. Rationalists believe reality has an intrinsically logical structure. Because of this, rationalists argue that certain truths exist and that the intellect can directly grasp these truths. That is to say, rationalists assert that certain rational principles exist in logic, mathematics, ethics, and metaphysics that are so fundamentally true that denying them causes one to fall into contradiction. Rationalists have such a high confidence in reason that empirical proof and physical evidence are unnecessary to ascertain truth – in other words, there are significant ways in which our concepts and knowledge are gained independently of sense experience. Because of this belief, empiricism is one of rationalism's greatest rivals. Different degrees of emphasis on this method or theory lead to a range of rationalist standpoints, from the moderate position that reason has precedence over other ways of acquiring knowledge to the more extreme position that reason is the unique path to knowledge. Given a pre-modern understanding of reason, rationalism is identical to philosophy, the Socratic life of inquiry, or the zetetic (skeptical) clear interpretation of authority...Rationalism should not be confused with rationality, nor with rationalization. In politics, Rationalism, since the Enlightenment, historically emphasized a politics of reason centered upon rational choice, utilitarianism, secularism, and irreligion – the latter aspect's antitheism later ameliorated by utilitarian adoption of pluralistic rationalist methods practicable regardless of religious or irreligious ideology.” Rationalists in philosophy include Plato and Aristotle; Avicenna, Maimonides, and Thomas Aquinas; and modern rationalism counts Rene Descartes, Baruch Spinoza, and Gottfried Leibniz.
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Figure III-4-1. Euler Diagram representing a definition of Knowledge

Figure III-4-2. Ultimate Standard of Empiricism and Rationalism
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https://truthexplored.files.wordpress.com/2012/10/screen-shot-2012-10-01-at-9-16-51-am.png
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Francis Bacon (1561-1626): Bacon was born in London and educated at home in his early years owing to poor health. He entered Trinity College, Cambridge in 1573 at the age of twelve, living for three years there with his older brother under the personal tutelage. His education was conducted largely in Latin and followed the medieval curriculum. He was also educated at the University of Poitiers at Cambridge, where he met Queen Elizabeth. “On 27 June 1576, he and Anthony entered de societate magistrorum at Gray’s Inn. A few months later, Francis went abroad with Sir Amias Paulet, the English ambassador at Paris, while Anthony continued his studies at home. The state of government and society in France under Henry III afforded him valuable political instruction. For the next three years he visited Blois, Poitiers, Tours, Italy, and Spain. During his travels, Bacon studied language, statecraft, and civil law while performing routine diplomatic tasks. On at least one occasion he delivered diplomatic letters to England for Walsingham, Burghley, and Leicester, as well as for the queen. The sudden death of his father in February 1579 prompted Bacon to return to England. Sir Nicholas had laid up a considerable sum of money to purchase an estate for his youngest son, but he died before doing so, and Francis was left with only a fifth of that money. Having borrowed money, Bacon got into debt. To support himself, he took up his residence in law at Gray's Inn in 1579, his income being supplemented by a grant of his mother Lady Anne of the manor of Marks in Essex.”

Bacon stated that he had three goals: to uncover truth, to serve his country, and to serve his church. He sought to further these ends by seeking a prestigious post. Being elected to the House of Commons in 1584, Bacon served the Commons until 1614. He proposed the union of England and Scotland to the king James I in 1603, and became the commissioner for the union. Appointed to Attorney General in 1613, Privy Councilor in 1616, and Lord Keeper in 1617, he became Lord Chancellor and Baron Berulam in 1618. Being charged by the Parliament with receiving of bribes in 1621, Bacon was briefly imprisoned to the Tower, and then banished from politics.

In one of his scientific works – The Advancement of Learning - published in 1605 as a survey of the existing knowledge, he argued that Aristotle’s logic of syllogisms was unsuitable in pursuing of knowledge; and suggested the inductive principles by seeking knowledge through organized experiment and systematic observation. His New Organon of 1620 discards traditional logic of syllogism by refusing the current system of reasoning, and induces from raw sense data to generalization by experimental procedures. In 1603 he published the Valerius Terminus: of the Interpretation of Nature that is an argument for the progress of knowledge: “Bacon considers the moral, religious and philosophical implications and requirements of the advancement of learning and the development of science.” His History of Life and Death is a treatise on medicine, with observations natural and experimental of the prolonging of life; in which he states his hope and desire “that the work would contribute to the common good, and that through it the physicians would become instruments and dispensers of God’s power and mercy in prolonging and renewing the life of man.” He wrote religious and literary works; and his legal work is considered to be in accordance to natural law, having been influenced by legislators such as Cicero and Justinian. We can consider Bacon’s influence in three fields as follows. Frist in science, his ideas were influential in the 1630s and 1650s, adhering to the Baconian approach to scientific enquiries. Second in North America, “Bacon played a leading role in establishing the British colonies in North America, especially in Virginia, the Carolinas and Newfoundland in northeastern Canada. His government report on The Virginia Colony was submitted in 1609. In 1610 Bacon and his associates received a charter from the king to form the Treasurer and the Company of Adventurers and planter of the Cityye of London and Bristoll for the Collonye or plantacon in Newfoundland, and sent John Guy to found a colony there.” Third in law, it is said “that Bacon’s legal work has had more success abroad than it has found at home,” and “that in France it has blossomed and come into fruit.”

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(a) *The Advancement of Learning* (1605): In Book I, Francis Bacon introduces errors and vanities of learning, and the merit of knowledge, which have intervened amongst the studies themselves of the learned. In learning, there are three distempers, vice or disease, in studies, fantastical learning, contentious learning, and delicate learning. (i) Ancient authors, both in divinity and in humanity, had long slept in libraries. “This by consequence did draw on a necessity of a more exquisite travel in the languages original, wherein those authors did write, for the better understanding of those authors, and the better advantage of pressing and applying their words, and thereof grew again a delight in their manner and style of phrase, and an admiration of that kind of writings.” In nature, vain matter is worse than vain words. (ii) In nature, there are many substances, which are solid, do putrefy or corrupt into worms; “so it is the propriety of good and sound knowledge, to putrefy and dissolve into a number of subtle, idle, unwholesome, and as I may term them, vermiculate questions, which have indeed a kind of quickness, and life of spirit, but no soundness of matter, or goodness of quality. This kind of degenerate learning did chiefly reign amongst the schoolmen, who, having sharp and strong wits, and abundance of leisure, and small variety of reading; but their wits being shut up in the cells of a few authors.” (iii) Concerning deceit or untruth, “it is of all the rest the foulest…for the truth of being, and the truth of knowing are one, differing no more than the direct beam, and the beam reflected. This vice therefore branches itself into two sort; delight in deceiving, and aptness to be deceived…so upon the like reason, a credulous man is a deceiver; as we see it in fame, that he that will easily believe rumors, will as easily argument rumors, and add somewhat to them of his own…As for the overmuch credit that has been given unto authors in science, in making them dictators, that their words should stand and not consuls to give advice; the damage is infinite that science have received thereby, as the principal cause that has kept them low, as a stay, without growth of advancement.”

The merit of knowledge is explained by imperial and military virtue as well as private virtue. For the former, “As for Julius Caesar, the excelency of his learning needs not to be argued from his education or his company, or his speeches; but in a farther degree does declare itself in his writings and works; whereof some are extant and permanent, and some unfortunately perished. For, first we see, there is left unto us that excellent history of his own wars, which he entitled only a commentary, wherein all succeeding times have admired the solid weight of matter, and the real passages, and lively images of actions and persons, expressed in the greatest propriety of words and perspicuity of narration that ever was; which that it was not the effect of a national gift, but of learning and precept, is well witnessed by that work of his, entitled *De Analogia.*” For the latter, “From moral virtue let us pass on to matter of power and commandment, and consider whether in right reason there be any comparable with that, wherewith knowledge invests and crowns man’s nature. We see the dignity of the commandment is according to the dignity of the commanded; to have commandment over beasts, as herdsmen have, is a thing contemptible; to have commandment over children, as schoolmasters have, is a disparagement, rather than an honor. Neither is the commandment of tyrants much better, over people which have put off the generosity of their minds; and therefore it was ever held, that honors in free monarchies and commonwealths had a sweetness more than in tyrannies, because the commandment extends more over the wills of men, and not only over their deeds and services. And therefore when Vigil puts himself forth to attribute to Augustus Caesar the best of human honors…But the commandment of knowledge is yet higher than the commandment over the will; for it is a commandment over the reason, belief, and understanding of man, which is the highest part of the mind, and gives law to the will itself; for there is no power on earth, which sets up a throne, or chair of state, in the spirits and souls of men, and in their cogitations, imaginations, opinions, and belief, but knowledge and learning.”
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In Book II, Francis Bacon classifies human understanding into three parts: history to his memory, poesy to his imagination, and philosophy to his reason. (i) History is natural, civil, ecclesiastical, and literary. History of nature is of three sorts: of nature in course, of nature in erring or varying, and of nature altered or wrought; that is, history of creatures, history of marvels, and history of arts. Civil history is three kinds, not un-fity to be compared with the three kinds of pictures or images: for of pictures or images, we see, some are unfinished, some are perfect, and some are defaced. So of histories we may find three kinds – memorials, perfect histories, and antiquities. History ecclesiastical receives the same division with history civil; but farther, in the propriety thereof, may be divided into the history of Church, history of Prophecy; and history of Providence. (ii) Poesy is a part of learning “in measure of words for the most part restrained, but in all other points extremely licensed, and does truly refer to the imagination; which being not tied to the laws of matter, may at pleasure join that which nature has severed, and sever that which nature has joined, and so make unlawful matches and divorces of things…It is taken in two senses, in respect of words, or matter; in the first sense, it is but a character of stile, and belongs to arts of speech, and is not pertinent for the present; in the latter, it is, as has been said, one of the principal portions of learning, and is nothing else but feigned history, which may be styled as well as prose as in verse.” Poesy is divided into the Narrative, Representative, and Allusive of parabolical. (iii) Philosophy is divided into three fields: Divine, Natural, and Human philosophies. Divine philosophy or natural theology is that knowledge or rudiment of knowledge concerning God, which may be obtained by the contemplation of his creatures; which knowledge may be truly termed divine, in respect of the object, and natural in respect of the light. Natural philosophy include natural science or theory, which is divided into physic and metaphysic, to which Bacon added one more area that is mathematics, either pure or mixed. Human philosophy or Humanity has two parts: one is a man segregate and the other congregate or in society. 

Medicine is a science which has been more professed than labored, and yet more labored than advanced; the labor having been rather than in circle than in profession. Human Knowledge concerns the Mind having two parts: one inquires of the substance or nature of the soul or mind; the other inquires of the faculties of function thereof. The knowledge is of two kinds: one is respecting his understanding and reason, and the other is his will, appetite, and affection. Invention is of two kinds: one is of arts and science, and the other is of speech and arguments. “Now we pass unto the arts of judgment, which handle the natures of proof and demonstrations, which as to induction has a coincidence with invention; for in all inductions, whether in good or vicious form, the same action of the mind which invents, judges; all one as in the sense; but otherwise it is in proof by syllogism; for the proof being not immediate, but by mean, the invention of the mean is one thing, and the judgment of the consequence is another.; the one exciting only, the other examining.” The duty and office of Rhetoric is “to apply reason to imagination for the better moving of the will; for we see reason is disturbed in the administration thereof by three means: by ill-equation or sophism, which pertains to logic; by imagination or impression, which pertains to rhetoric; and by passion or affection, which pertains to morality.” Civil Knowledge has three parts, according to the three summary actions of society, which are Conversation, Negotiation, and Government. “For many seeks in society comfort, use, and protection and they be three wisdoms of diver’s natures, which do often sever; wisdom of behavior, wisdom of business, and wisdom of state.” “The prerogative of God extends as well to the reason, as to the will of man; so that as we are to obey his law, though we find a reluctance in our reason.” Bacon concludes the Book II: “Thus have I made, as it were, a small glove of the intellectual world, as truly and faithfully as I could discover, with a note and description of those parts which seem to me not constantly occupied, or not well discovered by the labor of man.”

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(b) The New Organon (1620) aims to offer a new method of investigating nature, called the Interpretation of Nature. A better use of the mind and the understanding is needed to investigate nature. Bacon suggests an entirely new system of logic, which is based on induction rather than on the syllogism. Induction begins with the facts of nature and works slowly towards general axioms or propositions, by building up tables of comparison. Experiments are to be used to assist the senses in this process. Currently, man's minds are filled with various foolish and incorrect notions that prevent them from understanding nature properly. Bacon seeks to eradicate these notions, which he calls the idols, which originate in human nature, interaction between people and in the work of various philosophers, particularly Aristotle. Book one consists of Bacon's scathing attack on current philosophy and on the scientific method. He attacks the syllogistic method, and the various idols that prevent men from investigating Nature in a reasonable way. The lack of attention paid to natural philosophy and the excessive reverence for ancient authors are key reasons why man's knowledge of nature has progressed so slowly. But much the greatest obstacle and distortion of human understanding comes from the dullness, limitations and deceptions of the senses; so that things that strike the sense have greater influence than even powerful things which do not directly strike senses…The human understanding is carried away to abstractions by its own nature, and pretends that things which are in flux are unchanging. But it is better to dissect nature than to abstract. “The corruption of philosophy from superstition and a dash of theology is much more widely evident, and causes a very great deal of harm either to entire philosophies or to their parts. For the human mind is no less liable to the impressions of fantasy than to impressions from common notions.” “But the best demonstration by far is experience, provided it stays close to the experience itself. For it is a fallacy to pass on the other things which are supposed to be similar, unless the inference is made duly and in other.”

“The foundations of experience have been non-existent or very weak; nor has a collection or store of particulars yet been sought or made, able or in any way adequate, either in number, kind or certainty, to inform the intellect. To the contrary, learned men have accepted in the formation or confirmation of their philosophy some reports, or rather rumors and whispers, of experience, and have given them the weight of legitimate testimony. Imagine a kingdom or state basing its counsels and business not on letters and reports from ambassadors and messengers worthy of credence, but on the gossip of men about town and trivialities; this is just the kind of administration that has been brought into philosophy, as far as experience goes. Natural history contains nothing that has been reached in the proper ways, nothing verified, nothing counted, nothing weighed, nothing measured. But what is indefinite and vague in observation is deceiving and unreliable as information.” “And again the very wealth of mechanical experiments reveals the supreme poverty of the thing which most help and assist the information of the understanding. For a mechanic, who is by no means anxious about the investigation of truth, does not direct his mind or stretch his hand to anything but what is useful for his task…they have in themselves a wonderful power and provision, namely that they never deceive or disappoint…Thus we must seek to acquire a greater stock of experiments, and experiments of a different kind than we have yet done; and we must also introduce a quite different method, order and process of connecting and advancing experience.” “But we must not allow the understanding to leap and fly from particulars to remote and highly general axioms, and on the basis of their unshakable truth, demonstrate and explicate the intermediate axioms, as is still done, since the mind’s natural bent is prone to do this, and is even trained to it and made familiar with it by the example of syllogistic demonstration.” Once the obstacles are removed, interpretation is the true and natural work of the mind; but still everything will certainly be more in readiness: we look at the mind not only in its own native ability but also in its union with things towards further discoveries.
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Book Two is a detailed explanation of Bacon's method, using various examples. “It begins by creating tables of the various instances that meet in the nature to be investigated. After the relevant instances have been presented to the intellect, the task of induction can be carried out. Induction acts by excluding various possibilities, until an affirmative has been achieved. The next stage is the consideration of privileged instances, which assist the process in terms of information or of practice. The final section is a rough draft of the kind of natural history that Bacon argues is essential before any interpretation of nature is possible. The method of the Organon is not viable until a vast amount of information about the natural world has been collected.” Francis Bacon introduces nine steps of experiments: (i) privileged instances; (ii) supports for induction; (iii) the refinement of induction; (iv) the investigation to the nature of the subject; (v) natures which are privileged so far as investigation is concerned; (vi) the limits of investigation, or a summary of all natures universally; (vii) deduction to practice, or how it relates to man; (viii) preparations for investigation; and ascending and descending scale of axioms.

“Among privileged instances we shall first bring forward solitary instances. Solitary instances are those which exhibit the nature under investigation in subjects which have nothing in common with other subjects but that very nature; or again which do not exhibit the nature under investigation, in subjects which are similar in all things to other subjects except in that nature.” The second of the privileged instances is instances of transition: “There are the instances in which the nature which we are looking for, if previously non-existent, is in transition to being, and if already existing, towards non-being. And therefore in both these opposite movements such motion or passage to the opposite point of the circle. Such instances are not only a quick way to confirm an exclusion, but also pin down the affirmation, or actual form, to a small area.” “As third of the privileged instances, we shall put revealing instances…They are instances which reveal the nature under investigation naked and independent, and also as its height and in the supreme degree of its power; that is, liberated and free of impediments, or at least prevailing over them by the strength of its virtue, and suppressing and restraining them.” “As fifth of the privileged instances, we put concealed instances, which we have also chosen to call instances of the twilight. They are almost the opposite to revealing instances…As fifth of the privileged instances we shall put constitutive instances, which we have also chosen to call bundled instances. These are instances which constitute one species of a nature under investigation as a lesser form. Genuine forms are hidden in the depths and not easily discovered, and therefore the thing itself and the feebleness of human understanding require that we should not neglect but carefully observe particular forms which group certain bundles of instances together into a common notion.”

In this way, Francis Bacon introduces a series of the privileged instances: (6) instances of resemblances; (7) unique instances; (8) deviant instances; (9) borderline instances; (10) instances of power; (11) instances of association and of aversion; (12) accessory instances; (13) instances of alliance or of union; (14) crucial instances; (15) instances of divergence; (16) instances that open doors or gates; (17) summoning instances; (18) instances of the road or travelling instances and jointed instances; (19) instances of supplement or substitution; (20) cleaving instances or plucking instances; (21) instances of the rod or of the ruler; (22) running instances or instances of water; (23) instances of quantity; (24) instances of struggle or of dominance; (25) suggestive instances; (26) multipurpose instances; and (27) magical instances. He concludes: now we must proceed to the aids and correction of induction, and after that to concrete things, and to latent processes and latent structures, and the other things which we set out in due order in Aphorism 21 (that the intellect left to itself makes some attempt on that other way). We intend at the end to hand men their fortunes when their understanding is freed from tutelage and comes of age, from which an improvement of the human condition must follow, and greater power over nature.”

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John Locke – Theory of Knowledge: John Locke, as introduced previously, established the foundation of empiricism in philosophy by An Essay Concerning Human Understanding with innate notions, ideas, words, and knowledge. Book I. Innate Notions: Rejecting the traditional belief in innate principles meaning universal or self-evident truth and accepting the limitations of human reason, Locke insists that our all ideas begin with physical sensation, and humans obtain those ideas from own unprejudiced experience. They cannot experience any substantive reality without physical sensation, so it is impossible to acquire true knowledge by metaphysics, which is the fundamental challenge of empiricism against rationalism. No innate principles in the mind: If by the use of reason, men may discover some principles, “how can these men think the use of reason necessary to discover principles that are supposed innate, when reason is nothing else, but the faculty of deducing unknown truth from principles of propositions, that are already known. That certainly can never be thought innate, which we have need of reason to discover, unless as I have said, we will have all the certain truths, that reason ever teach us, to be innate.”

Book II: Ideas: Our senses convey objects into the mind, which produces perceptions. The external process of our minds is sensation, and the internal process of our minds is reflection. If the mind were a sheet of the white paper like the state of a child, sensations record their perceptions on it. If a man has any sensation by external operations, he begins to have a new set of ideas called ideas of reflection by internal operations, which is the original of all knowledge. He distinguishes simple ideas with complex ones divided into mode, substance, and relation. When the understanding is once stored with these simple ideas, “it has the power to repeat, compare, and unite them even to an almost infinite variety, and so can make at pleasure new complex ideas.” Whatever be the secret and abstract nature of substance in general, “all the ideas we have of particular distinct sorts of substances are nothing but several combination of simple ideas, coexisting in such, though unknown, cause of their union, as makes the whole subsist of itself.”

Book III: Words: Words in their primary signification stand for nothing, but the ideas in the mind of him that uses them.” Concerning the imperfection and abuses of words, he suggests their remedies. Though words can properly and immediately signify nothing but the ideas, yet they give them a secret reference to two other things: first, they suppose their words to be marks of the ideas in the minds also of other men, with whom they communicate; secondly, they often suppose their words to stand also for the reality of things. In general, it is impossible that every particular thing should have a distinct peculiar name; if it were possible, it would yet be useless; and “yet granting this also feasible, yet a distinct name for every particular thing, would not be of any great use for the improvement of knowledge.”

Book IV. Knowledge and Opinion: John Locke defines that knowledge is “the perception of the connection and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas,” reduced to identity or diversity, relation, co-existence or connection, and real existence. According to the degrees of certainty, he classifies instutitive, demonstrative, and sensitive knowledges. On the one hand, our knowledge is the consequence of the existence of things producing ideas in our minds by our senses; and on in the other hand, knowledge is the consequence of the ideas that are in our minds producing there general certain propositions. The greatest part of men are capable of doing, in regulating their opinions and judgment. Men are persuaded of several opinions without certain and indubitable proofs of their truth; so that it carries too great an imputation of ignorance, lightness, or folly, for men to quit and renounce their former tenets. John Locke did not examine the existence of God, but viewed that “the invisible things of God are clearly seen from the creation of the world.” Differentiating reason and faith, John Locke established the boundary between them: “the temporal and spiritual orders could operate independently of one another, and their respective institutions should not need to interfere in one another’s work.”
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Rene Descartes (1596-1650) was born in La Haye of Touraine of France; his mother died when he was one year old; his father was a member of the Parlement of Brittany at Rennes. “René lived with his grandmother and with his great-uncle. Although the Descartes family was Roman Catholic, the Poitou region was controlled by the Protestant Huguenots. In 1607, late because of his fragile health, he entered the Jesuit Collège Royal Henry-Le-Grand at La Flèche where he was introduced to mathematics and physics, including Galileo’s work. After graduation in 1614, he studied two years (1615–16) at the University of Poitiers, earning a Baccalauréat and License in Canon and Civil Law, in accordance with his father’s wishes that he should become a lawyer. From there he moved to Paris…I spent the rest of my youth traveling, visiting courts…Given his ambition to become a professional military officer, in 1618, Descartes joined the Dutch States Army in Breda under the command of Maurice of Nassau, and undertook a formal study of military engineering, as established by Simon Stevin. Descartes therefore received much encouragement in Breda to advance his knowledge of mathematics. In this way he became acquainted with Isaac Beeckman, principal of a Dordrecht school, for whom he wrote the Compendium of Music (written 1618, published 1650). Together they worked on free fall, catenary, conic section and fluid statics. Both believed that it was necessary to create a method that thoroughly linked mathematics and physics. While in the service of the duke Maximilian of Bavaria since 1619, Descartes was present at the Battle of the White Mountain outside Prague, in November 1620. He visited the labs of Tycho Brahe in Prague and Johannes Kepler in Regensburg.169

In November 1619 Descartes saw visions that a divine spirit revealed to him a new philosophy. In 1620 he left the army, visited various countries before his returning to France; and spent time a few years in Paris, where he wrote his first essay on method: Rules for the Direction of the Mind. In 1623, arriving in La Haye, he sold all of his property to invest in bonds, which provided him a comfortable income for the rest of his life. Descartes was present at the siege of La Rochelle by Cardinal Richelieu in 1627, and returned to the Dutch Republic in 1628, and joined the University of Franeker, studying under Metius, living either with a Catholic family, or renting the place. Next year he enrolled at the Leiden University to study mathematics and astronomy. He had a daughter with a servant girl in 1635, when he taught at the Utrecht University. Despite frequent moves, he wrote most of his works for over twenty years in the Netherlands: revolutionizing mathematics and philosophy. He published both The World and Man in 1630-33; both Discourse on the Method and Geometry in 1637; Meditations on First Philosophy in 1641; Principles of Philosophy in 1644; The Description of Human Body in 1648; Passions on Soul in 1649; and Correspondence in 1657 posthumously. By the invitation of Queen Christina of Sweden, Descartes arrived at Stockholm in 1649, but caught cold and soon died of inflammation of the lungs in few months.170

Photo III-4-1. Rene Descartes, 1648
Accessed 7 February 2016, https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/7/73/Frans_Hals_-_Portret_van_Ren%C3%A9_Descartes.jpg/240px-Frans_Hals_-_Portret_van_Ren%C3%A9_Descartes.jpg
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(a) **Discourse on Method** (1637): Part I. Various Considerations touching the Sciences: “For I found myself involved in so many doubt and errors, that I was convinced I had advanced no farther in all my attempts at learning, than the discovery at every turn of my own ignorance…For these reasons, as soon as my age permitted me to pass from under the control of my instructors, I entirely abandoned the study of letters, and resolved no longer to seek any other science than the knowledge of myself, or of the great book of the world. I spent the remainder of my youth in travelling, in visiting courts and armies, in holding intercourse with men of different dispositions and ranks, in collecting varied experience, in proving myself in the different situations into which fortune threw me, and, above all, in making such reflection on the matter of my experience as to secure my improvement…I should find much more truth in the reasonings…

Part II. The Principal Rules of the Method: “I believed that the four following would prove perfectly sufficient for me, provided I took the firm and unwavering resolution never in a single instance to fail in observing them. The first was never to accept anything for true which I did not clearly know to be such; that is to say, carefully to avoid precipitancy and prejudice, and to comprise nothing more in my judgment than what was presented to my mind so clearly and distinctively as to exclude all ground of doubt. The second, to divide each of the difficulties under examination into as many parts as possible, and as might be necessary for its adequate solution. The third, to conduct my thought in such order that, by commencing with objects the simplest and easiest to know, I might ascend by little and little, and, as it were, step by step, to the knowledge of the more complex; assigning in thought a certain order even to those objects which in their own nature do not stand in a relation of antecedence and sequence. And the last, in every case to make enumerations so complete, and reviews so general, that I might be assured that nothing was omitted.”

But the chief ground of my satisfaction with this method, was the assurance I had of thereby exercising my reason in all matters, if not with absolute perfection, at least with the greatest attainable by me: besides, I was conscious that by its use my mind was becoming gradually habituated to clearer and more distinct conceptions of its objects; and I hoped, also, from not having restricted this method to any particular matter, to apply it to the difficulties of the other sciences, with not less success than to those of Algebra. I should not, however, on this account have ventured at once on the examination of all the difficulties of the sciences which presented themselves to me, for this would have been contrary to the order prescribed in the method, but observing that the knowledge of such is dependent on principles borrowed from philosophy, in which I found nothing certain, I thought it necessary first of all to endeavor to establish its principles…I thought that I ought not to approach it till I had reached a more mature age.”

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Part III. Rules of Moral: “I formed a provisory code of morals, composed of three or four maxims, with which I am desirous to make you acquainted. The first was to obey the laws and customs of my country, adhering firmly to the faith in which, by the grace of God, I had been educated from my childhood, and regulating my conduct in every other matter according to the most moderate opinions, and the farthest removed from extremes, which should happen to be adopted in practice with general consent of the most judicious of those among whom I might be living…My second maxim was to be as firm and resolute in any actions as I was able, and not to adhere less steadfastly to the most doubtful opinions, when once adopted, than if they had been highly certain; imitating in this the example of travelers who, when they have lost their way in a forest, ought not to wander from side to side, far less remain in one place, but proceed constantly towards the same side in as straight a line as possible, without changing their direction for slight reasons, although perhaps it might be chance alone which at first determined the selection; for in this way, if they do not exactly reach the point they desire, they will come at least in the end to some place that will probably be preferable to the middle of a forest…My third maxim was to endeavor always to conquer myself rather than fortune, and change my desires rather than the order of the world, and in general, accustom myself to the persuasion that, except our own thoughts, there is nothing absolutely in our power; so that when we have done our best in respect of things external to us, all wherein we fail of success in to be held, as regards us, absolutely impossible; and this single principle seemed to me sufficient to prevent me from desiring for the future anything which I could not obtain, and thus render me contented; for since our will naturally seeks those objects alone which the understanding represents as in some way possible of attainment, it is plain, that if we consider all external goods as equally beyond our power, we shall no more regret the absence of such goods as seem due to our birth.”

“This method, from the time I had begun to apply it, had been to me the source of satisfaction so intense as to lead me to believe that more perfect or more innocent could not be enjoyed in this life; and as by its means I daily discovered truths that appeared to be of some importance, and of which other men were generally ignorant, the gratification thence arising so occupied my mind that I was wholly indifferent to every other object. Besides, the three preceding maxims were founded singly on the design of continuing the work of self-instruction. For since God has endowed each of us with some light of reason by which to distinguish truth from error, I could not have believed that I ought for a single moment to rest satisfied with the opinions of another, unless I had resolved to exercise my own judgment in examining these whenever I should be duly qualified for the task… I conclude not have restrained my desire, nor remained satisfied, had I not followed a path in which I thought myself certain of attaining all the knowledge to the acquisition of which I was competent, as well as the largest amount of what is truly good which I could ever hope to secure…And, during the nine subsequent years, I did nothing but roam from one place to another, desirous of being a spectator rather than an actor in the plays exhibited on the theater of the world; and, as I made it my business in each matter to reflect particularly upon what might fairly be doubted and prove a source of error, I gradually rooted out from my mind all the errors which had hitherto crept into it. Not than in this I imitated the Sceptics who doubt only that they may doubt, and seek nothing beyond uncertainty itself; for, on the contrary, my design was singly to find ground of assurance, and cast aside the loose earth and sand, that I might reach the rock or the clay. In this, as appears to me, I was successful enough; for, since I endeavored to discover the falsehood or incertitude of the propositions I examined, not by feeble conjectures, but by clear and certain reasonings, I met with nothing so doubtful as not to yield some conclusion of adequate certainty, although this were merely the inference, that the matter in question contained nothing certain… I continued to exercise myself in the method I have prescribed.”

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Part IV. Existence of God and of Human Soul: “I supposed that all the objects (presentations) that had ever entered into my mind when awake, had in them no more truth than the illusion of my dreams…whilst I thus wished to think that all was false, it was absolutely necessary that I, who thus thought, should be somewhat; and as I observed that this truth, *I think, hence I am*, was so certain and of such evidence, that no ground of doubt, however extravagant, could be alleged by the Sceptics capable of shaking it, I concluded that I might, without scruple, accept it as the first principle of the Philosophy of which I was in search. In the next place, I attentively examined what I was, and as I observed that I could suppose that I had no body, and that there was no world nor any place in which I might be; but that I could not therefore suppose that I was not; and that, on the contrary, from the very circumstance that I thought to doubt of the truth of other things, it most clearly and certainly followed that I was; while, on the other hand, if I had only ceased to think, although all the other objects which I had ever imagined had been in reality existent, I would have had no reason to believe that I existed; I thence concluded that I was a substance whose whole essence or nature consists only in thinking, and which, that it may exist, has need of no place, nor is dependent on any material thing; so that I, that is to say, the mind by which I am what I am, is wholly distinct form the body, and is even more easily known than the latter, and is such, that although the latter were not, it would still continue to be all that it is. After this I inquired in general into what is essential to the truth and certainty of a proposition; for since I had discovered one which I knew to be true, I thought that I must likewise be able to discover the ground of this certitude. And as I observed that in the words *I think, hence I am*, there is nothing at all which gives me assurance of their truth beyond this, that I see very clearly that in order to think it is necessary to exist. I concluded that I might take, as a general rule, the principle, that all the things which we very clearly and distinctly conceive are true, only observing, however, that there is some difficulty in rightly determining the objects which we distinctly conceive.”

“For in order to know nature of God, as far as my own nature permitted, I had only to consider in reference to all the properties of which I found in my mind some idea, whether their possession was a mark of perfection; and I was assured that no one which indicated any imperfection was in him, and that none of the rest was wanting. Thus I perceived that doubt, inconstancy, sadness, and such like, could not be found in God, since I myself would have been happy to be free from them. Besides, I had ideas of many sensible and corporeal things; for although I might suppose that I was dreaming, and that all which I saw or imagined was false, I could not, nevertheless, deny that the ideas were in reality in my thoughts. But, because I had already very clearly recognized in myself that the intelligent nature is distinct from the corporeal, and as I observed that all composition is an evidence of dependency, and that a state of dependency is manifestly a state of imperfection, I therefore determined that it could not be a perfection in God to be compounded of these two natures, and that consequently he was not so compounded; but that if there were any bodies in the world, or even any intelligences, or other natures that were not wholly perfect, their existence depended on his power in such as way they could not subsist without him for a single moment.”

“Finally, if there be still persons who are not sufficiently persuaded of the existence of God and of the soul, by reasons I have adduced, I am desirous that they should know that all the other propositions, of the truth of which they deem themselves perhaps more assured, as that we have a body, and that there exist stars and an earth, and such like, are less certain.”

“And because our reasonings are never so clear or so complete during sleep as when we are awake, although sometimes the acts of our imagination are then as lively and distinct, if not more so than in our waking moments, reason further dictates that, since all our thoughts cannot be true because of our partial imperfection, those possessing truth must infallibly be found in the experience of our waking moments rather than in that of our dreams.”
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Part V. Physical Questions: “But there are many other circumstances which evince that what I have alleged is the true cause of the motion of the blood: thus, in the first place, the difference that is observed between the blood which flows from the veins, and that from the arteries can only arise from this, that being rarefied, and, as it were distilled by passing through the heart, it is thinner, and more vivid, and warmer immediately after leaving the heart, in other words, when in the arteries, than it was a short time before passing into either, in other words, when it was in the veins; and if attention be given, it will be found that this difference is very marked only in the neighborhood of heart; and is not so evident in parts more remote from it.” “In the next place, how could digestion be carried on in the stomach unless the heart communicated heat to it through the arteries, and along with this certain of the more fluid parts of the blood, which assist in the dissolution of the food that has been taken in? Is not also the operation which converts the juice of food into blood easily comprehended, when it is considered that it is distilled by passing and repassing through the heart perhaps more than one or two hundred times in a day?” “I here entered, in conclusion, upon the subject of the soul at considerable length, because it is of the greatest moment: for after the error of those who deny the existence of God, an error which I think I have already sufficiently refuted, there is not that is more powerful in leading feeble minds astray from the straight path of virtue than the supposition that the soul of the brutes is of the same nature with our own; and consequently that after this life we have nothing to hope for or fear, more than flies and ants; in place of which, when we know how far they differ we much better comprehend the reasons which establish that the soul is of a nature wholly independent of the body, and that consequently it is not liable to die with the latter; and, finally, because no other causes are observed capable of destroying it, we are naturally led thence to judge that it is immortal.”

Part VI. The Investigation of Nature: With respect to experiment, “I have adopted the following order: first, I have essayed to find in general the principles, or first causes, of all that is or can be in the world, without taking into consideration for this end anything but God himself who has created it, and without educing them from any other source than from certain germs of truths naturally existing in our minds. In the second place, I examined what were the first and most ordinary effects that could be deduced from these courses; and it appears to me that, in this way, I have found heavens, stars, an earth, and even on the earth, water, air, fire, minerals, and some other things of this kind… Afterwards, when I wished to descend to the more particular, so many diverse objects presented themselves to me, that I believed it to be impossible for the human mind to distinguish the forms of species of bodies that are upon the earth… Thereupon, turning over in my mind all the objects that had ever been presented to my senses, I freely venture to state that I have never observed any which I could not satisfactorily explain by the principles I had discovered. But it is necessary also to confess that the power of nature is so ample and vast, and these principles so simple and general, that I have hardly observed a single particular effect which I cannot at once recognize as capable or being deduced in many different modes from the principles, and that my greatest difficulty usually is to discover in which of these modes the effect is dependent upon them.” “In conclusion, I am unwilling here to say anything very specific of the progress which I expect to make for the future in the sciences, or to bind myself to the public by any promise which I am not certain of being able to fulfil; but this only will I say, that I have resolved to devote what time I may still have to live to no other occupation than that of endeavoring to acquire some knowledge of nature, which shall be of such a kind as to enable us therefrom to deduce rules in Medicine of greater certainty than those at present in use; and that my inclination is so much opposed to all other pursuits, especially to such as cannot be useful to some without being hurtful to others, that if, by any circumstances, I had been constrained to engage in such, I do not believe that I should have been able to succeed.”
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(b) *The Meditations* (1641): Meditation I. Of the Things on which we may Doubt: “To this class of objects seem to belong corporeal nature in general and its extension; the figure of extended things, their quantity or magnitude, and their number, as also the place in, and the time during, which they exist, and other things of the same sort. We will not, therefore, perhaps reason illegitimately if we conclude from this that Physics, Astronomy, Medicine, and all the other sciences that have for their end the consideration of composite objects, are indeed of a doubtful character; but that Arithmetic, Geometry, and the other sciences of the same class, which regard merely the simplest and most general objects, and scarcely inquire whether or not these are really existent, contain somewhat that is certain and indubitable: for whether I am awake or dreaming, it remains true that two and three make five, and the a square has but four sides; nor does it seem possible that truths so apparent can ever fall under a suspicion of falsity (or incertitude).” “But let us for the present refrain from opposing this opinion, and grant that all which is here said of a Deity is fabulous: nevertheless, in whatever way it be supposed that I reach the state in which I exist, whether by fate, or chance, or by an endless series of antecedents and consequents, or by any other means, it is clear (since to be deceived and to err is a certain defect) that the probability of my being so imperfect as to be the constant victim of deception, will be increased exactly in proportion as the power possessed by the cause, to which they assign my origin, is lessened. To these reasonings, I have assuredly nothing to reply, but am constrained at last to avow that there is nothing of all that I formerly believed to be true of which it is impossible to doubt, and that not through thoughtlessness or levity, but from cogent and maturely considered reasons; so that hence forward, if I desire to discover anything certain, I ought not the less carefully to refrain from assenting to those same opinions than to what might be shown to be manifestly false.”

Meditation II. Of the Nature of the Human Mind: “Let’s pass, then, to the attributes of the soul. The first mentioned were the powers of nutrition and walking; but, if it be true that I have no body, it is true likewise that I am capable neither of walking nor of being nourished. Perception is another attribute of the soul; but perception too is impossible without the body; besides, I have frequently, during sleep, believed that I perceived objects which I afterward observed I did not in reality perceive. Thinking is another attribute of the soul; and here I discover what properly belongs to myself. This alone is inseparable from me. I am—I exist: this certain; but how often? As often as I think; for perhaps it would even happen, if I should wholly cease to think, that I should as the same time altogether ceased to be. I now admit nothing that is not necessarily true. I am therefore, precisely speaking, only a thinking thing, that is, a mind, understanding, or reason, terms whose signification was before unknown to me. I am, however, a real thing, and really existent; but what thing? The answer was, a thinking thing. The question no arises, am I aught besides? I will stimulate my imagination with a view to discover whether I am not still something more than a thinking being.” “So likewise, if I judge that the wax exists because I touch it, it will still also follow that I am; and if I determine that my imagination, or any other cause, whatever it be, persuades me of the existence of the wax, I will still draw the same conclusion. And what is here remarked of the piece of wax, is applicable to all the other things that are external to me.” “But, in conclusion, I find I have insensibly reverted to the point I desired: for, since it is now manifest to me that bodies themselves are not properly perceived by the senses nor by the faculty of imagination, but by the intellect alone; and since they are not perceived because they are seen and touched, but only because they are understood (or rightly comprehended by thought), I readily discover that there is nothing more easily or clearly apprehended than my own mind. But because it is difficult to rid one’s self so promptly of an opinion to which one has been long accustomed, it will be desirable to tarry for some time at this stage, that, by long continued meditation, I may more deeply impress upon my memory this new knowledge.”
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Meditation III. Of God, that He Exists: “By the name of God, I understand a substance infinite, independent, all-knowing, all-powerful, and by which I myself, and every other thing that exists, if any such there be, were created. But these properties are so great and excellent, that the more attentively I consider them the less I feel persuaded that the idea I have of them owes its origin to myself alone. And thus it is absolutely necessary to conclude, from all that I have before said, that God exists: for though the idea of substance be in my mind owing to this, that I myself am a substance, I should not, however, have the idea of an infinite substance, seeing I am a finite being, unless it were given me by some substance in reality infinite.” “Finally with regard to my parents, although all that I believed respecting them be true, it does not, nevertheless, follow that I am conserved by them, or even that I was produced by them, in so far as I am a thinking being. All that, at the most, they contributed to my origin was the giving of certain dispositions (modifications) to the matter in which I have hitherto judged that I or my mind, which is what alone I now consider to be myself, is enclosed; and thus there can here be no difficulty with respect to them, and it is absolutely necessary to conclude from this alone that I am, and possess the idea of a being absolutely perfect, that is, of God, that his existence is most clearly demonstrated. There remains only the inquiry as to the way in which I received this idea from God; for I have not drawn it from the senses, nor is it even presented to me unexpectedly, as is usual with the ideas of sensible objects, when these are presented or appear to be presented to the external organs of the senses; it is not even a pure production or fiction of my mind, for it is not in my power to take from or add to it; and consequently there but remains the alternative that it is innate, in the same way as is the idea of myself. And, in truth, it is not to be wondered at that God, at my creation, implanted this idea in me, that it might serve, as it were, for the mark of the workman impressed on his work.”

Meditation IV. Of Truth and Error: “From all this I discover, however, that neither the power of willing, which I have received from God, is of itself the source of my errors, for it is exceedingly ample and perfect in this kind; nor even the power of understanding, for as I conceive no object unless by means of the faculty that God bestowed upon me, all that I conceive is doubtless rightly conceived by me, and it is impossible for me to be deceived in it. Whence, then, spring my errors? They arise from this cause alone, that I do not restrain the will, which is of much wider range than the understanding, within the same limits, but extend it even to things I do not understand, and as the will is of itself indifferent to such, it readily falls into error and sin by choosing the false in room of the true, and evil instead of good.” “And it is this wrong use of the freedom of the will in which is found the privation that constitutes the form of error. Privation, I say, is found in the act, in so far as it proceeds from myself, but it does not exist in the faculty which I received from God, nor even in the act, in so far as it depends on him; for I have assuredly no reason to complain that God has not given me a greater power of intelligence or more perfect natural light than he has actually bestowed, since it is of the nature of a finite understanding not to comprehend many things, and of the nature of a created understanding to be finite; on the contrary, I have every reason to render thanks to God, who owed me nothing, for having given me all the perfections I possess, and I should be far from thinking that he has unjustly deprived me of, or kept back, the other perfections which he has not bestowed upon me.” “And certainly this can be no other than what I have now explained: for as often as I so restrain my will within the limits of my knowledge, that it forms no judgment except regarding objects which are clearly and distinctly represented to it by the understanding, I can never be deceived; because every clear and distinct conception is doubtless something, and as such cannot owe its origin to nothing, but must of necessity have God for its author – God, I say, who, as supremely perfect, cannot, without a contradiction, be the cause of any error; and consequently it is necessary to conclude that every such conception is true.”
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Meditation V. The Essence of Material Things and of God: “But after I have discovered that God exists, seeing I also at the same time observed that all things depend on him, and that he is no deceiver, and thence inferred that all which I clearly and distinctly perceive is of necessity true: although I no longer attend to the grounds of a judgment, no opposite reason can be alleged sufficient to lead me to doubt of its truth, provided only I remember that I once possessed a clear and distinct comprehension of it. My knowledge of it thus becomes true and certain. And this same knowledge extends likewise to whatever I remember to have formerly demonstrated, as the truths of geometry and the like: for what can be alleged against them to lead me to doubt of them? Will it be that my nature is such that I may be frequently deceived? But I already know that I cannot be deceived in judgments of the grounds of which I possess a clear knowledge. Will it be that I formerly deemed things to be true and certain which I afterward discovered to be false? But I had no clear and distinct knowledge of any of those things, and, being as yet ignorant of the rule by which I am assured of the truth of a judgment, I was led to give my assent to them on grounds which I afterward discovered were less strong than at the time I imagined them to be. What further objection, then, is there” Will it be said that perhaps I am dreaming (an objection I lately myself raised), or that all the thoughts of which I am now conscious have no more truth than the reveries of my dreams? But although, in truth, I should be dreaming, the rule still holds that all which is clearly presented to my intellect is indisputably true. And thus I very clearly see that the certitude and truth of all science depends on the knowledge alone of the true God, insomuch that, before I knew him, I could have no perfect knowledge of any other thing. And now that I know him, I possess the means of acquiring a perfect knowledge respecting innumerable matters, as well relative to God himself and other intellectual objects as to corporeal nature, in so far as it is the object of pure mathematics (which do not consider whether it exists or not).186

Meditation VI. Of the Existence of Material Thing, and of the Real Distinction between the Mind and Body: “And I easily understand that, if somebody exists, with which my mind is so conjoined and united as to be able, as it were, to consider it when it chooses, it may thus imagine corporeal objects; so that this mode of thinking differs from pure intellection only in this respect, that the mind in conceiving turns in some way upon itself, and consider someone of the ideas it processes within itself; but in imagining it turns toward the body, and contemplates in it some object conformed to the idea which it either of itself conceived or apprehended by sense.” “And in the first place, I will recall to my mind the things I have hitherto held as true, because perceived by the senses, and the foundations upon which my belief in their truth rested; I will, in the second place examine the reasons that afterward constrained ne to doubt of them; and, finally, I will consider what of them I ought now to believe.” In fact, I had formerly trusted to the senses, rather than to reason, and my ideas were not so clearly perceived by sense, I was readily persuaded that I had no idea in my intellect which had not formerly passed through the senses. But, afterward, a wide experience by degrees sapped the faith I had reposed in my senses. Now I begin to know myself better, and to discover more clearly the author of my being. Moreover, I find in myself diverse faculties of thinking that have each their special mode. With respect to other things, nature teaches me (by such sensations as pain, hunger, and thirst) that my own body is surrounded by many other bodies, some of which I have to seek after, and other to shun. There are many other beliefs, but it may easily happen that such judgments shall contain error without any rational ground. Without the supreme goodness of God, there is falsity in my judgments. There is a vast difference between mind and body: the mind does not immediately receive the impression from all the parts of the body, but only from the brain – common sense. However, doubt of the truth comes if one of my senses, my memory, and my understanding becomes repugnant in examining individual objects, we must acknowledge the weakness of our nature.187
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The Principles of Philosophy (1644): Part I. Of the Principles of Human Knowledge: The proposition, "I think, therefore I am" is of all others the first and most certain which occurs to one philosophizing orderly, "I did not therefore deny that it was necessary to know what thought, existence, and certitude are, and the truth that, in order to think it is necessary to be, and the like." We may validly infer the existence of God from necessary existence being comprised in the concept we have of him. "When the mind afterward reviews the different ideas that are in it, it discovers what is by far the chief among them – that of a Being omniscient, all-powerful, and absolutely perfect; and it observes that in this idea there is contained not only possible and contingent existence, as in the ideas of all other things which is clearly perceives, but existence absolutely necessary and eternal". That in passing from the knowledge of God to the knowledge of the creatures, it is necessary to remember that our understanding is finite, and the power of God infinite. The light of nature, or faculty of knowledge given us by God, can never compass any object which is not true, in as far as it attains to a knowledge of it, that is, in as far as the object is clearly and distinctly apprehended. Although God is no deceiver, we frequently fall into error. There are only two modes of thinking in us: the perception of the understanding and the action of the will. We never err unless when we judge of something which we do not sufficiently apprehend. The chief perfection of man is his being able to act freely or by will, and error is a defect in our mode of acting, not in our nature; and the fault of their subjects may be frequently attributed to other masters, but never to God. The liberty of our will is self-evident. We possess sufficient intelligence to know clearly and distinctly that this power is in God, but not enough to comprehend how he leaves the free actions of men indeterminate. All the objects of our knowledge are to be regarded either as things or the affections of things; or as eternal truths; with the enumeration of things. We may easily have two clear and distinct notions or ideas: the one of created substance and the other of uncreated and independent substance – the concourse of God. Universals are formed with the five common, namely genus, species, difference, property, and accident.

In sum, wherefore if we would philosophize in earnest, and give ourselves to the search after all the truths we are capable of knowing, we must, in the first place, lay aside our prejudices; on other words, we must take care scrupulously to withhold our assent from the opinions we have formerly admitted, until upon new examination we discover that they are true. We must, in the next place, make an orderly review of the notions we have in our minds, and hold as true all and only those which we will clearly and distinctly apprehend. In this way we will observe, first of all, that we exist in so far as it is our nature to think, and at the same time that there is a God upon whom we depend; and after considering his attributes we will be able to investigate the truth of all other things, since God is the cause of them. Besides the notions we have of God and of our mind, we will likewise find that we possess the knowledge of many propositions which are eternally true, as, for example, that nothing cannot be the cause of anything, etc. We will further discover in our minds the knowledge of a corporeal or extended nature that may be moved, divided, etc., and also of certain sensations that affect us, as of pain, colors, tastes, etc., although we do not yet know the cause of our being so affected; and, comparing what we have now learned, by examining those things in their order, with our former confused knowledge of them, we will acquire the habit of forming clear and distinct conceptions of all the objects we are capable of knowing."

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Part II. Of the Principles of Material Things: The existence of material things may be known with certainty. It can be doubted that our every perception coming from some object is different from our mind. Human body is more closely connected with our mind than any other. Our sense-perceptions are merely to be referred to this intimate union of the human body and mind. “This world of corporeal substance is extended without limit, for wherever we fix a limit, we still not only imagine beyond it spaces indefinitely extended, but perceive these to be truly imaginable, in other words, to be in reality such as we imagine them; so that they contain in them corporeal substance indefinitely extended, for, as has been already shown at length, the idea of extension which we conceive in any space whatever is plainly identical with the idea of corporeal substance.”

All the variety of matter, or the diversity of its forms depends on motion. We desire to know what ought to be understood by motion according to the truth of the thing, we may say, in order to give it a determinate nature, “that it is the transporting of one part of matter or of one body from the vicinity of those bodies that are in immediate contact with it, or which we regard as at rest, to the vicinity of other bodies. By a body as a part of matter, I understand all that which is transferred together, although it be perhaps composed of several parts, which in themselves have other motions; and I say that it is the transporting and not the force or action which transports, with the view of showing that motion is always in the movable thing, not in that which moves; for it seems to me that we are not accustomed to distinguish these two things with sufficient accuracy. Further, I understand that it is a mode of the movable thing, and not a substance, just as figure is a property of the thing figured, and repose of that which is at rest.”

Part III. Of the Visible World: We cannot think too highly of the works of God. We cannot think too highly of the works of God. “Having now ascertained certain principles of material things, which were sought, not by the prejudices of the senses, but by the light of reason, and which thus possess so great evidence that we cannot doubt of their truth, it remains for us to consider whether from these alone we can deduce the explication of all the phenomena of nature. We will commence with those phenomena that are of the greatest generality, and upon which the other depend, as, for example, with the general structure of this whole visible world. But in order to our philosophizing aright regarding this, two things are first of all to be observed. The first is, that we should ever bear in mind the infinity of the power and goodness of God, that we may not fear falling into error by imagining his works to be too great, beautiful, and perfect, but that we may, on the contrary, take care lest, by supposing limits to them of which we have no certain knowledge, we appear to think less highly than we ought of the power of God. That we ought to beware rest, in our presumption…The second is, that we should beware of presuming too highly of ourselves, as it seems we should do if we supposed certain limits to the world, without being assured of their existence either by natural reasons or by divine revelation, as if the power of our thought extended beyond what God has in reality made; but likewise still more if we persuaded ourselves that all things were created by God for us only, of if we merely supposed that we could comprehend by the power of our intellect the ends which God proposed to himself in creating the universe. In what sense it may be said that all things were created for the sake of man. For although, as far as regards morals, it may be a pious thought to believe that God made all things for us, seeing we may thus be incited to greater gratitude and love toward him; and although it is even in some sense true, because there is no created thing of which we cannot make some use, if it be only that of exercising our mind in considering it, and honoring God on account of it, it is yet by no means probable that all things were created for us in this way that God had no other end in their creation; and this supposition would be plainly ridiculous and inept in physical reasoning, for we do not doubt but that many things exist, or formerly existed and have now ceased to be, which were never seen or known by man, and were never of use to him.”
Chapter III. Political Philosophy

Part IV. Of the Earth: “In the next place, it can be proved that our mind is of such a nature that the motions of the body alone are sufficient to excite in it all sorts of thoughts, without it being necessary that these should ion any way resemble the motions which give rise to them, and especially that these motions can excite in it those confused thought called sensations. For we see that words whether uttered by the voice or merely written, excite in our minds all kinds of thoughts and emotions. On the same paper, with the same pen and ink, by merely moving the point of the pen over the paper in a particular way, we can trace letters that will raise in the minds of our readers the thought of combats, tempests, or the furies, and the passions of indignation and sorrow; in place of which, if the pen be moved in another way hardly different from the former, this slight change will cause thought widely different from the above, such as those of repose, peace, pleasantness, and the quite opposite passions of love and joy.” “But nevertheless, that I may not wrong the truth by supposing it less certain than it is, I will here distinguish two kinds of certitude. The first is called moral, that is, certainty sufficient for the conduct of life, that is, a certainty sufficient for the conduct of life, though, if we look to the absolute power of God, what is morally certain may be false. (Thus, those who never visited Rome do not doubt that it is a city of Italy, though it might be that all from whom they got their information were deceived.)”

Besides, there are some, even among natural, things which we judge to be absolutely certain. (Absolute certainty arises when we judge that it is impossible a thing can be otherwise than as we think it.) This certainty is founded on the metaphysical ground, that, as God is supremely good and the source of all truth, the faculty of distinguishing truth from error which he gave us, cannot be fallacious so long as we use it aright, and distinctly perceived anything by it. Of this character are the demonstrations of mathematics, the knowledge that material things exist, and the clear reasonings that are formed regarding them. The results I have given in this treatise will perhaps be admitted to a place in the class of truth that are absolutely certain, if it be considered that they are deduced in a continuous series from the…elementary principles of human knowledge.”

Concluding Remarks: Rune Descartes firmly founded the basis of rationalism. Believing that geometry is the ideal for all sciences and philosophy; by means of reason, Descartes discovered certain universal or self-evident truths, called innate, being derived not from sense experience but from intuition; from which he deduced the remaining content of philosophy. He views that “I think, therefore I am” which is the first and most certain. There is the distinction between the mind and the body or between a thinking and corporeal thing, from which Cartesian dualism was established. The existence of God is certain, since God is absolutely necessary, eternal, and infinite, while human mind and body are finite substances. Two modes of thinking which exist in us are the perception of the understanding and the action of the will. The liberty of our will is self-evident, while God has pre-ordained all things. The freedom of our will may be reconciled with the Divine pre-ordination: even though the light of reason appears to suggest us something contrary to what is revealed, we ought to prefer the Divine authority to our own judgment. According to him, human body is closely connected with the mind, so that the nature of body is extension of the mind. The mind cannot be doubt, but the body or the extended does not guarantee its own existence. The extension of the world is indefinite, which means that the world of corporeal substance is extended without limit. Everything in the universe except the mind is extended substance or matter; and the material world is fundamental in the universe and consists of two things: extension occupying space and motion moving in space. Using mind or reason, humans can understand the material world. The separation of mind and matter made scientists possible independently to investigate the matter by reason rather than the whole organism. Descartes’ books were condemned by many Protestant theologians and forbidden by the papal authority because the Cartesian dualism was against traditional religious view of the universe.
Benedict de Spinoza (1632-77): Spinoza was born in Amsterdam to Jewish parents who immigrated to the Netherlands from Portugal via Nantes of France in 1593. In the synagogue school, he received a religious education of the community and developed a fondness for mathematics. As a naturally gifted student, he was supposed to complete the upper grades trained to be a rabbi, but became skeptic about Judaism in its dogma and practices. He abandoned his formal studies and joined his father’s trade firm in late 1649. About the time of his father’s death in 1654, Spinoza faced a serious spiritual and intellectual crisis, which was similar to the experience of Uriel da Costa a generation ago. Turning away from his Jewish studies, Spinoza attended various meetings of the groups of free thinkers, and participated in discussions of religion, philosophy, and politics. In 1656, the Jewish community in Amsterdam excommunicated Spinoza because he was claiming that the Pentateuch was man-made and not written by Moses, which was “evil opinions and acts” to Judaism. Isolated from the Jews, Spinoza began his journey toward search for the truth by earning his bread from polishing lenses and tutoring private pupils. After he left the Jewish community, he stayed with Van den Enden, a political radical and former Jesuit, who taught him Latin and guided him to access to various resources, both classical and modern including Descartes, which widened his intellectual scope. Spinoza was associated with Samuel Fisher, a member of the Quaker mission who had studied Hebrew at the University of Oxford. Fisher, it seems, shared Spinoza’s skepticism of the historical accuracy of the Bible.

In 1661 Spinoza moved from Amsterdam to the coastal town of Rijnsburg, a quiet place for his philosophical work, where he began to write the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellectual. In 1663 Spinoza published the Rene Descartes’s Principles of Philosophy. “Although Spinoza generally accepted Descartes’s physics, he rejected Cartesian metaphysics, objecting to three features: the transcendence of God, the conception of mind as a mental substance radically distinct from matter (see mind-body dualism), and the ascription of free will both to God and to human beings. In Spinoza’s eyes the combination of these doctrines made the world unintelligible. It was impossible to explain the relation between God and the world or the causal interaction of mind and body or to account for events occasioned by free will. Spinoza also showed that Descartes’s definition of substance, which Spinoza accepted, implied that there cannot be more than one substance in the world. Spinoza’s monism is therefore the logical outcome of Cartesianism.” In the mid-1660s Spinoza moved again to the outskirt of The Hague, where he spent the rest of his life. “He began to acquire a wide circle of intellectual acquaintances, beginning with a philosophical-spiritual group in Amsterdam that conducted discussions with him by mail and occasionally in person.” In 1670 Spinoza published Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, which made him recognized as significant intellectual figure, finding him in the company of professors, diplomats, and writers. In 1675 Spinoza finished his Ethics, but that was published a few months after his death in 1677 in order to avoid controversy. It is asserted that “Spinoza was the first philosopher to make atheism into a philosophical system.”

Chapter II. Political Philosophy

(a) *A Theologico-Political Treatise* (1670): Preface: “Now, seeing that we have the rare happiness of living in a republic, where everyone’s judgment is free and unshackled, where each may worship God as his conscience dictates, and where freedom is esteemed before all things dear and precious.” (i) The light of reason is not only despised, but by many even execrated as a source of impiety, that human commentaries are accepted as divine records, and that credulity is extolled as faith; as I marked the fierce controversies of philosophers raging in Church and State, the source of bitter hatred and dissension, the ready instruments of sedition and other ills innumerable, I determine to examine the Bible afresh in a careful, impartial, and unfettered spirit, making no assumptions concerning it, and attributing to it no doctrines.(ii) I inquired, why the Hebrews were called God’s chosen people, and discovering that it was only because God had chosen for them a certain strip of territory, where they might live peaceably and at ease, I learnt that the Law revealed by God to Moses was merely the law of the individual Hebrew state, therefore that it was binding on none but Hebrews, and not even on Hebrews after the downfall of their nation. (iii) As in the whole course of my investigation I found nothing taught expressly by Scripture, which does not agree with our understanding, or which is repugnant thereto. (iv) I start from the natural rights of the individual, which are co-extensive with his desires and power, and from the fact that no one is bound to live as another pleases, but is the guardian of his own liberty. “I conclude that no one can be deprived of his natural rights absolutely, but that subjects, either by tacit agreement, or by social contract, retain a certain number, which cannot be taken from them without great danger to the state.” I pass on to the Hebrew State in order to trace the manner in which Religion acquired the force of law, and to touch on other noteworthy points.

Chapter I & II. Prophecy and Prophets: Prophecy, or revelation, is sure knowledge revealed by God to man. Spinoza concludes that “no one except Christ received the revelations of God without the aid of imagination, whether in words or vision. Therefore the power of prophecy implies not a peculiarly perfect mind, but a peculiarly vivid imagination. The prophets were endowed with unusually vivid imaginations, and not with unusually perfect minds. Imagination does not, in its own nature, involve any certainty of truth, such as it implied in every clear and distinct idea, but requires some extrinsic reason to assure us of its objective reality: hence prophecy cannot afford certainty, and the prophets were assured of God’s revelation by some sign, and not by the fact of revelation, as we may see from Abraham. Moses, also, was not sufficiently aware that God is omniscient, and directs human actions by His sole decree, for although God Himself says that the Israelites should hearken to Him, Moses still considered the matter doubtful and repeated “But if they will not believe me, nor hearken unto my voice.” Chapter III. The Vocation of the Hebrews, and Whether the Gift of Prophecy was Peculiar to Them: Every man’s true happiness and blessedness consist solely in the enjoyment of what is good, not in the price that he alone is enjoying it, to the exclusion of others. If any one wishes to maintain that the Hebrews have been chosen by God for ever, I will not gainsay him if he will admit that this choice, whether temporary or eternal, has no regard, in so far as it is peculiar to the Jews, to aught but dominion and physical advantage, whereas in regard to intellect and true virtue, every nation is on a far with the rest, and God has not in these respects chosen one people rather than another.

Chapter IV. The Divine Law: (i) Natural divine law is universal or common to all men, for we have deduced it from universal human nature. (ii) It does not depend on the truth of any historical narrative whatsoever, for inasmuch as this natural Divine law is comprehended solely by the consideration of human nature, it is plain that we can conceive it as existing as well as Adam as in any other man, as well in a man living among his fellows, as in a man who lives by
himself. (iii) This natural Divine law does not demand the performance of ceremonies – that is, action in themselves indifferent, which are called good from the fact of their institution, or actions symbolizing something profitable for salvation, or actions of which the meaning surpasses human understanding. (iv) The highest reward of the Divine law is the law itself, namely, to know God and to love Him of our free choice, and with an undivided and fruitful spirit; while its penalty is the absence of these things, and being in bondage to the flesh – that is, having an inconstant and wavering spirit. Through Biblical studies, Spinoza fulfilled the promise that Scripture literally approves of the light of natural reason and the natural Divine law.

Chapter V. The Ceremonial Law: The ceremonial law (consisting of ordinances, ceremonies and sacrifices in the sanctuary system) tended to preserve and confirm the Hebrew kingdom. “The formation of society serves not only for defensive purposes, but is also very useful, and, indeed, absolutely necessary, as rendering possible the division of labor. If men did not render mutual assistance to each other, no one would have either the skill or the time to provide for his own sustenance and preservation (meaning without division of labor).” The Jews when they first came pit of Egypt were not bound by any national laws, therefore, the sovereignty was bound to remain bested in the hands of one man who would rule the rest and keep them under constraints, make laws and interpret them. Moses, who surpassed the rest in virtue and persuaded the people of the fact, providing it by many testimonies, easily retained this sovereignty. Therefore, Moses, by his virtue and the Divine command, introduced a religion, so that the people might do their duty from devotion rather than fear, while he took the greatest care (benefits) that they should be obeyed willingly. The people could do nothing but remember the law, and follow the ordinances laid down at the good pleasure of their ruler. Men should do nothing of their own free will, but should always act under external authority by following the ceremonial law. Although such ceremonies were not ordained for the sake of upholding a government, they were ordained for the preservation of a society, and accordingly he who lives alone is not bound by them. The chief speculative doctrines taught in Scripture are the existence of God; so the truth of narratives has nothing to do with the Divine law, and serves for nothing except in respect of doctrine.

Chapter VI. Miracles: (i) Nature cannot be contravened, but she preserves a fixed and immutable order: if anyone assert that God acts in contravention to the laws of nature, which means that he would be compelled to assert that God acted against His own nature – that must be an evident absurdity. (ii) Miracles, in the sense of events contrary to the laws of nature, would lead us to doubt it, where, otherwise, we might have been absolutely certain of it, as knowing that nature follows a fixed and immutable order. We cannot gain knowledge of the existence and providence of God by means of miracles, but we can far better infer them from the fixed and immutable order of nature. A miracle, whether in contravention to, or beyond, nature is a mere absurdity; and, therefore, what is meant in Scripture by a miracle can only be a work of a nature, which surpasses, or is believed to surpass, human comprehension. God’s nature and existence, and consequently his Providence cannot be known from miracles, but they can be much better perceived from the fixed and immutable order of nature. (iii) By the decree and volitions, and consequently the providence of God, Scripture means nothing but nature’s order, following necessarily from her eternal laws. Scripture does not explain things by their secondary causes, but only narrates them in the order and the style which has most power to move men, and especially uneducated men, to devotion; and therefore it speaks inaccurately of God and of events. (iv) Scripture makes the general assertion in several passages that nature’s course is fixed and unchangeable. All these texts teach most distinctly that nature preserves a fixed and unchangeable order, and that the law of nature are so perfect, that nothing can be added thereto nor taken therefrom, and that miracles only appear as something new because of man’s ignorance.
Chapter VII. The Interpretation of Scripture: The method of interpreting Scripture does not widely differ from the method of interpreting nature—in fact, it is almost the same. For as the interpretation of nature consists in the examination of the history of nature, and therefrom deducing definitions of natural phenomena on certain fixed axioms, so Scriptural interpretation proceeds by the examination of Scripture, and inferring the intention of its authors as a legitimate conclusion from its fundamental principles. By working in this manner everyone will admit no principles for interpreting Scripture, and discussing its contents save such as they find in Scripture itself—and will be able with equal security to discuss what surpasses our understanding, and what is known by the natural light of reason.” Scriptures very often threaten matters which cannot be deduced from principles known to reason: it is chiefly made up of narratives and revelation: the narratives generally contain miracles, and revelations also were adapted to the opinions of the prophets, and in themselves surpasses human comprehension. Scripture does not give us definitions of things any more than nature does: therefore, such definition must be sought in the latter case from the diverse workings of nature; in the former case, from the various narratives about the given subject which occur in the Bible. As the supreme right of free thinking, even on religion, is in every man’s power, “and as it is inconceivable that such power could be alienated, it is also in every man’s power to wield the supreme right and authority of free judgment in this behalf, and to explain and interpret religion for himself. The only reason for vesting the supreme authority in the interpretation of law, and judgment on public affairs in the hands of the magistrates, is that it concerns questions of public right. Similarly, the supreme authority in explaining religion, and in passing judgment theorems, is lodged with the individual because it concerns questions of individual right… it would rather tend to establish individual freedom of judgment.”

Chapter XVI. The Foundations of a State: the Natural and Civil Rights of Individuals; and the Rights of the Sovereign Power: “The power of nature is the power of God, which has sovereign right over all things; and, inasmuch as the power of nature is simply the aggregate of the powers of all her individual components, it follows that every individual has sovereign right to do all that he can; in other words, the rights of an individual extend to the utmost limits of his power as it has been conditioned. Now it is the sovereign law and right of nature that each individual should endeavor to preserve itself as it is, without regard to anything but itself; therefore this sovereign law and right belongs to every individual, namely, to exist and act according to its natural conditions.” Natural right of the individual is only limited by his power, it is clear that by transferring, either willingly or under compulsion, this power into the hands of another, he in so doing necessarily cedes also a part of his right; and further, that the sovereign right over all men belongs to him who has sovereign power, wherewith he can compel men by force, or restrain them by threats of the universally feared punishment of death; such sovereign right he will retain only so long as he can maintain his power of enforcing his will; otherwise he will totter on his throne, and no one who is stronger than he will be bound unwillingly to obey him…In this manner a society can be formed without any violation of natural right, and the covenant can always be strictly kept—that is, if each individual hands over the whole of his power to the body politic, the latter will then possess sovereign natural right over all things; that is, it will have sole and unquestioned dominion, and everyone will be bound to obey, under pain of the severest punishment. A body politic of this kind is called a Democracy, which may be defined as a society which wields all its power as a whole. The sovereign power is not restrained by any laws, but everyone is bound to obey it in all things.” The private civil right we can only mean the liberty every man possesses to preserve this existence, a liberty limited by the edicts of the sovereign power, and preserved only by its authority. The men of two states becomes allies, when for the sake of avoiding war, or for some other advantages.
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Chapter XVII. The Jewish Theocratic Republic: The preservation of a state “chiefly depends on the subjects' fidelity and constancy in carrying out the orders they receive, is most clearly taught both by reason and experience; how subjects ought to be guided so as best to preserve their fidelity and virtue is not obvious.” For the sake of making themselves secure, kings who seized the throne in ancient times used to try to spread the idea that they were descended from the immortal gods.” “After their liberation from the intolerable bondage of the Egyptians, the Jews were bound by no covenant to any man; and, therefore, every man entered into his natural right, and was free to retain it or to give it up, and transfer it to another. Being, then, in the state of nature, they followed the advice of Mosses, in whom they chiefly trusted, and decided to transfer their right to no human being, but only to God; without further delay they all, with one voice, promised to obey all the commands of the Deity, and to acknowledge no right that He did not proclaim as such by prophetic revelation. This promise, or transference of right to God, was effected in the same manner as we have conceived it to have been in ordinary societies, when men agree to divest themselves of their natural rights. It is, in fact, in virtue of a set covenant, and an oath, that the Jews freely, and not under compulsion or threats, surrendered their rights and transferred them to God. Moreover, in order that this covenant might be ratified and settled, and might be free from all suspicion of deceit, God did not enter into it till the Jews had had experience of His wonderful power by which alone they had been, or could be, preserved in a state of prosperity. It is because they believed that nothing but God’s power could preserve them that they surrendered to God the natural power of self-preservation, which they formerly, perhaps, thought they possessed, and consequently they surrendered at the same time all their natural right.”

But all the Hebrew tribes, except Levites, offended their God by worshipping the golden calf, and polluted them in their gifts, eventually resulting in the ruin of the entire states.

Chapter XVIII. From the Commonwealth of the Hebrews: Although the commonwealth of the Hebrews might have lasted forever, it would be impossible to imitate it at the present day, nor would it be advisable so to do. “If a people wished to transfer their rights to God, it would be necessary to make an express covenant with Him, and for this would be needed not only the consent of those transferring their rights, but also the consent of God. God, however, has revealed through his Apostles that the covenant of God is no longer written in ink, or on tables of stone, but with the Spirit of God in the fleshy tables of the heart…God’s kingdom is not infringed upon by the choice of an earthly ruler endowed with sovereign rights; for after the Hebrews had transferred their rights to God, they conferred the sovereign right of ruling on Moses, investing him with the sole power of instituting and abrogating laws in the name of God, of choosing priests, of judging, of teaching, of punishing – in fact, all the prerogatives of an absolute monarch. (i) How hurtful to religion and the state is the concession to ministers of religion of any power of issuing decrees or transacting the business of government. (ii) How dangerous it is to refer to Divine right matters merely speculative and subject or liable to dispute. The most tyrannical governments are those which make crimes of opinions, for everyone has an inalienable right over his thought. (iii) To avoid such evils in a state, there is no safer way than to make piety and religion to consist in acts only – that is, in practice of justice and charity, leaving everyone’s judgments in other respects free. (iii) We see how necessary it is, both in the interests of the state and in the interests of religion, to confer on the sovereign power the right of deciding what is lawful or the reverse. (iv) We see how disastrous it is for a people unaccustomed to kings, and possessing a complete code of laws, to set up a monarchy. For a terrible example, the English people sought how to depose their monarch under the forms of law, but “when he had been removed, they were utterly unable to change the form of the government, and after much bloodshed only brought it about, that a new monarch should be hailed under a different name…accomplished nothing for the good.”
Chapter XIX. The Spiritual Right with the Sovereign: “I recognize no difference between the cases where God teaches and commands the practice of justice and charity through our natural faculties, and those where He makes special revelations; nor is the form of the revelation of importance so long as such practice is revealed and becomes a sovereign and supreme law to men. If, therefore, I show that justice and charity can only acquire the force of right and law through the rights of rulers, I shall be able readily to arrive at the conclusion, that religion can only acquire the force of right by means of those who have the right to command, and that God only rules among men through the instrumentality of earthly potentates... For this reason, we could not conceive sin to exist in the state of nature, nor imagine God as a judge punishing man’s transgressions; but we supposed all things to happen according to the general laws of universal nature, there being no difference between pious and impious.” In order that the religion revealed by the prophets might have the force of law among the Jews, it was necessary that every man of them should yield up his natural right, and that all should, with one accord, agree that they would only obey such commands as God should reveal to them through the prophets. “It is the function of the sovereign only to decide what is necessary for the public welfare and the safety of the state, and to give orders accordingly; therefore it is also the function of the sovereign only to decide the limits of our duty towards our neighbor – in other words, to determine how we should obey God.” “I do not pause to consider the arguments of those who wish to separate secular lights from spiritual rights, placing the former under the control of the sovereign, and the latter under the control of the universal Church; such pretensions are too frivolous to merit refutation.” After the death of Moses, no one held absolute sway, yet the power of deciding both in matters spiritual and matters temporal was in the hands of the secular chief. The people was bound to consult the supreme judge no less than the high priest. Though the kings had not as much power as Moses, nearly the whole arrangement and choice of the sacred ministry depended on their decision.200 Chapter XX. A Free State: “Moses, not by fraud, but by Divine virtue, gained such a hold over the popular judgment that he was accounted superhuman, and believed to speak and act through the inspiration of the Deity; nevertheless, even he could not escape murmurs and evil interpretations. How much less then can other monarchs avoid them! Yet such unlimited power, if it exists at all, must belong to a monarch, and least of all to a democracy, where the whole or a great part of the people wield authority collectively.” The object of government is not to change men from rational beings into beasts or puppets, but to enable them to develop their minds and bodies in security, and to employ their reason unshackled; neither showing hatred, anger, or deceit, nor watched with the eyes of jealously and injustice. In fact, the true aim of government is liberty. Spinoza tries to touch various issues on that in a free state, every man may think what he likes, and say what he thinks, as summarized below. (i) That it is impossible to deprive men of the liberty of saying what they think. (ii) That such liberty can be conceded to every man without injury to the rights and authority of the sovereign power, and that every man may retain it without injury to such rights, provided that he does not presume upon it to the extent of introducing any new rights into the state, or acting in any way contrary to the existing laws. (iii) That every man may enjoy this liberty without detriment to the public peace, and that no inconveniences arise therefrom which cannot easily be checked. (iv) That every man may enjoy it without injury to his allegiance. (v) That laws dealing with speculative problems are entirely useless. (vi) Lastly, that not only may such liberty be granted without prejudice to the public peace, to loyalty, and to the rights of rulers, but that it is even necessary for their preservation.” The safest way for a state is to lay down the rule that religion is comprised solely in the exercise of charity and justice, and that the rights of rulers in sacred, no less than in secular matters, should merely have to do with actions, but that every man should think what he likes and say what he thinks.201
(b) **Ethics (1677):** “The bulk of the Ethics is written as a geometric proof in the style of Euclid’s Elements, though its more direct inspiration was probably Proclus’s *Institutio theologica* (Elements of Theology), an axiomatic presentation of Neoplatonic metaphysics composed in the 5th century CE. Spinoza apparently believed that a geometric presentation of his ideas would be clearer than the conventional narrative style of his earlier works. Accordingly, he begins with a set of definitions of key terms and a series of self-evident “axioms” and proceeds to derive from these a number of “theorems,” or propositions. The early portion of the work contains no introductory or explanatory material to aid the reader, apparently because Spinoza initially thought it unnecessary. By the middle of Part I, however, he had added various notes and observations to ensure that the reader would understand the significance of the conclusions being developed. By the end of Part I he had also added polemical essays and introductions to various topics. The form of the work as a whole is therefore a mixture of axiomatic proof and philosophical narrative.”

**Part I. God:** A set of definitions of eight terms are self-caused, finite of its own kind, substance, attribute, mode, God, freedom, and eternity. “These definitions are followed by a series of axioms, one of which supposedly guarantees that the results of Spinoza’s logical demonstrations will be true about reality. Spinoza quickly establishes that substance must be existent, self-caused, and unlimited. From this he proves that there cannot be two substances with the same attribute, since each would limit the other. This leads to the monumental conclusion of Proposition 11: “God, or substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence, necessarily exists.” From the definition of God as a substance with infinite attributes and other propositions about substance, it follows that there can be, or be conceived, no other substance but God (Proposition 14) and that whatever is, is in God, and nothing can be or be conceived without God (Proposition 15). This constitutes the core of Spinoza’s pantheism: God is everywhere, and everything that exists is a modification of God. God is known by human beings through only two of his attributes - thought and extension (the quality of having spatial dimensions) - though the number of God’s attributes is infinite. Later in Part I, Spinoza established that everything that occurs necessarily follows from the nature of God and that there can be no contingencies in nature. Part I concludes with an appended polemic about the misreading of the world by religious and superstitious people who think that God can change the course of events and that the course of events sometimes reflects a divine judgment of human behavior.”

**Part II. The Nature and Origin of the Mind:** The idea of the mind is united to the mind in the same way as the mind itself is united to the body. There will exist in the human mind an adequate idea of that which is common and proper to the human body, and to any external body by which the human body is generally affected – of that which equally in the part of each of these external bodies and in the whole is common and proper.” It explores the two attributes through which human beings understand the world, thought and extension. Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking thing; and extension is an attribute of God, or God is an extended thing. In God there necessarily exists the idea of His essence, and of all things which necessarily follow from His essence. Like Descartes, Spinoza explains the interaction between mind and body: The two are not distinct entities causally interacting with each other but merely different aspects of the same events: “This idea of the mind is united to the mind in the same way as the mind itself is united to the body.” “There will exist in the human mind an adequate idea of that which is common and proper to the human body, and to any external bodies by which the human body is generally affected – of that which equally in the part of each of these external bodies and in the whole is common and proper.” “Individual physical or mental entities are “modes” of substance: physical entities are modes of substance understood in terms of the attribute of extension; mental entities are modes of substance understood in terms of the attribute of thought.”

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Part III. The Origin and Nature of the Affects: The actions of the mind rise from adequate ideas alone, but the passions depend upon those alone which are inadequate. If we imagine that a person affects with joy a thing which we love, we shall be affected with love towards him. If, on the contrary, we imagine that he affects it with sorrow, we shall also be affected with hatred towards him. The desire which springs from sorrow or joy, from hatred or love, is greater in proportion as the affect is greater. If we imagine that we are hated by another without having given him any cause for it, we shall hate him in return. Hatred is increased through return of hatred, but may be destroyed by love. The effect of one person differs from the corresponding effect of another as much as the sense of the one person differs from that of the other.

Part IV. Human Bondage or the Strength of the Effects: All our efforts or desire follow from the necessity of our nature in such a manner that they can be understood wither through it alone as their proximate cause, or in so far as we are a part of nature, which part cannot be adequately conceived through itself and without the other individuals. The strength of one man would scarcely suffice to obtain these things if men did not mutually assist one another. “Human power is very limited, and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes, so that we do not possess an absolute power to adapt to our service the things which are without us. Nevertheless, we shall bear with equanimity those things which happen to us contrary to what a consideration of our own profit demands, if we are conscious that we have performed our duty, that the power we have could not reach so far as to enable us to avoid those things, and that we are a part of the whole of nature, whose order we follow. If we clearly and distinctly understand this, the part of us which is determined by intelligence, that is to say, the better part of us, will be entirely satisfied therewith, and in that satisfaction will endeavor to preserve; for, in so far as we understand, we cannot desire anything excepting what is necessary, nor, absolutely, can we be satisfied with anything but the truth. Therefore in so far as we understand these things properly will the efforts of the better part of us agree with the order of the whole of nature.”

Chapter V. The Power of the Intellect or Human Liberty: The Stoic thought that the effects depend absolutely on our will, and that we are absolutely master over them, but they were driven, by the contradiction of experience. Descartes affirms the soul or mind is united specially to a certain part of the brain. But “The mind is subject to effect which are related to passions only so long as the body exists. The intellectual love of the mind towards God is the very love with which He loves Himself, not in so far as He is infinite, but in so far as He can be manifested through the essence of the human mind, considered under the form of eternity; that is to say, the intellectual love of the mind towards God is part of the infinite love with which God loves Himself.” He who possesses a body fit for many things possess a mind of which the greater part is eternal. The more perfection a thing possesses, the more it acts and the less it suffers, and conversely the more it acts the more perfect it is. “Even if we did not know that our mind is eternal, we should still consider as of primary importance Piety and Religion, and absolutely everything which in the Fourth Part we have shown to be related to strength of mind and generosity.” “Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but is virtue itself; nor do we delight in blessedness because we restrain our lusts; but, on the contrary, because we delight in it, therefore are we able to restrain them.” Thus, “Spinoza explains that freedom is achieved by understanding the power of the emotions over human actions, by rationally accepting things and events over which one has no control, and by increasing one’s knowledge and cultivating one’s intellect. The highest form of knowledge consists of an intellectual intuition of things in their existence as modes and attributes of eternal substance, or God; this is what it means to see the world from the aspect of eternity. This kind of knowledge leads to a deeper understanding of God, who is all things, and ultimately to an intellectual love of God, a form of blessedness amounting to a kind of rational-mystical experience.”

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Summary: Spinoza defines that (i) “God, or substance consists of infinite attributes, each one of which expresses eternal and infinite essence, necessarily exists.” In infinite attributes, only extension and thought are knowable to us, and are “not parallel and interacting, but identical and acting in one order and connection.” Modes are the affections of substance, and “the phenomenal world is made up of an infinite number of modes.” The mode of thought is the human mind and that of extension is the human body. God is self-caused for there is nothing outside him, and God acts from the laws of His own nature only, and is compelled by no one. (ii) Man’s mind is the idea of man’s body, and the mind itself is united to the body. All adequate ideas are necessarily true, while inadequate ideas or falsity is merely a negative conception. “There are three kinds of knowledge: opinion (imagination), rational knowledge, and intuitive knowledge. The first alone is the cause of error; the second consists in adequate ideas of particular properties of things, and in general notions; the third proceeds from an adequate idea of some attribute of God to the adequate knowledge of particular things.” (iii) He defines three fundamentals of human emotions: desire, pleasure, and pain. The desire springs from pleasure and pain, love causes pleasure, and hate causes pain. He lists and explains a series of emotions. (iv) All desires follow from the necessity of human nature. The desires being related to the mind consist of adequate ideas taking actions; and the desires not being related to the mind are inadequate things taking passions. A man guided by reason controls his desires by his intelligence. “Good” assists man to enjoy the intellectual life, but “bad” hinders man from perfecting his reason and enjoying a rational life. As a part of the whole of nature, we should understand that our well-being lies not in our selfishness but in harmonious effort to build better society with virtue. (v) Spinoza concerns about the method obtaining human liberty by showing that reason controls the emotions for freedom of mind or blessedness, which is “not the reward of virtue, but is virtue itself.”

The Jewish Virtual Library writes about Spinoza as below: Spinoza was trained in Talmudic scholarship, “but his views soon took unconventional directions which the Jewish community fearing renewed persecution on charges of atheism - tried to discourage. Spinoza was offered 1000 florins to keep quiet about his views, but refused. At the age of 24, he was summoned before a rabbinical court, and solemnly excommunicated. Spinoza refused all rewards and honors, and gave away to his sister his share of his father’s inheritance - keeping only a bedstead for himself. He earned his living as a humble lens-grinder. He died [at the Hague] in February 1677 of consumption, probably aggravated by fine glass dust inhaled at his workbench. His philosophy is summarized in the Ethics, a very abstract work, which openly expresses none of the love of nature that might be expected from someone who identified God with nature. And Spinoza's starting point is not nature or the cosmos, but a purely theoretical definition of God. The work then proceeds to prove its conclusions by a method modeled on geometry, through rigorous definitions, axioms, propositions and corollaries. No doubt in this way Spinoza hoped to build his philosophy on the solidest rock, but the method, as well as some of the arguments and definitions, are often unconvincing. Spinoza believed that everything that exists is God. However, he did not hold the converse view that God is no more than the sum of what exists. God had infinite qualities, of which we can perceive only two, thought and extension. Hence God must also exist in dimensions far beyond those of the visible world. Significantly, Spinoza titled his chief work The Ethics. He derived an ethic by deduction from fundamental principles, and so his ethics were closely linked to his view of God or nature as everything. The highest good, he asserted, was knowledge of God, which was capable of bringing freedom from tyranny by the passions, freedom from fear, resignation to destiny, and true blessedness. At first Spinoza was reviled as an atheist - and certainly, his God is not the conventional Judo-Christian God. The philosophers of the enlightenment ridiculed his methods - not without some grounds.”

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Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716): Leibniz was born in Leipzig, his father died when he was six and a half years old, and from that point on he was raised by his mother, whose teaching influenced Leibniz’s philosophical thoughts in his life. His father had been a professor of moral philosophy at the University of Leipzig, and the boy later inherited his father’s personal library, to which he could access from the age of seven, which enabled him to study a wide variety of advanced philosophical and theological works. “In April 1661 he enrolled in his father’s former university at age 15, and completed his bachelor's degree in Philosophy in December 1662. He defended his Metaphysical Disputation on the Principle of Individuation, which addressed the principle of individuation, on June 9, 1663. Leibniz earned his master's degree in Philosophy on February 7, 1664. He published and defended a dissertation An Essay of Collected Philosophical Problems of Right, arguing for both a theoretical and a pedagogical relationship between philosophy and law, in December 1664. After one year of legal studies, he was awarded his bachelor's degree in Law on September 28, 1665. His dissertation was titled On Conditions. In early 1666, at age 19, Leibniz wrote his first book, On the Combinatorial Art, the first part of which was also his habilitation thesis in Philosophy, which he defended in March 1666. His next goal was to earn his license and Doctorate in Law, which normally required three years of study. In 1666, the University of Leipzig turned down Leibniz's doctoral application and refused to grant him a Doctorate in Law, most likely due to his relative youth. Leibniz subsequently left Leipzig, and then enrolled in the University of Altdorf and quickly submitted a thesis, which he had probably been working on earlier in Leipzig. The title of his thesis was Inaugural Disputation on Ambiguous Legal Cases. Leibniz earned his license to practice law and his Doctorate in Law in November 1666. He next declined the offer of an academic appointment at Altdorf, saying that his thoughts were turned in an entirely different direction."

Leibniz served archbishop elector of Mainz from 1667 to 1674, when he went to Paris where he devoted three years to the study of mathematics, science, and philosophy with travelling to Amsterdam and London. In 1675 he was admitted by the French Academy of Sciences as a foreign honorary member, despite his lack of attention to the academy. In 1676, he entered the successive service of electors of Hanover for forty years of his life, by taking care of libraries and writing the history of their House of Brunswick as Councilor since 1678. He founded academies, worked on hydraulic presses, windmills, lamps, submarines, clocks, and wide variety of mechanical devices. He invented calculating machine in 1673, and devised the principles of infinitesimal calculus in 1675. He was also working on his dynamics and philosophy, becoming increasingly anti-Cartesian. His works on philosophy are the Discourse on Metaphysics (1686); the New System of Nature and of the Interaction of Substance (1695); the New Essays on Human Understanding (wrote 1705 and pub. 1765); Theodicy (1710); The Principles of Nature and of Grace (1714); and Monadology (1714).
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(a) *Discourse on Metaphysics* (1686): VIII. In order to distinguish between the activities of God and the activities of created things, we must explain the conception of an individual substance. IX. That every individual substance expresses the whole universe in its own manner and that in its full concept is included all its experience together with all the attendant circumstances and the whole sequence of exterior events. Furthermore, every substance is like an entire world and like a mirror of God, or indeed of the whole world which it portrays, each one in its own fashion; almost as the same city is variously represented according to the various situations of him who is regarding it. Thus the universe is multiplied in some sort as many times as there are substances, and the glory of God multiplied in the same way by as many wholly different representations of his works. XII. That the conception of the extension of a body is in a way imaginary and does not constitute the substance of the body. The whole nature of bodies is not exhausted in their extension, that is to say, in their size, figure and motion, but that we must recognize something which corresponds to soul, something which is common called substantial from... The souls and the substance-forms of other bodies are entirely different from intelligent souls which alone know their actions. XIII. As the individual concept of each person includes once for all everything which can ever happen to him, in it can be seen, a priori the evidences or the reason for the reality of each event, and why one happened sooner than the other. But these events, however certain, are nevertheless contingent, being based on the free choice of God and of his creatures. It is true that their choices always have their reasons, but they incline to the choices under no compulsion of necessity. In other words, the connection of the subject and predicate in these propositions has its basis in the nature of the one and of the other, and such contingent propositions have not the demonstrations of necessity, since their reasons are founded only on the principle of contingency or of the existence of things, upon that which is to be the best among several tings equally possible.

XVI. The extraordinary intervention of God is not excluded in that which our particular essences express, because their expression includes everything. Such intervention, however, goes beyond the power of our natural being or of our distinct expression, because these are finite, and follow certain subordinate regulation. XVII. An example of a subordinate regulation in the law of nature which demonstrates that God always preserves the same amount of force but not the same quantity of motion against the Cartesians and many others. They thought that the quantity of motion – the velocity multiplied by the mass of the moving body – is exactly equivalent to the moving force. Now it is reasonable that the same force is always preserved in the universe. However, mechanical perpetual motion is impossible, because the force in such a machine, being always diminished a little by friction and so ultimately destined to be entirely spent, would necessarily have to recoup its losses, and consequently would keep on increasing of itself without any new impulsion from without; and we see furthermore that the force of a body is diminished only in proportion as it give up force, either to a contiguous body or to its own parts, in so far as they have a separate movement. XVIII. The distinction between force and the quantity of motion is important as showing that we must have recourse to metaphysical considerations in addition to discussions of extension if we wish to explain the phenomena of matter. XXVIII. The only immediate object of our perceptions which exists outside of us is God, and in him alone is our light. XXIX. Yet we think directly by means of our own ideas and not through God's. XXX. How God inclines our souls without necessitating them; that there are no grounds for complaint; that we must not ask why Judas sinned because this free act is contained in his concept, the only question being why Judas the sinner is admitted to existence, preferably to other possible persons; concerning the original imperfection or limitation before the fall and concerning the different degrees of grace. "As concerns foreseen faith and good works, it is very true that God has elected none but those whose faith and charity he foresees, *quos se fide donaturum praescivit."*209
XXXIII. Explanation of the Relation between the Soul and the Body: “We can also see the explanation of that great mystery the union of the soul and the body, that is to say how it comes about that the passions and actions of the one are accompanied by the actions and passions or else the appropriate phenomena of the other. For it is not possible to conceive how one can have an influence upon the other and it is unreasonable to have recourse at once to the extraordinary intervention of the universal cause in an ordinary and particular case. The following, however, is the true explanation. We have said that everything which happens to a soul or to any substance is a consequence of its concept; hence the idea itself or the essence of the soul brings it about that all of its appearances or perceptions would be born out of its nature and precisely in such a way that they correspond of themselves to that which happen in the universe at large, but more particularly and more perfectly to that which happens in the body associated with it, because it is in a particular way and only for a certain time according to the relation of other bodies to its own body that the soul expresses of universe. I believe that those who are careful thinkers will decide favorably for our principles because of this single reason, viz., that they are able to see in what consists the relation between the soul and the body, a parallelism which appears inexplicable in any other way. We can also see that the perceptions of our senses even when they are clear must necessarily contain certain confused elements, as all the bodies in the universe are in sympathy, ours receives the impressions of all the others, and while our senses respond to everything, our soul cannot pay attention to every particular. That is why our confused sensations are the result of a variety of perceptions. This variety is infinite. It is almost like the confused murmuring which is heard by those who approach the shore of a sea. It comes from the continual beatings of innumerable waves. If now, out of many perceptions which do not at all fit together to make one, no particular one perception surpasses the others, and if they make impressions about equally strong or equally capable of holding the attention of the soul, they can be perceived only confusedly. 210

XXXIV. Concerning the difference between spirits and other substances, souls or substantial forms; that the immortality which men desire includes memory. Supposing that the human bodies are substances, and have substantial forms, and supposing that animals have souls, we are obliged to grant that these souls and these substantial forms cannot entirely perish, any more than can the atoms or the ultimate elements of matter, according to the position of other philosophers; for no substance perishes, although it may become very different. Such substances also express the whole universe, although more imperfectly than do spirits. The principle difference, however, is that they do not know that they are, nor what they are. Consequently, not being able to reason, they are unable to discover necessary and universal truth. It is also because they do not reflect regarding themselves that they have no moral qualities. XXXV. The excellence of spirits; that God considers them preferable to other creatures; that the spirits express God rather than the world, while other simple substances express the world rather than God. In order to prove by natural reasons that God will preserve forever not only our substance, but also our personality, that is to say the recollection and knowledge of what we are, it is necessary to join to metaphysical moral consideration. God must be considered not only as the principle and the cause of all substances and of all existing things, but also as the chief of all persons of intelligent substances, as the absolute monarch of the most perfect city or republic, such as is constituted by all the spirits together in the universe, God being the most compete of all spirits at the same time that he is greatest of all being. For assuredly the spirits are the most perfect of substances and best express the divinity. XXXVI. God is the monarch of the most perfect republic composed of all the spirits, and the happiness of this city of God is his principal purpose. XXXVII. Jesus Christ has revealed to men the mystery and the admirable laws of the kingdom of heaven, and the greatness of the supreme happiness which God has prepared for those who love him. 211
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(b) **New Essays on Human Understanding** (1704): Book I. Innate Notions: An innate idea is a concept of knowledge to be universal to all humanity: something people are born with rather than something people have learned through experience. The rationalists, like René Descartes, theorized that knowledge of God is innate in everybody as a product of the faculty of faith. But the empiricists, like John Locke, were critical of the theory and denied the existence of any innate ideas, saying that all human knowledge was founded on experience, rather than *a priori* reasoning: “the mind is in fact devoid of all knowledge or ideas at birth; it is a blank sheet or *tabula rasa*.”

All our ideas are constructed in the mind via a process of constant composition and decomposition of the input that we receive through our senses; so the concept of universal assent proves nothing except that it proves that “there is universal assent and nothing else.” The debate over innate ideas is central to the conflict between rationalist and empiricist epistemologies. “While rationalists believe that certain ideas exist independently of experience, empiricism claims that all knowledge is derived from experience.”

Leibniz views that Locke’s is closer to Aristotle and his to Plato, although each of them parts company at many points from the teaching of both of these ancient writers. Leibniz sees that the senses are necessary for all our actual knowledge, but they are not sufficient to provide it all, since they never give us anything but instances; that is particular or singular truths. Many instances confirm a general truth, but “they do not suffice to establish its universal necessity; for it does not follow that what has happened will always happen in the same way...But it appears that necessary truths, such as we find in pure mathematics and particular mathematical and geometry, must have principles whose proof does not depend on instances nor, consequently, on the testimony of the senses, even though without the senses it would never occur to us to think of them...Logic also abounds in such truths, and so do metaphysics and ethics, together with their respective products, natural theology and natural jurisprudence; and so the proof of them can only come from inner principles, which are described as innate.”

Book II. Ideas: An idea is an immediate inner object, and this object expresses the nature or qualities of things. Our gentlemen who take the soul to be initially a blank page, void of all characters, without any idea; how comes it to be furnished? “This tabula rasa of which one hears so much is a fiction, in my view, which nature does not allow and which arises solely from the incomplete notions of philosophers...Human souls differ not only from other souls but also from one another, though the latter differences are not of the sort that we call specific. And I think I can demonstrate every substantial thing, be it soul or body, has a unique relationship to each other thing; and that each must always differ from every other in respect of intrinsic denominations.”

Some ideas are simple and some composite. Complex ideas are either of modes or of substances or of relations. We have no clear idea of substance in general. And we have as clear an idea of spirit as of body because the idea of a corporeal substance in matter is as remote from our conceptions as that of spiritual substance.” “The mind, noticing how one thing ceases to be, and how another comes to exist which did not exist before, and concluding that in the future similar things will be produced by similar agents, considers in one thing the possibility of having any of its simple ideas changed, and in another the possibility of making that change; and so the mind comes by the idea of power.” When men die, spirits and bodies cannot operate where they are; and the soul could stop operating in this visible body; and if it could stop thinking altogether, it could be separated from this body without being united with another. “My own view is that the soul always thinks and feels, is always united with some body, and indeed never suddenly and totally leaves the body with which it is united.”

Leibniz thought the idea of the universe as a harmonious system, in which there is at the same time unity and multiplicity, coordination and differentiation of parts, as his leading idea. He utilized a deductive system of logic or of mathematics as an illustration of the general truth that the universe is a system.
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Book III. Words: Words serve to make our thought understood, to do this with ease, and to provide a way into the knowledge of things. “We fail in the first respect when we have no steady, determinate ideas for our words, or none which are accepted and understood by other. We fail in respect of ease when we have very complex ideas without having distinct names. This is often the fault of the languages themselves, because they do not contain the names; but in many cases the fault lies with the man, who does not know the names…There is a failure in the third respect when the ideas which words signify do not agree with what is real. (i) Someone who has terms without ideas is like one who has nothing but a list of book-titles. (ii) Someone who has very complex ideas would be like a man who had a stock of books uncollated and untitled, so that he could not indicate any book except by producing its pages one by one. (iii) Someone who is inconstant in his use of signs would be like a merchant who sold different thing by the same name. (iv) Someone who attaches his own special ideas to words in common use will not be able to give others the benefit of any insights he may have. (v) Someone whose head is full of ideas of substances which have never existed will not be able to advance in real knowledge. Then, what are the remedies of the imperfections and abuses of words? “The first remedy is never to use any word without associating an idea with it. The second remedy is that the names of modes should have ideas which are determinate, at least, and that the names of substances should have ideas which are also in conformity with what exists. The third remedy is to use words, as far as possible, in ways conforming to their common sue. The fourth is to declare what sense one takes a word to have, whether one is making words anew, or is employing old ones in new senses, or has found that usage has not adequately fixed the signification of some word.”

Book IV. Knowledge: Our knowledge does not extend further than our ideas. There are confused ideas where we cannot expect complete knowledge, such as the ideas of some sensible qualities. All our knowledge is of general or of particular truths, when the propositions turn out to be true, that is, the ideas become true. “Since we cannot be certain of the truth of any general proposition, unless we know the precise bounds of what its terms stand for, it is necessary we should know the essence of each species.” There are a sort of propositions, which under the name of maxims and axioms. “I am sure that reasonable people would never use axiomatic identities in the way we have been discussing. So it seems that these purely identical maxims are merely trifling.” Leibniz distinguishes propositions between truth of reason and truth of fact: the former are necessary propositions, in the sense that they are either themselves self-evident propositions or reducible thereto. All truths of reason are necessarily true, so their truth rests on the principle of contradiction. One cannot deny a truth of reason without being involved in contradiction, which also deduces the principle of identity. The latter are not necessary propositions, but contingent propositions, because of the opposites. “The truths of reason are necessary and their opposite is impossible; truths of fact are contingent and their opposite is possible.” Hence, connection between truths of reason is necessary, but connection between truths of fact is not always necessary. God chose the world which has the greatest maximum of perfection – metaphysical perfection and moral perfection or goodness. Leibniz divides the science into three sorts: “The first is physica or natural philosophy, which embraces not only bodies and their affections such as number and figure, but also spirits, God himself, and the angels. The second is practical philosophy, or ethics, which teaches the means for the attainment of things good and useful, and which aims not only at the knowledge of truth but also at the doing of what is right. Finally, the third is logic or the doctrine of signs (logos means word). To communicate our thoughts to one another, as well as record them for our own sue, signs of our ideas are necessary…And these three sort – natural philosophy, ethics, and logic – are the three great provinces of the intellectual world, wholly separate and instinct one from another.”
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(c) **Theodicy** (1710): The *Theodicy: Essays on the Justice of God, the Freedom of Man, and the Origin of Evil* was the only one of his philosophical works published in his lifetime. It is a series of arguments between Bayle and Leibniz. Leibniz fundamentally views that the faith can be reconciled with reason, man’s freedom with God’s omnipotence, or earthly evil with divine goodness and power. "Max Weber interpreted theodicy as a social problem, and viewed theodicy as a problem of meaning. Weber argued that, as human society became increasingly rational, the need to explain why good people suffered and evil people prospered became more important because religion casts the world as a meaningful cosmos. Weber framed the problem of evil as the dilemma that the good can suffer and the evil can prosper, which became more important as religion became more sophisticated. He identified two purposes of theodicy: to explain why good people suffer, and why people prosper. A theodicy of good fortune seeks to justify the good fortune of people in society; Weber believed that those who are successful are not satisfied unless they can justify why they deserve to be successful. For theodicies of suffering, Weber argued that three different kinds of theodicy emerged - predestination, dualism, and karma - all of which attempt to satisfy the human need for meaning, and he believed that the quest for meaning, when considered in light of suffering, becomes the problem of suffering."  

(1) Having so settled the rights of faith and of reason as rather to place reason at the service of faith than in opposition to it, we shall see how they exercise these rights to support and harmonize what the light of nature and the light of revelation teach us of God and of man in relation to evil. The difficulties are distinguishable into two classes. The one kind springs from man’s freedom, which appears in compatible with the divine nature. The other kind concerns the conduct of God, and seems to make him participate too much in the existence of evil, even though man be free and participate also therein. And this conduct appears contrary to the goodness, the holiness and the justice of God, since God co-operates in evil as well physical and moral, and co-operates in each of them both morally and physically. (26) Evil may be taken metaphysically, physically, morally. Metaphysical evil consists in mere imperfection, physical evil in suffering, and moral evil in sin. (86) The first difficulty is how the soul could be infected with original sin, which is the root of actual sins, without injustice on God’s part in exposing the soul thereto. The first is that of the pre-existence of human souls in another world or in another life, where they had sinned and on that account had been condemned to this prison of the human body, an opinion of the Platonists which is attributed to Origen and which even today finds adherents. The second opinion is that of Traduction, as if the souls of those from whom the body is engendered. The third opinion, and that most widely accepted today, is that of Creation: it is taught in the majority of the Christian Schools, but it is fraught with greatest difficulty in respect of original sin.  

(105) It may be that fundamentally all men are equally bad, and consequently incapable of being distinguished the one from the other through their good or less bad natural qualities; but they are not bad all in the same way: for there is an inherent individual difference between souls, as the Pre-established Harmony proves. Some are more or less inclined towards a particular good or a particular evil, or towards their opposites, all in accordance with their natural dispositions. But since the general plan of the universe, chosen by God for superior reasons, causes men to be in different circumstances, those who meet with such as are more favorable to their nature will become more readily the least wicked, the most virtuous the most happy; yet it will be always by aid of the influence of that inward grace which God unites with the circumstances. (106) All these attempts to find reasons, where there is no need to adhere altogether to certain hypotheses, serve only to make clear to us that there are a thousand ways of justifying the conduct of God. All the disadvantages we see, all the obstacles we meet with, all the difficulties...are no hindrance to a belief founded on reason, even when it cannot stand on conclusive proof.
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(d) **Monadology** (1714): Leibniz wrote a short treatise called *Monadology* upon request of Prince Eugene of Savoy. The Monad is a simple substance without parts, which goes to make up composites, since a composite is nothing else than a collection or aggregation of simple substances. Where there are no constituent parts, there is possible neither extension, nor form, nor divisibility; so these Monads are the true Atoms of nature, and the elements of things. It is not conceivable that a simple substance can perish or come into existence through natural means since it cannot be formed by composition. Then, we may say that the Monad can begin only through creation and end only through annihilation; however, composites begin or end gradually. Monads have some qualities: each monad must be different from each other. The natural changes of the Monad come from an internal principle, because an external cause can have no influence upon its inner being. There must be manifoldness in the Monad, which constitutes the specific nature and the variety of the simple substances – a multiplicity in the unity or in the simple substance – what is called Perception. Therefore, it is believed “that spirits alone are Monads and that there are no souls of animals or other Entelechies, and it has led them to make the common confusion between a protracted period of unconsciousness and actual death. They (the Cartesians) have thus adopted the Scholastic error that souls can exist entirely separated from bodies, and have even confirmed ill-balanced minds in the belief that souls are mortal. Perception is inexplicable by mechanical causes – by figures and motions. All simple substances or created Monads are called Entelechies because they have themselves a certain perfection. If soul has perceptions and desires in the general sense, all simple substances or created Monads could be called souls, and Entelechies, because they have in themselves a certain perfection.223

We experience in ourselves a state where we remember nothing and where we have no distinct perception, as in periods of fainting, or when we are overcome by a profound, dreamless sleep. In such a state, the soul does not sensibly differ at all from a simple Monad. When there are a great number of weak perceptions where nothing stands out distinctively, we are stunned; as when one turns around and around in the same direction, a dizziness comes on, which makes him swoon and makes him able to distinguish nothing. Among animals, death can occasion this state for quite a period. Since on awakening after a period of unconsciousness, we become conscious of our perceptions, we must, without having been conscious of them, have had perceptions immediately before; for one perception can come in a natural way only from another perception, just as a motion can come in a natural way only from a motion. This is the condition of Monads. But the knowledge of eternal and necessary truth gives us reason and the sciences, thus raising us to a knowledge of ourselves and of God; which is called in us the Rational Soul or the Mind.224

Through the knowledge of necessary truths, we come to perform Reflective Acts, which furnish the principal objects of our reasonings, based upon two great principles - the principle of Contradiction and the principle of Sufficient Reason. There are also two kinds of truths: those of Reasoning and those of Fact. The Truths of Reasoning are necessary, and their opposite is impossible; however, the Truths of Fact are contingent, and their opposite is possible. In the former, there are simple ideas without definition; there are also the Axioms and Postulates or, in a word, the primary principles which cannot be proved and have no need of proof; this are identical propositions whose opposites involve express contradictions. In the latter, there must be also a sufficient reason for contingent truths or truths of fact; that is to say, for the sequence of the things which extend throughout the universe of created beings, where the analysis into more particular reasons can be continued into greater detail without limit because of the immense variety of the things in nature and because of the infinite division of bodies. The ultimate reason for things must be a necessary substance, which we call God. Now, since this substance is a sufficient reason, we are linked together throughout, *there is but one God, and this God is sufficient.*225
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Therefore, God alone (or the Necessary Being) has this prerogative that if he be possible he must necessarily exist, and as nothing is able to prevent the possibility of that which involves no bounds, no negation, and consequently, no contradiction, this alone is sufficient to establish a priori his existence. Since contingent beings exist, we also prove it a posteriori. God alone is the ultimate unity or the original simple substance, of which all created or derivative Monads are the products. The soul changes its body only gradually and by degrees, so that it is never deprived all at once of all its organs. There is frequently a metamorphosis in animals, but never metempsychosis or a transmigration of souls. Neither are there souls wholly separate from bodies, nor bodiless spirits. God alone is without body. This is also why there is never absolute generation or perfect death in the strict sense, consisting in the separation of the soul from the body. Therefore, we may say, that not only the soul is indestructible, but also the animal itself is, although its mechanism is frequently destroyed in parts. “These principles have furnished me the means of explaining on natural grounds the union, or, rather the conformity between the soul and the organic body. The soul follows its own laws, and the body has its laws. They are fitted to each other in virtue of the pre-established harmony between all substances, since they are all representations of one and the same universe. Souls act in accordance with the laws of final causes through their desires, purposes and means. Bodies act in accordance with the laws of efficient causes or of motion. The two realms, that of efficient causes and that of final causes, are in harmony, each with the other.” Descartes saw that souls cannot at all impart force to bodies, because there is always the same quantity of force in matter. If he had known my law, he would have fallen upon my system. According to my system of Pre-established Harmony, bodies act as if there were no bodies, and yet both body and soul act as if the one were influencing the other.226

The totality of all the spirits must compose the city of God, that is to say, the most perfect state that is possible under the most perfect monarch. This city of God, truly universal monarchy, is a moral world within the natural world; and it is noblest and most divine among the works of God. It is also in relation to this divine city that God properly has goodness. His wisdom and his power are shown everywhere. As we established above that there is a perfect harmony between the two natural realms of efficient and final causes, it will be in place here to point out another harmony which appears between the physical realm of nature and the moral realm of grace, that is to say, between God considered as the architect of the mechanism of the world, and God considered as the Monarch of the divine city of spirits. This harmony brings it about that things progress of themselves toward grace along natural lines, and that this earth, for example, must be destroyed and restored by natural means as those times when the proper government of spirits demands it, for chastisement in the once case and for a reward in the other. Therefore, sins will bring their own penalty through the order of nature, while the good actions will attain their rewards in mechanical ways through their relation to bodies. “Finally, under this perfect government, there will be no good action unrewarded and no evil action unpunished; everything should turn out for the well-being of the good; that is to say, of those who are not disaffected in this great state, who, after having done their duty, trust in Providence and who love and imitate, as is meet, the Author of Good, delighting in the contemplation of his perfections according to the nature of genuine, pure love which finds pleasure in the happiness of those who are loved. It is for this reason that wise and virtuous persons work in behalf of everything which seems conformable to the presumptive or antecedent will; and are content with what God actually brings to pass through his secret, consequent and determining will, recognizing that if we were able to understand sufficiently well the order of the universe, we should find that it goes beyond all the desires of the wisest of us, and that it is impossible to have it better than it is, not only for all in general, but also for each one of us in particular, provided that we cleave as we should to the Author of all.”227
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(e) Political Writings of Leibniz: (i) Meditation on the Common Concept of Justice (1702-3): “I grant readily that there is a great difference between the way in which men are just and the way in which God is: but this difference is only one of degree. For God is perfectly and entirely just, and the justice of men is mixed with injustice, with faults and with sins, because of the imperfection of human nature. The perfections of God are infinite, and ours are limited. Thus if someone wishes to maintain that the justice and the goodness of God have entirely different rule than those of men, he must recognize at the same time that these are two different notions, and that it is either voluntary equivocation or gross self-deception to attribute justice to both. Choosing, then, which of the two notions must be taken for that of justice, it will follow that either there is no true justice in God for that of justice, it will follow that either there is no true justice in God or that there is none in men, or perhaps that there is none in either, and that in the end one doesn’t know what he is saying when speaking of justice – but this would destroy it, in fact, and leave nothing but the name. As do those also who make it arbitrary and dependent on the good pleasure of a judge or of a powerful person, since the same action will appear to be just or unjust to different judges.”

(ii) Opinion on the Principles of Pufendorf (1706): “In the science of law…it is best to derive human justice, as from a spring, from the divine, in order to make it complete. Surely the idea of the just, no less than that of the true and the good, relates to God...And the rules which are common to divine and human justice certainly enter into the science of natural law, and ought to be considered in universal jurisprudence.” So much for what regards the end and the object of natural law; it remains now to treat the efficient cause of this law, which our author does not correctly establish. It is without doubt most true, that God is by nature superior to all; all the same the doctrine itself, which makes all law derivative from the command of a superior. In this regard, neither the norm of conduct itself, nor the essence of the just, depends on his free decision, but rather on eternal truths, objects of the divine intellect, which constitute the essence of divinity itself. “And, indeed, justice follows certain rules of equality and of proportion which are no less founded in the immutable nature of things, and in the divine ideas, than are the principles of arithmetic and of geometry. So that no one will maintain that justice and goodness originate in the divine will, without at the same time maintaining that truth originates in it as well.” Accordingly, the best principles of universal jurisprudence collaborate with wise theology and bring about true virtue. Whoever, indeed, does good our of love for God or of his neighbor, takes pleasure precisely in the action itself (such being the nature of love) and does not need any other incitement, or the command of a superior; for that man the saying that the law is not made for the just is valid. To such a degree is it repugnant to reason to say that only the law or constraint make a man just; although it must be conceded that those who have not reached this point of spiritual perfection are only susceptible of obligation by hope or by fear; and that the prospect of divine vengeance, which one cannot escape even by death, can better than anything else make apparent to them the absolute and universal necessity to respect law and justice.”

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(iii) On Natural Law: A society is a union of different men for a common purpose; the most perfect society is that whose purpose is the general and supreme happiness. Natural law is that which preserves or promotes natural societies. The first natural society is between man and wife, for it is necessary to preserve the human race. The second is between parents and children; it arises at once out to the former; for when children are once created, or freely adopted, they must be reared, that is, governed and nourished. The third natural society is between master and servant, which is comfortable to nature when a person lacks understanding but does not lack the strength to nourish himself. Natural servitude takes place among unintelligent men, in so far as it is not restricted by the rules concerning the fear of God. The fourth natural society is the household, which is composed of all the above-mentioned society – some or all. Its purpose is the satisfaction of daily needs. The fifth natural society is the civil society. If it is small, it is called a city; a province is a society of different cities, and a kingdom or a large dominion is a society of different provinces – all to attain happiness for to be secure in it – whose members sometimes live together in a city sometimes spread out over the land. Its purpose is temporal welfare. The sixth natural society is the Church of God, which would probably have existed among men even without revelation, and been preserved and spread by pious and holy men. On the other hand, every society is either unlimited or limited. An unlimited society concerns the whole life and the common good. A limited society concerns certain subjects for example, trade and commerce, navigation, warfare and travel. An unlimited equal society exists between true friends. And such a society exists particularly between man and wife, between parents and grown children, and between masters and freemen. An unlimited unequal society exists between rulers and subjects. Such rule happens for the sake either of improvement or of conservation. All unlimited societies aim at welfare, but they do not all attain it; hence more men have had to unite to create greater communities.

(iv) International Relations: The main practical problem of international relations that Leibniz had to face throughout his life was that of French expansionism, since his life (1646-1716) was coincided with Louis XIV (1643-1715). “Leibniz’s position to French aggression began early, with the Consilium Aegypticum (1671), which he drew up in an effort to divert an imminent French invasion of the Netherlands to a crusade against the Ottomans in Egypt. Dutch trade, he suggested, could be more effectively ruined by an attack on Egypt, sealing of middle-eastern trade routes, than through a hazardous direct assault. Characteristically, he argued that a Christian prince should never make war on another Christian – though Protestant – power, and that French military force should be turned on the infidel.” The Mars Christianissimus (Most Christian War-God) of 1683 was a satire on Louis XIV and his imperialism, which was also in part a parody of Bossuet’s method of arguing from scripture (particularly the Old Testament). “There will be some who will imagine that his Most Christian Majesty would do better to begin his beautiful designs by the routing of the Turks than by the affliction of the poor Christians: but these people do not reflect at all that it is the Germans and the Flemish who live on the frontiers of France, and not the Turks; that one must pass from one’s neighbors to people far away, and move in these great matters by solid degrees, rather than by vain and perilous leaps. But, without looking for political reasons, here is one of conscience; which is that the king wishes to follow the rules of the New Testament.” Leibniz passed on to the effects of Louis’ mission in Germany and Italy. He said that “the minor Catholic clergy in Germany was already singing hosannas as it saw the advance of its liberator; Italian women, anxious to enjoy a liberté francaise, were impatiently awaiting a French garrison. France, said Leibniz, had powerful friends ready to receive it; who would dare, henceforth, to resist priests and women conspiring at the same time?” Resistance was ultimately useless. As Leibniz’ political connections with the Empire grew closer after 1700, he was appointed Aulic Counselor by the Emperor in 1703, and became the friend of Prince Eugene of Savoy.”

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Endnotes

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53 Ibid., 44-8.
54 Ibid., 49-51.
59 Ibid., 82-4.
60 Ibid., 86.
63 Ibid., 103-9.
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108 Ibid., 100-4.
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111 bid., 120-1.
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