Analyzing Japan’s Role in Korean Security within the Framework of the Quasi-Alliance Model

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Abstract

This paper assesses Japan’s role in Korean security using the quasi-alliance model. Developed by Professor Victor Cha, the quasi-alliance model to analyze the security relationship between Japan and the Republic of Korea, “two states that remain unallied despite sharing a common ally.” Cha defined the quasi-alliance model as “the triangular relationship between two states that are not allied, but share a third party as a common ally.” A key assumption is that the third state serves as the “great-power protector of the two states, and therefore exit opportunities for the two are limited.” While historical issues affected relations between Tokyo and Seoul, American security policies were the primary determinant of cooperation between Japan and Korea. American policy changes produced distinct “abandonment” or “entrapment” responses within the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK security alliances: shared perceptions yielded cooperation, while differing views produced friction. This paper analyzes America’s East Asia policies during the Bush and Obama administrations to assess Japanese and Korean reactions. Analyzed through the quasi-alliance model, American policies produced asymmetric responses in Japan and Korea, inhibiting security cooperation between Tokyo and Seoul. Diverging views of China exacerbated inherent friction between Korea and Japan. Thus, Japan will play a limited role in Korean security.

Keywords: China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, United States, Alliance Theory, Quasi-Alliance Model, Abandonment, Entrapment, Victor D. Cha, Global War on Terror, Axis of Evil, Alliance Transformation, Future of the Alliance, Wartime OPCON Transfer, Strategic Patience

Introduction

This paper examines relations between the United States, Japan, and
the Republic of Korea (ROK) to assess how recent changes in the security environment in East Asia and changes in American security policies affect security cooperation between Japan and the ROK. Using the quasi-alliance model developed by Georgetown University professor Victor Cha, this paper assesses Japanese and Korean perceptions of the security environment and American actions, and determines whether these changes foster perceptions of “abandonment” or “entrapment” within the framework of the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK security alliances. Japanese and Korean perceptions of changing American security policies affect cooperation between the two states.

The Quasi-Alliance Model

In developing the quasi-alliance model, Cha built upon the work of other alliance theorists to create a framework for analyzing relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea. Central to this theory are the concepts of abandonment and entrapment developed by Glenn Snyder that “capture the expectations and anxieties of mutual support that underpin interaction between allied and aligned states.”

External security threats are the reasons that states enter into alliances and are the basis for abandonment and entrapment concerns. Fears of abandonment and entrapment also exist among states that have no formal security ties, but satisfy the definition of aligned countries that possess “a set of mutual expectations between two or more states that they will have each other’s support in disputes or wars with particular other states.” Thus, Cha summarizes the conditions for abandonment and entrapment among unallied states as 1) an external security threat, 2) a degree of commonly perceived interest in defending against this threat, and 3) resultant expectations of mutual support.

Cha developed the quasi-alliance model in order to explain the security relationship between Japan and the Republic of Korea, “two states that remain unallied despite sharing a common ally.” During the Cold War, the United States formed separate alliances with Japan and the Republic of Korea through the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and U.S.-ROK Defense Alliance. The bi-polar structure of the Cold War and America’s status as a superpower allowed Cha to further refine the definition of the quasi-alliance model as “the triangular relationship between two states that are not allied, but share a third party as a common ally. A key assumption is that the third state serves as the “great-power protector of the two states, and therefore exit opportunities

International Journal of Korean Studies • Vol. XX, No. 1 123
for the two are limited.”

Using this framework, Cha developed two hypotheses to explain cooperative behavior or friction between states based upon abandonment and entrapment concerns:

Hypothesis A: If relations between states X and Y reflect an *asymmetrical* structure of abandonment/entrapment concerns, then there will be friction between X and Y.

Hypothesis B: If relations between states X and Y reflect a *symmetrical* structure of abandonment concerns, with respect to each other or respect to a third party Z, then cooperative relations should ensue.

In both hypotheses, the action of the third party is the most important factor, overriding changes in the security environment, domestic attitudes, and the status of bilateral relations.

In this case, changes in American security policy overshadow the historical animosity that characterizes relations between the two Asian states. Japan and Korea share a legacy of distrust that is heightened by memories of Japan’s colonization of the Korean Peninsula. Cha acknowledges the “Korea-Japan Tangle,” notes that negative perceptions affect relations at all levels, and concedes that “mutual enmity may constitute a baseline of Japan-Korea interaction.” However, because historical animosity also existed during times of cooperation, it is “larger strategic concerns that ultimately determine outcomes.”

Using the congruence and process tracing methods, Cha analyzed relations between Tokyo and Seoul following the normalization of diplomatic relations in 1965 through the end of the Cold War. He examined four major changes to American security policies during this period: the Nixon Doctrine, Détente, the Fall of Vietnam and the Carter Plan, and Reagan’s Peace through Strength initiative. These changes produced distinct abandonment and entrapment responses within the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK security alliances, which affected security cooperation between Tokyo and Seoul, as indicated below:
Table 1: Quasi-alliance model for Japan-ROK Relations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>AB/ENT Structure</th>
<th>Animosity</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969-71</td>
<td>Symmetrical AB (H:B)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-74</td>
<td>Asymmetrical AB/ENT (H:A)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Friction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-79</td>
<td>Symmetrical AB (H:B)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-88</td>
<td>Asymmetrical AB/ENT (H:A)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Friction (mixed)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AB=Abandonment, ENT=Entrapment, H:A=Hypothesis A, H:B=Hypothesis B

While other issues certainly influenced relations between Japan and Korea, changes in American security policy in East Asia were the most significant factor in affecting security cooperation between the two states.

Because the previous analysis was conducted within the context of the Cold War-security environment, the first question this paper must answer is whether the quasi-alliance model remains relevant in the post-Cold War era. In a brief analysis of security relations between Tokyo and Seoul in the 1990s, Cha noted that a “vastly different set of circumstances” has perhaps made the model “less useful in specific applications.” Indeed, the post-9/11 era portends even greater changes than the security environment of the 1990s.

Methodology

This paper assesses prospects of security cooperation between Japan and Korea by analyzing three main areas. First, it examines the current status of security cooperation between Tokyo and Seoul to determine whether the conditions exist for using the quasi-alliance model. Significant agreements on security issues, either in bilateral or trilateral fora, would constitute a *de facto* alliance, thereby negating conditions for the model’s applicability. Second, assuming that Tokyo and Seoul remain aligned but not allied, this paper analyzes how the Japanese and Korean governments have reacted to American changes in security policies in the post-Cold War and post-9/11 periods. This analysis preserves the framework of the quasi-alliance model, focusing on
whether Japanese and Korean responses to American actions reflected abandonment or entrapment concerns. Third, it assesses the validity of Cha’s assumption that America “serves as the great-power protector of the two states, and therefore exit opportunities for the two are limited.” The enormous changes in the security environment in East Asia may provide Japan or Korea with security options independent of their alliances with the United States.

In a related issue, Cha’s research showed that while changes in American security policy were the dominant factor in influencing cooperation between Japan and Korea, differing assessments of the security environment heightened or dampened the effects of American actions. Applying these assessments within the framework of the quasi-alliance model will yield broader conclusions on prospects for security cooperation between Japan and Korea.

Trilateral and Bilateral Security Cooperation: Completing the Triangle?

The first step is to determine whether the conditions for applying the quasi-alliance model still exist in the post-Cold War era; i.e., do Japan and Korea remain aligned but not allied? Despite changes within both the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK security alliances, they retain much of their Cold War mission, focus, and structure. Consequently, examining trilateral (U.S.-Japan-Korea) and bilateral (Japan-Korea) initiatives will determine whether increased security cooperation between Japan and Korea alters the basic premise of the quasi-alliance model.

Since the end of the Cold War, academics and practitioners have promoted trilateral security cooperation between the United States, Japan and Korea. The logic for this cooperation emphasizes the similarities between Japan and Korea. Both democracies are market-based economies that require access to sea lanes to import natural resources and export manufactured goods. Japan and Korea share a common ally in the U.S. and a common threat in North Korea. Establishing a trilateral alliance would address common security concerns, and serve as a means to build confidence and resolve differences. For example, a trilateral security mechanism would ease concerns over disparities in force structure; i.e., Japanese anxieties over Korea’s large army and Korean suspicions of Japan’s sizable air and naval forces.

Prospects for trilateral security cooperation increased following the end of the Cold War. American, Japanese, and Korean defense officials
began Track II negotiations in 1994 and the discussions became official 18 months later.\textsuperscript{12} Scholars from all three countries explored areas for cooperation: Japan’s National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), in conjunction with the Center for Naval Analysis and Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA), examined trilateral naval cooperation in 1997. The Washington-based Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA) held a trilateral workshop on military responses to nuclear, chemical, and biological contingencies in 2000.\textsuperscript{13} Reflecting the optimism of the period, Ralph Cossa, President of the Pacific Forum CSIS, developed the term “Virtual Alliance” to describe the close relations between the three states.\textsuperscript{14}

However, the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) demonstrated the challenges and limitations of trilateral security cooperation. Established in 1999, the TCOG was a means for high-level diplomats from America, Japan, and Korea to meet regularly and develop common policies toward North Korea. The TCOG’s purpose was “consulting on the development, and later coordinating the implementation, of the Perry Process,” a high-level review of America’s policy toward North Korea.\textsuperscript{15} In his report, former Secretary of Defense William Perry predicted that “this tripartite cooperation will endure into the future, and be applied to other problems in the region as well.”\textsuperscript{16}

In 2004, the IFPA, in collaboration with the Japan Forum on International Relations and Yonsei University’s Graduate School of International Studies, began research on trilateral cooperation on security policy issues beyond North Korea. Based on the initial success of the TCOG, the researchers sought to determine whether the TCOG model could be applied to other areas Dr. Perry envisioned, including contingency planning, long-term planning, and institution building.\textsuperscript{17}

However, significant changes in America’s policy toward North Korea, the abandonment of the Perry Process, and the advent of the Six Party Talks made the TCOG less important by the time the researchers began their study. The level of the participants and frequency of meetings declined; after 2003 the process was no longer referred to as the TCOG.\textsuperscript{18} Summarizing the challenges of trilateral security cooperation, the IFPA report noted:

For all of the factors bringing the three countries closer together on security and related matters in the 1990s, however, \textit{there are many persistent reasons why the growth of this kind of}
cooperation has been slow, and why it might have bumped up against a ceiling above which it simply cannot grow. [Emphasis added]. These include Japanese constitutional restrictions on the use of its military, South Korean historical sensitivities regarding Japan’s armed forces from its colonial era, slightly divergent threat perceptions, tight budgets on all sides that limit opportunities to design special trilateral exercises, and varying levels of tolerance for alarming China or Russia with stepped-up security cooperation.19

While all parties agreed that the TCOG process was beneficial, it was unable to withstand many policy changes and unable to move beyond North Korea issues. The IFPA concluded

the North Korean nuclear issue has commanded the allies’ collective attention in a way that no other single issue probably can. For this reason, a similar frequent, open-ended, and high-level dialogue on an issue like trilateral-crisis management or security cooperation does not seem feasible.” Lastly, the proliferation of multi-lateral forums within Asia made trilateral security cooperation less relevant. The advent of Six Party Talks reduced the role of the TCOG to “preparing for, and comparing notes after, a six-party gathering.20

Republic of Korea (ROK)-Japan bilateral security initiatives also must be considered to determine if the quasi-alliance model remains valid. The first bilateral security meeting between defense officials from Tokyo and Seoul occurred shortly after the initial trilateral discussions in 1994.21 Military-to-military exchanges exist at many levels including staff-talks, professional military education, and port visits. NIDS and KIDA hold frequent discussions on a variety of issues. Similar exchanges occur between the Japan Defense Agency’s Technical Research and Development Institute and Korea’s Agency for Defense Development.

Although the frequency and scope of the exchanges increased, there are clear limits to deeper security cooperation. There are no structures for bilateral training, planning, or operations. Command and control is limited to a hotline to coordinate flight plans.22 Government attempts to expand mechanisms for further exchange and cooperation have been
scuttled due to political reasons and exacerbated by nationalistic media in both countries.

In April 2011, South Korea and Japan were prepared to sign a General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA). South Korea has similar intelligence sharing agreements with 24 other countries, and a GSOMIA with Japan would have facilitated the exchange of classified information relating to North Korea. However, Korean President Lee Myung-bak did not consult with the legislature, leading to charges of “selling out to Tokyo” and the withdrawal of the agreement. In 2014, Japan and Korea quietly entered into a Memorandum of Understanding, enabling the two countries to share information related to North Korean nuclear and missile programs through the U.S.

A dispute between ROK and Japanese peacekeeping units in South Sudan further highlighted the challenges to bilateral security cooperation. In late December 2013, the commander of South Korea’s Hanbit unit requested additional ammunition as anti-government forces seized a town near the unit’s headquarters. How the request was handled and to whom it was addressed remains a source of controversy. Japanese accounts, which continue to be published on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs homepage, state the Korean commander requested ammunition from his Japanese counterpart. The Koreans contend the request was made to the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, which delivered Japanese ammunition after Japan’s Cabinet approved the transfer of 10,000 rounds. The Korean press quoted unnamed government officials alleging the Japanese actions not only endangered troops, but was part of a larger strategy of “active pacifism.” Japanese media accounts reflected exasperation with the “ungrateful” Koreans, noting public disclosure was necessary due to the Japan’s self-imposed weapons-export ban.

In summary, trilateral and bilateral initiatives have yielded greater cooperation between the U.S., Japan, and Korea. However, the scope of the enhanced cooperation was largely based on concerns about North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Despite a common threat, efforts at further cooperation revealed constitutional and political barriers. Concurrently, the increased use of multilateral fora to address the North Korean problem and other regional security concerns made trilateral and bilateral relationships less critical. Thus, despite significant
Changes since the end of the Cold War, Japan and Korea remain aligned, not allied. The premise for applying the quasi-alliance model remains.

Changes to American Security Policy and Japanese and Korean Responses

This section examines changes to each alliance in two periods: the post-Cold War period (1991-2001) and the post-9/11 era (2001-present). Although several events have influenced relations between the U.S. and its alliance partners since the end of the Cold War, the September 11th terrorist attacks marked a defining point in American defense strategy, ushering in new policies and giving urgency to existing initiatives. By analyzing responses to America’s initiatives with a focus on abandonment and entrapment concerns, prospects for security cooperation between Japan and Korea can be assessed.

Changes to the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance

Although the collapse of the Soviet Union is frequently used to mark the end of the Cold War, this event had a less pronounced effect on the U.S.-Japan security alliance. Since its inception, political and structural constraints have created vagaries related to threat perceptions, roles, and missions. While Americans frequently sought increased cooperation from Tokyo in regional security issues, successive Japanese governments desired a more limited role. The 1969 Nixon-Sato Communiqué, in which Japan acknowledged interests in stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait, is perhaps the best example of America succeeding in its objective of defining a broader regional role for Japan. However, successive Japanese governments worked to reverse this policy. They achieved their objectives with the publication of the 1978 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, which limited Tokyo’s responses to the defense of Japan.

Michael Green, Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, notes the shared outlook on regional security in the late 1970s and early 1980s was the only period in which American global security interests coincided with Japanese threat perceptions. More importantly, the mutual concerns were supportable within the limitations of Japan’s political and institutional restrictions:

By accident of geography, Japan’s enhanced ability to cooperate with U.S. forces in the defense of the home
islands effectively “bottled up” the Soviets’ new ballistic missile submarine fleet in the Sea of Okhotsk and new Backfire bomber squadrons in the Maritime Provinces. Without changing its exclusively defensive focus, the Japanese side became a player in regional military strategy.28

Despite this shared outlook, the American and Japanese militaries continued to operate in parallel. There were no attempts to develop a combined command structure or formalize contingency planning.

Differences in American and Japanese perceptions and expectations of one another quickly emerged following the Cold War. During the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the U.S. and other members of the international community viewed the Japan’s $13 billion contribution as insufficient due to Tokyo’s unwillingness to deploy its Self Defense Forces.29 The 1994 North Korean nuclear crisis further highlighted obstacles to cooperation. In response, American and Japanese diplomats and lawmakers crafted successive initiatives to enhance cooperation in regional security issues including the National Defense Program Outline (1995), the U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security (1996), and the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation (1997, Guidelines).

Similar to the Nixon-Sato Communiqué, the Guidelines extended Japan’s interests beyond the defense of Japan. Unlike the Communiqué, the Guidelines did not mention specific areas or countries, but addressed “cooperation in situations in areas surrounding Japan that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security.”30 Because the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan Strait were the likely sources of conflict, analysis of Japanese concerns related to both areas may reveal entrapment fears similar to those provoked by the Nixon-Sato Communiqué.

The Guidelines were developed in response to the 1994 North Korean nuclear crisis with a focus on Korean contingencies.31 Emphasis of the North Korean threat significantly changed the security calculus in Japan; strengthening the alliance to deter Pyongyang’s ambitions overshadowed previous entrapment concerns. Professor Akiko Fukushima of the National Institute for Research Advancement explained why Japanese citizens favored strengthening the alliance, stating “events emanating from North Korea have made Japanese citizens aware of the need for, and the cost of, Japanese peace, security,
and safety. The North Korean nuclear crisis in 1993 and in 1994 led to their acceptance of a stronger alliance with the United States.”

Pyongyang’s subsequent actions, particularly its 1998 Taep’o Dong Launch and 2002 admission that North Korean agents had kidnapped 13 Japanese citizens, further increased public awareness of the security threat. However, this public support should not be viewed as universal. In particular, the Japanese people opposed unilateral American action against North Korea. In this scenario, traditional entrapment concerns emerge.

Because any conflict outside of Korean Peninsula is likely to substantially increase Japanese fears of entrapment, American and Japanese officials have sought to narrowly define “situations in areas surrounding Japan.” In announcing the Guidelines, then-Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense Kurt Campbell stated, “First of all, this is not a mechanism to contain China.” However, the Taiwan Strait crisis in March 1996 revived Japanese concerns that the Japan would become involved in Sino-American disputes. Yoshio Omori, who served as Director of the Cabinet Research Information Office from 1993-97, stated:

The most serious crisis during that time was not Aum [a religious terrorist incident], or [the hostages in] Peru, but the China-Taiwan showdown. That was our gravest moment, at least in the sense that it exposed us to a kind of catalyst for confronting the question of what kinds of role Japan should play in the fabric of Asia and the world in the 21st Century as it became entangled in Sino-American power politics.

Although the crisis was resolved peacefully, fears of entrapment resurfaced when the Bush Administration sought to strengthen military ties with Taiwan after coming into office.

In the months following the September 11th attacks, President George W. Bush declared the Global War on Terror (GWOT), named North Korea as part of the “Axis of Evil,” and sought to transform its global alliances. Perhaps recalling the 1991 Persian Gulf War—when the Kuwaitis omitted Japan from the list of countries thanked for liberating the emirate—the government of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi moved swiftly and publicly to support the U.S.
Self Defense Force (JMSDF) vessels escorted the *USS Kitty Hawk* as the American battle group departed Japanese coastal waters on September 21, 2001. Following the passage of the Anti-Terror Special Measures Law (ATMSF) in October, JMSDF warships deployed to the Indian Ocean, providing fuel to multinational ships and inspecting suspicious vessels. JMSDF support continued as Diet extended the ATSML in 2003, 2005, 2006, and 2007 before replacing it with the Act on Special Measures concerning Implementation of Replenishment Support Activities. From December 2001 to November 2010, nearly 16,000 JMSDF sailors served in the Indian Ocean, providing fuel, water, and supplies to nearly 1,200 allied vessels.

Japan further supported the GWOT by dispatching the Japanese Iraq Reconstruction and Support Group to Samawah. David Foust of the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies notes that while the Japanese government used UN Resolutions 1483 and 1511 as justification for the deployment, the Ground Self Defense Force carried out their mission as part of the American-led “coalition of the willing.” The battalion-sized unit provided humanitarian assistance and construction support in southern Iraq from January 2004 to June 2006.

In contrast to its strong support for the GWOT, Japan reacted to President Bush’s “Axis of Evil” declaration with silence. The differences between the two allies became apparent in the following months. In August, Prime Minister Koizumi announced he would travel to Pyongyang for a summit with Kim Jong-il, and was considering large-scale economic aid to North Korea. At the time, U.S. government officials were presenting Japan and other allies with evidence of North Korea’s uranium enrichment program. American and Japanese differences widened when Kim Jong-il admitted North Korean agents had kidnapped Japanese citizens; the North Korean leader allowed five abductees to return to Japan with the prime minister. Japanese government efforts concentrated on securing the release of all abductees. Prime Minister Koizumi went back to North Korea the following May, returning with an additional five Japanese citizens.

These differences notwithstanding, Washington and Tokyo began efforts to transform the U.S.-Japan Alliance in December 2002. Following nearly three years of discussions, the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) approved the document *U.S. Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future*. Although not an amendment to the 1997 *U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines*, the new
document reflected significant changes in bilateral cooperation, contingency planning, and force posture realignment. Matteo Dian, Research Fellow at the University of Bologna, summarizes the rationale behind alliance transformation:

It stressed that the alliance had to be considered functional for the international security environment to improve and for common regional and global strategic objectives to be achieved. This opened up the possibility of wider cooperation that transcended the limits of the East Asian theatre—foreseeing possible globalization of the alliance.42

The document also addressed force reductions associated with the relocation of Marine Corps units to Guam. The SCC approved the *United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation* at their next meeting in May 2006, facilitating the relocation of 7,000 Marines and dependents from Okinawa.

In contrast to the Bush administration, President Barack Obama’s policies did not significantly alter the structure or function of its security alliances in Northeast Asia. Announced in 2009, the Strategic Patience policy extended an “open diplomatic hand to North Korea, contingent on North Korea’s return to the six-party framework and the path of denuclearization.”43 While stressing coordination in bilateral, trilateral, and multi-lateral fora, the Obama administration spent considerable time and effort implementing the policies and changes begun during the Bush administration.

Similarly, the 2011 “Pivot to Asia” represented a “continuation and expansion of policies already undertaken by previous administrations.”44 For Japan, this meant perpetuating the policies that “emphasized strengthening of relations with existing allies.”45 Because the Obama administration’s policies toward Japan represented a continuation of those of the Bush administration, abandonment and entrapment concerns arising from Bush administration’s policies are likely to persist in the Obama administration.

As with previous changes, Japanese officials were concerned that alliance transformation efforts would obligate Japan to disputes in which it had no concerns. Seeking to avoid entrapment, Japanese diplomats insisted that provisions against collective self-defense remain, based Japanese support on situational needs instead of a geographic area, and
excluded Taiwan from possible contingencies. These measures, as well as a broad-based understanding of the alliance, have alleviated many concerns about entrapment. In a 2009 poll by the Cabinet Research Office, only 17 percent of respondents chose the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty as a cause for entrapment.

Fears of abandonment outweigh entrapment issues, particularly among the Japanese officials responsible for developing policy and managing the alliance in the post-Cold War and post-9/11 eras. These concerns can be traced to the Persian Gulf War, as Kevin Cooney notes in his history of Japan’s foreign policy:

> The origins of this fear go back to the world community’s reaction to Japan’s nonparticipation in the Gulf War. Japan was at the pinnacle of its economic power, and yet its contribution to the war effort, while significant in economic terms, was deemed insignificant by Japan’s allies because there was no human contribution. When the Gulf War was fought, Japan was sitting on the sidelines... it does have a real fear of abandonment.

This was both a personal and professional issue for a generation of diplomats, military officers, and policymakers. An unnamed foreign ministry official describes the traumatic and formative experience as “the Vietnam for Japanese diplomats,” noting the ministry was divided by those who experienced the Gulf War and those who did not. Similar sentiments existed among Self Defense Force officers. Yoshitomi Nozomu, who would retire as a major general and advise the Koizumi Administration, recalls watching broadcasts of the Gulf War at a bilateral military exercise in February 1991. His humiliation at having to answer American soldiers’ questions about Japan’s failure to dispatch troops to Kuwait was made worse by local broadcasts of Japanese soldiers building ice sculptures for the Sapporo Ice Festival.

In summary, American policies in the post-Cold War and post-9/11 eras produced both abandonment and entrapment concerns in Japan. Entrapment concerns vary with respect to the threat and the circumstances in which Japan would be asked to fulfill its obligations. In the case of North Korea, practical concerns for Japan’s security are the most important issue—the only scenario in which entrapment fears become an issue is unilateral American action. In contrast, any scenario
in which Japan becomes involved in a Sino-American dispute gives rise to entrapment concerns. As noted, Japanese diplomats went to great lengths to craft the alliance transformation document to avoid becoming involved in any dispute over Taiwan.

Entrapment fears notwithstanding, abandonment was a greater concern for Japan throughout the post-Cold War and post-9/11 periods. Japan’s response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait—the first crisis of the post-Cold War era—profoundly shaped the attitudes of the security practitioners and policymakers during this time. This experience led to Japan deploying the Self Defense Forces to support American-led operations in the Indian Ocean and Iraq. However, it has not brought about greater cooperation on Korean security issues.

Changes to the U.S.-ROK Security Alliance

The structure of the U.S.-ROK security alliance, particularly the role of American forces, has and continues to change in the post-Cold War and post-9/11 eras. In 1989, the U.S. Congress adopted the Nunn-Warner Amendment, mandating a three-phase withdrawal of American military forces from Korea. By the end of 1991, the first phase of the withdrawal was complete, reducing American troop strength in Korea from 43,000 to 36,000. Symbolically, the last American battalion defending the Demilitarized Zone was redeployed.

Shortly thereafter, the Combined Forces Command (CFC) was reorganized. The American-led Combined Field Army was disestablished and a Combined Ground Component Command was created under the command of a ROK Army general officer. Additional combined functional components were established for naval, Marine, civil affairs, and psychological operations. Peacetime operational control (OPCON) of Korean forces was transferred from the CFC Commander to the ROK Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1994. Scholars and government officials termed these changes a “redefinition” of the alliance. However, uncertainties over North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, ballistic missile development, and regime stability halted further reductions of American forces in the mid-1990s.

As noted, the Bush administration’s policies in East Asia can be assessed in terms of the War on Terror, Axis of Evil declaration, and alliance transformation. Korea’s response to the War on Terror was swift and substantial. President Kim Dae-jung announced a “support policy” for American operations on September 24, 2001 and the ROK
National Assembly approved the deployment of medics and engineers to Afghanistan on December 7 of that year. Korea maintained over 200 soldiers and Marines in Afghanistan through 2007, followed by deployment of a Provincial Reconstruction Team from 2010 to 2014. In response to a separate American request, the Korean government dispatched the Zaytun unit to Iraq. Serving from 2004-2008, the 3,600-man unit was the third largest foreign deployment to Iraq.

President Bush’s “Axis of Evil” declaration created significant anxiety for President Kim, whose government adopted the “Sunshine Policy” for dealing with North Korea. In his first summit with President Bush following the declaration, President Kim sought to downplay differences, stressing President Bush’s “staunch support for our sunshine policy, as well as the U.S.’s unconditional proposal to dialogue with North Korea.” These policies, concerns, and disagreements continued under Kim’s successor, Roh Moo-hyun.

The Future of the Alliance (FOTA) Policy Initiative was proposed at the 34th ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting in December 2002. American and Korean officials held 11 rounds of discussions between April 2003 and July 2004, resulting in two major agreements involving the relocation of Yongsan Army Garrison to the Pyongtaek area and the realignment and consolidation of the Second Infantry Division to bases south of the Han River; 12,500 American troops would be withdrawn from Korea in conjunction with the agreements. The consolidation of U.S. Forces Korea fulfilled the Bush administration’s policy objective of “strategic flexibility,” enabling American forces to be deployed in off-peninsula missions.

Neither the Obama administration’s Strategic Patience nor its Pivot to Asia policies contained major changes to the structure or function of the U.S.-ROK alliance. With the exception of a decision to delay transferring wartime OPCON (which will be discussed in the following section), Americans and Koreans have focused on implementing the FOTA, while contending with an increasingly belligerent North Korea. Significant provocations include multiple attacks on South Korea, nuclear weapons tests, and long-range ballistic missile launches.

As anticipated, the redeployment of American forces associated with the FOTA Policy Initiative produced abandonment fears in Korea. Many viewed the withdrawal as part of a continued process of disengagement that began in the 1990s and accelerated in the post-9/11 era. Lee Sang Hyun, Director of the Security Studies Program at The Sejong Institute,
equated the reduction of forces specified by the Nunn-Warner Amendment to the 1971 withdrawal of the 7th Infantry Division and President Carter’s attempt to remove all ground forces from Korea. Chosun Ilbo editorials during the FOTA discussions questioned decisions to reduce troop strength—both American and Korean—stating, “Korean-U.S. cooperation has deteriorated” since the cuts of the early 1990s. Despite assurances to the contrary, the agreement to maintain 25,000 troops in Korea and an $11 billion investment in new capabilities, many Koreans feared America would abandon its commitment to the peninsula.

Despite the abandonment concerns, the Bush administration’s policies seem to have produced greater fears of entrapment. Kongdan (Katy) Oh of the Institute for Defense Analyses summarized Korean entrapment during the War on Terror: “South Korea was dragged into a war on terror it had not chosen to fight.” Differences over North Korean policy—the Axis of Evil versus the Sunshine Policy—led to fears that South Korea might be dragged into war should the United States strike North Korean nuclear facilities. Koreans also feared becoming entrapped in American conflicts, should these forces be deployed from Korea. In his first official comments following the FOTA Agreement, President Roh stated, “the USFK should not be involved in disputes in Northeast Asia without Korea’s agreement.” Katy Oh affirmed these entrapment fears, noting that Koreans refer to the strategic flexibility policy as a “‘water ghost,’ which will drag anyone who pursues it into deep water.”

Similar to Japan, the Obama administration’s policies in East Asia did not affect the structure or function of the alliance in the same manner as those of the Bush administration. The Strategic Patience and Pivot to Asia policies appear to have produced neither distinct abandonment nor entrapment concerns. Indeed, while scholars and practitioners routinely examined Korean abandonment and entrapment concerns throughout the post-Cold war era, there has been little published on this topic during the Obama administration.

In summary, American policies produced both abandonment and entrapment concerns in the Korean government during the post-Cold War and post-9/11 periods. Force reductions during the 1990s, along with those resulting from the FOTA agreement, aroused abandonment concerns similar to previous troop withdrawals. However, the possibility that American units in Korea could be deployed off-peninsula in support
of regional or global contingencies led to fears of entrapment. The War on Terror and Axis of Evil declaration led to similar entrapment concerns. Collectively, entrapment concerns are greater than abandonment fears. Because the Obama administration’s policies appear to have elicited neither distinct abandonment nor entrapment responses, entrapment remains the principal concern of the Korean government.

**Exit Opportunities**

The final area that must be examined is Cha’s assumption concerning America’s role as a “great-power protector,” in which Japan and South Korea have limited opportunities to exit their alliances with the United States. The end of the Cold War has ushered in an era characterized by vastly changed threat perceptions. Economic growth and technological advances have afforded both nations with significant military resources. Accordingly, both Japan and Korea have three options with respect to their security alliances with the United States: maintain the existing alliances, abandon the alliance and pursue a policy of neutrality, or seek an alliance with another power.

There are no indications the Japanese government has, or is considering, an alternative to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. The trade frictions that characterized relations in the 1980s and the frustrations that existed during the 1991 Gulf War and 1994 nuclear crisis do not exist. This assessment is shared on both sides of the Pacific; the American and Japanese people broadly support the policies of both governments. The Pew Research Center conducted comprehensive polling in conjunction with the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, and found that more than eight in ten surveyed prefer to maintain or improve close ties, with 68 percent of Americans trusting Japan and 75 percent of Japanese trusting America. Additionally, an equal percentage of Americans (31 percent) responded that the earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear crisis were the most important events in relations between the two nations as those who identified World War II. Writing in the *Wilson Quarterly*, Professor Ellis Krauss underscored today’s mutual support—“U.S.-Japan relations have never looked more positive. President Obama’s “pivot” to Asia was matched by Japan’s own pivot to America.”

Conversely, because of changes to the U.S.-ROK alliance, differing perceptions of the North Korean threat, rising nationalism and attendant anti-Americanism, and an increased sense of reconciliation or unification with the north, Korean policy makers were often at odds with their
American counterparts. While successive administrations have advocated a continued American presence on the Korean Peninsula—to include the period following reunification—these same administrations have sought enhanced roles for Koreans within the alliance as well as broader contacts with other countries in the region. Transfer of wartime OPCON highlights the desire for enhanced roles.

In his 2005 graduation address at the ROK Air Force Academy, President Roh advocated an increased Korean role within the alliance, stating, “[t]he Korean military will develop in 10 years into an independent army which will take over wartime operational control [from the U.S.].” The president’s announcement is part of a larger initiative to pursue a more independent foreign policy and “play a leading role as a balancer, instead of an unappreciated agent as in the past.”

Shortly after President Roh’s address, Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-ung announced that Korea would enhance its military ties with China and Russia as the first step in “balancing” role. Returning from a visit with his Chinese counterpart, he said, “[w]e plan to strengthen military cooperation with China, upgrading Seoul-Beijing security exchanges to a level similar to those between South Korea and Japan.” At the time, observers believed the “balancer” policy is the first step of a strategic realignment in which Korea would abandon its ties with the U.S. in order to be aligned with China. Increased trade and investment—China surpassed the U.S. as Korea’s largest trading partner in 2004—deep cultural ties, and dissatisfaction with American policies appeared to support the rationale for a China-Korea alliance.

In 2015, two key events seemed to indicate Seoul’s further tilt toward Beijing. In March, South Korea joined the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, China’s planned development bank. In its account of the announcement, The Wall Street Journal noted that China accounted for a quarter of Korea’s exports, compared to 12 percent sent to the U.S. In early September, President Park Geun-hye attended events in Beijing to commemorate the end of World War II. President Park joined Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping in reviewing a military parade as part of “[t]he 70th Anniversary of Victories in the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Against Fascism.” Although the Chinese government invited world leaders to attend the events on a newly established national holiday, Western leaders declined to attend.
While media accounts cite both events as “evidence that South Korea cannot resist the growing centripetal pull of Beijing’s orbit,” political and social scientists provided a more nuanced explanation. Scott Snyder, Director of the Program on U.S.-Korea Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, views Park’s visit as part of a long-term diplomatic strategy to gain support from Beijing in Seoul’s dealings with Pyongyang. He noted this strategic rationale has not changed since the two countries established diplomatic relations in 1992, commenting that many elements of President Roh Tae-woo’s Nordpolitik exist in Park’s Trustpolitik. While South Korea has not achieved its desired level of strategic coordination with China on North Korea, President Park’s visit provided another opportunity to pursue its diplomatic objectives.

Similarly, Yonsei University Professor Sohn Yul believes Korea’s actions—both in terms of its bilateral relations with China and trilateral relations with the U.S. and Japan—reflect the country’s “middle-power diplomacy.” Sohn observed that, “as the United States and China compete for regional leadership, with Japan firmly aligned with the United States,” South Korea has “attempted to take a different approach by playing a mediating role and developing friendly relations with both great powers.”

University of Southern California Professor David Kang offered another explanation of South Korea’s closer relations with China. Kang asserted that Seoul’s foreign policy is based on two fundamental strands of the country’s identity: South Korea’s intense desire for unification and Korea’s long history of stable relations with China. Korean identity is based on a unified Korean Peninsula, from which a unified language, culture, and history evolved over 5,000 years. Kang notes that Korea has had generally good relations with China throughout much of its history, and highlights that the current warm relations extend beyond mutual economic interests. Lastly, Kang asserts that South Korea’s long-term objectives—unification with the north regardless of its nuclear capability—are more aligned with China’s goal of peaceful change than the American objective of eliminating North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities.

These factors notwithstanding, there are many factors that make a Korea-China security alignment scenario unlikely, both presently and following reunification. Regardless of current challenges, neither Americans nor Koreans are willing to abandon the security alliance while North Korea remains a threat to both countries. In either a rapid
reconciliation or a North Korean collapse, the alliance will help preserve Korean security, lest it have to “contend directly with the militaries of China, Russia, and Japan.”

Cha noted that, “despite the historical tributary relationship, China has never provided the type of security guarantee that the U.S. has provided Korea.”

While the Korean people view China as critical to the country’s economic future, public opinion overwhelmingly supports maintaining the security relationship with the U.S. In March 2014, the Asan Institute for Policy Studies found that support for the alliance remained near its all-time high, with 93.3 percent of South Koreans surveyed stating, “the alliance was a necessity.” In the same survey, 66.0 percent of respondents favored maintaining the alliance following reunification. The results suggested “the Korean public has both broader perceptions of threats in the region as well as an expanded view of the scope of the alliance.”

Thus, while Seoul will continue to seek greater autonomy and authority within the alliance, it is unlikely that Korea will abandon the U.S.-ROK security alliance to pursue neutrality or develop a similar military pact with China.

Conclusions

In summary, the quasi-alliance model and its associated hypotheses remain valid for analyzing the prospects for security cooperation between Japan and the Republic of Korea in the post-Cold War and post-9/11 eras. Despite increased security cooperation, the TCOG demonstrated the limits to trilateral cooperation. Political, legal and historical differences continue to inhibit bilateral cooperation. Cha’s assumption that America “serves as the great-power protector of the two states, and therefore exit opportunities for the two are limited” is also valid, as neither Japan nor Korea is considering options outside of the current system. Indeed, Japanese support for the alliance is at historic levels. Although Koreans may express dissatisfaction with certain aspects of the alliance, this criticism should be interpreted as seeking change within the alliance, rather than a repudiation of the alliance itself. Because the basic premises of the quasi-alliance model remain valid, analyzing abandonment and entrapment perceptions arising from changes to American security policies can be used to assess prospects for security cooperation between Japan and Korea.

Extending the quasi-alliance model to the post-Cold War and post 9/11 periods, Japan’s response to American policy changes has been a
perception of “abandonment,” while Koreans fear “entrapment.” The results, along with previous outcomes, are summarized below using Cha’s methodology:

**Table 2: Quasi-alliance model for Japan-ROK Relations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>AB/ENT Structure</th>
<th>Animosity</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969-71 Nixon Doctrine</td>
<td>Symmetrical AB (H:B)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-74 Détente</td>
<td>Asymmetrical AB/ENT (H:A)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Friction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-79 Carter Doctrine</td>
<td>Symmetrical AB (H:B)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-88 Peace Through Strength</td>
<td>Asymmetrical AB/ENT (H:A)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Friction (mixed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991-2000 Post-Cold War Period</td>
<td>Asymmetrical AB/ENT (H:A)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Friction (mixed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-present Post-9-11 Era</td>
<td>Asymmetrical AB/ENT (H:A)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Friction (mixed)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AB=Abandonment, ENT=Entrapment, H:A=Hypothesis A, H:B=Hypothesis B

American-initiated changes to the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK security alliances produced distinct abandonment and entrapment concerns in its allies in Asia during the post-Cold War and post-9/11 periods. Japanese entrapment concerns occur in scenarios involving unilateral American action against North Korea, or the possibility of becoming involved in a crisis in the Taiwan Strait. However, abandonment concerns arising from the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War outweigh Japanese fears of entrapment. These concerns were particularly acute among the policy makers and practitioners who shaped Japan’s security policies over the last quarter-century.

South Korea’s reaction to American initiatives is also mixed. Drawdowns associated with the Nunn-Warner Amendment and FOTA produced abandonment concerns similar to previous withdrawals of
American forces. Repositioning American forces with the capability to deploy off the peninsula causes entrapment concerns, particularly if those forces were to be deployed within the region. Similarly, disagreements on strategic objectives—gradual unification versus the elimination of North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missiles—lead to fears of unilateral American action. Differing views on China’s role exacerbates disagreements between the U.S. and Korea. Despite the hypothetical nature of both scenarios—off-peninsula deployment and unilateral action—entrapment fears outweigh abandonment concerns.

American actions since the end of the Cold War have produced asymmetrical responses from its respective allies: Japanese perceptions of abandonment and South Korean perceptions of entrapment. Prospects for increased cooperation are limited, as evidenced by the disagreements in South Sudan and failure to sign a GSOMIA. Friction will continue to characterize the relationship between Japan and Korea, and Japan will play a limited role in Korean security.

Notes:

2 Snyder as quoted in Cha, p. 39.
3 Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism, p. 40.
4 Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism, p. 37.
5 Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism, p. 47.
6 Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism, p. 46.
7 Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism, pp. 19-23 and 231-2.
8 In addition to Japan and Korea, Cha cites Britain and France after the Napoleonic Wars and France and Germany after World War II as examples of cooperation where strategic interests took precedence over historical animosity. Cha, p. 23 and pp. 231-2.
9 Cha defines the congruence method as a means to determine “whether there is temporal co-variation between the independent and dependent variables . . . the independent variable is abandonment/entrapment structures. The dependent variable is cooperation and friction in Japanese-Korean foreign-policy behavior.” Process tracing is used to assess “whether a necessary causal connection exists between the abandonment-entrapment concerns and foreign-policy outcomes.” Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism, p. 58.
10 Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism, p. 201.
11 Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism, p. 207.
17 Schoff, First Interim Report, p. 2.
20 Schoff, First Interim Report, p. 20.
25 Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs Webpage.
28 Green, p. 244.
31 Former Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord recalled briefing Chinese officials in November 1995, noting “We went out of our way to say that the Guidelines Review was directed at Korean contingencies and not directed at China.” Former General Secretary of the Liberal Democratic Party Koichi Kato reiterated this in 1997. Quoted in Yoichi Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999), pp. 428 and 399.
33 Survey by Chuo Ron Monthly, July 2004, reported in
35 Funabashi, pp. 400-1.
38 Japan Maritime Self Defense Force Homepage. International Counterterrorism
39 David Fouse, “Japan’s Dispatch of the Self-Defense Force to Iraq: Lessons Learned,”
40 “Northeast Asia has Mixed Reactions to ‘Axis of Evil’ Remark,” Stratfor, February 1,
41 Gilbert Rozman, “Japan’s Relations with the U.S. and its North Korea Option,”
Foreign Policy Research Institute, December 2002. Available online at
42 Matteo Dian, The Evolution of the US-Japan Alliance: The Eagle and the
43 Charles L. Pritchard and John Tilleli, Jr., Chairs and Scott A. Snyder, Project Director,
44 Mark E. Manyin, Stephen Daggett, Ben Dolven, Susan V. Lawrence, Michael F.
Martin, Ronald O’Rourke, and Bruce Vaughn, “Pivot to the Pacific The Obama
45 Manyin, p. 2.
46 Dian, pp. 123-124.
47 Tomohito Shinoda, “Costs and Benefits of the U.S.-Japan Alliance from the Japanese
Perspective,” Takashi Inoguchi, G. John Ikenberry, and Yoichioro Sato, Eds., The U.S.-
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48 Kevin Cooney, Japan’s Foreign Policy Since 1945, (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2007).
49 Jonathon Watts, “Japan Revisits the Gulf War,” The Diplomat, September 20, 2001,
Available online at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/sep/20/worlddispatch.afghanistan
50 Tim Kelly and Nobuhiro Kubo, “Gulf War Began Japan’s Retreat from Pacifism,”
military-history-idUSL3N13W1M820151220
51 The Combined Naval Component Command and Combined Marine Forces Command
were established in 1994, and the Combined Civil Affairs Task Force was established in

52 Seoung Ryoul Cho notes that the term “redefinition” has been used in many studies of the US-ROK Security Alliance, but that there is no consensus on the direction of the “redefinition” process. Seoung Ryoul Cho, “The ROK-US Alliance and the Future of US Forces in South Korea,” Korea Journal for Defense Analysis, p. 79.


56 Lee Sang Hyun, p. 72.


61 Kongdan (Katy) Oh.


64 Seong Jae Min.


68 Korea International Trade Association (KITA), available on-line at http://www.kita.org


Scott A. Snyder, “Why South Korea’s President Park Attended Xi’s Military Rally in Beijing.”


