

Should The United States Support Korean Unification And If So, How?

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Abstract:

This article argues that the priority for the ROK-U.S. alliance must shift to Korean reunification. President Parks' Dresden Initiative provides an opportunity for the U.S. to support the ROK's plans for reunification. There are four paths to reunification: the ideal one is peaceful unification; the second is internal regime change leading to the emergence of new leadership that seeks peaceful unification; the third is catastrophic collapse of the Kim Family Regime; and the fourth and worst case is conflict and war. However, if comprehensive policies and a strategy with balance and coherency among ends, ways, and means is developed that focuses on reunification regardless of the path followed, the alliance will eventually be able to reach the ideal path to reunification even if there is collapse or war.

Keywords: Korea, North Korea, South Korea, unification, 2009 Joint Vision, Kim family regime, Kim Jong-un, regime collapse

Introduction

Strategic Patience, America's approach to North Korea, has given us strategic paralysis. If the desired effects are changing North Korean behavior, fostering good faith efforts towards denuclearization, and restarting the six-party talks, Washington cannot point to any real successes. There are two major challenges in North Korea: the regime's nuclear weapons program, and its human rights atrocities – which arguably rank among the worst crimes against humanity committed in modern history. There is also the threat of war and the effects of regime collapse. The United States has worked for twenty years to try to end North Korea's nuclear program, and the United Nations just published its comprehensive Commission of Inquiry report on the abhorrent human rights violations being committed in the North.¹ Yet neither of these

efforts has resulted in changes in this troublesome country or the achievement of objectives desired by the U.S. and the international community – nor are they likely to do so.

Elimination of the nuclear program or liberating North Korea by force are not realistic options, as the second- and third-order effects would be too severe for the Republic of Korea, the region, and the world. Some policymakers rely on China to influence the North to end its nuclear program, and wait patiently for the regime to change its behavior; however, this has not achieved the desired effects to date.

Why haven't we gotten anywhere? Based on our knowledge of the nature of the Kim family regime and its strategy, it is clear that North Korea will not give up its nuclear program under any circumstances, and the horrendous human rights atrocities will not end so long as the Kim regime remains in power. If that is the case, the question is this: what policies and strategy should the United States and the Republic of Korea develop and implement in response?

The answer lies in the 2009 U.S.–ROK Joint Vision Statement, which says the Republic of Korea and United States will seek peaceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula. This vision was reaffirmed in May 2013 when South Korean President Park Geun-hye and President Obama met in Washington.² Reunification has long been overlooked or seen as a distant dream, discounted because of the disparity between North and South, or viewed as an exclusively Korean problem. Reunification has received little international attention; even less attention has been paid to planning for reunification, and no preparations for it have been made, save for the work that the Republic of Korea has done over the years.

Why Support Reunification?

Some would ask why the U.S. would support reunification. Surely, most of the regional powers oppose it due to the security and economic impact if reunification occurs via violent conflict on the peninsula. Some argue that there are Koreans who do not want reunification because of the potential negative impact on their economic well-being. If there are Koreans and regional powers that do not support reunification, then why should the U.S.?

The first reason is an assumption, but an important one. Reunification is the best way to achieve peace and stability in Northeast Asia. Once the Kim family regime is no longer in power and reunification occurs, the security situation will change dramatically, with

no more nuclear threats; no more provocations; no more international arms smuggling; no more missile and nuclear proliferation to hostile and rogue nations around the world; and no more million-man army threatening the South and holding the region hostage with its nuclear and chemical weapons, special operations forces, and myriad asymmetric capabilities. This end state alone should drive the ROK, U.S., and regional powers to aggressively seek Korean reunification:

*A stable, secure, peaceful, economically vibrant, non-nuclear peninsula, reunified under a liberal constitutional form of government determined by the Korean people.*³

The second reason for the U.S., as well as the international community, to support reunification lies in the 1953 Korean War Armistice Agreement. Paragraph 60 of the Agreement states:

60. In order to insure *the peaceful settlement of the Korean question*, the military Commanders of both sides hereby recommend to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides that, within three (3) months after the Armistice Agreement is signed and becomes effective, a political conference of a higher level of both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, *the peaceful settlement of the Korean question*, etc.⁴ (italics mine)

The division of the peninsula is the “Korean question.” The resolution of the “Korean question” through peaceful settlement can occur through reunification, especially since for the past sixty-plus years there have been no political conferences or negotiations to resolve the question. Of course, whether there will be a peaceful settlement depends solely upon the actions of the Kim family regime.

The third reason for the United States to support reunification is both practical and moral. It is practical for the previously stated reasons: it will lead to peace and stability, and it will solve the Korean question. It may well result in a reduction of the security costs borne by both the South Korean and American governments, to include a reduction of both nations’ forces stationed on the peninsula.

It is moral because of the shared ROK-U.S. history and, most importantly, because of the shared values of Koreans and Americans. The U.S. has contributed to Korean history in a multitude of ways, but two stand out. The first is that the Taft-Katsura Agreement paved the way for the Japanese occupation and colonization of Korea.⁵ The second is the 1945 decision to have the Soviets receive the Japanese surrender north of the 38th parallel and for the U.S. to receive the surrender south of the parallel. Although this was done to prevent Soviet domination of the entire peninsula, it resulted in the division of Korea and the establishment of two Koreas, North and South. The U.S. should support reunification to help overcome the unhappy legacy of these past historical events.

The more important moral reason to support reunification is because the ROK and U.S. share similar values. The “Miracle on the Han”⁶ allowed the ROK to become a modern, developed middle power with close economic, cultural, and political ties with the U.S. One of the best expressions of the shared values is President Park’s May 2013 address to the U.S. Congress, in which she described the close ties – some would say blood ties – between the people and governments of the two nations.⁷

These are some of the major reasons to strive for reunification. However, the question is and has been, since 1953: how can Korea achieve reunification, especially in light of the security threats posed by North Korea and the Kim family regime?

An Ideal Path to Reunification

As already stated, it is time to recognize that no major change will occur on the Korean Peninsula unless there is reunification, and that the international community, and particularly the United States, should stand behind and assist the Republic of Korea in developing a path to reunification.

Some will ask how we can even think about reunification while there are the threats of provocation, regime collapse, and conventional and nuclear war from North Korea. The common belief is that as long as these threats exist, there can be no possibility of reunification, let alone *peaceful* reunification. However, this is the very thinking that has led to the current strategic paralysis when it comes to addressing the North Korean problem.

The ideal path to peaceful reunification is built on respect, reconciliation, reform, rebuilding, and reunification (R5). The operative

word here is *ideal*. Some will immediately discount this as a mere dream; however, such a path can form the basis of a strategy and supporting campaign plan that provide multiple benefits even if peaceful reunification is not achieved in the near-term.

We should defer to (and support) the reunification plan of the Republic of Korea as President Park initially described it in her speech in Dresden on March 28, 2014.⁸ In addition to the points made in her speech, a reunification plan will likely include a few of these key elements:

- Provision of full support to President Park's policy of *trustpolitik*;⁹
- Development of a comprehensive information operations and influence campaign to inform the North Korean population about the outside world and educate them about the benefits of reunification;
- Establishment of peninsula-wide land ownership policies, to include compensation or recompense for those with pre-1948 claims in the North;
- Development of military integration plans, with specific focus on how the two militaries will be integrated and how senior military leaders will be treated if they support reunification;
- Conducting detailed planning for infrastructure, and identification of required government and non-government investment;
- Conducting detailed planning for economic transition and, ultimately, integration;
- Conducting detailed planning for the integration of governmental/administration functions; and
- Conducting comprehensive diplomatic coordination for international cooperation in support of reunification.

Again, these are just some of highlights of an ideal path to reunification. While we should strive to follow this path, the Kim regime has a vote and for various reasons may not agree. Unfortunately, there are three other paths that the North could pursue, any of which could be

more likely than an embrace of the above principles likely to be announced by Park.

Bottom-up internal resistance to the regime appears to be growing among parts of North Korea's population and even within the periphery of the political elite and military. This could be the second path to reunification. Such resistance should be monitored, assessed, understood, and possibly supported, to include assistance through an unconventional warfare campaign led by the Republic of Korea. Although this is unlikely, given the regime's ability to suppress dissent, to lead to an Arab Spring-like phenomenon, such mass mobilization could occur and cannot be discounted. Such grassroots resistance could lead to a coup and the emergence of new leaders in the North that might then seek reunification with the South. The danger with internal resistance is that it can lead to conflict within the North, which could grow out of control and spill over into the Republic of Korea. However, if there were regime change, with or without conflict, there would eventually be opportunity to get back on the ideal path to reunification. All the planning and preparation that had previously been conducted would still have value after regime change via internal resistance.


The third path to reunification could be the collapse of the Kim dynasty. Regime collapse is defined as the loss of central governing effectiveness of the regime, combined with the loss of support and coherency of the military and security services. Although bottom-up internal resistance could lead to regime collapse, the regime's demise is more likely to result from its inability to support the military and security services. Regime collapse is a result of friction within the regime elite and "deprioritization" of key military units. Regime collapse would likely lead to internal conflict, as actors fight to retain power and resources. In the worst case, when faced with significant internal or external pressure and the threat of regime collapse, Kim Jong-un might make the decision to execute his campaign plan to reunify the peninsula under his control, thus ensuring survival of the his family's regime (in his calculus). However, if collapse occurs without a direct attack on the ROK, the ROK-U.S. alliance, the UN Command, or both (and possibly also China) will likely have to conduct stabilization operations in the North to prevent spillover, establish security, restore stability, and relieve humanitarian suffering. Again, once the security situation is stabilized there could be a return to the ideal path to reunification. All of the planning and preparation that has taken place would still have value and

could still be applied. Furthermore, many of the preparations could help mitigate the negative effects of regime collapse.

Finally, the fourth, worst case path to reunification is through war. First and foremost, the ROK–U.S. alliance must deter war, but if deterrence fails, then the alliance will win decisively and bring an end to the Kim regime. As in the case of regime collapse, post-conflict stabilization operations can and should be shifted toward the ideal path to reunification.

While the ideal path to reunification is the peaceful one, the other three paths of internal resistance, regime collapse, or war could all result in significant levels of conflict. However, all the planning and preparation for peaceful reunification that occurs prior to conflict will support post-conflict activities, and as soon as conditions warrant, the Republic of Korea can return to the peaceful path.

The four paths portrayed graphically might look like this:



A shift in policy and strategy to a more realistic approach focused on reunification is going to be difficult for many to support, as the concept is difficult to grasp. There is great pressure to solve the Korean nuclear problem in the near-term, and taking a long-term view may be politically unacceptable to some, as that could be interpreted as tacit acceptance of the North as a nuclear power. However, as stated already, as long as the

Kim family remains in power, there is almost nothing that can be done diplomatically that will result in the regime deciding to give up its most important weapon and what Kim Jong-un believes is the key to survival as a deterrent as well as for support of its blackmail diplomacy. The North's propaganda organs have criticized every country that has agreed to give up its nuclear weapons, and has used Iraq and Libya as examples, respectively, of what happens when one either fails to develop nuclear weapons or voluntarily relinquishes them. Iraq's inability to develop a nuclear weapon left it vulnerable to U.S. attack, and the North believes that, had Saddam developed nuclear weapons, the U.S. would not have invaded. The North also believes that, had Qaddafi continued to develop nuclear weapons, he would have been able to sustain his dictatorship. It is likely that recent events in Ukraine have only reinforced the regime's belief that giving up nuclear weapons makes a nation vulnerable to coercion and invasion. Security guarantees by the U.S. and the international community will never be trusted by the North because of the failure to uphold the Budapest Agreement.¹⁰ These are all reasons why the regime is unlikely to willingly give up its nuclear program.

The path to reunification is complex. It requires detailed planning by the South Korean government on how to integrate political and economic structures and education systems, and how to rebuild infrastructure, to name only a few challenges. There are numerous policy decisions that, if made before the reunification process begins, can have profound effects on the process and its outcome. Two examples are particularly instructive: the first has to do with property, and the second deals with the North Korean military and security services.

One of the keys to reunification will be how property ownership in North Korea will transfer to the people who live in houses and apartments. In the North, everything is owned by the state. The people, theoretically, own nothing as individuals. Furthermore, there are people in South Korea who have pre-1948 claims to property in the North and believe they are entitled to reclaiming it.

The Korean government should consider establishing a policy that will compensate those with pre-1948 claims, but will not allow them to reclaim land. Following such a policy course is critical because one of the most important objectives during the reunification process will be to ensure that the North Korean population remains in place to avoid a mass migration that could severely test South Korea's capacity to absorb new arrivals. One of the ways to do this is to allow the people to obtain

ownership of the houses or apartments in which they live. This will require some education as to property ownership and should be included as one of the objectives that support the ideal path to reunification.

A second consideration concerns what should be done with the North Korean People's Army (NKPA). A lesson learned from Iraq and the disbanding of the Iraqi army along with "de-baathification" is that such actions can lead to disenfranchisement and resistance. It is possible that there could be even greater resistance to reunification than the unrest which confronted newly installed governments in Iraq or Afghanistan, because the legitimacy of the Kim regime rests on the myth of anti-Japanese partisan warfare resulting in the liberation of Korea in 1945, leading Kim Il-sung to develop North Korea into what author Adrian Buzo has termed a "guerrilla dynasty."¹¹ Due to the regime's indoctrination efforts, the people have developed a "guerrilla mindset", and this, combined with the huge investment that the North has made in its special operations forces, provides a civilian and military capability to support resistance activities. Because of this situation, a decision to ensure that the NKPA remains intact, coherent, and under a functional chain of command is required. Of course, the challenge is how to affect this outcome. One way is to initiate an influence campaign targeting the military leaders of key organizations mainly at the corps level (sometimes referred to as the second-tier leadership, because they are outside the core regime elite, although they possess significant power because of the forces they command). As part of the ideal path to reunification, one of the areas of focus should be on eventual military integration. Focusing on military integration can provide a vehicle to transmit other messages to the second-tier military leaders, such as assurances that if they do not attack the South and instead maintain control of the chain of command of their units, they will have a place in a reunified Korea. This has to be established ROK policy and must be part of an influence campaign. While there is no guarantee that this will have the desired effect, failing to plan and prepare this way almost ensures that there will be significant military challenges, if not outright resistance, to reunification especially following internal resistance or regime collapse.


These are just two of the many areas where planning and preparation for reunification is required. Focusing on the ideal path to peaceful reunification will result in a strategy that can be applied across the spectrum of possible scenarios, including internal resistance, regime

collapse, or war.

How Should the U.S. Support Korean Reunification Efforts?

Although it is quite clear in the 2009 Alliance Joint Vision Statement that peaceful unification is the goal of the alliance, the number one action any American president should take is to express his or her support for Korean reunification in any speech about the Korean security situation. The second action must be to direct the national security apparatus to plan and actively prepare for support to the ROK strategy for reunification. As previously stated, support for President Park's policy of *trustpolitik* must also be supported alongside her "Northeast Asian Peace and Security Initiative." This will not only continue to sustain and strengthen the alliance; it has the added benefit of helping to overcome the wider security challenges that she has termed the "Asian Paradox."¹² Too often, the U.S. national security apparatus has focused on stovepipe issues, ranging from the North's nuclear program, to deterrence and defense, to executing the ROK-U.S. free trade agreement, to interdicting the North's illicit and proliferation activities without any consideration of the impact on reunification. There must be a U.S. strategy with balanced and coherent ends, ways, and means, within acceptable levels of risk, to support the overarching ROK reunification strategy. All the disparate activities that focus on the Korean peninsula must be synchronized and orchestrated with single-minded focus on the end state.

While the ideal path to reunification has been described succinctly above, the actual path may look much more complex, uncertain, and dangerous. The chart below was developed in the late 1990's during the planning for the first CONPLAN 5029, the plan of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff and U.S. Combined Forces Command for North Korean instability and collapse. It was an attempt to show that there is likely no clear path to reunification and that there are myriad contingencies that have to be accounted for.



The one takeaway from this chart should be that there are so many variables and possibilities for miscalculation by the Kim family regime that it is difficult to plan and prepare for each. What is really required is to have a well-grounded strategy that is executed by leaders supported by organizations with the agility to deal with the range of security and diplomatic problems resulting from North Korean actions while remaining, as stated, single-mindedly focused on the end state: *reunification*.

The third-most important action that should be taken by the U.S. is to support the development of that well-grounded strategy. The U.S. has to be in a support role because it is imperative that the ROK lead reunification efforts, since ROK leadership is important not only for legitimacy on the peninsula and within the entire Korean population but also for support diplomacy as well. South Korea must speak with the leading voice on all aspects of reunification, and the U.S. is in a position to be support this necessary condition. One action for consideration would be to develop a combined ROK-U.S. strategy group that would focus on developing an alliance strategy for reunification.¹³

In short, the three most important actions the U.S. should take are to visibly support the ROK's reunification plans, ensure that the U.S. national security apparatus focuses on the strategic end state of

reunification, and further ensuring that this apparatus assists the ROK in developing and carrying out a unification strategy. There are many other ways in which the instruments of American national power can and should support ROK reunification plans. The following section provides some specific examples, but is not all-inclusive. The U.S. national security apparatus must develop the detailed, complete policies and strategies.

Diplomatic Support to the ROK Reunification Effort

America's diplomatic relations with China, Japan, and Russia are important. Again, while the ROK should be in the lead when dealing with diplomatic aspects of reunification issues, U.S. diplomats must demonstrate American support for ROK plans and policies.

Questions about the long-term presence of U.S. forces in the region will have to be resolved. While the U.S. presence will likely be guided by the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty of 1953,¹⁴ it will be up to the ROK to either request continued stationing of U.S. forces on the peninsula or to ask them to leave. The ROK-U.S. alliance can be maintained with or without troops on the peninsula, but the ROK and U.S. assessments of the future security situation will influence decision-making in this regard. Regional powers will also want to know the future status, so this delicate diplomatic issue will have to be addressed sensitively at the appropriate time.

The U.S. can use its position on the UN Security Council to ensure that supporting resolutions are proposed and acted upon. Given that China or Russia could and may veto these resolutions, it is thus imperative that U.S. diplomats work to gain Russian and Chinese support for, or at least abstention on, key UN resolutions that will influence reunification.

UN Security Council Resolutions 82 through 85, which remain in force, should be examined to determine how they may apply to reunification efforts.¹⁵ They are still relevant from a security perspective, and as long as there are threats from the Kim family regime, they remain important for the ROK, the U.S., and the international community. It must be determined whether they will provide international legitimacy for ROK, U.S., and international forces to help stabilize the situation in either a post-conflict or post-collapse situation in North Korea. Diplomats should be working on this now, before a crisis occurs.

Economic Support to the ROK Reunification Effort

The economic instrument is arguably the second-most important action following stabilizing the security situation. Effective economic policies and a strong economic foundation will enable successful reunification. Support from the IMF and World Bank may also be crucial, and the U.S. can work to bring about such support.

However, the most important element to success will be investment in North Korea, to both properly use the natural resources present there and to develop the proper industrial capacity and infrastructure to do so. While many would say that this is solely a Korean responsibility and that the resultant costs should be borne by Koreans, others – rightly, in my view – argue that the investment opportunities are vast and that, if properly encouraged and incentivized, commercial investment will contribute to establishing the necessary conditions for successful reunification.

President Park has said that reunification will be a “jackpot” for the Korean people.¹⁶ It can be a jackpot for others as well. The U.S. government has to be prepared to establish economic policies that will encourage U.S. industry to invest in the North. The ROK and U.S. governments should consider if it is possible to establish procedures under the current ROK-U.S. Free Trade Agreement that would help bring investors to the North when the time is right.

Lastly, before reunification occurs and while the Kim family regime remains in power, the U.S. may consider lifting some economic sanctions to support diplomatic or informational efforts as well as to lay the groundwork for economic investment during the reunification process. This is a controversial proposition, but one that should be examined to ascertain whether it will make a long-term, positive contribution.

Information Support to the ROK Reunification Effort

As has been mentioned above, in the ideal path to reunification, the flow of information to key target audiences – both the general population and the second-tier leaders (those who are on the periphery of the elite and have control over key elements, such as military maneuver forces and other elements of the security apparatus) – is critical to the success of reunification.

Experts in strategic communications and psychological operations from the ROK and U.S. should work together to develop the most effective themes and messages to influence the attitudes, opinions, and behavior of those key target audiences.

U.S. military psychological operations (or Military Information Support Operations) organizations should partner with ROK organizations to pool their resources and capabilities to disseminate information throughout North Korea.

The U.S. Broadcasting Board of Governors should ensure that the Voice of America and Radio Free Asia are resourced and focused on getting information to the North Korean people so that they can better understand the outside world and counter the long-term psychological conditioning caused by the Kim family regime. Support should also be provided to defector organizations that are working to get information to the North Korean people.

Psychological operations professionals must study the North Korean system and population now and have a deep understanding of things such as *Songbun* so that it can counter the ideas that have been put forth over the last sixty-plus years. While that deep understanding will help current operations, it will also allow organizations to ramp up operations as the reunification process begins (or in the event of regime collapse or war).

Lastly, strategic communications are critical to backing up diplomatic efforts to support ROK reunification efforts. This includes both people and governments surrounding the Korean peninsula, as well as the broader international community.

Military Support to the ROK Reunification Effort

Although the military alliance is the most visible example of U.S. support to the ROK, and deterrence and defense against North Korean attack has to be the military priority until reunification occurs, there are a number of other actions that can be taken now to support reunification.

First and foremost, an optimally effective and efficient military organization is required for the full range of military operations – from provocations, to war, to regime collapse, to post conflict/collapse operations. This exists in the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC). However, with the upcoming OPCON transfer, this command will dissolve into separate ROK and U.S. war fighting commands. Although it is important to continue to improve military capabilities, the dissolution of CFC constitutes a reduction in capabilities and should thus

be prevented. CFC can evolve and it may in fact be time to put a Korean general, with a U.S. deputy, in command of CFC. This may be especially important vis-à-vis having true ROK leadership in the reunification effort. Having a Korean military commander can enhance the legitimacy of military operations in Korea, especially during post-conflict or post-regime collapse scenarios.

The United Nations Command (UNC) remains in Korea to uphold the armistice and also serves as the UN headquarters to command and control international forces should hostilities resume and sending states decide to again deploy military forces to defend South Korea from attack by the North. However, what is not known is how the UNC may support reunification of the peninsula. Although the mandate for military action in UN Security Council Resolutions 82 through 85 does not address reunification, the Armistice does highlight the “Korean question”, as previously discussed. What should be considered is how the UNC and sending states may contribute to reunification. Roles and missions as well as command relationships between the UNC and CFC should be coordinated now, before the reunification process begins. This will be especially important should the Kim family regime’s collapse coincide with the requirement to conduct large humanitarian assistance and stability operations in the north. The UNC and its member nations can potentially make significant international contributions and this should be planned for now, before crisis occurs.

As there is growing internal resistance inside North Korea, the ROK must determine that supporting that resistance contributes to South Korea’s strategy for reunification. If it does, then the U.S. should support a ROK-led unconventional warfare campaign to support internal resistance in North Korea.

Finally, ROK and U.S. military forces need to continue to refine plans for the full range of contingencies, from provocations, to internal resistance, to regime collapse to war. All plans need to have the single alliance end state – reunification – specified, so that all military organizations develop comprehensive plans that will support completion of the entire mission. If plans and actions do not contribute to reunification, then they may not be worthy of execution. The fundamental question that should be asked by policymakers, strategists, and military planners is whether the policy, strategy, plan, or action being considered contributes to preparation for reunification. This should be a guiding principle until the Korean Peninsula is once again

unified.

Conclusion

The U.S. has practical and moral interests in supporting reunification of the peninsula. While the past sixty years have shown the importance of deterrent military forces, it should be recognized that the status quo cannot be maintained indefinitely. Furthermore, only reunification will produce an acceptable security situation in Northeast Asia.

Most importantly, reunification provides a long-term policy and strategy focus that can cure the current strategic paralysis that exists particularly with U.S. policy vis-à-vis North Korea. Both the ROK and U.S. presidents have stated that peaceful reunification is the desired end state for the ROK–U.S. alliance. Whether this is achieved through peaceful means will be up to the Kim regime. However, planning and conducting the necessary preparations as part of a comprehensive strategy can provide the alliance with the flexibility to address and perhaps mitigate the effects of any contingency. Regardless of the contingencies that occur, the alliance can remain focused on the only end state that will end the North's nuclear program and stop the horrific human rights atrocities and crimes against humanity that have occurred there for the past sixty-plus years.

President Park has provided the opportunity for the alliance to develop a long-term, comprehensive strategy with balance and coherency among ends, ways, and means, coupled with the agility to follow any path to reunification: the ideal or straight line path, the path of internal resistance and regime change, collapse of the Kim family regime, or the worst case of conflict and war. We cannot predict what will happen in the future, but we can devise a strategy that focuses on achieving the desired alliance end state that will allow the diplomatic and military instruments of power to address any contingency on the path to reunification.

Notes:

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¹¹ Adrian Buzo, *Guerrilla Dynasty: Politics and Leadership in North Korea* (I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., December 31, 1999), p. 1.

¹² Park Guen-hye, “A Plan for Peace in North Asia,” *Wall Street Journal*, November 12, 2012, available at: <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323894704578114310294100492>.

¹³ David S. Maxwell, "Beyond the Nuclear Crisis: A Strategy for the Korean Peninsula," unpublished thesis, National War College, National Defense University, April 2004, pp. 90-91.

¹⁴ Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea, October 1, 1953, available at:
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/kor001.asp.

¹⁵ United Nations Security Council Resolutions 82-84, available at:
[http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/82\(1950\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/82(1950)); and
United Nations Security Council Resolution 85, available at:
[http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/85\(1950\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/85(1950)).

¹⁶ "Unification May be Jackpot: Park," *Joongang Ilbo*, January 7, 2014, available at:
<http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=2983129&clo c=joongangdaily|home|top>.