The Failure of the Bush Administration’s North Korea Policy: A Critical Analysis

James I. Matray
California State University, Chico

Abstract

This article describes the events surrounding the Second North Korean nuclear crisis that began in October 2002. It focuses attention particularly on identifying the reasons President George W. Bush decided to abandon the Agreed Framework of October 1994, as well as questioning the validity of his claim that Pyongyang’s development of a Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) program justified the initiation of this confrontation. The article begins with a description of the factors that explain the Bush administration’s adoption of “Hawk Engagement” as a strategy to achieve regime change in North Korea. It then covers the ongoing efforts to end the crisis, tracing negotiations at the Six-Party Talks beginning in August 2003 in Beijing. The article presents evidence to substantiate the judgment that Bush’s hardline advisors were responsible for implementing a militant and aggressive policy that, rather than toppling Kim Jong Il’s government, strained relations with South Korea, elevated the status of China in East Asia, and forced North Korea to expand its nuclear weapons program as an act of self-defense.

Keywords: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; International Atomic Energy Agency; George W. Bush; Bush Doctrine; Republic of Korea; Kim Dae-jung; Sunshine Policy; Kim Jong Il; KEDO; Colin L. Powell; The Agreed Framework; OPLAN 5027; “Axis of Evil”; Hawk Engagement; People’s Republic of China; Nuclear Posture Review; Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU); Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; Proliferation Security Initiative; Iraq War; Six-Party Talks; CVID; North Korean Human Rights Act.

On 13 October 2008, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) notified the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that it was lifting its ban the United Nations conducting inspections of the nuclear processing plant at Yongbyon, 60 miles north of its capital at Pyongyang. It also announced that it would resume deactivating a
related nuclear facility within days. These actions came in response to the United States fulfilling its commitment to remove North Korea from its list of states sponsoring international terrorism, making it possible for the DPRK to gain access to funding for economic development through the International Monetary Fund. Three months earlier, Washington had refused, however, to take this action after having pledged to do so, insisting that Pyongyang first agree to allow unlimited inspections throughout North Korea. Breaking the impasse, the United States agreed that inspection of any suspected nuclear site would require mutual consent.¹ This series of events matched and maintained a pattern in U.S.-DPRK relations that took hold after George W. Bush became president in January 2001 and continued until he left office eight years later. Rather than seeking a resolution of the second North Korean nuclear crisis, the Bush administration, as this article will document, consistently pursued a policy purposely aimed at creating roadblocks to delay progress toward an agreement because its primary objective was not a settlement with, but rather destruction of the DPRK.

Evidence indicates that when the Bush administration assumed power, a foreign policy priority was achieving regime change in nations hostile toward the United States, among them North Korea. The collapse of Communist governments in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union after 1989 convinced many Americans that the DPRK’s demise was imminent as well. However, it survived the devastating impact of diplomatic isolation, natural disasters, economic destitution, mass deprivation, and the death of founder Kim Il Sung, frustrating rightwing U.S. foreign policy analysts. Several of Bush’s security advisors were determined to eliminate this vestige of the Cold War that stood in defiance of U.S. hegemony following victory in its contest with the Soviet Union. They never genuinely entertained the thought of meaningful negotiations with Pyongyang, as reflected in public references to the DPRK as a rogue state that starved its people and had no regard for human life. But their characterization of Pyongyang as a dangerous and unfathomable regime argued in favor of honest and respectful communication to avoid misunderstandings that might ignite an unwanted conflict. Bush, however, preferred confrontation to conciliation. When he made his first telephone calls to world leaders in February 2001, South Korea’s President Kim Dae-jung spoke of the need to engage North Korea. “Who is this guy?,” Bush remarked after putting his hand over the mouthpiece. “I can’t believe how naïve he is.”²
Chung-in Moon and Jong-yun Bae, political science professors at Yonsei University, contend that the “Bush Doctrine” raised the odds against the establishment of a constructive U.S.-DPRK relationship. “Its moral absolutism, hegemonic unilateralism, offensive realism, and focus on weapons of mass destruction and global terrorism,” they assert, “radically changed the terms of American engagement with North Korea.”

Not only was Bush unenthusiastic about international agreements, but his approach gave very little consideration to the interests of the Republic of Korea (ROK). Shortly after becoming president of South Korea early in 1997, Kim Dae-jung initiated a “Sunshine Policy” toward the DPRK that sought engagement, while putting off reunification, not least because it might cost $3.2 trillion to rehabilitate North Korea. Kim Dae-jung’s pursuit of reconciliation climaxed in a personal meeting with Kim Jong Il in Pyongyang, where he stated on 17 June 2000 that “Koreans no longer need to live under the constant threat of an imminent war.” Unfortunately, the summit did not lead to new confidence building measures. In part, this was because North Korea was becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the lack of progress toward implementing the Agreed Framework former President Jimmy Carter had negotiated in 1994 to end the first nuclear crisis when Washington almost staged air strikes to destroy the Yongbyon facility. “In that deal,” journalist Todd Crowell explains, “Pyongyang agreed to shut down its one operating reactor, stop construction on two others and leave the nuclear fuel untouched rather than extracting plutonium from the spent fuel rods” in return for 500,000 tons annually of heavy fuel oil to burn power plants, $4.5 billion to build two nuclear-powered electricity plants that did not produce weapons-grade (plutonium) waste, and negotiations to normalize U.S.-DPRK relations.

In 1995, the United States, Japan, and the ROK formed Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), an international consortium to build nuclear plants at Kumho on the east coast of the DPRK. Several factors impeded prompt fulfillment of the Agreed Framework, in particular the 1997 East Asian Financial Crisis. Economic distress prevented Japan and the ROK from arranging financing until 1999. U.S. bipartisan distrust and dislike of North Korea translated into Congress not appropriating funds to build the reactors, although it did pay for the fuel oil. But Pyongyang shared responsibility for delaying the process with high wage demands and opposition to Seoul’s participation. More important was its aggressive behavior,
notably the grounding of a DPRK submarine off the ROK coast on a spy mission in September 1996 and the firing of a missile over Japan in August 1998. While South Korea withheld funds for the nuclear plants, the United States delayed lifting economic sanctions. Not until August 2002 did KEDO pour concrete at Kumho for the reactor containment building for light-water reactor (LWR) Unit 1, with only site plans in place for Unit 2. By early 2001, the DPRK began to speak of resuming its nuclear program because of KEDO’s lack of progress. “As the Clinton presidency came to an end,” Jonathan D. Pollack, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, writes, “U.S.-North Korean relations remained uncertain, incomplete, and far from satisfactory for either country.” The Bush administration saw opportunity in this situation. The new president’s hawkish foreign policy advisors believed that Clinton had been too solicitous toward North Korea. A major policy shift was at hand.

Clinton’s embrace of the “Sunshine Policy” had brought U.S.-North Korean relations to the brink of normalization. Bush’s reversal of U.S. North Korea policy shortly after his inauguration on 20 January 2001 would ignite the second North Korean nuclear crisis. The following month, the president voiced his acute displeasure after Kim Dae-jung joined Russian President Vladimir Putin in a public declaration of support for respecting the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Bush already was moving toward voiding this agreement in preparation to persuade Congress to approve his plan to construct a national missile defense system (NMD). A central justification for the new U.S. policy was the threat from North Korea, indicating a lack of interest in seeking an arms control agreement. Bush made this clear when the ROK president visited Washington in March 2001. With Kim Dae-jung seated next to him, the new president stated bluntly that there was nothing to talk about with North Korea until it fulfilled prior commitments. Apparently, Bush was acting on the advice of military advisors. On 6 March, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell told reporters, as President Kim was arriving in Washington that the new administration would pick up where its predecessor had left off with respect to North Korea. He quickly learned that he was mistaken, announcing the next day that he had “gotten ahead of his skis.” Washington would not negotiate with North Korea, he explained, until Pyongyang was willing to broaden the issues for discussion to include not only nuclear disarmament, but reduction of its conventional capabilities. Rather than using the
Agreed Framework as the foundation for a comprehensive settlement with the DPRK. Boston University Political Science Professor Walter C. Clemens, Jr. reports, “the record shows that the Bush administration did what it could to poison the atmosphere and sabotage the prospect of an accommodation with North Korea.”12 One reason was a preference for policies that were “Anything But Clinton” (ABC). Initially, the Clinton administration had hesitated to implement the Agreed Framework because it thought the DPRK’s collapse was imminent, but it soon realized that failing to engage North Korea, as Scott Snyder, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, writes, only would create a “negotiating stalemate” which would “reinforce the old negotiating dynamic of threat, crisis, and brinkmanship.”13 It is clear that DPRK leader Kim Jong Il at first wanted to “pick up where we had left off” and resume direct talks with the United States, but the Bush administration insisted on multilateral negotiations in the belief that world pressure would force North Korea to submit. Bush defended his adoption of a tougher policy toward the DPRK, arguing that Pyongyang could not be trusted because it was refusing to fulfill its prior agreements, even though he presented no evidence to substantiate this claim. Indeed, on 19 March 2002, George J. Tenet, director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), testified to Congress that North Korea was complying with the Agreed Framework. Many scholars have concurred with this judgment. Kim Jong Il also was respecting a moratorium on missile tests he had declared in 1999, although he had done so contingent on progress toward completing the Kumho plants. Professor of International Relations at the University of Southern California David C. Kang concludes that Pyongyang wanted a settlement because it needed outside help to revive its economy.14

In 2001, North Korea began enacting reforms allowing for a degree of free enterprise and pursuing cooperative economic ventures with South Korea, notably the tourist site at Kumgang and the industrial village at Kaesong.15 His approach contradicted the ideology of juche or self-reliance that had been the basis for his father Kim Il Sung’s right to rule. Following Kim Il Sung’s death in 1994, Kim Jong Il substituted the principle of songun (military first) in deciding national priorities.16 Professor of Asian Affairs at Georgetown University Victor D. Cha has described how North Korean leaders recognized that they had limited resources for economic modernization and expansion of their conventional military capabilities. Pyongyang therefore refused to
abandon development of nuclear weapons because this seemed the best way to meet its security needs. Cha emphasizes that the DPRK’s goal was deterrence, forcing its enemies to be cautious and prudent in dealing with North Korea. Bush’s confrontational rhetoric beginning in the spring of 2001 understandably alarmed the North Koreans, increasing their suspicions about the new administration’s intentions. The revival of public U.S. hostility toward the DPRK guaranteed a renewed crisis. For the previous half century, the DPRK had educated its people to fear the United States as a grave threat to its security. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 removed a key source of protection, intensifying these fears. Kim Il Sung’s interest in possessing atomic weapons dated from China’s explosion of a nuclear device in 1964, but securing a nuclear weapons capability now seemed essential to deter threats from the United States. President Kim Dae-jung’s “Sunshine Policy” assumed that self-defense was the primary motive behind Pyongyang’s military strategy, with a priority on developing a nuclear weapons capability as the only way to ensure its security and survival.

Disregarding North Korea’s right to protect itself, Bush demanded that it disarm as a condition to begin negotiations. The administration wanted to isolate and minimize contact with North Korea, while it developed a comprehensive policy. There was strong support for Bush’s new confrontational approach, given the accepted popular conviction that Kim Jong Il was insane. “Very few policy-makers, security analysts and journalists,” University of Queensland Professor of International Relations Roland Bleiker laments, “ever make the effort to imagine how threats are perceived from the North Korean perspective, or consider how these perceptions are part of an interactive security dilemma in which . . . [American] foreign policy . . . is implicated as deeply as the vilified regime in Pyongyang.” Most Americans who paid attention to North Korea instead shared the Bush administration’s belief that the DPRK was a profound threat to peace in Northeast Asia. Time magazine early in 2003 reported that it maintained a standing army of one million troops—the world’s fourth largest—with an estimated 4.7 million more in reserve. It also kept a massive store of artillery shells and hundreds of Scud missiles that it could load with biological and chemical agents and rain down on South Korea and the 37,000 U.S. troops stationed there. At the time, Cha reported that the DPRK also had 3,500 tanks, 2,500 personnel carriers, 10,600 artillery guns, 2,600 multiple rocket launchers, and more than 500 warplanes. In fact, North
Korea represents less of a conventional military threat to South Korea than these statistics suggest. Professor of Pacific and Asian History at Australian National University Gavan McCormack explains, for example, how "much of this equipment is vintage 1960s (some even 1950s)." North Korea’s military, he adds, is "dilapidated and antiquated," lacking fuel for sustained use of its armored vehicles and aircraft.  

Logic suggested that North Korea no longer contemplated an unprovoked attack on South Korea because it understood that doing so would ignite a blistering counterattack resulting in its extinction. "Pyongyang’s end game has changed from one of hegemonic unification,” Cha and Kang explain, “to basic survival” because it faces a superior adversary. The ROK has a far stronger economy, making possible much higher military expenditures. For example, in 1998, it spent twice as much on defense than Pyongyang, although this represented just 3.5 percent of its budget as compared to 37.9 percent in the DPRK. Moreover, the ROK has cutting-edge weaponry and sophisticated communications, intelligence, and electronic warfare capabilities. Hiding this disparity, however, was North Korea’s missile program. Time’s January 2003 article provided an example of how Pyongyang’s possession and testing of these weapons caused tremendous anxiety:

Pyongyang yields a huge stash of short- and medium-range missiles, including at least 100 Nodong missiles [with a 1,500-pound payload] capable of striking Japan. U.S. intelligence officials say Pyongyang wants to become the first rogue state capable of striking the U.S. homeland with a missile. In 1998 the North Koreans test-fired a three-stage Taepo Dong-1 rocket that landed in the Pacific Ocean. The Pentagon believes that North Korea is developing an intercontinental ballistic missile, the Taepo Dong-2, that could reach Alaska, Hawaii and possibly California. 

Terrified Americans envisioned North Korea’s mounting nuclear warheads on these missiles. The Agreed Framework, however, had halted the DPRK’s processing of spent nuclear fuel that U.S. officials believed had yielded enough plutonium to produce one or two bombs. The Bush administration amplified these numbers, causing Jonathan Pollack to remark in 2003 how its estimates were “highly inconsistent.”
In June 2001, the Bush administration conducted its first major review of U.S. policy toward the DPRK, which resulted in replacement of “malign neglect” with a policy of leveling unilateral demands. The United States would resume negotiations with North Korea only after it had met certain conditions: Pyongyang had to agree to discuss all issues of concern to the United States, to include nuclear weapons, missiles, and human rights violations. Any agreement required provisions for verification of compliance. Ignoring pleas from David Gregg, former U.S. ambassador to the ROK, and his father, former President George H.W. Bush, to continue the “Sunshine Policy,” Bush “opted for a waiting game with Pyongyang,” while developing the NMD that received congressional funding in December 2001.\textsuperscript{27} For North Korea, these events heightened fears that the new administration was planning a military assault to overthrow the DPRK, especially after newspapers reported Bush’s approval of revisions in the U.S. operational battle plan for Korea (OPLAN 5027) that substantially expanded the target list, timetable, and depth of a U.S. counteroffensive on Pyongyang. “When we’re done, they will not be able to mount any military activity of any kind,” one U.S. official remarked about OPLAN 5027. “We will kill them all.”\textsuperscript{28} Moving beyond a Korea policy of ABC, Bush shifted from a strategy of deterrence that Kang argues was working to one aimed at compellence of Kim’s regime either to disarm entirely or disappear.\textsuperscript{29}

Jasper Becker, publisher of \textit{Asia Weekly} magazine, praised Bush’s pursuit of regime change in North Korea, citing a moral obligation to encourage the collapse of the DPRK. He and other writers describe how Pyongyang’s failed economic doctrine has created enormous popular suffering, climaxing in the death of perhaps three million people in the 1990s as a result of malnutrition and starvation.\textsuperscript{30} No one would disagree that the regime is odious and repulsive. “After misgoverning, manipulating, oppressing, and lying to its people for fifty years,” McCormack writes, “the Kim family has forfeited any right to govern.” Critics also viewed Kim Jong Il as mentally imbalanced. But Cha and Kang insist that the DPRK “is neither irrational nor undeterrible.” “Emotion and ideology,” they observe, “have often interfered with the reasoned study of North Korea, and this has led scholars and policymakers to consistently overestimate the North Korean threat and to misunderstand the motivations behind North Korea’s actions.”\textsuperscript{31} “North Korean negotiators,” Snyder explains, “have shown remarkably consistent style, behavior, and objectives in their interactions with
American officials.” He describes how a pattern of “drama and catastrophe” has governed U.S.-DPRK talks on missiles, the return of prisoner of war remains, and KEDO, with Pyongyang being inflexible at the outset to probe for weakness in its adversary. Its initial goal in negotiations has been to establish a baseline and parameters for a framework leading to a “package solution.” Progress has required building a trusting relationship and adhering to “the principle of simultaneity of action.” “Taking action that humiliates a vulnerable negotiating counterpart,” Snyder concludes, “may make the uncertain prospect of future cooperation [with the DPRK] even less likely.”

On 11 September, 2001 the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon provided a pretext for the Bush administration to intensify its pressure on North Korea, shifting its policy from NMD to elimination of its nuclear capabilities. Bush’s first priority, however, was initiating a war to destroy the Taliban in Afghanistan, informing other nations that they were “either with us or against us.” He also prepared for a U.S. military assault on Iraq. A clear indication that these issues were linked came on 29 January 2002 when President Bush in his State of the Union address declared that the DPRK was part of an “Axis of Evil” that included Iran and Iraq. Bush spoke just weeks before his scheduled trip to South Korea, where he was to meet with ROK President Kim Dae-jung. His transparent objective was to apply pressure on Kim to replace conciliation with confrontation in his policy toward North Korea. But the Bush administration had other motives. First, combining North Korea with Iran and Iraq in an “Axis of Evil” would counter claims that the United States was waging a “war on terrorism” against Islamic states alone. Second, it sought to purge whatever public support remained for the Agreed Framework. Third, emphasis on how Pyongyang’s nuclear program posed a grave threat to the United States would compel Congress to continue financing for its proposed NMD. Fourth, and most important, Bush was acting on the advice of his hawkish advisors who long had urged isolating and increasing pressure on the DPRK to encourage the collapse of its Communist regime. His public commitment to the DPRK’s demise only confirmed Pyongyang’s belief that possessing nuclear capability was essential for its self-defense.

By then, Bush had decided to implement an aggressive strategy to accelerate the fall of the DPRK that Victor Cha, an administration advisor, labeled at that time “Hawk Engagement.” Cha reported that the
The president considered engagement to be helpful, but viewed its main value as exposing North Korea’s true malevolent intent. The policy, Cha explained, was “neither the twin nor the opposite of [Clinton’s], but rather a buffed-up cousin” that had five new elements: “insistence on improved implementation of the Agreed Framework; verifiable controls on the North’s missile production and exports; a way to address the posture of conventional forces; a demand for reciprocal gestures in return for compromises with the North; and close coordination with allies.” Abandoning Clinton’s approach of seeking to build transparency, confidence, and a sense of security, Bush’s policy would create a rationale for punitive action.

Through establishing conditions for cooperation that the administration knew Pyongyang never could accept, it ensured rejection, providing justification for charges of unreasonable inflexibility. Peter Hayes, executive director of the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, explains how Bush sought to exploit North Korea’s economic weakness to achieve regime change, thereby eliminating the DPRK as a military threat. If Pyongyang refused to end its nuclear program, this would alienate the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia. Furthermore, U.S. allies would unite behind a policy to disarm North Korea if it exploded a nuclear device. Nations with different reasons for hating North Korea would join in imposing stiff economic sanctions, causing the DPRK to collapse.

Political leaders in Japan, China, and especially the ROK raised objections to Bush’s belligerent and provocative characterization of North Korea. The president tried to calm fears that he was instigating a crisis during meetings with his counterparts in these nations, but he maintained his tougher line. During 2001, the number of construction workers at Kumho plummeted from 1,500 to only a hundred with South Korea and Japan having spent $1.5 billion to finish just 35 percent of the work. Brookings Institution Senior Fellow Michael O’Hanlon and George Washington University Professor of Political Science and International Affairs Mike Mochizuki have criticized Bush’s decision to scuttle the Agreed Framework. “At the time, the United States was accused of giving in to North Korean blackmail,” they write, “but the deal the administration signed was a smart one: energy in exchange for energy and non-proliferation.” Responding to Bush’s increasing confrontational tone, Pyongyang acted to exploit rising friction between Washington and Seoul, seeking to improve relations with the ROK through encouraging contact across the demilitarized zone and joint
economic ventures. North Korea already had been working to elevate its international status, normalizing relations with Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Italy, Britain, Spain, Luxembourg, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Greece, and the European Union. Kim Jong Il also made overtures to Japan, resulting in Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro’s visit to Pyongyang in the fall of 2002 to discuss steps toward ending five decades of mutual hostility. Meanwhile, Secretary of State Powell had attempted to convince Pyongyang of U.S. sincerity in wanting to arrive at a negotiated settlement. In April, he stated in testimony before Congress that the administration was willing to discuss its differences with the North Koreans any time, any place, and even in a bilateral context. McCormack emphasizes, however, that this meant “talks to North Korea . . . not negotiations with North Korea.”

Charles L. Pritchard, the Bush administration’s representative to KEDO and then special envoy for negotiations with North Korea, has contended that Powell’s desire for a diplomatic agreement with North Korea was genuine, but administration hardliners undermined his efforts. In April, Pyongyang agreed to a resumption of bilateral negotiations, he reports, leading to the development of a “Bold Approach” for submission to Pyongyang that summer. Two incidents then persuaded Bush to shift course and postpone a meeting with North Korea. First, a DPRK warship sunk an ROK patrol boat, killing a number of South Korean sailors. Second, new information surfaced, apparently confirming evidence that Pyongyang was developing an alternate nuclear arms program in violation of the Agreed Framework. In September, the State Department was ready to meet with North Korea, but its “Bold Approach” no longer would be the issue for discussion. Just seventeen hours after receiving Washington’s invitation, Pyongyang agreed to the meeting. “The speed with which [it] approved the request (and all the add ons),” Pritchard observes, “was testimony to how much it valued the opportunity to develop a relationship with the United States and the Bush administration.” But Bush’s hawkish advisors had other plans, having already completed work on a Nuclear Posture Review. A key provision of this new U.S. strategic doctrine asserted the right to stage preventive attacks against terrorists and rogue states that possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). Significantly, in September, Presidential Decision Directive 17 explicitly listed North Korea as a target of preemption in two possible scenarios—countering an attack on South Korea and halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Observers conveniently ignored
how these decisions contradicted a U.S. pledge in the Agreed Framework not to threaten or target North Korea for a nuclear attack. In June 2002, journalist Seymour M. Hersh reported intelligence information that North Korea was working on a nuclear weapons program using Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) caused the Bush administration to adopt a policy shift triggering “larger policy consequences that have redefined the East Asia political and security landscape.” In fact, the Clinton administration had received evidence in 1997 and 1998 that the DPRK was producing small amounts of HEU. Although not a violation of the Agreed Framework, which had suspended enrichment of plutonium, Pyongyang had pledged not to enrich uranium when it signed an agreement with the ROK in 1991. Clinton’s advisors had briefed the incoming administration about this, but Bush and his advisors did not make the information public. Pyongyang may have initiated an HEU weapons program as a hedge against the United States, Japan, and the ROK not implementing controversial provisions of the Agreed Framework, but it is just as likely that it sought an independent means to operate the Kumho LWRs, avoiding dependence on the United States for access to fuel. Not only were other signatories of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) enriching uranium for fuel to power their LWRs, but North Korea was not obligated to allow inspection of undeclared sites until KEDO completed a significant portion of its work. In any event, the Bush administration, without proof, had decided that the DPRK had a secret program, privately advising congressional leaders to delay funding for the Kumho reactors because Pyongyang was violating the NPT. In May, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John R. Bolton accused North Korea of not cooperating with the IAEA in allowing unfettered inspections to verify compliance with the NPT. In June 2002, the CIA submitted a top secret National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that assessed North Korea’s nuclear program. Affirming that the DPRK was enriching HEU in violation of the Agreed Framework, its more incendiary information reported that since 1997, Pakistan had been assisting North Korea to develop a second method to acquire fissionable material by producing weapons grade uranium from natural uranium. In return for sharing “sophisticated technology, warhead-design information, and weapons-testing data,” Pakistan was able to purchase missiles from the DPRK, providing it with precious export income. Using Pakistani high-speed centrifuge machines, North
Korean scientists began to enrich large quantities of uranium in 2001. The United States was aware that Abdul Qadeer Khan, Pakistan’s leading nuclear scientist, was operating a black market, selling nuclear components, but did not interfere, so as not to compromise sources and methods or jeopardize its relations with Pakistan. Selig S. Harrison, Asia Program director at the Center for International Policy, has claimed that Khan made the last of thirteen trips to North Korea in June 2002 to learn missile technology. In addition to the reactor, chemical separation plant, and fuel fabrication facility at Yongbyon, the DPRK allegedly was processing uranium ore at Pyongsan and Pakchon. Pakistani leader Pervez Musharraf denied in October 2002 that Khan had shared any nuclear information with North Korea. Two years later, as former State Department officials Mitchell B. Reiss and Robert Gallucci stress, Khan confessed to providing the DPRK with centrifuge prototypes and blueprints, which enabled Pyongyang to begin its HEU program.  

Hersh has emphasized that Bush held the NIE in confidence that summer and into the fall during his campaign to build support for waging war against Iraq. A Japanese diplomat later attributed this delay to the need to coordinate with U.S. allies. Yet in July, Condoleezza Rice, National Security Council (NSC) advisor, recommended in a letter to Congress, the continued shipment to North Korea of fuel oil and parts for the Kumho LWRs. Professor of History at the University of Chicago Bruce Cumings questions the conclusiveness of the CIA’s report, explaining how Bush

senior officials demand access to raw Intelligence before it has been vetted for accuracy and reliability by the CIA and other agencies, a process known as “stovepiping”. This means that Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz judge the veracity of reports from the field themselves (or with their staffers) without the information having first been “subjected to rigorous scrutiny”, and then rush the most damning reports into speeches, such as those intended to make the case for war in Iraq.

Moreover, he emphasizes how it would require the use of 1,000 centrifuges over four or five years to manufacture one or two large unwieldy atomic bombs on the Pakistan model. Nevertheless, the Bush administration insisted that North Korea was secretly developing HEU for use in deployment of weapons by mid-decade. Harrison wrote
at the time, however, that only confirming the existence of operational enrichment facilities would prove the accuracy of these charges. Bush administration officials looked to Pakistan to verify their claims, but Musharraf continued to deny the allegations. As annoying, British intelligence issued a report confirming that Pakistan shared nuclear technology only with Libya.\textsuperscript{51}

Serious doubts existed about whether Pyongyang had an HEU program. “The imprecision in the CIA analysis,” Clemens contends, “underscored the difficulties of estimating the capabilities and ultimate purposes of [its] enrichment program—a point that begs the question of how complete and compelling the intelligence data may have been on which the United States decided to confront North Korea.”\textsuperscript{52} Acting on what he wanted to believe, Bush chose to use the HEU issue to ignite the second North Korea nuclear crisis. On 3 October 2002, James Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, accompanied by a delegation of administration officials, set off for two days of talks in Pyongyang. NSC hardliners, Hersh explains, provided him with a carefully scripted message, demanding that North Korea halt its uranium enrichment program as a condition for further discussions because it was in violation of the Agreed Framework and the NPT. In response, his counterpart Kim Gye-gwan denied the accusation and abruptly adjourned the meeting after less than an hour, ending what Pritchard, who was present, later called “a bad caricature of a party game gone wrong.” According to Japanese sources, Kelly’s charge shocked North Korean leaders, who met in an all-night session to decide on a course of action. Meeting again the next day, Kelly repeated his accusation. Refusing to discuss the HEU issue, Kim replied that ”the United States did not have a real desire to move forward to resolve the issues and . . . was attempting to disarm North Korea and change its system by means of force, coercion, and pressure.” Since it now had become clear that the United States planned “to carry out a policy of ‘strangulation,’ Pyongyang had no choice but to counter with an ultrahard-line response of its own.”\textsuperscript{53}

Later that afternoon, Kelly met with higher-level North Korean representatives. Kang reports that Vice Foreign Minister Kang Suk-ju, “in a flustered and uncharacteristically unscripted fashion,” declared that the DPRK had the right to pursue nuclear capabilities because Bush had named it as part of an “Axis of Evil,” adding that Pyongyang had even “stronger weapons” for use in retaliation against a U.S. attack.
Furthermore, the U.S. preemption doctrine justified North Korea’s reinforcing its Military First Policy and modernizing its military to the maximum extent possible. After listing U.S. failures to fulfill the Agreed Framework, including the promise not to threaten or stage a nuclear attack on the DPRK, Kang offered a pledge, Pritchard reports, to discuss the HEU program in return for a U.S. promise “to recognize North Korea’s system of government; conclude a peace agreement with a nonaggression commitment; and not interfere with North Korea’s economic development.” Pritchard acknowledges that he made “no precise, irrefutable statement—a smoking gun”—admitting the DPRK had an HEU program, explaining how the delegation reached this conclusion after piecing together the North Korean’s words. Most convincing was Kang’s statement that Pyongyang required more developed weapons to occupy an equal footing with the United States in negotiations. Translations of the transcripts of these meetings have differed, raising doubts about U.S. claims. Lacking firm confirmation as well was a report that Ri Gun, North Korea’s chief negotiator, later told Kelly privately that the DPRK already had nuclear weapons and was prepared to test or sell them if the United States continued its threatening, confrontational policy. Tim Beal, senior lecturer at Victoria University, concludes that these rumors have combined with American negotiators interpreting what they heard as what they wanted to hear to transform North Korea’s alleged HEU admission into “a sort of urban myth.”

Observers continue to debate the reasons behind North Korea’s apparent admission that it had an HEU program. Kongdan Oh, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, and Ralph C. Hassig, a social psychologist, assert that Kim Jong Il was attempting to demonstrate his dash and daring as a military leader; defying the United States and unsettling the DPRK’s neighbors would impress his people. They agree with Jung-hoon Lee and Chung-in Moon, political science professors at Yonsei University, who suggest that it was only a repetition of Pyongyang’s previous pattern of blackmail, raising the stakes to secure more political and economic rewards. But this was an act of desperation, reflecting Kim Jong Il’s recognition that North Korea needed to end its isolation, but could not without destabilizing his regime. According to Cha and Kang, North Korea continued to develop nuclear weapons to deter a threatening adversary. Since the DPRK quickly accepted the U.S. invitation to meet, Professor of International Affairs at Australian
National University Peter Van Ness reasons that Pyongyang may have been making a display of goodwill as part of a campaign to rehabilitate its image. Other writers emphasize that Vice Minister Kang later denied admitting to Kelly the existence of an HEU program, responding only after Washington issued a public statement claiming he had made the admission. Foreign Minister Paek Nam-sun insisted that what Kang said was “deliberately ambiguous,” stating “that North Korea is ‘entitled’ to have such a program or ‘an even more powerful one’ to deter a preemptive U.S. attack,” Selig Harrison reports. “According to Paek, Kang also stated that North Korea is entitled to pursue an ‘ncnd’ (neither confirm nor deny) policy concerning the specifics of its nuclear capabilities, just as the United States does—especially since the two countries remain belligerents in the technically unfinished Korean War.”57

During Kelly’s visit to Pyongyang, Congress was debating the resolution authorizing military action against Iraq, diverting the Bush administration’s attention away from the crisis it had ignited with North Korea. The State Department did not disclose Pyongyang’s alleged admission that it had an HEU program until 15 October, four days after Bush received congressional approval to overthrow Saddam Hussein’s regime. On 25 October, an official DPRK statement blamed the United States for the dispute and offered a “grand bargain” to resolve all bilateral differences. Washington swept this offer aside. On 14 November, after securing approval from a reluctant Japan and the ROK, it suspended oil shipments to North Korea to punish it for violating the Agreed Framework. While Kelly’s charges had shocked DPRK leaders, they reacted to Bush’s retaliatory action with anger. Oddly, U.S. leaders seemed surprised when, in December, Pyongyang announced that it planned to withdraw from the NPT pursuant to reopening its 20-megawatt nuclear reactor and processing plant at Yongbyon. It then removed monitoring devices, expelled IAEA inspectors, and resumed reprocessing of plutonium rods.58 The Bush administration’s condemnations of North Korea’s duplicity and malevolence dominated U.S. newspaper and television coverage. *Time* described how DPRK officials, in a party-like atmosphere, cut the seals and covered the cameras at the facility in front of IAEA inspectors. They staged an instant replay the next day at cooling ponds holding dormant fuel rods. *Time* judged these actions “the clearest sign yet that Pyongyang is intent on pushing the stand-off to the brink.” North Korea instead declared
early in 2003 its willingness to halt its nuclear weapons program, if the United States would agree to sign a non-aggression treaty with the DPRK. Washington rejected this proposal and then halted grain shipments to North Korea.59

“Seemingly overnight,” Time reported in January 2003, “the U.S. begins the New Year eyeball to eyeball with a paranoid, ruthless regime hell-bent on obtaining nuclear weapons to complement an army the Pentagon rates among the most formidable in the world.” Harrison interpreted this sudden turn of events differently. “With stunning rapidity,” he contended, “the Bush administration had ended a decade of U.S. diplomatic arrangements with North Korea to eliminate its nuclear weapons program based on a CIA report describing its HEU enrichment efforts as a distant and uncertain possibility.” The evidence that Washington provided Japan, Russia, and South Korea did not confirm plant construction, but only

that North Korea has made efforts to buy equipment that could be used to make and operate centrifuges. This equipment includes electrical-frequency converters, high-purity cobalt powder for magnetic-top bearing assemblies, and high-strength aluminum tubes.

Harrison concluded at the time, based on scanty evidence, that North Korea had received only aluminum tubes. He then elaborated on the daunting task ahead for Pyongyang’s alleged HEU program:

Richard Garwin, a respected nuclear scientist, has estimated that 1,300 high-performance centrifuges would have to operate full time for three years to make the 60 kilograms of fissile material needed for a basic (“gun-type”) nuclear weapon. Accomplishing that would require an enormous sustained input of electricity, without fluctuation or interruption. Moreover, the operation of a multi-centrifuge “cascade” requires a high-powered motor with a speed twice that of a MiG-21 jet engine. North Korea cannot produce engines even for its Russian-supplied MiGs, and it has only limited, highly unreliable electricity capabilities.

Pyongyang also would need hundreds of frequency converters, as well as other key components that it did not possess, especially a special grade of steel for rotors and caps and rotor bearings.60
Reiss and Gallucci directly disputed the validity of Harrison’s assessment. They argued that the DPRK had the ability to create an HEU enrichment program and then buy the equipment and components necessary to build nuclear weapons. Pyongyang, Reiss and Gallucci claimed, possessed plenty of money raised from currency counterfeiting, narcotics smuggling, and cigarette pirating. “Second,” they write,

in April 2003, French, German, and Egyptian authorities intercepted a 22-ton shipment of high-strength aluminum tubes acquired for North Korea by a German firm. In November of that year, a representative from Urenco, the European uranium-enrichment consortium, testified in a German court that the dimensions of those tubes—which were intercepted en route to North Korea—matched the technical requirements for vacuum casings for a Urenco centrifuge. A German newspaper reported that North Korea had attempted to circumvent German, and presumably Chinese, export controls by claiming that the tubes were intended for a Chinese company, Shenyang Aircraft Corporation. It is particularly noteworthy that the specifications for the German aluminum tubes are essentially identical to those used by a Malaysian company in manufacturing outer centrifuge casings for Libya’s formerly clandestine gas-centrifuge uranium-enrichment program.

Reiss and Gallucci insisted that it did not require much energy to enrich uranium sufficiently to build nuclear weapons. It was vital, they believed, for the Bush administration to act so that Pyongyang could not sell nuclear weapons to terrorists. Joshua Muravchik, a neoconservative scholar at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Research, strongly agreed, applauding Bush for ending a long appeasement policy that allowed North Korea to manipulate U.S. illusions and fears. The reality, he insisted, was that diplomacy and incentives would not stop the DPRK in its determination to secure nuclear weapons.61

Many writers have questioned the wisdom of the United States in pursuing a policy that incited North Korea to resume its plutonium enrichment program. “By scuttling the 1994 agreement on the basis of uncertain data that it presented with absolute certitude, and by insisting that North Korea ‘confess’ to the existence of a uranium program before new negotiations on denuclearization [could] begin,” Selig Harrison has observed, “the Bush administration . . . blocked action on the one present
threat that North Korea was known to pose: the threat represented by its reprocessed plutonium, which could be used for nuclear weapons or transferred to third parties.” At the time, James Laney, former U.S. ambassador to the ROK, worried that the situation “could spin out of control.” He urged immediate U.S. reengagement with North Korea, focusing on the plutonium because it required just six months to process the 8,000 rods as compared to two or three years for enrichment of HEU.62 Explanations of Bush’s decision have varied. First, Cha highlighted two impending deadlines that persuaded the administration of the necessity to act. According to the Agreed Framework, completion of the Kumho reactors was to occur in 2003. The next phase required implementing critical provisions that would test the intentions of both parties, persuading Bush of the need to abandon the agreement if Pyongyang did not accept revisions. Also, Kim Jong Il’s self-imposed missile testing moratorium, which was contingent on continued progress in U.S.-DPRK dialogue, would end in December 2002.63 These deadlines therefore provided the impetus for the Bush administration to implement the next logical step in its policy of Hawk Engagement.

Harrison identifies a second explanation as rooted in resolution of an internal debate that began at the start of Bush’s presidency over “whether to give the North Koreans an ultimatum or to negotiate...” Bush agreed with hardliners that “North Korea is a failing Stalinist dictatorship held together only by the ruthless repression of a mad ruler who dreams of firing nuclear weapons at Los Angeles.” During August 2002, the president finally decided at his Texas Ranch that it was time to overthrow the regime, waving his finger in the air and shouting “I loathe Kim Jong Il!” He elaborated self-righteously how he had “a visceral reaction to this guy, because he is starving his people.” Canceling plans to follow the “Bold Approach” at the next meeting, Bush’s strategy was to use claims of the HEU program to unite world opinion against Pyongyang, justifying the imposition of economic sanctions that would hasten the fall of the DPRK. Harrison contended at the time that Bush was acting on his belief in the U.S. right to impose democracy and capitalism on other nations because these were the only proper and legitimate systems in the world.64 Less extreme, Crowell speculated that Bush falsely characterized Pyongyang’s enrichment of uranium as a weapons program to mask his real aim of preventing the DPRK from avoiding dependence on the United States for fuel to operate its LWRs. The administration could not admit its true intention without agreeing
with Pyongyang that it purposely had misrepresented Kang’s comments to Kelly.  

A third explanation holds that the administration constrained Kelly’s flexibility in Pyongyang in October 2002, unintentionally creating the impasse. Washington did not intend to terminate the Agreed Framework, waiting for the North Koreans to nullify the agreement. When Kelly arrived for the highest level U.S. talks with the DPRK since Bush had assumed office, North Korea wanted to resume dialogue, but the American diplomat, following instructions, acted in a highly “arrogant manner” when he made accusations. As expected, Pyongyang reacted with anger and hostility, initiating another round of crisis diplomacy. Having trapped North Korea, Bush then could implement Hawk Engagement. As one U.S. intelligence official who attended White House meetings in late 2002 told Hersh, matching public remarks about the desire for compromise was much private talk of vindication:

Bush and Cheney want that guy’s head on a platter. Don’t be distracted by all this talk about negotiations. There will be negotiations, but they have a plan, and they are going to get this guy after Iraq. He’s their version of [Adolf] Hitler.

Indeed, early in 2003, Bush initiated a diplomatic full-court press against North Korea, sending Kelly and Bolton to Moscow, Beijing, Seoul, and Tokyo to lobby for the imposition of stiff sanctions.

Finally, some writers contend that Bush created the second nuclear crisis to short-circuit North Korea’s strategy of building international sympathy and support. To discredit the “Axis of Evil” speech, Pyongyang had taken successful steps to build constructive political, economic, and cultural relations with Russia, Japan, and a dozen Western nations. Its positive response to the “Sunshine Policy” in South Korea resulted in many examples of cooperation, promoting increasingly cordial relations between Seoul and Pyongyang. Bush administration opposition to inter-Korean collaboration on such issues as mine clearing and joint economic ventures, combined with the misbehavior of U.S. soldiers, inflamed rising anti-Americanism among South Koreans. Creating the HEU crisis on the eve of the presidential election, along with supporting a candidate who advocated a tough policy toward North Korea, may have been a failed maneuver to prevent No Mu-hyun, a leading critic of the United States, from winning. Certainly as troubling was the DPRK’s successful courting of Japan, beginning in
early 2002. In September, the Bush administration was shocked when Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro traveled to Pyongyang. As a gesture of goodwill, the North Koreans acted to resolve a simmering dispute when it admitted abducting Japanese citizens and promised their return. Washington had informed Tokyo of the HEU discovery three weeks before Koizumi’s summit in a failed effort to prevent the trip. Several writers contend that the goal of the Kelly mission was to counter Kim Jong Il’s “charm diplomacy” and reassert U.S. control over policy toward North Korea, compelling its allies to substitute belligerence for benevolence.

Meanwhile, the United States and a few other nations had deployed military forces in the Middle East in preparation for an invasion of Iraq. The Bush administration presented as its main justification Saddam Hussein’s possession of WMDs, but this was nothing more than a pretext. On 17 March, Bush issued an ultimatum giving the Iraqi dictator forty-eight hours to leave his country, pointing to the necessity for regime change, rather than disarmament. Listeners should not have been surprised. Regime change was a central objective of U.S. foreign policy from the start of Bush’s presidency. The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 had provided the administration with a rationale to build American public support for action to topple governments hostile to the United States. Significantly, the United States came close to achieving regime change in the Korean War, when its troops advanced into North Korea with the purpose of destroying its Communist government. Early in 2003, the Bush administration initiated a strategy to unite the world behind accomplishing this same result. At first, Bush’s policy experienced success, as the UN Security Council considered placing the North Korean nuclear issue on its agenda. Washington used the HEU revelations to convince Russia, Japan, and the ROK to join in demanding an end to the DPRK’s nuclear program. Hawk Engagement would not be effective, however, without enlisting the PRC’s cooperation. This was because China, by 2003, was providing the DPRK with 90 percent of its energy resources, 30 percent of its aid, and 38 percent of its imports. In a series of meetings with Chinese leaders, U.S. diplomats emphasized that Pyongyang’s behavior was endangering stability in the region.

Early in 2003, the PRC began pressing the DPRK to dismantle its nuclear weapons program, fearing that if it remained intransigent, the United States might take military action. While promising Pyongyang
bilateral talks, Beijing told the United States it would host multilateral discussions to reach an agreement on ending the crisis. Having laid the groundwork, the Bush administration now was ready to reengage with the North Koreans. In April 2003, the PRC acted as mediator at a meeting between U.S. and DPRK representatives in Beijing. U.S. Assistant Secretary Kelly conveyed assurances that the Bush administration wanted to use dialog and diplomacy to resolve differences with North Korea. In response, the North Koreans proposed a “three-stage roadmap” for resolving the crisis, offering to abandon its nuclear and missile programs in exchange for a U.S. pledge of nonaggression, rather than a treaty, the opening of diplomatic relations, economic aid, and compensation for delay in construction of the LWRs, along with their early completion. In reply, Kelly offered the prospect of economic aid, but stated that verification of Pyongyang’s complete dismantlement of its nuclear program was necessary prior to the discussion of other issues. He also reiterated the U.S. requirement for multilateral negotiations. North Korea’s refusal to surrender its nuclear capability until it was certain that the United States no longer threatened its existence defined the terms of the subsequent diplomatic stalemate.

Victory in Iraq motivated the Bush administration to pursue intensified multilateral pressure to isolate, contain, and transform the DPRK. Washington pressed Japan to cut off North Korea’s access to cash and technology. In May, Bush proposed the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) to unite nations behind the enforcement of UN Security Council sanctions against the export of nuclear components and materials. The administration hoped to extend the PSI to combating North Korea’s alleged involvement in counterfeiting and drug trafficking. In June, eleven nations approved the PSI in the Madrid Initiative. Russia, China, and South Korea, however, refused to participate, not least because they would suffer the negative consequences if the DPRK collapsed. Hayes voiced doubts at the time about whether Bush’s tactics would promote achievement of his ultimate goal, observing that Washington could “chase missile-carrying airplanes or ships around the world, but it cannot make a dent in [the] fundamental dynamics” of the nuclear crisis. However, the U.S. president refused to believe, Van Ness observed, that he could not “have both regime change and a non-nuclear North Korea.” Nevertheless, the Bush administration remained optimistic as it proclaimed “Mission Accomplished” in Iraq. Undoubtedly reacting out of fear in light of an
apparently swift U.S. military triumph in Iraq, Pyongyang succumbed in July to Chinese pressure and dropped its demand for bilateral talks, resulting in Russia, South Korea, and Japan joining these three nations in the so-called Six-Party Talks to resolve the nuclear dispute.\(^{77}\)

When the first session of the Six-Party Talks convened in August 2003, Bush was experiencing a rapid erosion of leverage because of dead American soldiers in Iraq and huge U.S. budget deficits, not to mention mounting criticism of his foreign policies both at home and abroad. Pyongyang now could defy Washington’s demand that the DPRK unilaterally disarm before the United States even considered any concessions. At the meeting, the United States focused on securing an admission from North Korea that it had started an HEU program, while DPRK representatives stressed the U.S. failure to fulfill the Agreed Framework. Displaying defiance, North Korea’s delegation admitted that it now had a nuclear weapons capability and was near finishing the reprocessing of 8,000 plutonium fuel rods. However, it pledged to freeze and ultimately dismantle its program in return for a U.S. declaration of non-hostile intent, mutual respect, and non-interference in its internal affairs. The U.S. delegation rejected the offer, maintaining a stand of “dismantle first, dialogue later” that Moon and Bae identify as the key complication preventing progress at the talks. Van Ness, however, criticized both sides for assuming “such extreme positions that a peaceful resolution of the standoff [was] not possible without outside pressure to convince both governments to modify their irreconcilable positions.” China, Russia, Japan, and South Korea—the other participants—advocated mutual compromise as the only way to reach a settlement.\(^{78}\)

Bush’s policy toward North Korea angered South Korea, imposing enormous strains on the U.S.-ROK alliance. Seoul, holding more than one quarter of the nation’s population, was within easy reach of DRPK artillery. During Bush’s visit to South Korea in early 2002, Kim Dae-jong reminded him that if the Korean War resumed, the South Korean people would pay a gigantic price in death and destruction.\(^{79}\) Not surprisingly, the ROK government consistently opposed the U.S. pursuit of regime change in North Korea because prospective costs of rehabilitation as a result of premature reunification were staggering. According to Lee and Moon, Seoul’s approach of “unconditional reciprocity” toward the DPRK doomed Hawk Engagement because it made cooperation with the United States contingent on serious pursuit of a negotiated settlement. Russia, and to a lesser extent Japan, also
favored engagement with North Korea. All three agreed on the necessity for North Korea to terminate its nuclear weapons program, but they suspected that the Bush administration was looking for an excuse to stage a military attack to achieve this purpose. Opposing efforts to isolate the DPRK, they insisted on resolving the crisis through negotiations, resisting Bush’s pressure to impose economic sanctions because they feared this would ignite a war.80

Fortunately for the United States, its inflexibility at the first Six-Party session did not alienate the Chinese. However, the PRC was opposed to the U.S. pursuit of regime change even more than Russia, Japan, and South Korea. Two factors explain its stand. First, Beijing feared that if the DPRK collapsed, there would be a flood of impoverished refugees pouring into Manchuria. Second, a reunited Korea under the ROK, presumably still closely allied with the United States, would present a probable security threat, but certainly, after recovery, create a potent economic rival. The PRC supported the Agreed Framework and Bush’s decision to discard it, Cha explains, eliminated chances for creating the effective coalition that the success of Hawk Engagement required. Indeed, Beijing strongly opposed imposition of economic sanctions on North Korea, making plain its refusal to give the Bush administration a free hand to punish the DPRK. Although Chinese leaders periodically chastised the North Koreans in private discussion, the PRC clearly placed most of the blame for creating the impasse on the United States. Following the first Six-Party meeting, it advised U.S. diplomats that Washington needed to table serious proposals and stop demanding positive North Korean steps toward disarmament before engaging in genuine negotiations. Obviously, Beijing’s position gave leverage to Pyongyang, who could promise nuclear disarmament was conditional only upon receiving an assortment of incentives. Hayes argues that the Bush administration had conceded the initiative to Pyongyang, which exploited the delay to work feverishly on completing an atomic weapon. After the first Six-Party meeting adjourned, he predicted that the DRPK soon would test a nuclear device and then would demand huge rewards to disarm and accept inspections.81

Criticism of the United States for inflexibility grew during the fall of 2003. In October, at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Bangkok, Thailand, Bush signaled a softening of his strident position, stating that the United States would sign a document pledging not to attack the DPRK. His new approach, Lee and Moon observe, ignored
the reality that negotiation of a settlement was possible “only if North Korea [felt] that the outside world [was] there to help the regime, not destroy it.” Proof of this flaw came in February 2004 at the second Six-Power meeting, when the U.S. delegation rejected the DPRK’s offer to freeze its nuclear program in return for large amounts of economic aid. The United States stood alone in opposing any concessions prior to verification of complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement (CVID) of the DPRK’s nuclear program. Pyongyang refused to comply with this demand and the session adjourned. Thereafter, escalating international criticism of U.S. obduracy increased pressure on the Bush administration to adopt a more conciliatory approach. At that time, the Bush administration had less leverage after shifting 12,000 U.S. troops from South Korea to Iraq, while moving remaining forces in the ROK away from the DMZ. Another factor motivating the United States to table a new initiative was the desire to remove the Korean impasse as an issue in Bush’s reelection campaign. Also, in June, Prime Minister Koizumi at the G-8 summit meeting had made a personal appeal for compromise.82

Many world leaders thought that DPRK recalcitrance was justified whenever the United States resorted to aggressive tactics to force Pyongyang into making concessions. This was true at the third session of Six-Party Talks when the U.S. delegation, on 24 June 2004, presented a proposal that it billed as a compromise, but in fact was just more Hawk Engagement. Still hoping to save its strategy, the Bush administration proposed to allow China, Russia, Japan, and the ROK to provide immediate economic aid to North Korea, including tons of heavy fuel oil every month, but only after a commitment from the DPRK to dismantle its nuclear weapons programs. Washington would issue a “provisional” guarantee not to assault North Korea or attempt to overthrow its government. Also, direct negotiations would begin about lifting U.S. economic sanctions, contingent on proof that Pyongyang was respecting human rights. After three months, economic assistance would continue only if the DPRK had allowed international inspections and disclosed the full nature of its facilities, dismantled them, and then shipped them out of the country. Significantly, before discussions began on approval of its proposal, the U.S. delegation “insisted that North Korea first admit to the existence of the alleged uranium-enrichment facilities and specify where they are located.” Clemens emphasizes how this “proposal seemed crafted to ensure its rejection,” complaining that Washington’s actions continued to ensure a “no war-no peace outcome” which only reinforced
Kim Jong Il’s rule over his isolated and impoverished people.  

If the DPRK accepted the U.S. proposal, its survival would depend on the fulfillment of promises coming from a government dedicated to its destruction. Far from surprising, Pyongyang rejected the “sham offer” and countered with “reward for freeze” or receipt of oil and aid before gradual movement toward CVID. In July, North Korean leaders told Harrison and Gregg that its proposal now included a requirement for excluding references to HEU and serious steps toward normalization. Following U.S. rejection, Pyongyang added as conditions that Washington provide energy aid, lift economic sanctions, and delist the DPRK as a sponsor of terrorism. North Korea also publicly warned that it might stage a test explosion of a nuclear device. Meanwhile, cooperation between Pyongyang and Seoul continued, as the two Koreas signed agreements on a mutual end to propaganda against one another and steps to avoid military clashes at the DMZ. Japan and the ROK also continued to invest in the DPRK’s economy. Further upsetting the Bush administration, the PRC was questioning the validity of U.S. evidence that North Korea had an HEU program, not least because of its fabrications regarding Iraq. Early in 2005, Washington presented evidence to Beijing that Libya had received nuclear material from North Korea, arguing that since it had the signature of no other known producer; it had to have come from Pyongyang. On 20 March, the Washington Post reported that the Bush administration had misrepresented intelligence on the supposed transfer, as it had done to support claims of WMDs in Iraq.

Pyongyang refused to attend Six-Party Talks scheduled for September 2004, pointing to increased U.S. spy plane over-flights as evidence of Bush’s hostile intent. Further proof justifying its decision came in October when Bush signed the North Korean Human Rights Act, which banned economic aid to North Korea unless it made progress on human rights. The bill also allocated $4 million for radio broadcasts into the DPRK promoting democracy and $20 million annually until 2008 to fund grants to private groups for programs fostering human rights and the development of a market economy in North Korea. Despite claims to the contrary, the DPRK hoped that the U.S. presidential election would bring regime change in the United States. Bush’s reelection brought word from North Korea that it would be “quite possible” to resolve the crisis if the United States moderated its policy. On 14 January 2005, Pyongyang announced that it not only would return to the Six-Party
Talks, but “respect and treat [the United States] as a friend unless [it] slanders the [DPRK’s] system and interferes in its internal affairs.” Six days later, Bush in his inaugural speech dedicated his second term to the achievement of “the great objective of ending tyranny” around the globe. Condoleezza Rice, in her confirmation hearings to replace Powell as secretary of state, included North Korea in a list of six “outposts of tyranny.” When North Korea publicly announced on 10 February that it had nuclear weapons, it was reacting to this latest provocative U.S. rhetoric. Washington immediately condemned North Korea for undermining the NPT and also rejected Pyongyang’s proposal for bilateral negotiations to fashion a settlement. In response, a DPRK diplomat announced termination of the multilateral negotiations: “Six-party talks is old story. No more.”

China was determined to prevent the failure of the Six-Party Talks. During discussions with U.S. diplomats, PRC leaders threatened to make a public declaration blaming the breakdown of negotiations on the Bush administration’s inflexibility. In response, Washington agreed to drop its demand for CVID as a condition for granting the DPRK any new concessions. Christopher Hill, who had become the chief U.S. negotiator the previous February, also initiated bilateral talks with his North Korean counterpart in August. Based on this new U.S. shift toward conciliation, Pyongyang agreed to participate in the fourth session of the Six-Party Talks that convened again in Beijing in September 2005. Insisting on its right to maintain a non-military nuclear capability, North Korea identified as its demands in return for terminating its nuclear weapons program economic aid, security guarantees, U.S. recognition, and completion of the Kumho reactors. Pyongyang was emphatic in emphasizing that “concession for concession” had to govern the process. Adjourning to develop specifics on a sequence of events, negotiators reconvened in November for the fifth session of the Six-Party Talks. In the interim, the Bush administration created new obstacles. On 15 September, it imposed sanctions on the Banco Delta Asia in Macao because it managed a DPRK account of $24 million that Washington claimed Pyongyang had obtained through illegal money laundering and drug trafficking. When the Six-Party Talks reconvened in November, negotiations ended quickly after the U.S. delegation reiterated its demand for CVID. That same month, the administration announced the dissolution of KEDO, finally burying the dead Agreed Framework.
Early in 2006, Pyongyang acted to exploit international anger in response to Bush’s alleged duplicity. Kim Jong Il visited Beijing, while making overtures for greater cooperation with Japan and South Korea. But the DPRK also acted provocatively, staging a short-range missile test in March 2006 and a long-range firing the following July. In September, it warned the United States that it was preparing to test a nuclear weapon, demanding that Washington lift its economic sanctions and agree to resume negotiations on the principle of “action for action.” When the Bush administration showed no sense of urgency and failed to reply, the DPRK exploded a nuclear device on 9 October, but with disappointing results. In response, the United States, amid widespread global outrage, pressed the United Nations to impose stiff sanctions, but Russia and China blocked action to punish North Korea. As the crisis deepened, Republican Party losses in the November off-year elections appear to have persuaded the Bush administration to opt for conciliation. Later that month, U.S. diplomats discussed resumption of the Six-Party Talks with the other participants, agreeing to address the Banco Delta Asia issue and offer new incentives to Pyongyang. In early 2007, negotiators met for their sixth and seventh sessions, resulting in agreement in February on a set of steps leading to a final settlement. North Korea immediately would declare all nuclear facilities and dismantle them in sixty days. In return, Pyongyang would receive 50,000 tons of fuel oil and 950,000 more when dismantlement was complete. The United States also agreed to release funds in Banco Delta Asia and remove the DPRK from its official list of terrorist states.

Incredibly, the Bush administration delayed releasing North Korea’s assets. In April, the deadline for nuclear dismantlement passed without the DPRK’s completing this process because Washington had not met its part of the bargain. Yet North Korea desired a settlement, and, after gaining access to its funds on 15 June, invited IAEA inspectors to watch the shutdown of the Yongbyon facility. In response, the Bush administration announced its willingness to hold direct talks, as the president apparently wanted to register a major success in ending the nuclear crisis before leaving office. Rapid progress followed. In July, after the IAEA inspectors confirmed the Yongbyon shutdown, North Korea received 50,000 tons of fuel oil, mostly from Russia. That same month, the eighth session of the Six-Party Talks convened, with North Korea’s submitting what it claimed was all information related to its nuclear programs. Pyongyang agreed to total dismantlement of all its
nuclear facilities by the end of the year, if Washington ended all economic sanctions and removed North Korea from the terrorist state list. At the ninth session of the Six-Party Talks in October, Pyongyang provided a detailed timetable for dismantlement of all its nuclear weapons facilities. By then, Republican politicians were assailing Bush and Secretary of State Rice for appeasement of North Korea. To placate them, Bush sent a letter to Kim Jong Il in December, expressing dissatisfaction with the DPRK’s description of its nuclear program, insisting that he provide complete and accurate information. He requested specifics on the number of warheads and amounts of nuclear fuel, as well as details about North Korea’s HEU program and involvement in promoting nuclear proliferation.

Another factor influencing Bush’s decision to resume Hawk Engagement was the simultaneous election of Yi Myung-bok as president of the ROK. During Yi’s campaign, he spoke for his party and a growing number of South Koreans in criticizing the “Sunshine Policy” and advocating a tougher approach toward North Korea. Upon assuming office, Yi demanded that the DPRK take real steps toward nuclear disarmament as a condition for receiving further assistance from the ROK. Relations between the Koreas experienced a rapid deterioration, as Pyongyang demanded that South Korean firms evacuate the jointly operated industrial village at Kaesong. However, in May 2008, Pyongyang attempted to satisfy Bush’s demands when it provided seven boxes of documents detailing its three separate efforts—in 1990, 2003, and 2005—to develop a nuclear weapon. The Bush administration registered dissatisfaction because this information failed to confirm its claims about the extent of the DPRK’s nuclear activities. Despite the DPRK’s destruction of the cooling tower at Yongbyon in June, the United States demanded that North Korea provide documents confirming its HEU program and the export of nuclear technology. The DPRK responded that it could not produce what did not exist, insisting upon prompt delivery of all the fuel oil promised in return for providing full information on its nuclear programs. It also announced that it was halting dismantlement of nuclear facilities until the United States fulfilled its commitments.

In July 2008, the ninth session of the Six-Party Talks convened. The U.S. delegation complained that North Korea had provided only a “partial account” of its nuclear programs. However, it reported that the United States had relaxed some economic sanctions and initiated steps to
remove the DPRK from its terrorist states list. In response, North Korea’s delegation agreed to begin negotiations on a timetable for complete dismantlement by the end of October and to provide details for a rigorous system of inspections. By early September, negotiators were to settle on arrangements for IAEA inspectors to visit sites, review documents, and conduct interviews. But subsequent bilateral talks foundered because of the U.S. demand for unfettered inspection rights throughout North Korea. Pyongyang also was unwilling to move forward on a timetable for dismantling its remaining nuclear facilities until the United States had removed the DPRK from the terrorist state list. Washington met this condition in October, but hopes for a settlement evaporated when it resumed its extreme stand on inspections. North Korea was now certain that even if it ended its nuclear weapons program, the Bush administration still would work to destroy its Communist government, just as it would have invaded Iraq regardless of the existence of WMDs. Undersecretary of State Bolton confirmed this intent in a 2002 interview. Taking a book titled The End of North Korea off a shelf and slapped it on the table. “That,” he said, “is our policy.” Pursuing this course “for the last four years,” New York Times columnist Nicholas D. Kristof wrote in February 2005, “only strengthened Mr. Kim and allowed him to expand his nuclear arsenal several fold,” adding that, “as best we know,” the DPRK did not make one nuclear weapon before Bush became president.

George W. Bush’s policy of Hawk Engagement inflicted serious and perhaps permanent damage on U.S. security interests in Northeast Asia. Former U.S. Ambassador Laney and Jason T. Shaplen, policy advisor for KEDO, persuasively argue that the Agreed Framework was the best deal possible at a less than ideal moment in U.S.-Korean relations. It bought eight years of stability on the peninsula and provided both “parties with critical breathing room.” It laid the groundwork for a comprehensive agreement because it gave time to Kim Jong Il to consolidate power after his father’s death and to the ROK to strengthen its economy and democracy. Bush spurned this approach in favor of a provocative strategy that threatened to end aid and impose sanctions unless North Korea dismantled its WMDs, refusing, Pritchard observes, “to deal realistically with an enemy.” “Believing that another squeeze would bring the regime to heel,” Carpenter and Bandow conclude, represented “the triumph over hope over experience.” Bush’s policy failed miserably, creating the new danger of Pyongyang selling nuclear
weapons to terrorists. Indeed, U.S. measures to increase economic deprivation in North Korea eliminated Pyongyang’s options, forcing it to resort to precisely the illicit activities that Washington condemned to help sustain its regime. “To dismiss North Korea’s security fears,” Kang emphasizes, “is to miss the root cause of North Korea’s actions.” While exaggerating the North Korean threat, Bush’s hawkish advisors underestimated Pyongyang’s resilience. Blindly believing that toppling Kim Jong Il’s regime would be easy, they refused to accept the reality that, Cha suggests, the DPRK’s “nuclear program is best ended by the guarantee of regime survival . . .” Blaming the continuing nuclear crisis on North Korea, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld remarked on 10 February 2005 that “I don’t think that anyone would characterize the leadership in that country as being restrained.”98 If Rumsfeld and his boss wanted to know the real reason why Hawk Engagement was a failure, they should have looked in the mirror.

Notes:

6 McCormack, Target North Korea, 154-156; Todd Crowell, “Kumho: North Korea’s Nuclear Ghost Town,” Asia Times (September 24, 2005), 1.
7 Scott Snyder, Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999), 119-138; Carpenter and Bandow, The Korean Conundrum, 50-52; Michael O’Hanlon and


12 Clemens, “Why Has the Bush Team Ignored North Korea?,” 2.


20 Bleiker, “A Rogue is a Rogue is a Rogue,” 721.

21 Romesh Ratnesar, “How Dangerous is North Korea?,” Time (January 5, 2003).


26 Pollack, “The United States, North Korea, and the End of the Agreed Framework.”

27 Abramowitz and Laney, “Meeting the North Korean Nuclear Challenge,” 1; Beal, North Korea, 100-101, 103, 108; Pritchard, Failed Diplomacy, 5-7.


30 Jasper Becker, Rogue Regime: Kim Jong Il and the Looming Threat of North Korea (New York: Oxford, 2005), 266. See also, Gordon Cucullu, Separated at Birth: How North Korea Became the Evil Twin (Guilford, CT: The Lyons Press, 2004); Bradley K. Martin, Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader:

31 McCormack, Target North Korea, 184; Cha and Kang, Nuclear North Korea, 4, 46.

32 Snyder, Negotiating on the Edge, 43, 55-56, 59, 91, 93.

33 Seymour M. Hersh, “What the Administration Knew about Pakistan and the North Korean Nuclear Program,” The New Yorker (January 27, 2003), 47.


39 O’Hanlon and Mochizuki, Crisis on the Korean Peninsula, 12.

40 Cha and Kang, “The Korea Crisis,” 23; Becker, Rogue Regime, 244-245.


42 O’Hanlon and Mochizuki, Crisis on the Korean Peninsula, 37; McCormack, Target North Korea, 166.


44 Bleiker, “A Rogue is a Rogue is a Rogue,” 727; Cumings, “North Korea: The Sequel,” 151; Peter Van Ness, “The North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Four-Plus-Two—An Idea Whose Time Has Come,” Asian Perspective 27, no. 4 (2003), 251; Beal, North Korea, 81, 103; McCormack, Target North Korea, 158.

45 Hersh, “What the Administration Knew about Pakistan and the North Korean Nuclear Program,” 42.


Harrison, “Did North Korea Cheat?”


Hersh, “What the Administration Knew about Pakistan and the North Korean Nuclear Program,” 46; Pritchard, Failed Diplomacy, 34, 37. See also, Cha and Kang, Nuclear North Korea, 131-132.


McCormack, Target North Korea, 167-68; Beal, North Korea, 110-114.


Ratnesar, “How Dangerous is North Korea?”; Moon and Bae, “The Bush
Doctrine and the North Korean Nuclear Crisis,” 25.

60 Ratnesar, “How Dangerous is North Korea?”; Harrison, “Did North Korea Cheat?,” 3-4.

61 Reiss and Gallucci, “Red Handed”; Joshua Muravchik, “Facing Up to North Korea,” Commentary 115, 3 (March 2003), 34.

62 Harrison, “Did North Korea Cheat?,” 10; Laney and Shaplen, “How to Deal with North Korea.”


65 Crowell, “Kumho: North Korea’s Nuclear Ghost Town,” 2.

66 Bleiker, “A Rogue is a Rogue is a Rogue,” 733; McCormack, Target North Korea, 162-163.

67 Quoted in Hersh, “What the Administration Knew about Pakistan and the North Korean Nuclear Program,” 47; Carpenter and Bandow, the Korean Conundrum, 80, 92.

68 Harrison, “Did North Korea Cheat?,” 3; Cha and Kang, Nuclear North Korea, 13, 35.

69 Cha, “Hawk Engagement and Preventive Defense on the Korean Peninsula,” 40; Laney and Shaplen, “How to Deal with North Korea”; Kang, “The Avoidable Crisis in North Korea.”


73 Abramowitz and Laney, “Meeting the North Korean Nuclear Challenge,” 3; Clemens, “How to Cope With North Korea and Nuclear Weapons,” 246; Becker, Rogue Regime, 256-257.

74 McCormack, Target North Korea, 167; Carpenter and Bandow, The Korean
Conundrum, 82.


79 McCormack, Target North Korea, 106; Pritchard, Failed Diplomacy, 161.


82 Lee and Moon, “The North Korean Nuclear Crisis Revisited,” 150; Bleiker, “A Rogue is a Rogue is a Rogue,” 721, 731-732; Pritchard, Failed Diplomacy, 103.


97 Laney and Shaplen, “How to Deal with North Korea”; Pritchard, *Failed Diplomacy*, 55; Carpenter and Bandow, *The Korean Conundrum*, 34.