

Understanding Anti-Americanism Among South Korean College Students

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Introduction

During a half-century long alliance between South Korea and the United States, South Koreans have been, for the most part, staunchly pro-American. This began to change in the early 1980s, especially in the aftermath of the Kwangju Incident. Since then, anti-Americanism has ebbed and flowed in South Korea. In light of this, the recent resurgence of anti-Americanism could arguably be dismissed as merely the latest wave in a familiar pattern, and, thus, one that will eventually fade away, just as it has in the past.

However, this current manifestation of anti-Americanism is unique because it coincides with an extraordinary set of international events: the 9/11 attack, the revelation of North Korea's clandestine nuclear weapons program, the US's "hard-line" policy towards North Korea, the US decision to relocate its troops away from the DMZ and Seoul, and finally, the stunning recent announcement by the US to reduce its troops in South Korea by a third. Because of these unusual circumstances, many ponder what implications this new surge of anti-American sentiment may have on the fate of the US-South Korean alliance.

The importance of this current wave of anti-Americanism is reflected in the voluminous literature on this topic. The purpose of this article, is not to offer yet another explanation for the rise of anti-Americanism. Instead, it aims to examine closely the common assumptions, beliefs and reasoning about the rise of anti-Americanism offered in the existing literature. Four main hypotheses can be identified in the literature, each focusing on an important factor that is considered to have an impact on South Korean attitudes towards America. In this study, these hypotheses will each be tested using data collected from a 2004 survey of South Korean college students.²

The subjects of this survey were confined to college students for three reasons. First, there is a consensus among researchers of anti-Americanism that the current antipathy towards America is largely a generational phenomenon. Survey after survey has shown that anti-Americanism is most prevalent among Koreans in their 20s and 30s. Second, younger Koreans are the ones who will be shaping future US-South Korean relations. Already, their influence has been pivotal in the most recent presidential election. Third, among the sub-groups of

younger Koreans, college students have not only played a significant role in South Korean politics in recent history, but have allowed for more controlled and accessible testing than any other segments of their generation.

The most significant finding of this study is in direct contradiction with the commonly-held view that the lessening fear of the North Korean threat is largely responsible for the rise of anti-Americanism. On the contrary, this study shows, first, that apprehension among college-age South Koreans about the North Korean military threat is actually much higher than is commonly assumed. Second, and more significantly, it shows that this threat perception of North Korea is *not* related to how South Koreans feel about the US. In other words, this study de-couples two factors—*anti-Americanism* and *the South Korean perception of the North Korean military threat*—which are most frequently linked in the current literature. Instead, this study shows that it is mostly the US's image, its policies and, in particular, its handling of the North Korean nuclear problem, that has affected South Korean sentiments. In other words, the cause of South Korean anti-Americanism lies not with the perception of North Korea, *per se*, but with America's foreign policy towards North Korea.

Hypotheses Suggested in Anti-Americanism Literature

A considerable amount of literature has been produced exploring various possible causes of the recent resurgence of anti-Americanism in South Korea. Numerous reasons have been offered, suggesting the complexity of the phenomenon. This wide variety of views can be grouped roughly into two main theories. The first, which looks inward at South Korea's economic and political development, can be called the "domestic" view, and the second, which looks outward at the changes in the international environment, can be called the "international" view.

The domestic view emphasizes the importance of both the spectacular economic growth and recent democratization of South Korea. According to this view, many Koreans, conscious of their significant accomplishments and commensurate status, resent the US for failing to recognize this new reality and perpetuating an antiquated and hierarchical relationship.³ The infamous and tragic incident in June of 2002, which 'triggered' a new surge of anti-Americanism, illustrates this point well. During a military exercise, a US armored vehicle killed two Korean teenage girls. The subsequent US military court-martial and acquittal of the two American soldiers responsible provoked an impassioned outcry against the perceived unfairness of the

extraterritoriality privilege of US troops. This incident highlighted the unequal relationship maintained by the two military allies. After all, South Korea enjoys no such comparable privileges with the US. This example supports the domestic growth perspective which accounts for the rise of anti-Americanism as the expression of South Korea's growing national stature, both politically and economically, and the resulting desire to see that increased stature reflected in a more equitable relationship between South Korea and her historic patron.

The international perspective, on the other hand, focuses on the changing global environment, especially with regard to North Korea. It is this "international" view that is the focus of this study and from which all hypotheses will be drawn. According to this perspective, during the Cold War American and South Korean security interests converged on their common understanding of North Korea as a threat. While South Korea needed the US military presence to deter North Korean aggression, the US needed to maintain a presence on the peninsula to contain the expansion of Communism and project its power in Northeast Asia. But the end of the Cold War, followed by the revelation of North Korea's nuclear weapons program and the 9/11 attack, brought about, as Victor Cha puts it, "a decoupling of security interests" between the two countries.⁴

From South Korea's perspective, the end of the cold war finally provided an opportunity to ease tensions on the peninsula. The economically stronger and democratic South began to contemplate a new way to deal with their impoverished and diplomatically isolated northern neighbor: engagement rather than confrontation. Of course, South Korea's primary national security goal remained the same, that is, defense against a northern invasion. But changes in the international environment, most significantly the collapse of the Soviet Union and the transformation of a now nominally Communist China, offered South Korea the chance to experiment with a different strategy, namely, engagement, which would have been impossible during the Cold War.

For the US, on the other hand, the nature of the North Korean threat has been profoundly enlarged, especially due to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. As a result, the US no longer considers North Korea as merely a small Communist country threatening only South Korea and East Asia. Now likely possessing a small nuclear arsenal, along with long-range missile capabilities North Korea poses the amplified threat of nuclear and missile proliferation, which in a post-9/11 environment intersects ominously with global terrorism. Thus, North Korea is seen as a potential crucial link between WMD and terrorist groups who could attack the US.⁵ In this sense, nuclear proliferation in North Korea poses a direct threat to the security of the US itself. Accordingly,

North Korea has become a focal point in the US war on global terrorism. This was made clear with the designation of North Korea as a member of the "Axis of Evil."⁶

According to the international view, it is this aggressive American stance against North Korea, singularly focused on the "complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement" of the North's nuclear weapons programs, that has soured the affections of the South Korean people in two important ways. First, it has produced the unflattering perception of a US pursuing its own security interests at the expense of South Korea's.⁷ And second, it has promoted the perception of the US as a spoiler of inter-Korean reconciliation.

With regard to the first case, the US's policy of retaining the option of preemption to resolve the North Korean nuclear problem, which the US has employed as strategic leverage in its negotiations, strikes South Koreans as completely insensitive to the enormous potential human toll and suffering that would result from armed conflict. Estimates of the casualties that could result from a northern assault run as high as one million civilian deaths in Seoul in just the first day alone.⁸

Because of the possibility of such catastrophic casualties, South Koreans feel that the US, in being unwilling to shelve military preemption, is bargaining with Korean lives for a stronger negotiating position in its war on terror. This sentiment, of course, was not always the case. When the US offered South Korea a defensive shield, it earned for itself a grateful ally in the South. But when the US acted more as a "mighty giant" who would recklessly risk the security of South Korea for its own interests, it became, astonishingly enough, "more of a threat than Pyongyang" to some South Koreans.⁹ It is this image of a completely self-interested America which much of the literature points to as the source of anti-Americanism. Thus, it can be hypothesized that the image of an America pursuing its own interests at the expense of South Korean interests promotes anti-Americanism (Hypothesis 1) and that fear of another Korean war also fosters anti-Americanism (Hypothesis 2).

In the second instance, the US's hostile stance against the North has promoted a perception of the US as "an impeder of improved North-South relations," as Cha puts it.¹⁰ He argues, however, that by itself, the US's hard-line policy would not have produced this negative image. The other essential factor is the diminished South Korean perception of the North Korean threat. According to this reasoning, as North Korea seemed progressively less threatening and dangerous to the South, South Koreans naturally began to believe reconciliation was truly attainable. Thus, for South Koreans, the US, which had

previously been recognized as South Korea's "security guarantor," increasingly earned the unsavory reputation as the "spoiler of inter-Korean reconciliation."¹¹ This leads us to the third hypothesis, which states that the perception of the US as an obstacle to reconciliation between the two Koreas is associated with anti-Americanism (Hypothesis 3).

According to the international view, the perception gap, mentioned above, between how the US and South Korea regard the North Korean threat was the wedge that soured the South Korean people's attitude towards America. There are two, somewhat related explanations for the cause of this perception gap. Some argue that it is due to the growing recognition of the economic disparity between the North and South. By the end of the cold war, a huge gap had opened up between the two countries, to the South's advantage. As a result, many South Koreans grew increasingly skeptical about the feasibility of an invasion from the North.¹² Others maintain that the change in the perception of the North Korean threat is largely due to former President Kim Dae Jung's "sunshine policy." Many commentators believe that the historic summit meeting between the leaders of North and South Korea in June 2000 led countless South Koreans to conclude that North Korea had largely suspended its hostile intentions against the South.¹³

These analysts point out that this lessened anxiety over the North Korean threat has eroded the strategic value of US troops in South Korea.¹⁴ As a result, this has caused the already existing resentment over misbehaving US troops to grow even worse.¹⁵ Moreover, as mentioned above, this relaxed attitude towards the North Korean threat has also contributed to the opinion that the US is an obstacle to inter-Korean reconciliation and the lasting peace it would bring to the peninsula. In short, it is the diminished perception of the North Korean threat that is the key to understanding the latest rise of anti-Americanism.¹⁶ Hence, our fourth and last hypothesis is that as the perception of the North Korean threat decreases, the level of anti-Americanism increases (Hypothesis 4).

The remainder of this article will explore whether these four hypotheses, found in the international view, are supported by data gathered from a 2004 survey of South Korean college students. To test the four hypotheses, the next section will present an OLS regression model.

Empirical Model: Hypotheses, Variables, and Sample *Hypotheses*

H1: The image of America pursuing its own interests at the expense of South Korean interests promotes anti-Americanism.

H2: Fear of another Korean war fosters anti-Americanism.

H3: The perception of the US as an obstacle to reconciliation between the Koreas is associated with anti-Americanism.

H4: As the perception of the North Korean threat decreases, the level of anti-Americanism increases.

The Variables Used in the Model

Dependent Variable

To measure anti-Americanism, this article relies on survey participants' self-assessments about their feelings toward the US on a scale of 1-10 (1 being very positive feelings toward the US and 10 being very negative). Because the dependent variable is continuous, this study uses ordinary-least-squares regression (OLS) to estimate the model.

Independent Variables

- Image of a self-interested America (Hypothesis 1)
- Fear of war (Hypothesis 2)
- Perception of the US as an obstacle to inter-Korean reconciliation (Hypothesis 3)
- Perception of the North Korean threat (Hypothesis 4)

How these independent variables are measured is detailed in the appendix

Sample

The subjects for this study are college students in South Korea. The sample consists of 1,076 students, attending some twenty-two universities in South Korea. To assure broad and accurate representation, a variety of large universities (eight public, fourteen private) were selected from Seoul and four major regions.¹⁷ Administration of the questionnaires took place during the last half of May, 2004. Fifty-two sets of the questionnaires were sent to a participating professor at each university along with instructions to administer the questionnaire to a class as diverse as possible in terms of gender, age and major. Of the 1,144 total questionnaires that were distributed, 1,076 valid responses were collected (a 94% response rate). Slightly over half (56%) of the students were male and more than 99% (99.6%) were between 18 and 29 years of age. Students were asked to complete the questionnaire during class time.


Findings and Discussion

Perception of the North Korean Threat Variable

Figure 1 represents the mean scores of the respondents' sentiments toward Kim Jong Il's regime and the five countries on a scale of 1-10 (1 being the most positive and 10 being the most negative). On the surface, the figure largely confirms the consensus view, i.e., college-age South Koreans feel the United States is "more dangerous" than North Korea.¹⁸ However, when asked specifically about Kim Jong Il and the North Korean regime, their negative attitudes sharply increase, surpassing even the high negative numbers for the US.

This finding demonstrates that the commonly-accepted belief that younger generation South Koreans indiscriminately dismissing the North Korean threat is an incomplete picture. On the contrary, the data suggests that younger South Koreans make a sharp distinction between North Korea, which is viewed relatively benignly, and the North Korean regime, which is viewed with considerably more alarm.

FIGURE 1
Feelings Toward Countries/Regime




Source: *South Korean College Students Survey, 2004*, H. Chae, T. Carwile, S. Damberger

Figure 2 is based on a survey question that asked respondents how they feel about five possible relationships between North Korea and South Korea (4 point measure: 1=strongly disagree; 2=disagree; 3=agree; 4=strongly agree).¹⁹ This finding also illustrates how common assumptions about South Korean perceptions of the North

Korean threat are, at best, incomplete, and, at worst, misleading. The widely held belief is that many younger generation South Koreans, who have not lived through the brutality of the Korean War, embrace the North as "a brother in need."²⁰ One representative of this view is Thomas Omestad, who argues that younger generation South Koreans view the "impoverished North as more an object of pity than fear."²¹ Missing in his analysis, however, is an appreciation of the fact that while the younger generation affirms North Korea to be a "brother in need," they still understand the grave threat posed by the regime.

FIGURE 2
Image of North Korea




Source: *South Korean College Students Survey, 2004*, H. Chae, T. Carwile, S. Damberger

This equivocal and complex image of North Korea casts doubt on the central premise of the current literature, namely, that South Koreans' lessening anxiety over the North Korean threat is the key to explaining the rise of anti-Americanism. In other words, the latter exists in large part because of the precondition of the former. However, this study suggests otherwise, and therefore raises the intriguing question of how anti-Americanism can be sustained in the face of South

Koreans' maintaining their traditional wariness over the North Korean military threat.

Figure 3 is based on a survey question that asked respondents how seriously they consider North Korea's nuclear weapons and missile program to be a security threat for each of the following: South Korea, Northeast Asia, the US, and the world, each on a scale of 1-10 (1 being not a threat and 10 being an extremely serious threat). The widely-held view among analysts is that most South Koreans dismiss the threat posed by North Korean weapons to themselves because of their confidence that North Korea would never actually use them on the Korean peninsula. They reason that Korean ethnic solidarity would absolutely preclude any Korean, on either side of the political border, to inflict a nuclear holocaust on the other side.²² However, Figure 3 indicates that most college students think that North Korea's weapons are, in fact, a threat first against South Korea, and only secondarily against either NE Asia (i.e., Japan), the US, or the world. In other words, this finding implies that the notion of a shared "Korean bomb" is false, since most college students apparently view South Korea as the most at-risk-nation of North Korea's WMD and missile arsenal.²³

FIGURE 3
Perception of the North Korean Nuclear Threat for Each Entity



Source: *South Korean College Students Survey, 2004*, H. Chae, T. Carwile, S. Damberger

The three bar-charts above consistently indicate that South Korean college students consider North Korea to be a serious security threat and nurse highly negative feelings against the Kim Jong Il regime. What is surprising in the data is that this heightened alarm over North Korean nukes and antipathy for Kim Jong Il has not translated into a more benign attitude towards the US, a nation which ostensibly might protect South Korea from such a threat, as the "perception of North Korean threat" hypothesis (H4) anticipates. In other words, South Koreans seem to be quite capable of harboring both anti-Americanism and anti-North Korean Regime-ism, *at the same time*.

This disconnect between South Korean's perception of the North Korean threat and their perception of the US can be accounted for, in part, by the bi-variate correlations analysis between the dependent variable and the *perception of the North Korean threat* variables. As Table 1 shows, among the four *perception of threat* variables, two are not significantly correlated with the dependent variable. Respondents' perception of Kim Jong Il's regime and their perception of the threat from North Korean weapons are not related to their sentiments about the US. For that reason, these two variables are not included in the regression analysis model in Table 2.

TABLE 1
Pearson's Correlations Coefficients: Relations between the dependent variable and the variable, *perception of the North Korean threat*

		Feelings toward NK	Belief that NK threatens SK's security	Feelings toward Kim Jong Il's regime	Feelings of whether NK's WMD/missiles threaten SK security
Feelings toward US	Pearson's Sig level	-.161***	-.129***	-.033	-.043
	N	1074	1073	1061	1075

***correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed).

Source: *South Korean College Students Survey, 2004*, H. Chae, T. Carwile, S. Damberger

The irrelevance of the variable, *perception of the North Korean threat*, in accounting for anti-Americanism in South Korea, is further confirmed in the regression analysis, shown in Table 2. According to this regression analysis, neither of the two indicators—*perception of North Korea* and *perception of the North Korean military threat*—is at a statistically significant level, though each does correlate

significantly with the dependent variable in the bi-variate correlations analysis, as shown above in Table 1. The regression analysis shows us that the South Korean younger generation's opinions about North Korea and the North Korean security threat are not at all related to their opinion of the US. It makes no difference for public perceptions of the US whether a person is inclined favorably towards North Korea or unfavorably. The same is true whether a person feels threatened by North Korea or is at ease. In short, the OLS regression analysis (Table 2) and the bi-variate correlations analysis (Table 1) both show that anti-Americanism among college-age South Koreans is independent from what they think about the North Korean military threat.

This finding contradicts the most important assumption commonly held by researchers, i.e., that the diminished perception of the North Korean threat is the key to accounting for the rise of anti-Americanism. In other words, this study shows that there is no linkage between anti-Americanism and the perception of the North Korean threat. What younger generation South Koreans think of North Korea, whether they believe it is dangerous or not, is irrelevant to their opinion of the US. Rather, it is the conclusion of this paper, that it is not the perception of North Korea that explains anti-Americanism, but perceptions of the US itself.

TABLE 2
Effects of Independent Variables on Anti-Americanism

Independent Variables	Unstandardized Coefficients	Std.	Sig. Error
Image of a Self-Interested America			
US is concerned with SK's security	.295	.083	.000
US promotes SK's economic prosperity by providing stability and security	.440	.092	.000
US responsible for partition of Korea	-.278	.082	.001
US as an obstacle to SK democratization	-.122	.091	.179
Fear of War			
US policy might lead to a war in Korea	.219	.081	.007
US policy will lead to preemptive attack	.259	.120	.031
Perception of the US as an Obstacle to inter-Korean Reconciliation			
US as an obstacle to reconciliation	.200	.032	.000
US hampers SK's engagement policy	.319	.111	.004
Perception of the North Korean Threat			

Feelings towards North Korea	-.039	.029	.185
Belief that NK threatens SK's security	.018	.088	.838
Demographics			
R is male	-.130	.134	.333
R has served in the military	-.130	.145	.370
F (ANOVA)	28.373		
N	1042		

Source: *South Korean College Students Survey, 2004*, H. Chae, T. Carwile, S. Damberger

The US Related Variables

With respect to the variables related to the US, the findings of this study confirm the other three hypotheses (H1, H2, H3). This study's regression analysis (Table 2) shows that all the indicators (except one) measuring the US-related variables are at statistically-significant levels (note: the bold numbers in the right column). Three factors, *the image of the US as self-interested*, *the fear of war*, and *the image of the US as an obstacle to reconciliation*, are related to anti-Americanism, as is suggested in the literature. The regression analysis shows that these three hypotheses are correct: South Korean college students who hold to any of these three factors are also inclined to have unfavorable feelings toward the US.

The regression analysis of Table 2 also reveals a fascinating finding about two crucial issues, which put the US in a bad light, and their relationship to anti-Americanism. These two issues concern, first, the complicitous role of the US in Korea's partition and, second, the democratization of South Korea.

On the first issue, when respondents were asked whether they thought the US was primarily responsible for the partition of Korea, 76% agreed. The regression analysis (Table 2) shows, as predicted by the literature, that this interpretation, heavily impacts attitudes toward the US. Those who hold the US responsible for the partition view the US more unfavorably than those who do not hold the US culpable.²⁴

On the second issue, when respondents were asked whether they thought the US was an obstacle to South Korea's democratization, almost an equally high percentage (71%) agreed. However, unlike the first issue regarding national partition, this interpretation of political history does not have any correlation to the respondents' sentiments toward the US, as shown by the regression analysis (Table 2). Whether or not South Koreans believe the US propped up the military

dictatorship and hampered South Korea's democratic movement has little bearing on public opinion toward the US.

This last finding may be quite a surprise to most analysts since it is widely believed that the complicitous role the US played in retarding South Korea's recent democratization is a major factor in shaping negative public opinion of the US. As one scholar eloquently put it, the US's role as an obstacle to Korean democracy is "engraved in the national psyche."²⁵ While this was probably the case in past cycles of anti-Americanism, it is not the case now.

The argument could be made that college-age Koreans are simply too young to remember a 20+ year old incident. But that account does not explain why the same college students are fixated on the history of Korea's partition, which took place more than half a century ago. The interpretation that this article offers is that the current wave of anti-Americanism is primarily about perceptions of the American role in inter-Korean relations, that is, its perceived role in reconciliation and in resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis, both of which, relate closely to the history of national partition. In other words, the influence that historical interpretations of Korea's partition have on anti-Americanism is largely a derivative one, relevant only in that it is connected to the larger issue of inter-Korean relations.

Conclusion

The conclusion of this study is that there is a disconnect between anti-Americanism and anxiety over the North Korean threat. That is, the two are unrelated to each other; how South Koreans feel about one issue has no bearing on how they feel about the other. This accounts for how anti-Americanism in South Korea can co-exist with the perception of North Korea as a dangerous security threat.


However, this manifestation of two statistical and ostensibly opposing "highs" suggests important implications for US-South Korean relations. The reputed gap between American and South Korean perceptions of the North Korean threat is not the reason for the souring of South Korean attitudes about the US. Rather, quite to the contrary, it is precisely because South Koreans share with the US a grave apprehension of the North Korean threat that they are also alarmed over the hard-line policies of the US toward North Korea. In other words, it is an in-house dispute among allies who share a common adversary. The current wave of anti-Americanism, then, is largely a reflection of these concerns and complaints.

If the US could reverse the pervasive perception among South Koreans that its foreign policy subordinates South Korea's safety and security to resolving the nuclear crisis, then South Korean sentiments

toward the US would take a dramatic turn. Anti-Americanism is not a rejection of the US as an ally, but a plea for policy change.

The survey data demonstrates that anti-Americanism among college students should not be interpreted as their desire for the US to retreat from the Korean peninsula altogether. Figure 4 shows that an overwhelming majority (70%) expressed a desire to see the historic US-South Korean alliance maintained, though on a more equal footing. The percentage shoots up to 77.2% when those favoring a stronger traditional arrangement and those satisfied with the status quo are added to the total. In fact, only a tiny minority (0.6%) want to see the military alliance terminated entirely. These statistics may be explained by the younger generation's continued apprehension of, in their eyes, an ever-present and looming North Korean threat.

FIGURE 4
The Most Desirable US-SK Relationship



Source: *South Korean College Students Survey, 2004*, H. Chae, T. Carwile, S. Damberger

The conclusion of this study is rather complex. On the one hand, there is no connection between perceptions of the North Korean threat and anti-Americanism. On the other hand, among those who do harbor anti-American feelings, the reason for their discontent precisely has to do with American policy towards North Korea.

The key significance of this study lies in its excluding South Korean perceptions of the North from the equation of anti-

Americanism, shedding new light on US-South Korean relations. This suggests that the US can promote better relations by focusing on the chief concern of South Koreans, their own national security. At the same time, the US can cultivate a stronger partnership with the South Korean government by highlighting their shared concerns over a common North Korean threat. Thus an accurate understanding of this current wave of anti-Americanism opens the door for a renewed cooperation between the United States and South Korea.

APPENDIX: Independent Variable Descriptions

(To measure the independent variables, the following survey questions are included in the model.)

Image of a self-interested America

- In making policy decisions regarding North Korea's nuclear weapons and missile program, to what extent do you think the US takes into account the security interests of South Korea? (4 point measure: 1=great deal; 2=somewhat; 3=very little; 4=not at all)
- Please rate how strongly you agree or disagree with the statement: "The US military presence in South Korea promotes economic prosperity by providing stability and security." (4 point measure: 1=strongly agree; 2=agree; 3=disagree; 4=strongly disagree)
- Thinking about the US role in Korea's recent history, please rate how strongly you agree or disagree with the statement: "America was primarily responsible for the partition of Korea." (4 point measure: 1=strongly agree; 2=agree; 3=disagree; 4=strongly disagree)¹
- Please rate how strongly you agree or disagree with the statement: "America has been an obstacle to South Korea's democratization during the military dictatorship of the 70s and 80s." (4 point measure: 1=strongly agree; 2=agree; 3=disagree; 4=strongly disagree)

Fear of war

- How worried are you that the current US policy towards North Korea might lead to a war in the Korean peninsula? (4 point measure: 1=not at all; 2=very little; 3=somewhat; 4=great deal)
- Do you believe the US might launch a preemptive attack on North Korea at some time in the future? (dummy variable, 1=yes; 0=no)

Perception of the US as an obstacle to inter-Korean reconciliation

- Is the US troop presence in South Korea an obstacle to reconciliation between the North and South? Please rate on scale of 1-10 (1 being not an obstacle and 10 being a big obstacle)
- Based on what you know, how would you characterize the relationship between the current US policy towards North Korea and the current South Korean government's engagement policy? (dummy variable, 1=the US policy hampers South Korea's engagement policy; 0=South Korea's engagement policy hampers the US policy, or they are complementary)

Perception of the North Korean Threat

- On a scale of 1-10 (1 being very positive and 10 being very negative), how would you rate your feelings towards North Korea?
- Please rate how strongly you agree or disagree with the statement: "North Korea is threatening South Korea's national security." (4 point measure: 1=strongly disagree; 2=disagree; 3=agree; 4=strongly agree)²

Endnotes

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⁶ The President's State of the Union Address, January 29, 2002, [accessed July 1, 2004], <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nnews/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html>.

⁷ Kim, "Anti-Americanism in Korea," pp. 109-110.

⁸ Anthony Faiola, "As Tensions Subside Between Two Koreas, U.S. Strives to Adjust," *Washington Post*, July 25, 2004, sec. A.

⁹ Kim, "Anti-Americanism in Korea," p. 111; Faiola, "As Tensions Subside Between Two Koreas, U.S. Strives to Adjust," sec. A; Tim Shorrock, "A Dangerous Game in Korea," *Nation* 276:3, January 27, 2003, [accessed January 21, 2004], <http://web13.epnet.com>.

¹⁰ Cha, "America and South Korea: The Ambivalent Alliance?" p. 280; Cha, "Anti-Americanism and the U.S. Role in Inter-Korean Relations," pp. 126-127. Also see Balbina Y. Hwang, "Defusing Anti-American Rhetoric in South Korea," *The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder*, No 1619, January 23, 2003, p. 3; Kim, "Changing Inter-Korean Relations and the Impact on the U.S.-ROK Alliance," p. 66.

¹¹ Cha, "America and South Korea: The Ambivalent Alliance?" p. 279; Cha, "Anti-Americanism and the U.S. Role in Inter-Korean Relations," p. 127.

¹² Hwang, "Defusing Anti-American Rhetoric in South Korea," p. 3. Also see Eric Larson and others, *Ambivalent Allies? A Study of South Korean Attitudes Toward the U.S.* (Santa Monica, Calif: RAND Corporation, 2004), p. 13, [accessed August 20, 2004], <http://www.rand.org>.

¹³ Youngshik Bong, "Anti-Americanism and the U.S.-Korea Military Alliance," *Confrontation and Innovation on the Korean Peninsula: Beyond the North Korean Nuclear Crisis*, edited by the Korea Economic Institute (Washington, D.C.: The Korea Economic Institute, 2003), p. 26; Cha, "America and South Korea: The Ambivalent Alliance?" pp. 280-281; Cha, "Anti-Americanism and the U.S. Role in Inter-Korean Relations," p. 127; Kim, "Anti-Americanism in Korea," p. 116; Kim, "Changing Inter-Korean Relations and the Impact on the U.S.-ROK Alliance," 58-59, 64; Eric Larson and others, *Ambivalent Allies?*, pp. 30-31; Lee, "Sources of Anti-Americanism in Korean Society: Implications for Korea-U.S. Relations," p. 219.

¹⁴ Cha, "Anti-Americanism and the U.S. Role in Inter-Korean Relations," p. 127; Chaibong Hahm, "Anti-Americanism, Korean Style," *Korean Attitudes Toward the United States*, David I. Steinberg, ed. (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2005), p. 227; Kim, "Changing Inter-Korean Relations and the Impact on the U.S.-ROK Alliance," p. 65; Moon, "Changing South Korean Perception of the United States Since September 11," p. 51; Eric Larson and others, *Ambivalent Allies?*, p. 31; Lee, "Sources of Anti-Americanism in Korean Society: Implications for Korea-U.S. Relations," p. 214.

¹⁵ Kim, "Anti-Americanism in Korea," p. 112.

¹⁶ Bong, "Ant-Americanism and the U.S.-Korea Military Alliance," pp. 26-28.

¹⁷ Nine universities were selected from Seoul, two from Kyunggi Province, two from Chunchong Province, five from Kyungsang Province, and four from Cholla Province. One major region, Kangwon province, in the northeastern part of South Korea, was not included in this survey. The omission was due to lack of contact (a participating professor in the region could not be found). However, analysis shows very little variance among the four Provinces and Seoul on the question of "what are your feelings toward the U.S.?" The means for each region are: Seoul (7.04), Kyunggi Province (7.21), Cungechong Province (7.05), Kyungsant Porvince (7.46), and Cholla Province (7.25). The means are within the narrow range of 7.04 and 7.46 (on the scale of 1-10).

¹⁸ Cha, "Anti-Americanism and the U.S. Role in Inter-Korean Relations," p. 128; Faiola, "As Tensions Subside Between Two Koreas, U.S. Strives to Adjust," sec. A; Kim, "Changing Inter-Korean Relations and the Impact on the U.S.-ROK Alliance," pp. 70-72.

¹⁹ This question is a modified version of a survey question that appeared in "Hanguksahoe ui gachikwan geupbyeon kwa handon" ("Radical Shift and Confusion in the Values of the Korean Society"), CEO information, no. 397 (Seoul: SERI, 23 April 2003), p. 20, cited in Bong, "Anti-Americanism and the U.S.-Korea Military Alliance," p. 28.

²⁰ Faiola, "As Tensions Subside Between Two Koreas, U.S. Strives to Adjust," sec. A.

²¹ Thomas Omestad, "Crisis? What Crisis?" *U.S. News & World Report* 134:5, February 17, 2003, [accessed January 21, 2004], <http://web13.epnet.com>. Also see Kim, "Changing Inter-Korean Relations and the Impact on the U.S.-ROK Alliance," p. 67.

²² Chung Min Lee, "Revamping the Korean-American Alliance: New Political Forces, Paradigms, and Roles and Missions," *Korean Attitudes Toward the United States*, David I. Steinberg, ed. (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2005), pp. 157-158; Sung-han Kim, "Brothers versus Friends: Inter-Korean Reconciliation and Emerging Anti-Americanism in South Korea," *Korean Attitudes Toward the United States*, David I. Steinberg, ed. (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2005), p. 181; Kim, "Changing Inter-Korean Relations and the Impact on the U.S.-ROK Alliance," p. 67.

²³ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), p. 191. Also see Bong, "Anti-Americanism and the U.S.-Korea Military Alliance," p. 27.

²⁴ Moon, "Changing South Korean Perception of the United States Since September 11," p. 51; Kim, "Anti-Americanism in Korea," p. 114.

²⁵ Moon, "Changing South Korean Perception of the United States Since September 11," p. 49. Also see Omestad, "Crisis? What Crisis?"